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CHAPTER 3 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
(1) STATEMENT OF THE RULE. - 
The good or bad character of a party to a cause is generally a 
matter which is collateral to the main issue, (connected, but sub- 
ordinate to the main issue) and evidence of it is accordingly in 
general inadmissible. 
1 This is as true in Scotland as it is true in 
England, America, and the common law countries of the common-wealth. 
It should however, be noted that this general rule of exclusion, is 
subject to exceptions. What I wish to do just now, is to state the 
rules of admissibility with regard to character evidence, and also 
state the accompanying exceptions where such exist, with a view to 
enabling anyone to understand simply and straight away what the scope 
and limitations of admissibility of character evidence is. In later 
chapters, I will be discussing much more elaborately, the rules that 
might just have to be mentioned briefly here. 
It is only in a relatively few cases that character of a party is 
directly in issue; in the great majority of cases, both civil and 
criminal, character is not itself in issue and must therefore be 
judged solely according to its probative value, if any, in relation 
to the fact in issue. When a person's general character is in issue, 
evidence may of course, be given of his general character, whether in 
civil or criminal proceedings. Thus in a nutshell, the rule is-that, 
where character is not in issue, evidence of a good or bad character 
of a party in a civil or criminal proceeding is generally 
1) Walker and Walker - The Law of Evidence in Scotland, 
0 17; Dick- 
son, Evidence (3rd ed. ) § 6. 
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inadmissible; and on the other hand, where a person's character is in 
issue in a civil or criminal cause, evidence of his general character 
may be given; both rules are subject to exceptions which will shortly 
be discussed. I will like to draw attention to the fact that it is 
the character of the parties to the cause that the rules are 
concerned with and as such does not include the character of 
witnesses, victims or third parties. Suffice to say just now that, 
character of all witnesses who give evidence is relevant, (in both 
civil and criminal causes) and, they may be cross examined as to 
their credit. It should be noted that there are times when a party 
could be a witness, in such cases, the rule that applies as to 
witnesses generally becomes applicable, but it should be made clear 
that the position of the accused in criminal cases is special. 
So starting off with civil cases, all evidence of character, good 
or bad is excluded. This rule of evidence is not doubted in America, 
England or Scotland, and it is also accepted in the common-wealth 
countries where some have enacted it into statute. Section 52 of the 
Indian Evidence Act' states: "In civil cases the fact that the 
character of any person concerned is such as to render probable or 
improbable any conduct imputed to him is irrelevant, except in so far 
as such character appears from facts otherwise relevant". This 
provision is contained word for word in section 66 of the Nigeria 
Evidence Act. 2 Perhaps the discussion of the rule may now devolve on 
a brief explanation and illustration of the above provision since it 
1) Indian Evidence Act, 1872 
2) Nigeria Evidence Act, 1945 
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represents the generally accepted position. No attempt will be made 
to analyse and scrutinise the words of the provision, this and any 
further detailed discussion will have to wait till later. 
So two things are clear. First, in civil cases where the character 
of a party is not in issue, character evidence is inadmissible for 
the purpose of proving or disproving any fact in issue in the case, 
because of its evidential irrelevance, and the rule applies to bad 
and good character alike. Thus, the defendant to a civil action of 
keeping false weights, ' or for the impeachment of a will for fraud, 2 
will not be allowed to assert his good character for the purpose of 
disproving the claim. And secondly, in a civil case where character 
of a party is in issue, or directly relevant to the determinaton of 
the facts in issue in the proceedings, evidence of character of the 
party is admissible. Thus, in a libel action, the question being 
whether a governess was "competent, ladylike and good-tempered", 
while in her employer's service, witnesses were allowed to assert or 
deny her general compentency, good manners and temper. 
3 
And where A 
sued an insurance company for loss sustained by a burglary, to which 
the defence was that the loss was caused by the dishonesty of B, - 
A's servant, evidence was received that B was an associate of bur- 
glars and had entered A's service by means of a forged character. 
4 
in a more limited context, character will always be directly rele- 
vant to the measure of damages in defamation assuming that the issue 
of liability is determined in favour of the plaintiff. What is- 
relevant here, however, is the reputation which the plaintiff may be 
1) Attorney-General V. Bowman (1791) 2 Bos. & P. 532 n. 
2) Goodright, ex dem Faro Hicks (1789) Bull N. P. 296 
3) -Fountain V. Boodle, 3 Q. B. 5; See also Brime V. Bazalgette, 3 Ex. 
692; King V. Waring, 5 Esp. 14; Jones V. James, 18 L. T. 243. 
4) Hurst V. Evans (1917) 1 K. B. 352. 
1 
-- ---- 
-I-- ý- 
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taken as having enjoyed before publication of the defamatory matter, 
and the extent to which his reputation has been affected adversely by 
the defamation. Section 69 of the Nigeria Evidence Act provides: "In 
civil cases, the fact that the character of any person is such as to 
affect the amount of damages which he ought to receive, is relevant". 
This exact provision is contained in section 55 of the Indian 
Evidence Act. 
The rule of evidence as to character in criminal cases, is very 
different from that of the civil proceedings. For instance, evidence 
of the accused good character is always admissible on his behalf in 
criminal courts, whereas as we have seen, same is not true for the 
defendant in civil cases. But while he is free to call evidence of 
his good character, evidence of his bad character would then become 
admissible in rebuttal. But in general, evidence that an accused 
person is of bad character is not admissible against him; the prose- 
cution cannot make evidence of bad character of the accused part of 
its original case. Both of these rules, are clearly stated by Vis- 
count Simon, L. C. in Stirland V. Director of Public Prosecution, 
' 
when he said: "The historical development of the English rule that 
the prosecution in seeking to prove the crime charged may not, gene- 
rally speaking, 'introduce evidence as to the previous bad character 
of the accused, but that the accused may call evidence in support of 
his previous good reputation is difficult to trace...... By the end 
of the eighteenth century evidence of good character was constantly 
1) (1944) 2 AR E. R. at p. 17; see also (1943) 30 Cr. App. R. 40 at 
52-54. 
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admitted". A remarkable instance is provided by the trial of Arthur 
O'Connor1 for high treason in (1798), - where Mr Erskine was one of a 
large number of distinguished persons who testified to the prisoner's 
character for loyalty. Erskine, indeed, in the course of his 
evidence (page 40) stated that with the choice before hint of defen- 
ding Mr O'Connor or of giving evidence as to his good character, he 
chose the latter and the Attorney General, Sir John Scott (page 113) 
told the jury that 'in all doubtful cases character ought to have 
very considerable weight indeed'. Cockburn C. J., in R V. Rowton2 
observes that 'although, logically speaking, it is quite clear that 
an antecedent bad character would form quite as reasonable a ground 
for the presumption and probability of guilt as previous good 
character lays the foundation for the presumption of innocence, yet 
the prosecution cannot go into evidence as to bad character. This 
allowing of evidence of a prisoner's good character to be given has 
grown up from a desire to administer this part of our law with mercy 
as far as possible. It has sprung up from the time when the law was 
according to the common estimation of mankind, severer than it should 
have been'. Section 67 of the Nigeria Evidence Act and section 53 
of the Indian Evidence Act, both state what the common law rule says, 
that: "In criminal proceedings the fact that the person accused is of 
a good character is relevant". 
As we have, seen above, in criminal cases, evidence of an accused 
person's bad character cannot be ordinarily given in evidence against 
him, 3 even though it may seem an attractive proposition to say that 
1) (1798) 27 St. Tr. 31. 
2) (1865) L&C. C. C. R., at p. 530 
3) R V. Lon (1902) 5 C. C. C. 493 (Que. K. B. ); R V. Doyle (1916) 26 
C. C. C. 197 N. S. S. C. ); R V. McLaren (1935) 63 C. C. C. 257 (Alta. C. A. ). 
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someone who has a bad reputation is a person likely to commit 
offences. As a matter of fact, some legal systems, as they obtain on 
the continent permit that line of reasoning which is quite inconsis- 
tent with the common law system of justice. However, whatever the 
courts on the continent may think, this common law rule is widely 
accepted. Section 54 of the Indian Evidence Act states that: "In 
criminal proceedings, the fact that the accused person has a bad 
character is irrelevant, unless evidence has been given that he has a 
good character, in which case it becomes relevant". The Nigerian 
equivalent of this provision appears to state things more 
elaborately. Section 68 of the Evidence Act of Nigeria provides: 
(1) Except as provided in this section, the fact that an accused 
person is of bad character is irrelevant in criminal proceedings. 
(2) The fact that an accused person is of bad character is relevant: 
(a) when the bad character of the accused person is a fact in issue; 
(b) when the accused person has given evidence of his good character 
(3) An accused person may be asked questions to show that he is of 
bad character in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (d) of the 
proviso to section 159.1 
In criminal cases there are a limited number of cases where charac- 
ter is itself in issue, (such cases may be described generally as 
execptions to the rule) and in such cases, this is almost always 
because some aspect of character is an essential element of the 
offence (hence in issue in the case) and so may be proved by*evidence 
1) See equivalent provisions in Section 1 (f), Criminal Evidence Act 
1898; s. 5 (2) Evidence Act, 1908 (New Zealand); ss. 413A &. -413B--of-Crimes 
Act, 1900 - (New South Wales). 
- 514 - 
like any other fact in issue. In R V. Barsalou, 1 Wurtele, J., said: 
"One of these exceptions (ie, exceptions to the rule) is that when 
any act done by any person is either a fact in issue, or is relevant 
to the issue, any fact which supplies a motive for such act is 
relevant, and proof of it is admissible even if such fact should tend 
to affect and damage such person's good character: Stephen's Digest 
of the Law of Evidence, article 7. While-the law does not allow 
evidence of general bad character to be adduced in the first instance 
as a criminative circumstance, whenever it is necessary to prove a 
motive on the part of the defendant to commit the offence charged, it 
is competent to prove particular facts which are of a nature to show 
a motive, even when they may injuriously affect his reputation, and 
the reason is that proof of the existence of a motive is not in 
itself a criminative circumstance but is only a circumstance which 
tends to remove the improbability of the act which has been proved to 
have been done having been done without criminal intent". 
Quite often exceptions to the rule of inadmissibility of evidence 
of bad character in the first instance occur by virtue of statutory 
provisions2 (most important of which have already been discussed 
under similar facts evidence), but there are some other important 
instances which are not statutory. For instance, in indictments for 
rape and other sexual offences of general immoral character of the 
prosecutrix is admissible. 
3 
Other instances that qualify as an exception to the general rule 
includes where the character of places, things or animals is in 
1) (No 2) (1901) 4 C. C. C. 347 (Que. K. B. ). 
2) See s. 21 of the Firearms Act, 1968; s. 99 of The Road Traffic 
Act, 1972; s. 1 of The Street Evidence Act, 1959; s. 4 of The Vagrancy. 
Act, 1824; s. 5 Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871; s. 27 
(3) of The 
Theft Act, 1968. 
3) Cf R V. Clarke (1817) 2 Starkie 241; R V. Jenkins (1945) 31 Cr. 
App. R. 1- See post for further discussion. 
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issue. When the doings of animals are in issue, it is relevant to 
prove its general character, 
l 
or habits of the species, or of the 
particular animals as well as doings of the same, or similar animals 
on other occasions. If it is material to show that at the time of 
an accident that a horse had the habit of shying, instances may be 
proved of such shying both before and after the time of the 
accident 
3 Thus the character of an animal is no less relevant than 
that of a human being as indicating its probable conduct on a 
particular occasion. Similarly, in prosecutions for keeping a bawdy- 
house, 4 or house of ill-fame 
5 it is relevant to prove the character 
of the place., Also the character of the inmates is thought to be 
generally admissible too. However, in prosecutions for keeping a 
bawdy-house or house of ill-fame, or a place of resort for gambling, 
liquor selling or the like, it is often difficult to distinguish 
whether a question of Evidence or a question of Criminal Law is 
involved; and much will depend on the elements of the crime as deter- 
mined by the wording of the statute, applicable and by its judicial 
construction. For example, if it distinctly appears in the statute 
that the repute of the house is the essential criminal fact, so that 
merely to keep a house of that reputation is the defence, then repu- 
tation is a fact in issue, and the reputation may be shown, irrespec- 
tive of the actual character or use of the house. 
6 
But if the actual 
character or use of the house is also or alone an element of the 
crime, then the question of the use of reputation is an evidentiary 
1) See Maggi V. Cutts (1878) 123 Mass. 535 (viciousness of horse); 
Broderick V. Higginson (1897) 169 Mass. 482,48 N. E. 269 
2 See Wigmore, Evidence, § 201. 
3) Todd v. Rowley 8 Allen (Mass. ) 51; See Brown V. Eastern Counties 
By. 22 Q. B. D. 391; 
4) . Atkinson V. Powledge (1936) 123 Fla. 389,167 
So. 4; R V. Their- 
lvnck (1931) 55 C. C. C. 126; R V. West (1950) 96 C. C. C. 3499 5) King 
V. State (1879) 17 Fla. 183v-190. -F)-See King V. State (1879). 17 Fla. 
183 190 - ("ill-fame"; reputation admitted both of the house and the 
individuals who resort to it); Atkinson V. Powled a (1936) 123 Fla. 389, 
167 so. 4 (city ordinance making it a misdemeanour to keep a house "known 
or notoriously reputed", etc, held valid following King V. State). 
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one ie, whether the reputation, as an exception to the hearsay rule 
may be used to evidence the character. 
) 
A house of ill-fame, or bawdy-house, signifies a house commonly 
resorted to or lived in by prostitutes for purposes of prostitution; 
thus, one element in the offence of keeping it may be the kind of 
person resorting to or living in it. Now it is usually understood by 
courts that this element of the crime involves, not merely the actual 
but also the reputed character of these persons as prostitutes, in 
which case their reputed character becomes a fact in issue. 
2 
As amply demonstrated under the discussion of similar facts 
evidence and evidence of similar happenings, the condition or 
character of a place or thing may sometimes be proved by showing the 
dangerous condition for example, of a dock that other drownings had 
occurred thereat. 
3 
In Ship V. King, 
4 
evidence of previous convic- 
tions was admitted to prove the character of a place as a gaming 
house, even though the accused was not found therein. Also, to prove 
the character of a place as disorderly, convictions of former occu- 
piers are receivable though the present one is admittedly 
respectable-5 As pointed out above, a number of other issues under 
this head have been discussed under similar facts evidence in civil 
cases with regards to evidence of similar happenings, and it is not 
necessary to give it a repeat treatment here. 
There are still some other instances when the bad character of a 
person is admissible against him. On a charge of homicide, the bad 
character of the deceased and previous assaults by the latter6 have 
1) See Wigmore, Evidence at § 1620 2) State V. Koettgen (1915) 88 N. J. L. 51,95 Atl 747 (Swayze: "Thieves 
and prostitutes do not gather in a church"; see also U. S. V. Stevens (1833) 4 Cr. C. C. 341.3) Moore V. Ransom, 14 T. L. R. 539 C. A. 4) 
(1949) 95 C. C. C. 143 (Que. C. A. ); R V. Fralkow (1936) 2C. C. C. 42 (Ont. C. A. ) 
5) R V. Mi_skin Higher (1893) 1 Q. B. 275. 
'6) R. V Hopkins 10 Cox. 
229; See post 
been received to show that the prisoner had reasonable grounds for 
apprehending violence. And in America, evidence of the character of, 
and threats by the deceased is admissible on a plea of self-defence "1 
It is pertinent to draw attention to the provisions of Uniform 
Rule 47,2 and the Federal Rules of Evidence (R. D. 1971) 404 
3 both of 
'America. The Uniform Rule 47, states that: "Subject to Rule 48, when 
a trait of a person's character is relevant as tending to prove his 
conduct on a specified occasion, such trait may be proved in the same 
manner as provided by Rule 46, except that (a) evidence of specific 
instances of conduct other than evidence of conviction of a crime 
which tends to prove the trait to be bad shall be inadmissible, and 
(b) in a criminal action evidence of a trait of an accused's 
character as tending to prove his guilt or innocence of the offence 
charged (i) may not be excluded by the judge under Rule 45 if offered 
by the accused to prove his innocence, and (ii) if offered by the 
prosecution to prove his guilt, may be admitted only after the 
accused has introduced evidence of his good character". 
Federal Rules of Evidence, 404 states: "Evidence of a person's 
character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion, except: 
(1)..... evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2)....... evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim 
1) Wi gnore on Evidence, ss. 63,110, (3rd ed. ); See R V. Biggin 
(1920) 1 K. B. 213. 
2) Uniform Rules of Evidence (1953) 
3) Federal Rules of Evidence (America) (1971) 
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of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut 
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3)....... evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in 
rules 607,608 and 609.... Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be. admissi- 
ble for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident". 
I would think that provisions of Uniform Rule 47 appear clearer 
than that of Federal Rules of Evidence 404, though the latter seems 
to cover a much wider scope by its provision, infact its general 
provision is quite applicable to evidence of similar facts, since it 
seems to be more concerned with the use of character as a means to 
prove circumstantially that a person acted in conformity with his 
character in a specific instance. However, by express exception to 
the exclusionary principle of Rule 404, an accused may introduce 
particularly relevant character trait as circumstantial evidence of 
his innocence, and the 'prosecution is then permitted to rebut this 
evidence by introduction of pertinent bad character traits of the 
accused. Additionally, an accused may introduce pertinent evidence 
of the character of the victim, as in support of a claim of self- 
defence to a charge of homicide or consent in a case of rape, and the 
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prosecution may introduce similar evidence in rebuttal. The Rule 
also permits the prosecution to introduce evidence of a character of 
peacefulness of the victim to rebut the defendant's allegation that 
the victim was the first aggressor. It-also prohibits the use of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove the character of a person in 
order to establish guilt circumstantially. Analysed this way, makes 
it much easier to see its congruency with other common law rules 
earlier stated. As I have earlier notified, most of these issues 
will still be considered more elaborately in later discussion. 
(2) EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER OF THE PARTIES IN CIVIL CASES 
Subject to some specific exceptions, it is generally said that the 
character of a party in a civil cause is inadmissible; in other 
words, it cannot be used, as it is used for or against a defendant in 
a criminal case, to indicate the likelihood that the act in issue was 
or was not done. A good illustration of this rule is Attorney- 
General V. Bowman, ,l where it was said that "a defendant to an 
information for keeping false weights was precluded from calling a 
witness as to good character on the ground that the proceedings 
although criminal in form were civil". 
This common law rule of evidence has been enacted into statutory 
provisions in some common-wealth countries. In Nigeria for instance, 
section 66 of the Nigeria Evidence Act2 states that: "In civil cases 
the fact that the character of. any person concerned is such as to 
render probable or improbable any conduct imputed to him is irrele- 
vant, except in so far as such character appears from facts otherwise 
relevant". Section 52 of the India Evidence Act3 contains exactly 
the same provision. It is clear from the provision of the section 
that it deals with the relevancy of character evidence in civil cases 
of the parties involved in the litigation. Since the rule of 
evidence with regard to character of the parties in civil cases is 
adequately and correctly represented by the above provision of the 
Nigeria Evidence Act and its Indian equivalent, it will be worthwhile 
and neccesary to take a closer look at the words of the section for a 
1) (1791), 2 Bos. & P. 532 
2) Nigeria Evidence Act 1945 
3) India Evidence Act 1872 
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proper understanding. Since both relevant sections of the Acts 
contain exactly the same words, I intend whatever interpretation I 
give to be applicable to both; save for the definition of the word 
'character', which has a different meaning in each of the countries. 
The meaning of character under the India Evidence Act is contained in 
the explanation to section 55 of the Act, which states that: "In 
section 52,53,54 and 55, the word 'character' includes both reputa- 
tion and disposition"; while under section 71 of the Nigeria Evidence 
Act, the word 'character' has been given a different meaning following 
the definition given by the majority judgement in R V. Rowton, 
1 to 
the effect that: "In sections 66 to 70, the word 'character' means 
reputation as distinguished from disposition, ..... ". Much more has 
earlier been said about the defintion of the word 'character' and so 
in the meantime, we can consider the other aspects of the interpreta- 
tion of section 52 of the India Evidence Act and section 66 of the 
Nigeria Evidence Act. 
Character we know, may refer to the character of the parties to a 
litigation or the character of thier witnesses. The expression 'any 
person concerned' may include both witnesses and parties, but 
obviously it refers to the parties, in this connection. This section 
does deal with evidence of character, in reference to the parties in 
civil cases, to the effect that, evidence of character, good or bad, 
is generally irrelevant in civil cases, unless character is' of the 
substance in issue. 
2 
1) (1865) L. & C. 520; 169 E. R. 1497 
2) See Lakes V. Buckeye State Mut. Ins. Ass. 110 Ohio App. 168 N. E. 
2d 895 (1959); see also Greenberg V. Aetna Ins. Co. (1967) 427 Pq. 494, 
235 A. 2d 582. 
lb 
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Character is of no value when the issue is whether, a contract was 
entered into or not, or whether there was payment of money or consi- 
deration. In action for seduction the character of the female for 
chastity is directly in issue and may be impeached either by general 
evidence of misconduct or proof of particular acts. When a person's 
general character is in issue, evidence may of course be given of his 
general character, whether in civil or criminal cases. But where 
character is not in issue in any civil case evidence of character 
cannot be given with a view to show that any conduct imputed to him 
is probable or improbable. It is the settled policy of the law to 
reject character evidence of parties in civil cases in proof or 
disproof of any act attributed to him. The rule therefore, is that 
each transaction is to be determined by its own circumstances and not 
by the character of the parties. 
(1) RATIONALE 
The question for us to consider now is, what is the rationale for 
excluding character evidence of the parties in civil cases, and that 
question will be answered shortly, it is worth mentioning that the 
reasons for the exclusion in' civil cases, differ wholly from the 
reasons forbidding the prosecution's use of the character of an 
accused person. The reasons advanced for the exclusion of character 
evidence in civil cases, can be categorised as follows: - 
Firstly it is a common assertion that a party's character is 
usually of no probative value; for example, where the issue is 
whether a contract was made or broken, whether money was paid or 
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property improved by mistake, whether goods were illegally converted 
or a libel published, there is no moral quality in the act alleged, 
or at any rate any' moral quality that may have been present is 
ignored by the law. In some other cases like seduction, such a moral 
quality may appear; but apart from these exceptions, it is either 
non-existent or immaterial. And talking about the rationale for 
exclusion in civil cases generally, the opinion of Martin, B, in 
Attorney General V. Radloff, 
1 comes easily to mind; he said: "In 
criminal cases evidence of the good character of the accused is most 
properly and with good reason admissible in evidence because there is 
a fair and just presumption that a man of good character would not 
commit a crime , But in civil cases such evidence is with equal good 
reason not admitted, because no presumption would fairly arise, in 
the very great proportion of such cases, from the good character of 
the defendant, that he did not commit the breach of contract or of 
civil duty, alleged against him". 
While the above statement deals with the introduction of evidence 
of good character, the same prohibition applies with respect to 
evidence of bad character, 
2 
unless the evidence meets the rigid 
standards relating to the admission of evidence of similar äcts. 
3 In 
Thompson V. Church, 
4 a case 'qui tam' for an assault, the defendant's 
character as a malicious, quarrelsome man was rejeced. And it was 
observed per curiam, that: "The general character is not is issue. 
The business of the court is to try the case, and not the man; and a 
1) (1854) 10 Ex. 84; 23 L. J. Ex. 240; 156 E. R. 366; 
2) See Sinclair V. Ruddell (1906), 3 W. L. R. 532; see also Laid V. 
Taxi Cabs Ltd (1914) 6 O. W. N. 505 (C. A. ) 
3) See Post - Similar Facts Evidence 
4) (1791) 1 Root 312 
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very bad man may have a very righteous cause"; and this I think is 
actually the meat of the reason. 
The second rationale usually given for the exclusion of character 
evidence in civil cases, is a more complex one, termed 'Anxilliary 
policy'; it has been. pointed out by several courts as equally 
sufficient for exclusion. And this concept of 'Anxilliary policy' 
can be best examined in the brief discussion we can give it now, by 
looking at some of the elucidating judicial statements on it. 
Hosner, C. J. in Stow V. Converse, 
2 
observed that: "It is not only 
in contravention of the fundamental. rule that evidence shall be 
confined to the issue, to admit such testimony; but it would be 
infinitely dangerous to the administration of justice. Instead of 
meeting a change of mis-conduct by testimony evincive of not having 
misconducted, general character would become the principle evidence 
in most cases; and he who could throng the court with witnesses to 
establish his reputation in general would shelter himself from the 
wrongs he had perpetrated". In that case, the plaintiff's good 
character was not received to rebut a slander. 
In Wright V. McKee, 
3 Aldis, i., said: "Many considerations concur 
in rejecting such evidence in civil cases. Evidence of this 
character has but a remote bearing as proof to show that wrongful 
acts have or have not been committed; and the mind resorts to it for 
aid only when the other evidence is doubtful and nicely balanced; it 
may then perhaps suffice to turn the wavering scales; very rarely can 
it be of substantial use in getting at the truth. It is uncertain in 
1) See Wigmore On Evidence, § 29 
2) (1820) 3 Conn. 345 
3) (1864) 37 Vt. 163 
its nature both because the true character of a large portion of 
mankind is ascertained with difficulty; and because those who are 
called to testify are reluctant to disparage their neighbours, - 
especially if they are wealthy, influential, popular, or even 
pleasant and obliging. It is mere matter of opinion, and in matters 
of opinion, men are apt to be greatly influenced, by prejudice, 
partisanship or other bias, of which they are unconscious; and in 
cases which are not quite clear they are. apt to agree with, the first 
one who speaks to them on the subject or to form their opinion upon 
the opinions of others. The introduction of such evidence in civil 
cases wherever character is assailed would make trials intolerably 
long and tedious and greatly increase the expense. and delay of 
litigation. It is a kind of evidence that is easily manufactured, is 
liable to abuse, and if in common use in the courts as likely to 
mislead as to guide aright". 
And another good reason for the exclusion of character evidence 
(especially bad character this time) of the parties in civil cases, 
is the argument that, to admit character evidence, would be to 
surprise the parties and to allow to create prejudice or bias for or 
against a person. As Sir James Stephen' put it: "if it had not been 
for the Rules of Evidence, the reputation of half the population of 
the village would have been torn in pieces. The rules of evidence 
kept matter to apoint, and so minimise the evil; but the parties, the 
witnesses, the attornies, all appeared to me to be, one more anxious 
1) Sir James Stephen, (1872), The India Evidence Act, p. 9 
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than another, to- fight the matter out till the very last rag of 
character had been stripped off the back of every man, woman and 
child, whose name was in any way brought into the discussion. The 
French courts display this evil, in an aggravated form". 
While the courts generally appear to exclude character evidence in 
civil cases on the basis of irrelevance, the real rationale from the 
above is the policy to restrain civil proceedings within manageable 
limits and to prevent unfairness to civil litigants, who cannot be 
expected to be prepared to protect themselves against imputations 
which may range over their whole career, without previous notice. 
1 
All these reasons combined seemed to justify the general policy of 
the law of evidence excluding the character of the parties to a civil 
cause when offered to prove or disprove the doing of an act, but, as 
it would soon be revealed, a strict and rigid following of the rule 
has caused some embarrasment to the law itself by giving rise to some 
indefensible decisons; it has become clear that such rules may 
actually constitute a clog, in the form of a barren technicality, in 
the wheel of justice. 
In criminal cases, the exception referred to by Martin, B., was 
introduced at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
2 The 
rationale for allowing this evidence in criminal cases was clearly 
based on its relevance. Thus, in R V. Rowton, 3 Willes J. said: "Such 
evidence is admissible, because it renders it less probable that what 
the prosecution has averred is true, it is strictly relevant to the 
issue..... ". 
1) 13 Halsbury (2nd ed. ) p. 572; See also Edwards et al. V. Ottawa 
River Navigation Co. (1876), 39 U. C. Q. B. 264. 
2) 1 Wigmore On Evidence (3rd ed., '1940), p. 451 
3) 169 E. R. 1497 at 1506 - 
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If the logical relevance of the evidence were the test of 
admissibility, it would be difficult to rationalise its exclusion in 
civil cases and its admission in criminal cases. In tort actions 
such as assault, deceit and negligence, evidence of good character on 
the part of the defendant would appear to be as relevant as the 
evidence of good character of the accused in a criminal case; and 
this is the basis of the debate that has been most fiercely contested 
in the United States. 
To start with, I would think that it may be maintained that the 
reasons of the policy apply in ordinary civil cases only, and that 
where a moral intent is marked and prominent in the nature of the 
issue, the defendant's good moral character should be received as in. 
criminal cases. Such a modification would save us -from such 
appalling decisions as was given in Lester V. Gray, 
1 
where in a suit 
of assault and battery against a physician-by a woman for 
"lasciviously manipulating her person".... "in the course of a 
pretended treatment", the defendant offered his "general good charac- 
ter and high reputation as a physician" but was excluded. To my mind 
this sort of decision can certainly not be justified, as the issue 
clearly involves one of conduct and probably there is in this case a 
special need even beyond that in most cases of charges of crime in 
civil actions, for knowing the character of the defendant. Wigmore, 
2 
in criticising the decision in this case, described it as "an example 
of juristic arteriosclerosis in letting a rule of thumb stiffen into 
1) (1928) 217 Ala. 585,117 So. 211 
2) See ante. 
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inflexibility; such a ruling makes it dangerous for honourable physi- 
cians to treat neurasthenic patients in private". 
However, in Hicker V. Hicker, 
1 in a divorce suit, alleging wife's 
adultery, wife's character for chastity was held admissible on her 
behalf 'to disprove the acts charged'. I think there is argument for 
cases of this nature that makes it necessary for such evidence to be 
made admissible. 
The question one may ask is why some cases that naturally fall 
within the ambit of civil cases should be treated differently; and 
the answer to that question is not far fetched. 
As earlier pointed out, in a special dispensation to criminal 
defendants whose life or liberty were at hazard, the common law 
relaxed its ban upon evidence of character to show conduct to the 
extent of permitting the accused to open the door by producing 
evidence of good character. The question however, is that, should 
the same dispensation be accorded in a civil action, to a party who 
has been charged by his adversary's pleading or proof with a criminal 
offence involving moral turpitude? 
Walworthch J. observed in Townsend V. Gravest that character is 
admissible in cases of 'a crime, of any other act involving moral 
turpitude' if evidenced only 'by circumstantial evidence or by the 
testimony of witnesses of doubtful credit'. 
Most courts seem to argue that the peril of judgement here is less, 
and as such they have declined to pay the price in consumption of 
time and distraction from the issue which the concession entails. 
1) (1899) 158 Ind. 425,55 N. E. 81; 
2) (1832) 3 Paige Ch. 453,455 
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For instance in Goodright V. Hicks 
I 
where a will was impeached for 
fraud, the defendant was not allowed to prove his good character in 
answer; and in Kornec V. Mike Horse Mining..... 
2 in an action for 
assault, the defendant's good reputation for peacefulness was 
excluded. 
Foremost in the cases opposed to this line of rulings is Ruan V. 
Perry; 
3 in that case, the defendant a naval officer had ordered the 
plaintiff's vessel, a neutral, to lie to, and had taken her out of 
her course, by reason of which she was captured by a belligerent 
captain; and the defendant's good character was received because the 
evidence was purely circumstantial. Tompkins J. observed that: "In 
actions of tort and especially charging a defendant with gross depra- 
vity and fraud, upon circumstnaces merely, as was the case here, 
evidence of uniform integrity and good character is oftentimes the 
only testimony which a defendant can Oppose to suspicious circumstan- 
ces". 
In Fowler V. Insurance Co, 
4 
a case involving the defence of fraud, 
in an action on an insurance policy, the plaintiff's good character 
was excluded. Savage C. J., observed to the effect that. "A specific 
fraud is charged that must be met on its merits, unless supported 
only by circumstances, as in the case of Ruan V. Perry..... Every man 
must be answerable for every improper act; and the-character of every 
transaction must be answerable for'every improper act; and the 
character of every transaction must be ascertained by its 
1) (1801) Bull. N. P. 296; 4 Esp. 50 
2) (1947) 120 Mont. 1,180 p. 2d 252 
3) (1805) 3 Caines 120 
4) (1827) 6 Cow. 673 
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circumstances, and not by the character of the parties". The decison 
in this case is based on proof on circumstances only; generally it 
represents the rule with regard to the present discussion. But it 
failed to disapprove of the opinion of Tompkins J., in Ruan V. Perry; 
as a matter of fact it appears to acquiesce. 
However, there is a growing minority of cases, in which the judges 
are impressed with the serious consequences to the party's standing, 
reputation and relationships, which such a charge involving moral 
turpitude, even in a civil action may bring in its train, and have 
chosen to follow the criminal analogy, by permitting the party to 
introduce evidence of his good reputation for the trait involved in 
the charge. In a long and elucidating statement, Start C. J., 
observed in Hein V. Holdridge, 
1 that: "There would seem to be no 
logical reason why the same rule should not apply to civil actions in 
which the defendant is charged with the- crime.... The rule seems to 
be one of practical convenience, for the purpose of avoiding the 
confusion of issues. On principle, however, it would seem that there 
ought to be exceptions to this general rule... In as much as the 
general rule is not based upon any philisophical reason, but is 
merely one of convenience, it ought not to be applied to cases where 
justice to the defendant requires that the inconvenience arising from 
a confusion of the issues should be disregarded, and he-be permitted 
to give evidence of his previous good character, or, in other words, - 
that such evidence ought to be received in a civil action when it is 
of a character to bring it within all of the reasons for admitting 
1) (1900) 78 Minn. 468,81 N. W. 522,523" 
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such evidence in criminal cases. Civil actions for an indecent 
assault, for seduction, and kindred cases, are of this character; for 
such cases are not infrequently mere speculative and blackmailing 
schemes. The consequences to the defendant of a verdict against him 
in such a case are most serious, for the issue as to him involves his 
fortune, his honor, his family. From the very nature of the charge, 
it often happens that an innocent man can only meet the issue by a 
denial of the charge, and proof of his previous good character. 
Ought a defendant in such a caes to be deprived of the right to lay 
before the jury evidence of his previous good character because it 
will tend to confuse the issue, while a defendant in a case where the 
state charges him with a simple assault, involving no more serious 
consequences than the payment, perhaps, of a fine of five dollars, is 
accorded the absolute right to give such evidence? ...... (But the- 
doctrine) ought not to be extended to civil actions where the issue 
relates to a simple assault, or to the fraud, deceit, or negligence 
of the defendant, or to similar actions, for they are not within the 
reasons we have suggested for the admission of evidence of good 
character in exceptional civil actions". 
I would like to make certain observations about his statement, 
especially in the light of subsequent decisions that share part of 
his views. In the first place, he seems to have limited his concern 
for the use of previous good character, to defendants only, while 
many other cases apply it with regards to the plaintiff's. It could 
-5 32 - 
be that Start C. J., actually intends his statement to be applicable 
to both parties to a litigation, even though he seems to have only 
referred to the defendants expressly.. Secondly, he restricted 
instances where he would like to see good character admissible to 
cases of indecent assault, seduction, and kindred cases, and 
excluding cases of simple assault, fraud, deceit and negligence, or 
to similar actions. The thing about a case like this is that there 
are always loose ends. In the first set of limitation where good 
character is admissible, only two categories of cases is mentioned, 
and other cases can easily be fitted into the 'kindred cases'. There 
is also another thing, and that is that even in the other set of 
cases which he does not expect the rule to apply, serious issues of 
moral turpitude can always be read into them, and they too could be 
argued to be just as much "mere speculative and blackmailing 
schemes", especially in cases involving fraud and deceit, and it 
appears to be the view of later decisions. 
For instance in the case of The United States V. Genovese, 
' 
which 
was about the cancellation of naturalisation for fraudulent answers, 
the defendant's good character was said to be admissible as in 
criminal cases. And in Waggoman V. Ft. Worth Well Machinery & Supply 
Co. 2 where the plaintiff sued for false imprisonment and to cancel a 
note for duress; counter claim was brought charging the plaintiff 
with embezzlement. The court held that the plaintiff was properly 
permitted to include evidence of his good character for honesty and 
veracity. However, I think the holding is erroneous, as to the 
1) 133 F. Supp. 820 (D. N. J. 1955) 
2) (1934) 124 Tex. 325,76 S. W. 2d 1005,1006 
latter trait admitted for embezzlement. 
In Hess V. Marianari, 
I 
a case of assault, with claim for punitive 
damages, the court held that since such claim requires finding of 
criminal intent, the defendant is entitled as in criminal cases to 
show his good character for people. And this point was mentioned in 
the later case of Skidmore V. Star Insurance Co., 
2 
which approves the 
majority rule rejecting evidence of character to show conduct in 
civil cases; and it distinguishes the Hess' case on the inadequate 
ground that criminal intent was their material. 
As expected, the tendency has always been to expand the scope of 
the exceptions. Thus we know that when the defendant pleads self- 
defence, he may show the plaintiff's reputation for turbulence if he 
proves it was known to him, on the issue of reasonable apprehension. 
3 
Thus on a charge of homicide, the bad character of the deceased and 
previous assaults by the latter, 
4 have been received to show that the 
prisoner had reasonalbe grounds for apprehending violence. When on a 
plea of self defence or otherwise, there is an issue as to who 
committed the first act of aggression, most courts seem to admit 
evidence of the good or bad reputation of both plaintiff and defen- 
dant for peacefulness, as shedding light on thier probable acts. 
5 
Under these circumstances such evidence throws light upon the inten- 
tion of the accused and the reasonableness of his acts and may tend 
to establish his innocence or the degree of guilt6 
On the whole, the balance of expediency is close one, and so 
1) (1918) 81 W. Va. 500,94 S. E 968.2) (1943) W. Va. 307,27 S. E. 2d 845 
3) See Dingle V. Hickman (1922) 32 Del. 49,119 Atl. 311; Linkhart 
V. Savely (1950) 190 Ore. 484,227'P. 2d 187; Martin V. Estrella, 266 
A. 2d 41 (R. I. 1970). 4) R V. Hopkins, 10 Cox. 299 5) Seee La LiV. 
Skillin (1929) 219 Ala. 228,121 So. 521,64 A. L. R. 1022; Lines rt V. 
Savely, (1950) 190 Ore. 484,227 p. 2d. 6) Field V. State, 47 Ala. 
603. 
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usually when the issue is merely whether the defendant committed the 
act charged, the-court would presumably admit or exclude defendant's 
evidence of good reputation according to their alignment with the 
majority or minority view on the general question as discussed above. 
Greenleaf, 
' 
observed as follows: "And generally in actions of tort, 
where-ever the defendant is charged with fraud from mere circumstan- 
ces evidence of his general good character is admissible to repel 
it"; thus supporting the growing view that if a party if charged with 
fraud or other act involving moral torpitude and the charge is based 
only on circumstantial evidence, he may rebut the charge, by proof of 
good character. But this view is undisputably contrary to the rule 
in civil case and there is also a weight of authority against it; and 
it does not seem to be based upon a recognisable principle of the law 
of evidence as well. 
I would like to, say that I share the view expressed by Start C. J., 
in Hein V. Holdridge. 
3 
1) At s. 54 
2) Henr V. Brown 2 Heisk (Tenn. ) 213; 
3) 1900) 78 Minn. 468,81 N. W. 522,223. 
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(ii) 
EXCEPTIONS: GENERAL 
With respect to the character of parties to a cause Best' observed: 
"The law of England meets the difficulty by making a distinction 
between cases where their character ought to be supposed to be in 
issue and where it ought not. According to the general rule, upon 
the whole probably a just one, it is not competent to give evidence 
of the general character of the parties in forensic proceedings, much 
less of particular facts not in issue in the cause, with a view of 
raising a presumption either favourable to one party or 
disadvantageous to his antagonist. But where the very nature of the 
proceedings is to put in issue the character of any of the parties to 
them, a different rule necessary prevails; and it is not competent to 
give general evidence of the character of the party with reference to 
the issue raised but even to inquire into particular facts tending to 
establish it. Thus in actions for seduction, the character of the 
female for chastity is directly in issue, and may be impeached either 
by general evidence of misconduct or proof of particular acts". 
Thus it is clear as demonstrated above that evidence of character, 
good or bad is generally irrelevant in civil cases unless character 
is of the substance in issue. When a person's general character is 
in issue, evidence may of course be given of his general character, 
but where character is not in isse, evidence of character cannot be 
given. A good example of when a party's character is in issue is the 
example of seduction action given above by Best. And another good 
f 
1) Best On Evidence, Sections 257,258 
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obvious example is that of actions for defamation. On the issue of 
liability, the character of the plaintiff (which is, at the outset, 
presumed rehuttably to be good) will not necessarily be in issue, as 
where the defence is one of privilege or fair comment on a matter of 
public interest; but if the defence is one of justification, at least 
tome aspect of the plaintiff's character, to an extent determinable 
from the pleadings will be the subject of the case. 
' The pleaded 
particulars may be broad enough to put in issue the plaintiff's 
character in every sense, so as to comprise his general reputation, 
his disposition to behave in certain ways or specific incidents of 
his conduct, or they may be limited to one or more aspects of 
character only. 
This principle is by no means confined to defamation and seduction 
cases. For instance in Hurst V. Evans, 
2 
where the defence to an 
action against an insurance company was that the loss was sustained 
by the dishonesty of the plaintiff's servant; it was admissible to 
prove that the servant was a known associate of burglars and had 
entered the plaintiff's service on a forged reference; thereby 
admitting both general and specific evidence of character. 
Lord M'Claren observed in the case of Charles Bern (Bern's 
Executor) V. The Royal Lunatic Asylum of Montrose, 
3 that: "..... in 
the case of actions of slander, and claims of damages for seduction, 
or breach of promise of marriage, the institution of such an action 
always and necessarily puts the character of the pursuer in issue". 
1) Fountain V. Bo odle (1842) 3 Q. B. 5. 
2) (1917) 1 K. B. 352 
3) (1893) 20 R. 859, L. M'Claren at p. 863; see also Hyslop V. 
Miller (1816) 1 Mur. 43 at 49; CVM (1923) S. C. 1 L. P. Clyde at 
p. 4. 
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This statement is as true in Scotland, as it is in the other common 
law countries and America too. So, in a more limited context, 
character will always be directly relevant to the measure of damages, 
assuming that the issue of liability is determined in favour of the 
-plaintiff. Character as affecting damages must rank the most 
significant exception to the general rule in civil cases. 
Though a person's character is not relevant in civil cases to show 
the doing or not doing of an act by him, it is quite clear as 
Wigmore, 1 observed that "..... there are two ways in which character 
may be involved, - one an evidential question, the other not. (1) 
Whether a person's character is evidentiary for any other purpose, 
for example, a wife's character to show that the husband's alienation 
of affection was a natural consequence. (2) Whether a person's 
character is under the legal principles and the pleading of the case 
one of the issues in it e. g., the character of a plaintiff in 
defamation, either as expressly brought in issue by a plea of truth, 
or as issuable in the assessment of damages; the character of an 
employee as involving the employer's liability to a fellow servant 
for the selection of incompetent employees; the character of a hcuse 
charged with being used for immoral traffic; and so on". It is my 
view that the latter part of sections 66 and 52 of the Nigeria and 
India Evidence Acts respectively, adequately covers these exceptions; 
though it is put in limited words, it has wide meanings. "In civil 
cases" it is stated, "the fact that the character of. any person 
concerned is such as to render probable or improbable any conduct 
1) Wigmore On Evidence, § 54 
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imputed to him is irrelevant, EXCEPT in so far as such character 
appears from facts otherwise relevant". 
One issue I would go back to briefly is that of the admissibility 
of evidence of character where justification is pleaded. As already 
pointed out, 
1 the defendant can in support of a plea of justifica- 
tion, adduce evidence both of general and specific acts to prove that 
the alleged defamatory statement is true. The positon was 
undoubtedly reiterated in the case of Maisel V. Financial Times, 
2 
. 
where in an action for libel the plaintiff in his statement of claim 
interpreted the libel by an innuendo which was in substance, (1) the 
words complained of referred to acts dishonestly done by him and (2) 
that he was a man of dishonest character and unfit to be a director. 
Upon this the defendants, the proprietors of the newspaper in which 
the article complained of was published, justified and gave particu- 
lars of other dishonest acts besides those referred to in connection 
with the plaintiff's arrest, by which they sought to establish that 
the plaintiff was a man of dishonest character and unfit to be a 
director by reason of various things he had done or that had occured 
to him. The plaintiff moved to have these particulars struck out; 
the court held that, in as much as by the construction which the 
plaintiff himself had placed upon the libel, the defendants were sued. 
for charging generally that he (the plaintiff) was a dishonest per- 
son, they were entitled to give particulars to show why they said 
that the plaintiff was a dishonest person and the particulars objec- 
1) See Fountain V. Boodle (1842) 3'Q. B. 5; Hurst V. Evans, (1917) 
1 K. B. 352 
2) (1915) 84 L. J. K. B. 2145; 112 L. T. 953; 31 T. L. R. 192. 
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ted to were admissible. In his speech, Lord Loreburn commenting and 
approving the court of appeal judgement said: "Lord Justice Phillmore- 
in his judgement said a few words which he 'would venture to repeat. 
The Lord Justice said: If the libel says of the plaintiff 'You did 
one specific act, you stole a hatchet', it is a fair enough justifi- 
cation to say those words are true in their natural and ordinary 
meaning - 'You did steal it. But if the allegation in the libel is 
an allegation of conduct or life, or character or the coverse thing, 
then it is not enough to say the words are true. You have got to say 
the words are true because the plaintiff has done so and so if the 
imputation is that the plaintiff is a thief, you have got to say it 
is true he is a thief because he stole on this, that, or the other 
occasion, or tried to steal on this, that, or the other occasion, and 
was only prevented by main force or something of that kind". 
This brings us to the question, and that is that, in cases where 
justification is pleaded, why should the defendant be exceptionally 
allowed to use the plaintiff's bad character as evidence of his 
probable guilt, without reciprocating, by allowing the plaintiff to 
give evidence of his own good character. There is something we 
should note, and that is that the present problem must be 
distinguished from the question where the plaintiff's reputation may 
be considered in mitigation of damages. That is different, and in 
such cases the plaintiff is allowed to prove or give evidence of his 
good character; I'll be going into that shortly. A good illustration 
of the present issue is Cornwall V. Richardson, 
1 
where in an action 
1) (1825) Ry & Moo. 305 
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for defamation, evidence of the plaintiff's good character was held 
irrelevant even though justification was pleaded. 
The question to be considered can be hypothetically illustrated 
like this. For instance, where A is said by, B to have been guilty of 
murder or forgery, and in a suit for defamation is met by a plea of 
truth, so that the issue is whether A committed the crime or murder 
or of forgery, it is supposed by some courts that A should be allowed 
to invoke his good character for peacefulness or for honesty, as 
bearing on the probability of his having committed the crime which B 
is trying to prove against him. I would think that it may be unfair 
to disallow such evidence in this circumstances as it is the best 
avenue in such a situation for the plaintiff to prove his innocence. 
There is much reason for assimilating the situation to that of an 
accused person and taking it out of the rule applicable ordinarily; 
not only because the plaintiff is repudiating an accusation of crime, 
but also because an unfavourable outcome affects his character to a 
degree equivalent to a punishment and crime, a significance wholly 
absent after the loss of an ordinary civil suit. Supporting this 
view Mr. Thomas Starkiel said: "Where, indeed, the defendant justi- 
fies the slander which conveys an imputation of dishonesty, the case 
may admit a very different consideration, for there the party is 
charged with a crime, and in such a case character affords the same 
presumption of innocence as if the party had been tried for the 
offence". 
1) Evidence, II, 305, (1824) 
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In Sample V. Wynn, 1 where on a charge of bestiality, the plea of 
truth was made, Nash C. J., said: "the nature of the crime charged 
upon the plaintiff is of the most odious character, the preferring of 
which is calculated to banish the individual charged from the 
ordinary intercourse of his fellowmen, to brand him with an offence 
more odious than that which drove Cain into the wilderness and made 
him a wonderer upon the face of the earth..... the crime charged is 
detestable and there is but one witness to the foul deed. In such a 
case, how can the purest man that lives, shield himself from the 
effects or revenge if not permitted to resort to such evidence? " 
it is clear that subsequent cases have allowed the plaintiff to 
evidence of his good character. For example, in Powel V. Harper, 
2 in 
a libel charging the plaintiff with stolen goods and justification 
was pleaded, the plaintiff's general character for honesty was 
admitted on his behalf. And in Harding V. Brooks, 
3 in a slander 
charging the plaintiff as "a liar, a knave and a rascal" and 
justification was pleaded, the plaintiff's evidence of good character 
was received, in order by "proof of the general tenor of his conduct 
and character to repel such imputations", and it was used to repel 
charges of specific misconducts. 
The usual answer to this line of authorities by those against it is 
that such practice puts the plaintiff in a position relatively too 
favourable, as against the defendant who already has the burden of 
proving his plea of truth. 
1) (1853) 1 Busbee 321 
2) (1833), 5 C. & P. 589 
3) (1827) 5 Pick. 244, see also, Bavington V. Robinson (1915) 127 
Md. 46,95 Atl. 1067 
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(a) CHARACTER AS AFFECTING DAMAGES IN CIVIL CASES 
I would think that it is well settled that character may be 
directly in issue, either on the question of liability or the quantum 
of damages. The causes of action in which this occur, and in which 
the present discussion will be based are (a) Defamation, (b) Breach 
of Promise of Marriage, (c) Seduction and (d) Actions in which 
damages for Adultery are claimed. Strictly speaking, character as 
affecting damages does not properly belong to the Law of Evidence, 
but to the Law of Damages, because character or reputation, is here 
admitted not for rendering probable or improbable the conduct or act 
attributed, but for something else; the object is to ascertain the 
amount of damages by an inquiry into reputation. One question that 
may arise is whether the plaintiff's bad character is relevant in all 
cases in determining the amount of damages; the answer is NO. For 
instance, character will not be relevant in determining the amount of 
damages to be awarded for being bitten by a dog, or for injury caused 
by a railway accident; such cases do not consider the plaintiff's 
character. Before considering the arguments and other finities, I 
will like to consider the general principles. 
In civil cases, good character being presumed may not be proved in 
aggravation of damages; but the party attacked may repel general 
evidence of bad character by general evidence of good character, or 
meet specific acts of impropriety by disproof of such acts though not 
by evidence of general good character. Thus the pursuer as in 
Scotland, is entitled to substantiate his claim for damages by 
1) Jones V. James, 18 L. T. 243; Narracett V. Narracett 33 L. J. P. -& M. 
61 
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proving that he is of good character, and the defender, in order to 
mitigate damages, is entitled to prove the contrary, as Lord Justice- 
Clerk Hope pointed out in M'Neill V. Rev. Gilbert Rorisonl, when he 
said: "As the pursuer put her general character in issue, and led 
evidence in regard to it, it was perfectly understood, and so the 
defendant admitted, that he might have called evidence to show that 
her general character was not what she represented, even although 
such general evidence might have gone to some of the imputations in 
this particular libel". 
So, that the plaintiff under the forgoing doctrine may refute the 
imputations cast on his reputed character, by showing his good 
reputed character is not doubted. But whether he may go into it 
until it has been attacked has been the subject of much difference 
opinion. This divided opinion has resulted in some case of excluding 
good character before attack, 
2 
while some courts admitted it under 
similar circumstances. 
3 The better view seems to be that this 
reputation is assumed to be good and that he has therefore no need to 
sustain it until it has been attacked. In other words a plaintiff 
cannot give evidence of general good character in aggravation of 
damages, unless counterproof has been first offered by the defendant, 
for, until the contrary appears, the presumption of law is already in 
his favour. For instance in an action for seduction, where evidence 
was produced for the defence to prove that the girl had previously 
had a child by another'man, 'Lord Ellenborough-would not allow'"a 
1) (1847) 10 D. 15, L. J. Cl. Hope at 34; L. Moncrieff at pp. 26,27 
2) Buckeye Cotton Oil Co V. Sloan (1918), 6th C. C. A., 250 Fed. 712; 
Draper V. Hellman (1928) C. T. & S. Bank, 203 Cal. 26,263 Pac. 240. 
3) R V. Waring (1803) 5 Esp. 13; Williams V. Greenwade (1835) 3 
Dana 432. 
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question to be asked respecting her general good character for 
chastity, but restricted the plaintiff to the proof that the specific 
charge made by the defendant was false. 
' 
In Plato Films Ltd. and others V. Speidel, 
2 it was decided that in 
an action for libel or slander, although the good character of the 
plaintiff is presumed at the outset, he may, notwithstanding, adduce 
evidence through witnesses other than himself, as to his reputation. 
. 
And the case goes further to give the types of questions which the 
character witnesses may answer as: "'What are you? How long have you 
known him? Have you known him well? Have you had an opportunity of 
observing his conduct? What character has he borne during that time 
for honesty, morality or loyalty (according to the nature of the 
case)? As far as you know, has he deserved that character? '"3 A 
character witness called by the plaintiff cannot, however, be asked 
questions in examination-in-chief about particular facts to 
illustrate the plaintiff's good behaviour. In cross-examination, 
however, the witness may be asked about particular facts known to him 
in order to test the grounds of his belief. 
4 
Bad character is admissible in chief in mitigation of damages, in 
defamation cases, provided that it would not, if pleaded, amount to a 
justification. 
5 Originally, early English rulings were all inclined 
to admit bad repute, under the general issue, in mitigation6 as 
stated above, but then came a series of rulings excluding it. 
7 How- 
ever, subsequently, the earlier line of rulings was restored8 and 
such evidence became admissible again. "Stephen extends this to all 
1) Bamfield V. Massey, 1 Camp. 460 
2) (1961) All E. R. 876 
3) Plato Films Ltd & Ors. V. Seidel (1961) 1 All E. R. 876 at 889, 
4) Ibid 
5)" Watt V. Watt (1905) A. C. 115,118" 
6) Dennis V. Pawling (1716) Vin. Abr. 'Evidence', I b, 16 (xii, 159); 
Knobell V. Fuller (1908) Peake, Add. Cas. 139, Lord Kenyon, C. J., Leic- 
ester V. Walter (1809) 2 Camp. 251; Williams V. Callender (1810) Holt 
N. P. 307; Snowdon V. Smith (1811) 1 M&S. 286 7) Jones V. Stevens 
(1822) 11 Price 235; Brace irdle V. Bailey (1859) 1 F. & F. 536. 
8) Scott V. Sampson (1882 L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 491. 
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civil cases, 
' but this seems unsuitable; and Taylor2 confines it to a 
actions for defamation, seduction, breach of promise and for damages 
for adultery, of which only the first survives today". 
3 In Scotland, 
evidence of bad character in mitigation of damages seems to be admis- 
sible in all civil cases. However, as Phipson4 himself realises, 
this "point is, ..... of less importance now, since the person whose 
character is assailed may, if called as a witness, be asked as to 
such facts, even where amounting to a justifiction, on cross-examina- 
tion to credit, 
5 
unless, indeed, he has been called by the opposite 
side, 
6 or has merely been put into the box for cross-examination 
without. having been asked any question in chief. The judge must, 
however, explain to the jury the effect of the evidence and the 
nature of the issues that they have to try". 
8 
One question that arises is that, where a plaintiff's bad character 
is admitted in mitigation of damages, is it the general bad 
character, or character for the particular trait - specific acts - 
that should be used? The House of Lords in Plato Films Ltd. V. 
Speidel, 
9 
appears to favour the view that only evidence of general 
bad character should be admitted. It is however clear, whatever view 
one holds, that the adduced evidence must relate to the "segment-of 
the plaintiff's life to which the defamation relates. I am strongly 
attracted by a passage in Lord Ratcliffe's speech in Plato Films Ltd. 
V. Speidel, in which he dissented from the reasoning of the other 
members of the House of Lords. He said: "These considerations lead 
1) Art. 57. . 
2) Taylor On Evidence, s. 356 
3) Phipson On Evidence (12th ed. ) § 543. 
4) See Ibid 
5) Watt V. Watt (1905) A. C. 115; R V. Perryman, 112 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 
655-656; Sievier V. Duke,,. the Times, May 7,1904 
6) Scott V. Sampson, 8 Q. B. D. 491 
7) Bracegirdle V. Bailey, 1F&F. 536 8) Scott V. Sampson, 8 Q. B. D. 
491; Wood V. Cox, 4 T. L. R. 652,655; Plato Films Ltd V. SS a (1961) 
A. C. 1090 (H. L. ) which overruled Wood V. Durham (188) 21 Q<. B. D. 501 
9) (1961) A. C. 1090 
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me to the opinion that it would be wrong to hold that general 
evidence of reputation, which must mean reputation in that sector of 
a plaintiff's life that has relevance to the libel complained of, 
cannot include evidence citing particular incidents, if they are of 
sufficient notoriety to be likely to contribute to his current 
reputation. Such incidents are, after all, the basic material upon 
which the reputation rests, and I cannot see the advantage to anyone 
of excluding the better form of evidence in favour of the worse. It 
remains true that the issue is not whether the incidents actually 
happened but whether it is common report that they did. If it is, 
that seems to me to be the best available evidence of a plaintiff's 
reputation. I find it difficult to combine an aversion from rumour 
with an indulgence for general evidence of reputation which, 
unvouched, is virtually the same thing". 
Without going into the plausibility of his last sentence, one thing 
is clear, and that is that, there are arguments, for the use of 
eivdence of specific acts, and these arguments date back a long time. 
In Steinman V. McWilliams, 
' it was argued that general character 
alone should be considered. Coulter, J., observed as follows: "Can 
evidence of seperate and particular departments of character be 
lawfully allowed? ..... How is character estimated? Certainly by, its 
general import. It will not do to take up the Decalogue and inquire 
whether a man is generally represented as addicted to fornication or 
adultery, to profane swearing, sabbath-breaking.... If this mode of 
destroying character was allowed in courts, the standing of all men 
1) (1847) 6 Pa. St. 175 
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would be in peril. We have but few_ catos among us; and if we had 
more, such individuals would hardly seek redress in our courts. But 
the law is not for the protection of such men, but for the protection 
of that middle class all the world over, who have a sense of truth, 
honour and virtue, and who are yet not above the infirmities of life; 
whose sensibility as to the value of character and whose liability to 
err, make them more susceptible of wounds from the shaft of slander. 
The thousands of wagging tongues of this world sometimes in sport and 
sometimes in malice make free with some department or quality, of 
character of good men in the main; and if malice were allowed, to 
seize hold of these reports and embody, them in a court of justice to 
destroy character, few men would be safe. The truth is that it is 
only in general character that a man find his true level in society; 
and that alone ought to mark his value". 
In reply by those who would like to admit both evidence of specific 
acts, and general character, it is argued as evidenced in the speech 
of Strong, J., in Conroe V. Conroe, 
1 that: "A man may have many 
virtues and consequently a good reputation, and yet be notorious for 
a single vice. If this virtues be called in question, it is an 
inquiry; but if only his vice be 'asserted, his injury is less.... 
(the plaintiff's) averment is not that her reputation for all the 
virtues which go to make up good character is fair, but that her 
reputation for chastity was sound; and it is-that, she complains has 
been taken from her. Its real value was therefore a proper subject 
1) (1864) 47 Pa. 202 
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of inquiry". 
Lastly, the argument that the reputation for the particular trait 
alone should be considered is set forth by Lyon, J., in Wilson V. 
Noonanl: "It is said that a person who brings such an action puts his 
reputation in issue; but it seems to be more accurate to say that he 
thereby puts it in issue in the particular wherein he claims that it 
has been assailed. Human reputation is complex in its nature. 
Because a man has a single vice, or even more than a single vice, it 
does not follow from that circumstance that he is totally 
depraved.... He may be an incorrigible liar, and yet strictly honest 
in all his dealings. He may be a great scoundrel in pecuniary 
matters, and yet perfectly chaste..... where a person's character for 
truth and veracity is falsely assailed, and he brings his action 
against the assailant to recover damages therefore, if his reputation 
for truth and veractiy is good, on what sound principle can it be 
said that if such plaintiff is unchaste, or dishonest in business 
matters, or coveteous, profane, or a sabbath-breaker, the damages to 
which he would otherwise be entitled shall be reduced to a normal 
sum? " 
Having seen what the different arguments are, I don't think that 
the exclusive admissibility of general character should be encouraged 
even though the House of Lords seemed to have approved of it in Plato 
Films Ltd. V. S eP idel2; and at the same time, I would not support an 
exclusive admissibility of specific acts. I would like to think that 
in mitigation of damages both evidence of general character and 
1) (1871) 27 Wis. 614 
2) (1961) A. C. 1090 (H. L. ) 
specific acts of the plaintiff should be admitted and there are a 
number of cases in support of this. For instance, it has been held 
that in an action for seduction, the defendant may adduce evidence of 
general reputation for immorality and of specific acts on the part of 
the person seduced, committed prior but not subsequent to the act 
complained of. 
' The reason is that subsequent acts may have been 
brought about by the defendants own misconduct. 
2 
And in actions for 
criminal conversation, alienation of affections and enticement, the 
wife's general moral character and previous acts of adultery (not 
subsequent acts for the same reason as in seduction cases) may be 
proved by the defendant. 
3 And in Jones V. James, 4 - an action for 
breach of promise to marry - the defendant pleaded a general charge 
of immorality and not merely specific acts of misconduct against the, 
plaintiff. it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to give 
general evidence of good character for modesty and propriety for 
demeanour. But for the general allegation of immorality, it appears 
such evidence cannot be given by the plaintiff in the first instance, 
presumably on the theory that the plaintiff's character is not in 
issue unless the defendant attacks it. The defendant on the other 
hand can adduce general - evidence of bad character and specific acts 
of immorality- 
5 
It is worth knowing that in Scotland there is a practice that, even 
when evidence as to character or reputation is held admissible, 
evidence of specific criminal or immoral acts may be disallowed on 
1) Elsam V. Faucett (1856), 2 Esp. 562; Winter V. Henn (1831) 4C&P. 
494; see also McCready V. Grundy (1876) 39 U. C. Q. B. 13 6. 
2) PhIpson 
3) Bromley V. Wallace (1803) 4 Esp. 237 - 
4) (1868) 18 L. T. 243 
5) Foulkes V. Selway (1801) Esp. 236 
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the practical ground of inexpediency. 
) 
A person of bad character cannot claim the same amount of damages 
as a person of good reputation, this to me is the normal dictate of 
fairness, and as such evidence tending to increase or diminish 
damages should be admissilbe, though not expressly involved in the 
issue. However, legal problems are not as straightforward as the 
dictates of common sense, so this particular subject had not been 
without its own controversy and healthy arguments for and against. 
We can best illustrate the problem through a hypothetical situation; 
For example, where A sues B for defamation, and the issue is as to 
the proper amount of compensation, the question then arises whether 
it is fair to measure his compensation by the quality of his original 
actual standing in the community, and, in particular, whether the 
fact that he had little or no reputation to loose may be considered 
as good reason for diminishing the damages accordingly. 
As earlier pointed out, the question here is not that of the Law of 
Evidence, that is, character or reputation for character is not 
offered as having probative value to evidence the probability of 
something else. What is actually involved here is a principle of the 
Law of Damages, i. e., whether compensation should be regulated accor- 
ding to a certain fact, namely, quality of'reputation; if yes, repu- 
tation becomes material; if no reputation is immaterial, and will not 
be considered. In this connection however, it is more accurate to 
speak of 'reputed character' than of 'character', because it is less 
of reputation than less of character for which damages are claimed; 
1) See CYM. (1923) S. C. 1 L. P. Clyde at p. 4; see also H v. P (1905) 
8 F. 232, Lord President Dune-din; A V. B (1895) 22 R. 402, Lord Presi- 
dent Robertson at 404.. 
and futhermore, that this reputation is not offered evidentialy, but 
as an element brought into issue by the law of the case. A good 
illustration of the facts above is well passaged by Lord President 
(Clyde) in C V. M, 1 when he said: "In this case the pursuer asks for 
damages in respect of the harm done to her character by a slanderous 
statement alleged to have been made concerning her by the defender. 
It necessarily follows that she puts her character in issue; and 
therefore it is a relevant defence against her claim of damages to 
aver and prove that her character is such that it has not suffered 
any damage by the statement complained of. The point of such a 
defence is not that she is a bad character, but that she has a bad 
character. Accordingly, it appears to me that the amendment which 
the defender now proposes on answer 2, to the effect that 'the pur- 
suer is well known in the neighbourhood in which she resides 'as a 
person of loose and immoral character, and she has suffered no 
damages as the result of the defender's statement, ' is relevant and 
should be admitted. This amendment will provide sufficient basis for 
evidence to the effect that the pursuer's reputation was a bad one, 
and has suffered either no damage, or, at any rate, not as much 
damage as might otherwise'have been the case". 
This whole subject of the amount of damages is simply but 
adequately covered under the India Law of Evidence and Nigeria Law of 
23 
Evidence by sections 55 and 69 of the respective Evidence Acts 
which incidentally contain same wordings, as follows: "In civil cases 
1) (1923) S. C. 1 at 4 
2) (1872) India Evidence Act 
3) (1945) Nigeria Evidence Act 
the fact that the character of any person is such as to affect the 
amount of damages which he ought to receive, is relevant". Before 
going further into an explanation of the above provision, one may 
want to know about how the rule has been operating in England, from 
which the statutes have their origin. 
In England, as earlier indicated, there was a divison of opinion as 
to whether in an action for defamation, the defendant may use the 
plaintiff's poor reputation or lack of reputation to mitigate the 
damages. The arguments on each side are strong, and so, it should be 
no surprise that this has been one of the most controverted questions 
in the whole law; and the balance of convenience is so clear, accor- 
ding to the point of view, taken, that it is no wonder that courts 
have taken radically opposite views. The earlier English rulings 
were all inclined to admit bad character under the general issue, in 
mitigation. And a taste of the argument in favour of considering 
reputation can be found in view expressed by Mr. Holt, 
1 he remarked 
that: "The ground of the action on the case for a libel is the 
'quantum' of injurious damage which the person libelled either has or 
may be presumed to have sustained from the libellous matter... (Thus) 
the reputation cannot be said to be injured where it was before 
destroyed. The plaintiff has previously extinguished his own charac- 
ter. He has therefore no basis for an action to recover compensation 
for the lcSS character and its consequential damage. The law consi- 
ders him as bringing an action of damage to a thing which does not 
exist". 
1) Holt's N. P. 308 
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Nolt, J., in Buford V. M'Lunyl expressed a similar view when he 
said: " In every action at law the object is to recover reparation 
for some injury sustained. And where the injury is to property, the 
value of the article is the principal object of inquiry. And I can 
see no good reason why the value of character may not be investigated 
as well as that of any other commodity, when the reparation of chara- 
cter is the object of this suit... It is said it would be taking a 
person by surprise thus to permit an inquiry into his character. But 
if the character of a witness, who is called upon in court and 
compelled to give evidence without any previous notice, is not 
shielded from such an attack, how much less ought a party who has 
voluntarly brought his character into court claim such an exemption? 
He commences with stating that he is a person of good name, fame and 
reputation, and he ought to be always prepared to defend his allega- 
tion. A person is presumed to be always prepared to defend his 
general character, if he has a good one; if he has not, it ought to 
be exposed.... I hold that a woman ought not to be taken from the 
stews and brothels of a town, to be placed alongside the most respec- 
table ladies who equally adorn out drawing-rooms and our churches; 
nor that the high priest of vice and corruption should be ranked with 
the pious priest of the parish or the respectable bishop of the 
diocese. Where a person's character is such that'he cannot safely 
trust it to a court and jury, slander can do him but little injury; 
and a person who is neither ashamed nor afraid to expose his charac- 
ter to the eye of the public ought not to be permitted to shelter it 
under the forms of law from the eye of a jury". 
1) (1818) 1 Nott & M. 269 
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There were many other cases that were decided along this line. 
' 
However, then came the series of rulings in which such evidence was 
excluded, and the opposing argument lays stress on the abuses to 
which the use of such evidence is open. 
Livingston, J., in Foot V. Tracy, 2 presented his opposition in the 
following argument: "I am now satisfied that more mischief will 
follow from an adoption of such a rule than by excluding the investi- 
gation altogether except when presented as a complete justification 
in the form of a special plea.... It is answered that a person of 
bad fame has no right to bring a suit, or if he does, that he cannot 
expect the same compensation as those who have a character to lose. 
But no one, however low a man's reputation may be, has a right to 
publish slanders of him, or to charge him with crime of which he is 
innocent. If he confines himself to the truth, he can plead it; but 
if he will deal in general invective, or indulge his wit and venom by 
travelling out of the record, he must abide by the consequence. 
Nothing is better settled than that the truth of a libel or slander 
cannot be relied on in justification, unless pleaded. What is not 
permitted, then directly, ought not to be tolerated in any other 
way... (This result) will only impose on those who choose to publish 
their animardversions on the crimes or failings of others, which 
occupy so great a portion of our public papers, the task of proving 
by particular facts the truth of what they assert. Nor is there any 
hardship in this. Those who sport with the feelings of others, under 
the professions of zeal for the public good, on no other basis than 
1) Anon V. Moor. (1813) 1M&S. 284; Leicester V. Walter (1809) 
2 Camp. 251.2) 
(1806) 1 Johns. 46 
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that of common fame, which is not always an infallible guide, cannot 
complain if courts require from them, on these as on most other 
occasions, some better proof of their calumnies than general opinion. 
If every man who does not enjoy an unblemished reputation, or has the 
-ý 
misfortune to be disesteemed by his neighbours, were fair game, in a 
country where the liberty of the press- is so much perverted and 
abused, few indeed would escape". 
Similar vigorous arguments are contained in the dissenting judge- 
ment of Cheves, J., in Buford V. McLuny. 
1 He marshalled his argument 
in numbers thus: "(1) It is alleged that the pleadings put the chara- 
cter of the plaintiff in issue. Now it is not true, in point of law, 
that the character of the plaintiff is put in issue... (Since a plea 
denying the allegation would be demurrable). (2) But it is said that 
the foundation of the damages given in actions of slander is the 
actual injury suffered by the plaintiff in his character. This is 
not true; it is upon the presumption of loss (little more than a 
legal fiction) and not upon the actual loss, that actions of slander 
are principally founded...... Are not the heaviest damages given 
when the slander is uttered against unsullied and impregnable charac- 
ter, - where the malice of the calumniator has been shot 'like a 
pointless arrow from a broken bow'? To the tottering and question- 
able character, the shafts of the slanderer are fatal and ruinous, 
.... o in such cases we 
know that the damages are usually nominal, 
though the injury is immeasurable and intolerable. Is it not, then, 
1) (1818) 1 Nott. & M. 272 
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amusing ourselves with a phantom, when we suppose that the actual 
loss sustained by the sufferer is the real foundation of damages in 
actions of slander? There must be other higher principles on which 
they are founded. Is it not obvious that the foundation of these 
damages is to be discovered in the general sanctity of character, 
which is considered as a sheild, not against the irreparable injury 
only, but against every possible assault upon the hallowed blessing 
of a good name? Even the wicked and the worthless are allowed this 
protection, as the infidel was once permitted to enter the christian 
sanctuary..... Ought (the defendant) not to be subjected to heavier 
penalties for thus oppressing the fallen, perhaps the broken-hearted 
and repentant and reforming offender; than if he had, with equal 
malice but with meaness, attacked the highest and most irreproachable 
man in the community? I should say he ought. (3) But if the 
admission of this evidence were clear, according to. analogy and 
theory, it ought to be rejected in practice from its immateriality to 
a fair defence, and from the abuses of which it will be susceptible. 
It is immaterial, because, as far as such a cause should operate, it 
has its full influence (and too much) through the knowledge of the 
jury.... It is susceptible to the greatest abuses. The person, not 
of unblemished reputation, must suffer every calumny that the tongue 
can utter, in silence; for if he seeks redress against any specific 
slander, he must suffer the defects of his character to be exhibited 
and proclaimed in a court of justice by as many witnesses as the 
fears or malice of the defendant may choose to call. A man laboring 
under a neighbourhood calumny, though perfectly innocent, must be the 
victim of every specific slander that may be uttered against him. He 
dare not enter the portals of a court of justice, or he will be 
doomed to eternal infamy by a thousand tongues". 
This viewpoint was unanimously supported in Jones V. Stevens, 1 when 
in a case of slander, charging the plaintiff with being a disreput- 
able and unprofessional attorney; testimony to his general bad chara- 
cter and reputation as an attorney was held inadmissible under the 
general issue. Graham, B. remarked that: "There is a full concur- 
rence of opinion amongst the whole court that such general evidence 
of bad character is not admissible, ... and that principally on the 
grounds that a party cannot be expected to be prepared to rebut it, 
and that, if it were to be received, any man might fall a victim to a 
combination made to ruin his reputation and good name, even by means 
of the very action which he should bring to free himself from the 
effects of malicious slander". And Garrow, B., in his own judgement 
made an observation that: "If ever it should (become the law that 
such evidence should be adissible), the libeller will become a much 
more general character than we find now; for he will derive protec- 
tion and impunity from the apprehension and dread, with which the 
object of his malice would* naturally be possessed, of resorting for 
redr. ess, to courts of justice to vindicate his name, where it would 
be permitted to the defendant to bring* forward testimony of general 
bad character which from its nature it would be impossible to dis- 
1) (1822) 11 Price 235,256,269 
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prove; whereby they in effect become the means of putting the libels 
of which they complain on the records of the courts of giving a wider 
circulation to the calumnies contained in them". 
From these arguments, both for and against, it is obvious as ear- 
lier observed that the balance of convenience is so clear according 
to the point of view taken, and considering the views expressed by 
those who are for the exclusion, one cannot fail to appreciate some 
of the many interesting points made; they are certainly arguments 
that cannot in anyway be ignored. However, subsequent doctrine 
looks upon the earlier line as better or probably fairer and so 
receives such evidence, and this class of "decisions is championed by 
the argument put forward by Cave, J., in Scott V. Sampson. He said: 
"Speaking generally, the law recognises in every man a right to have 
the estimation in which he stands in the opinion of others unaffected 
by false statements to his discredit, and if such false statements 
are made without lawful excuse, and damage results to the person of 
whom they are made, he has a right of action. The damage, however, 
which he has sustained must depend almost entirely on the estimation 
in which he was previously held. fie complains of an injury to his 
reputation, and seeks to recover damage for that injury; and it seems 
most material that the jury who have to award those damages should 
know, if the fact is so, that he is a man of no reputation. 'To deny 
this would, ' as is observed in Starkie on Evidence, 'be to decide 
that a man of the worst character is entitled to the same measure of 
damages with one of unsullied and unblemished reputation. A reputed 
1) (1882) L. P.. aQ. B. D. 491 
- 559 - 
thief would be placed on the same footing with the most honourable 
merchant, a virtuous woman with the most abandoned prostitute. To 
enable the jury to estimate the probable quantity of injury sus- 
tained, a knowledge of the party's previous character is not only 
material but seems to be absolutely essential'. It is said that the 
admission of such evidence will be a hardship upon the plaintiff, who 
may not be prepared to rebut it; and under the former practice where 
the damages could not be pleaded to, and general evidence of bad 
character was allowed to be given under a plea of not guilty, there 
was something in the objection, which, however, is removed under the 
present system of pleading, which requires that all material facts 
shall be pleaded; and a plaintiff who has notice that general 
evidence of bad character will be adduced against him, can have no 
difficulty whatever, if he is a man of good character, in coming 
prepared with friends who have known him to prove that his reputation 
has been good". This line of reasoning represents the present law 
not only in England but in other common law countries too, and it 
appears that the main gist in this argument is that a person should 
not be paid for the loss of that which he never had. 
I will now like to consider briefly the relevant provisions of the 
India and Nigeria Law of Evidence. Sections 55 and 69 of the India 
and Nigeria Law of Evidence, respectively provide exactly the same, as 
follows: "In civil cases the fact that the character of any person is 
such as to affect the amount of damages which he ought to receive is 
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relevant". 
The provision above makes relevant only the character of the person 
claiming damages and not the other party - (the defendant); the 
character of the latter may also sometimes be relevant for 
determining the amount of damages. In an action of damages for 
defamation, evidence that the defendant was maliciously reckless for 
pure personal monetary gains is quite relevant in determining the 
quantum of damages; against him. However on the other hand, in 
action of damages for rape, evidence that the defender was a man of 
brutal and licentious disposition was held irrelevant. 
' And evidence 
regarding the defender's character has been held irrelevant in 
actions of damages for assault; wrongous imprisonment; breach of 
23 
contract; 
4 and in actions for seduction for a testamentary deed on 
the ground of facility, circumvention and fraud. 
5 
I suppose it is worth mentioning generally that the class of suits 
in which damages are claimable and the amount of damages that are 
appropriate in different kinds of suits, are regulated by the laws 
under which such suits are brought. The damages awarded upon viola- 
tions of a right are a remedy prescribed by the substantive law, and 
the kind of facts admissible in actions for damages vary according to 
the nature of the actions; is it for seduction, or breach of promise 
of marriage, or defamation, or adultery, and so on. 
So under the English law, in an action for damages on account of 
adultery, or for seduction of wife or daughter evidence of general bad 
character of the wife or daughter or particular acts of immorality or 
1) A V. B (1895) R. 402 
2) See Haddawa V. Goddard (1816) 1 Mur. 148 at 151 
3) Simpson V. Liddle (1821) 2 Mur. 579 at 580 
4) Kitchen V. Fisher (1821) 2 Mur. 584 at 591. 
5) Clarke V. Spence (1825) 3 Mur. 450 
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indecorum is admissible in mitigation of damages. 
1 And in such cases 
what is really sought is compensation for the pain which the plain- 
tiff had to suffer for disgracing his family and ruining his domestic 
happiness and so the damages should be commensurate with the pain 
which will vary according as the character of the wife or daughter 
has been previously unblemished or profligate. 
In Hamlin V. Great Northern Railway Co, 2 it was observed as 
follows: "Generally speaking, the rule is this, in the case of a 
wrong, the damages are entirely with the jury, and they are at 
liberty to take into consideration the injury to the party's feelings 
and pain he has experienced as for instance, the extent of violence 
in an action of assault and many topics, and many elements of damage 
find place in an action for tort or wrong of any kind, which 
certainly have no place whatever in an ordinary action on contract". 
I would like to point out however, that such evidence is actually not 
admissible under section 55 or 69 of the India and Nigeria Law of 
Evidence respectively; but they are certainly admissible under other 
sections, e. g. the provision of section 12 of the India Evidence Act 
and its Nigerian equivalent, section 13. Section 12 of the India 
Evidence Act states- that: "", In suits in which damages are claimed, any 
fact which will enable the court to determine the amount of damages 
which ought to be awarded is relevant". - 
Aýsimilar provision is contained in section 13 of the Nigeria 
Evidence Act which states that "In proceedings in which damages are 
1) Verry V. Watkins, 7 C. & P. 308 
2) 1 H. & N. 408; 26 L. J. Ex. 20 
claimed, any fact which will enable the court to determine the amount 
of damages which ought to be awarded is relevant". 
In actions for breach of promise to marry, the bad character of the 
plaintiff is clearly in issue. In an action of breach of promise of 
marriage the quantum of damages will be influenced by the amount of 
pain and injury to feeling caused to the plaintiff, but this in turn 
is dependent on the actual bad character of the plaintiff as to 
chastity, which may infact be used as an excuse too, for terminating 
the contract, - it is very material. 
' Also, if the plaintiff has 
been guilty of criminal intercourse with another, and such fact is 
unknown to the defendant at the time of the contract, he may prove it 
as a defence. The same is true if without his fault she becomes 
unchaste after the promise and if without the fault of the defendant, 
the plaintiff by her subsequent indelicate conduct injures her repu- 
tation, this may be shown in mitigation of damages. 
It is also relevant in an action of breach of promise of marriage, 
to prove as a defence to the action that, unknown to the defender, 
the pursuer has had an illegitimate child, because on"discovering 
the fact the defender may resile from the engagement. 
2 But he would 
not be able to resile if he had always been in knowledge of her 
illegitimate child, I mean if she had intimated him with that fact 
and he still subsequently got engaged to her in clear knowledge of 
the facts as they were. If the woman had been seduced first under 
promise of marriage, the defendant cannot be heard to prove her bad 
character. In an action for seduction, evidence of the bad 
1) Foulkes V. Sellwa ,3 Esp. 236 
2) Fletcher V. Grant (1878) 6 R. 59; Brodie V. Macgregor (1900) 8 
S. L. T. 86 
3) Walker V. Mclsaac (1857) 19 D. 340 
character of the person seduced is admissible in reduction of 
damages, but the evidence must refer to a time prior to the 
seduction; 
l 
and in such actions one element of damage is the wounded 
sensibility of the injured party and another is the loss of society 
of the daughter or wife; both should affect quantum of damages. 
In libel cases, general evidence of plaintiff's bad character is 
controlled by the provision of r. 37 of Or. 36, R. S. C. (Rules of 
Supreme court) which runs thus: "In actions for libel or slander, in 
which the defendant does not by his defence assert the truth of the 
statement complained of, the defendant shall not be entitled on the 
trial to give evidence in chief, with a view to mitigation of dam- 
ages, as to the circumstances under which the libel or slander was 
published, or as to the character of the plaintiff, without the leave 
of the judge, unless seven days at least before the trial he furni- 
shes particulars to the plaintiff of the matters as to which he 
intends to give evidence". 
2 
Save for the use of the word 'is', 
instead of 'shall' as in r. 37 of Ord. 36, R. S. C., this rule is 
reproduced in section 70 of the Nigeria Evidence Act, word for word. 
In Hobbs V. Tinling, 
3 
the defendants did not justify but gave notice 
of facts in mitigation, under Order 36, r. 37 (now Order 82, r. 7). 
The plaintiff, when giving evidence in chief, deposed without objec- 
tion not only to his general good reputation, but also to specific 
facts from which his good reputation could be inferred. He was 
cross-examined as to specific incidents not mentioned either in the 
1) Verry V. Watkins, 7C&P. 308 
2) Now Ord. 82 rule 7 
3) (1929) 2 K. B. 1 
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alleged libel or in the particulars given in the notice. It was held 
that the cross-examination was admissible as going to credit, ie, to 
shake the witness's credibility as to other matters deposed to by 
him, but not in mitigation of damages, and consequently no evidence 
was admissible to rebut his denials. 
In Scotland, there is a practice which application is similar to 
the requirement of r. 37 of Or. 36, though not exactly the same as the 
7 day limit is not required. A few cases would illustrate the 
practice, which simply is that the defender may not prove the truth 
of the slander complained of, even in mitigation of damages, without 
a plea and counter issue of veritas. In Andrew Paul V. Thomas 
Jackson, 
1 
which was an action of damages for written slander, the 
writings complained of being letters accusing the pursuer of having 
used murderous threats against the defender, the writings were 
admitted, and it was stated in defence that the pursuer had on 
various specified occasions, used violent and abusive language 
concerning the defender, threatning him with bodily harm, which 
induced him to write the letters complained of, but no issue of 
veritas convicii was taken. The court held that the defender was 
debarred from leading evidence in proof of his statements to show 
provocation, and in mitigation of damages, as such evidence could 
not, in the circumstances, be distinguished from that of the veritas 
convicii. 
Also in Rev. John James Browne and others V. John McFarlane, 
l 
where 
in an action of damages against the publisher of a Scottish newspaper 
1) (1884) 11 R. 460, see also McNeill V. Rorison (1847) 10 D. 15 
L. J-Cl. Hope at 34; L. Moncriefff at pp 26,27; 
2) (1889) 16 R. 368. 
for slander contained in a paragraph published in it, the defender 
stated in evidence that he received the paragraph from his regular 
correspondent in Ireland, whose name he refused to disclose. He 
proposed to lead evidence of the circumstances which might have 
affected the writer, but of which the defender was ignorant, with a 
view to mitigation of damages (there being no counter issue of 
veritas) in proof of an averment as to the circumstances in which the 
paragraph was written, of which admittedly he knew nothing. The 
evidence was disallowed by the court. 
I suppose it should be pointed out that Or. 36 r. 371 has not altered 
the common law as laid down in Scott V. Sampson, 
2 
with reference to 
the admissibility of evidence of the plaintiff's bad character in 
mitigation of damages in an action of libel, and'Mangena V. Wright, 
3 
is a good confirmation. 
1) Rules of The Supreme Court (1883) 
2) (1882) 8 Q. B. D. 491 
3) (1909) 2 K. B. 958 
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(b) 
RUMOUR AS AFFECTING DAMAGES 
In seeking to mitigate damages 1y showing the plaintiff's reputation 
to be susceptible of little or no injury, the defendant will 
sometimes attempt to attain his purpose by showing less than a-total 
lack of reputation for general character or for the particular trait. 
If for instance, the charge was that the plaintiff stole a horse, the 
defendant, will offer to show that there was a prevalent rumour or a 
common belief that the plaintiff stole the horse; thus the defendant 
will assert, his false charge could not have hurt the plaintiff by 
causing a belief in his guilt, because there was already a common 
belief in it, or at least a rumour of it. The argument for 
permitting this was well put in the following passage from the 
dissenting judgement of Pigot C. B. in the case of Bell V. Parke, 
1 
when he said: "It is by putting extreme cases that the application of 
a principle can often be most clearly tested; let me put the case 
that I shall now describe. Suppose this to have happened:, a 
gentleman employed in a railway office is found in the office 
murdered, and circumstances of the very strongest suspicion attach 
upon one individual; the case is tried, the facts are fully 
investigated, the individual is acquitted; but there exists 
generally, in the community at large, a moral conviction that the 
party charged is guilty... He is entitled to the benefit of his 
acquittal, and to the presumption of innocence which the law casts 
round one whose guilt has not been proved; no man can be justified in 
1) (1860) 11 Ir. C. L. 413,425 
calling him a 'murderer', - nay, the general impression may, if the 
truth were clearly known, be unjust. ' But, rightly or wrongly, he has 
lost his good name, and there exists a general reputation that he was 
guilty of the specific offence which I have described..... Is it just 
or reasonable that a man so covered with the reputation of having 
been guilty of an atrocious crime should be entitled to as large a 
measure of damages, for being called a murderer, as a person of 
unblemished fame, upon whose character the breath of slander had 
. never 
been blown?.... Suppose two successive cases presented in 
succession to the same jury; in one, the alleged murderer is plain- 
tiff, in the other the plaintiff is a man without a stain upon his 
character; I do not think it just or reasonable (and I cannot think 
that it will ultimately be established as the Law of England) that 
the same measure of damages should be awarded to each". 
But, on the other hand, there are grave objections to permitting 
such a practice1 as suggested above, and on the balance the better 
practice seem to be that, which requires the exclusion of such evi- 
dence, and this is the result in the great majority of jurisdictions. 
The difficulty is, however, to draw the line between a mere rumour of 
the particular act charged and a general loss of reputation as to the 
particular trait involved in it, for the . 
latter is received in most 
jurisdictions. In King V. Root, 2 where the libel had charged the 
plaintiff with being in a state of beastly intoxication, and it was 
held that mere rumours of the act charged were inadmissible, while a 
1) See Fitzgerald, B., in Bell V. Parke, (1860) 11 Ir. C. L. 413,420 
2) (1829) 4 Wend. 139 (New York) 
bad reputation for excessive intoxication would be admissible. So 
far, then, as rumours of the sort have in effect destroyed the plain- 
tiff's reputation to a real extent, it is proper enough to receive 
them; for this is only saying what all concede, that his reputation 
may be shown. But the distinctions drawn and the phrasing used in 
the various decisions and jurisdictions differ considerably. 
In England, prior to the decision in Scott V. Sampson, 1 the 
defendant was allowed, in mitigation of damages, to adduce evidence 
that, 'prior to the defamatory statement complained of, there were 
rumours to the same effect as the statement complained of. This 
evidence was admitted on the theory that, if people were saying these 
things about the plaintiff in any event, he had received little 
injury. The reception of such evidence goes back to the case of 
Leicester V. Walter, 
2 
a case involving a libel issue, and the right 
to dispute the damages under the general issue being conceded. 
Mansfield, C. J., received evidence of "a general suspicion of 
plaintiff's character", "general rumour", "to show that he could 
receive little injury", "provided the reports got into many men's 
mouths". This decision appears to have followed an earlier 
unreported case of Earner V. Merle, decided but Lord Ellenborough, 
C. J., in which the damages upon a slander charging insolvency were 
mitigated by "rumours in circulation" to the effect. The subsequent 
treatment of the subject is well analysed by Cave, J., while summing 
up the cases in Scott V. Sampson, 
3 he said: "While such-evidence 
appears to have been admitted by Lord Ellenborough, C. J., in Earner V. 
1) (1882) L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 491 
2) (1809) 2 Camp. 251 
3) (1882) L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 491 
Merle (unreported) and by Cresswell, J., with the-approbation of 
Wightman, J., in Richards V. Richards, 
1 
and while its admissibility 
was supported by Pigot, C. B., in Bell V. Parke, 
2 
it was doubted by 
Abbot, C. J., in Waithman V. Weaver, 
3 
and by Coleridge, J., in Nye V. 
Thompson 
4 
and it was held inadmissible by Fitzgerald and Hughes, 
. B. B., in Bell V. Parke, 
5 
and by the whole court of Exchequer in Jones 
V. Stevens; "6 he then mentions Leicester V. Walter? as an early 
ruling of a peculiar sort. The only case omitted by the learned 
judge is Anon V. Moor, 
8which 
received "reports in the neighbour- 
hood". In any case, it was in Scott V. Sampson, 
9 
that it was 
finally decided that evidence of such rumours was inadmissible. And 
the relevant passage of Cave, J's, judgement which settled this rule 
of exclusion in England, is in the following words: "It would seem 
that such evidence (rumours and suspicions as to the truth of the 
charge made by the defendant) is not admissible, as only indirectly 
tending to affect the plaintiff's reputation. If these rumours and 
suspicions have infact affected the plaintiff's reputation, that may 
be proved by general evidence of reputation. If they have not 
affected it, they are not relevant to the issue. To admit evidence 
of rumours and suspicions ý is to give- anyone who knows nothing 
whatever of the plaintiff, or who may even have a grudge against him, 
an opportunity of spreading, through the means of the publicity 
attending proceedings, what he may have picked from the most disrepu- 
table sources and what no man of sense who knows the plaintiff's 
1) 2 Moo. & Rob. 557 
2) 11 Ir. C. L. R. 413 
3) 11 Price 257 it 
4) 16 Q. B. 175 
5) 11 Ir. C. L. R. 413 
6) 11 Price 235 
7) 2 Camp. 251 
8) 1M&S. 284 
9) (1882) L. R. 8Q. B. D. 491 
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character would for a moment believe in. Unlike evidence of general 
reputation, it is particularly difficult for the plaintiff to meet 
and rebut such evidence; for all those who know him best can say is 
that they have not heard anything of these rumours. Moreover, it may 
be that it is the defendant himself who has started them"; so a 
question to a witness, whether he had heard anywhere the story which 
was the libel in question before he saw it in the defendant's journal 
was excluded. 
This decision was affirmed by the House of Lords in Plato Films 
Ltd. and others V. Speidel. 
1 Lord Denning buried rumour once and for 
all with the following eulogy: "Rumour is a lying jade, begotten by 
gossip out of hearsay and is not fit to be admitted in a court of 
law". 2 This has always been the view in Canada3 and the United 
States4 too, and other common law countries. 
5 
The position in Scotland however, appears to be different in view 
of the decision in Macculloch V. Litt. 
6 This was an action of 
damages for verbal defamation, imputing to the pursuer, criminal, or 
at least improper intercourse with a Mr Armstrong who had died 
several years previous to the occasion of the libel. One of the 
witnesses adduced by the defender was asked: Was there a report of a 
former improper intimacy between Mrs Macculloch and Mr Armstrong? On 
which the court ruled that, although no issue of justification had 
been taken, that it was competent to ask a witness that the answer 
could be founded on, not as an answer to the action, but merely as 
enabling the jury to assess the amount of damages. 
1) (1961) 1 All. E. R. 876 
2) Ibid at 888 
3) McCregor V. McArthur (1885) 5 U. C. C. P. 493 
4) Sun Print & P. Ass'n V. Schenck (1900) 40 C. C. A. 163,98 Fed. 925 
5) Englishman V. Lajpat Rai, 37 C. 760: 14 C. W. N. 713 
6) (1851) B D. 960 
In the words of Lord Wood, 
' "This point must be decided according 
to the light of our own law. There is no issue in justification to 
prove the truth of the statement. Therefore, if this evidence is 
going to prove the truth of the statement, it must be rejected; and 
even if there were an issue in justification, it does not appear to 
me that the defender can prove the truth of the statements by proving 
the existence of a former rumour. The defender, however, does not 
desire this. She disclaims all attempt to prove the truth _of 
the 
report. She merely wishes to prove that, at the time, the scandal 
was generally and currently reported. She does not propose to prove 
a separate fact, but merely that there was a current report. As far 
as I can judge, the question is admissible; and I believe there is a 
series of decisions of the jury court, to this effect. I do not see 
the later English authorities are against this view. We have no 
evidence that such a question is inadmissible when it is put, as 
here, for the purpose of enabling the jury to judge what amount of 
damages they should give. It does not appear to me' to be irrelevant 
to prove that what Mrs. Litt said was a current report. I am not to 
be held as admitting it as an answer to the action, but merely in 
mitigation, with the view to enable the jury to assess the damages". 
I am not sure if a Scottish court will take the same view today 
especially as the English courts from where Lord Wood appeared to 
have drawn support for his view have decisively rejected the admissi- 
bility of rumour in the later case of Scott V. Sampson2 as confirmed 
1) Ibid 
2) (1882) L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 491 
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in Plato Films Ltd V. Speidel. 
l 
It is however, true that at the time 
of his decision, the tenor of English authority admitted such evi- 
dence in mitigation of damages. However, it is interesting to note 
that in the earlier case of McNeill V. Rev. Gilbert Rorison, 
2 
the 
Lord Justice Clerk did say about the facts of the case that: "So far 
as reports or rumours are concerned, I apprehend that no question was 
raised, either in the letters or in the record, or at the trial. But 
if such had been the point, I think the evidence would, in this case, 
have been wholly incompetent". 
In H V. P3 in an action of damages for slander brought by a married 
woman against a man who had in a letter to her stated that she had 
committed adultery with him, the defender pleaded veritas. The 
defender stated that the pursuer had also committed adultery with "A" 
and had allowed "B" and "C" to take indecent familiarities with her. 
He did-not mention on record the names of A, B, and C, but sent the 
names and addresses to the pursuer's agent. 
The court, affirming the judgement of Lord Ordinary, Pearson held 
that the defender's statements in regard to third parties were 
irrelevant. 
1) (1961) A. C. 1090 
2) (1847) 10 D. 15 
3) (1905) 8 F. 232. 
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3 CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES 
(i) GOOD CHARACTER 
In criminal cases, general evidence of good character of the 
accused is always relevant and admissible in favour of the accused, 
though general evidence of bad character is not admissible. Such 
evidence of good character might be given by witnesses for the 
prosecution in cross-examination or by witnesses called by the 
defence, and now in addition the accused himself may give evidence on 
oath of his own good character. It should be remembered that at a 
time the accused was not a, competent witness on his own behalf, but 
even then, evidence of his good character was always admissible. And 
earlier views, before the accused was a competent witness for the 
defence, were that such evidence was admitted as an act of 
indulgence. However, since the accused became a competent witness 
on his own behalf, it cannot be said that evidence of good character 
is admitted as a matter of indulgence but on policy, since evidence 
of his bad character can be given in return. 
Section 53 of the India Evidence Act, 2 aptly provides that: "In 
criminal proceedings the fact that the person accused is of a good 
character Is relevant"; and section 67 of the Nigeria Evidence Act3 
contains exactly the same provision. The implication of this 
provision, or rather the inference that can be drawn from the 
provision is that, the accused's good character may always be proved 
for the defence; this interpretation clearly conforms with the 
generally accepted common law rule in England and other 
1) Stephen, H. C. L., i, 449 (History of The Common Law of England) 
2) 1872 Act (Evidence) 
3) 1945 Act (Evidence); Cap. 62, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
jurisdictions, ' where it is generally agreed that the accused may 
produce evidence of his good character. However, one thing the Act 
does not indicate is the' purpose for which such evidence of good 
character is relevant, and neither is the purpose defined at common 
law, and this has generated a lot of thought and debate. The uncer- 
tainty of the purpose of evidence of good character gives rise to an 
important questions which has to be answered, and it is this: how far 
is the good character of an accused person a defence in a charge 
against him for a criminal offence? In other words, if a person is 
charged with, and tried for, a criminal offence, and at the end of 
the case for the prosecution, assuming that a prima facie case has 
been made out against him, he alleges that he is a person of good 
character and substantiates that allegation by evidence acceptable to 
the court that he is a person of the good character so alleged by 
him, is he entitled to be discharged and acquitted? Simply put, the 
proposition is whether or not the good character of an accused can be 
used as a defence to criminal liability, but I believe the first 
question and as a matter of fact, a more important question to be 
answered should be, what is the actual purpose for which such evi- 
dence of good character is relevant. The former question is depen- 
dent on the latter, if the latter is ascertained and adequately 
answered, then the former can be easily answered. Though these 
questions come directly to mind, under the consideration of the Act, 
they equally arise at common law, and so it becomes pertinent to look 
1) See Dickson, Evidence (3rd edition). Para. 15; see also Slater V. 
H. M. A. (1928) J. C. 94 at 105. 
for authority or guidance in the English legal system, since it is 
the parent legal system for most of the others, particularly those in 
the Commonwealth. 
It is clear as earlier mentioned that in criminal cases' the 
accused is, on grounds of humanity, and for the purpose of raising a 
presumption of his innocence is allowed to prove his general good 
character (though not specific instance theteof) either by cross- 
examination of the witnesses for the prosecution, or in chief by his 
own testimony or that of independent witnesses. If however, the 
presumption arising from the evidence of previous good character be 
set up by the prisoner, it is competent to neutralise its effect by' 
the cross-examination of his witnesses, either as to particular 
facts, or as to grounds of his belief for the purpose of 
2 
discrediting their testimony and it is competent to repel such 
evidence by calling witnesses to give evidence of the prisoner's 
general bad character. However, it should be mentioned that up and 
until the beginning of the 1800's, it is true to say that the 
admissibility was not recognised in the absolute form as it is today; 
today, evidence of the accused's general good character is admissible 
in all prosecutions whether for felony or misdemeanour, 
3 but before 
there were two well understood limitations, both based apparently on 
considerations of probative value, but both now entirely abandoned. ' 
First, and originally it was thought that character could be invoked 
in capital cases only. The jurists realised the inadequacy of such a 
rule and saw an urgent need for a reform. Mr T. McNally, 
4 commenting 
1) See Phipson On Evidence (12th ed. ) para. 528; Att. 
2 B. & P. 532; Att-Gen. V. Radloff, 10 Ex. 84; 
2) Red V. How (1836) 7 C. & P. 298 
3) Taylor, Evidence, s. 352 
4) T. MacNally, 1802, Evidence, 320 
Gen V. Bowman, 
on the original rule said: "It has been here-to-for held that a 
prisoner cannot examine to character, except 'in favorem vitae' when 
charged on a capital indictment; but the rule is now wisely extended 
to all cases of misdemeanours. And this appears to have been the 
ancient practice. In R V. Brown (1798)..... the point appears fin- 
ally settled.... Lord Carlton, C. J. C. P., said he had conversed with 
many of the judges on the subject now before the court, who thought 
as he did that... evidence of such a nature might be very material; 
e. g., suppose a man of very great property was indicted for perjury, 
where the object to be attained by the perjury was a mere triffle, 
for instance a shilling; or suppose a man to be charged with a riot 
or assault, who was known to be of peaceful and quiet disposition; 
evidence of character in such cases directly encountering the nature 
of the charge in the indictment must be of the last importance... 
Lord Kilwarden, C. J. K. B., agreed with Lord Carlton, and observed that 
the reason generally assigned for the admission of such evidence in 
capital cases was altogether unsatisfactory to his mind. It was said 
_ to 
be 'in favorem vitae', but he had no conception, according to the 
principle of sound sense and right reason, that character could be 
. evidence 
in a case affecting the life of a man, and yet not"evidence 
in a case affecting his freedom, his property and his reputation". 
Also, criticising the old rule of limitation to capital offences, 
and at the same time making an argument for an extension of the rule, 
Parsons C. J., in Comm V. Harding, 
l 
was of opinion, "that a 
1) (1807) 2 Mass. 317 
prisoner ought to be permitted to give in evidence his general 
character in all (criminal) cases; for he did not see why it should 
be evidence in a capital case and not in cases of an inferior degree. 
In doubtful cases, a good general character should be admitted on 
behalf of the defendant in all criminal prosecutions; but they were 
clearly of opinion that it might be admitted in capital cases, in 
favour of life". 
As I pointed out earlier on, it is now well established and 
understood that evidence of good character of accused is admissible 
upon charges of all grades, even in cases of misdemeanours. 
It was also once thought that character was receivable in doubtful 
cases only, (and under no other circumstances) to turn the balance of 
evidence; this too like the previous is now obsolete. 
A good illustration of this practice is found in Lord Ellenborough 
C. J., speech to the jury in Davison's Trial: 
1 
"If you do not know 
which way to decide, character should have an effect. But it is 
otherwise in cases which are clear. If it could be permitted to 
operate where a crime is clearly proved, it would always be brought 
forward; because there is hardly anyone who has not at sometime 
maintained a good character.... If the evidence were in even balance, 
character should make it preponderate in favour of a defendant; but 
in order to let character have its operation, the case must be 
reduced to that situation". 
I would-like to think that there is something more fundamental to 
the limitation of the admissibility of evidence of good character at 
1) (1808) 31 How. St. Tr. 217 
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all these times. With regard to evidence of good character, it is 
well to observe, in passing that there is no class of evidence 
requiring more careful scrutiny. Many persons are moved by a 
spurious feeling of compassion to give such evidence recklessly and 
in superlatives. A man who knows very little about the person to 
whose character he testifies will give him a eulogy which might well 
be the envy of the unconvicted part of the population, and will think 
that he is merely discharging a duty of charity in so doing. The 
following shrewd observation comes down to us from L. C. J. Hyde, in 
Turner's trial 
1: "The witnesses he called in point of reputation, - 
that I must leave to you (the jury). I have been here many a 
fairtime. Few men that come to be questioned but shall have some 
come and say, 'He is a very honest man, I never knew any hurt by him' 
But is this anything against the evidence of the fact? " It appears 
the correct import of this statement is that when the evidence 
against the accused is such as to clearly establish his guilt, no 
importance can be attached to evidence of good character.. 
However, if one could explain, as the possible rationals for the 
limitation of the admissibility of evidence of good charcter as seen 
in the old cases, as being a direct result of the fear of unreliabi- 
lity of such evidence, which is now a generally doubtful or untrust- 
worthy reason, it then comes as a surprise that some cases could have 
been decided this century, seemingly acknowledging and applying this 
supposedly obsolete rules. A good example of this is, R V. Broad- 
1) (1664) 6 How. St. Tr. 565,613 
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hurst, Meanley, and Bliss Hill. 
' In this case, the appellant Bliss 
Hilll, a practising solicitor, together with two others, Mary Broad- 
hurst, and Theresa Meanley was indicted for having uttered a forged 
will knowing the same to be forged, with intent to defraud. They 
were also indicted for conspiracy to utter the forged will in order 
to prevent the due course of law and justice in the probate suit in 
which they were plaintiffs. All the appellants were convicted. The 
appellant appealed against his conviction and sentence, which was one 
of three years' penal servitude, appeared before the court of Crimi- 
nal Appeal in person and argued his appeal thus, inter alia: "I am a 
solicitor and I have practised in Wolverhamption for many years..... 
The judge at the trial in his summing up misdirected the jury in 
several instances on the facts and on the law, and did not sufficien- 
tly direct them on certain matters. He was wrong in directing the 
jury to consider the evidence in the case as affecting me apart from 
that of my character and reputation, and not directing them to have 
regard to my proved character for life-long rectitude and integrity 
as affecting the credibility of my evidence, and the probability of 
my knowingly doing anything wrong and to have regard to the especial 
ruinous consequences to me as a solicitor of knowingly making myself 
a party to an offence. Evidence of character should always be submi- 
tted to the jury with other circumstances of the case to enable them 
to come to a decision on the whole of the evidence. 
2 Avory J., did 
not leave the evidence of my character to the jury in this free way 
but qualified it by telling them that it could only be taken into 
1) (1918) 13 Cr. App. R. 125 at p. 127 
2) Russel On Crime, (7th ed. ) p. 2119 
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consideration if the remainder of the evidence left them in doubt". 
The passage in the learned trial judge's summing up to the jury 
reads thus in part': "If the evidence leaves you in doubt whether 
this charge is brought home to him, you are entitled to take into 
consideration the character which he has hiterto borne. You are 
entitled to take into consideration in the sense that you may say to 
yourselves it is unlikely that a man of such a character, of such a 
reputation, would commit such an offence". 
Darling J., giving the judgement of the court of Criminal Appeal 
which dismissed the appeal said, inter alia2: "It has been usual to 
treat the good character of the party accused as evidence to be taken 
into consideration only in doubtful cases. Juries have generally 
been told that where the facts proved are such as to satisfy their 
minds of the guilt of the party, character, however excellent, is no 
subject for consideration; but that when they entertain any doubt of 
the guilt of the party, they may properly turn their attention to the 
good character which he has received... The history of the admission 
of good character, as given in Stephen's History of the Criminal law 
of England, shows that such evidence does not stand on precisely the 
same plane as that concernig the relevant facts going to*prove or 
disprove the issue". 
3 
In a_similar decision, Martin J., in Rex V. Riopel, 
4 said: ".... 
Did the honourable judge presiding at the trial err in law and in 
fact when he rejected completely the evidence of good character made 
ý_. 
1) (1918) 13 Cr. App. -R. 
125 at 128 
2) Ibid at 128 - 129 
3) R V. Davison (1808) 31 St. Tr. 216, Per Lord Ellenborough C. J; 
R V. Frost (1839) 4 St. Tr. (N. S. ) 85 
4) (1 2 D. L. R. 1155,1159 (Canada, Quebec) 
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by the accused? " He continued by answering, "The trial judge did not 
tell the jury that they were to reject completely the proof of good 
character made by the accused. He distinguished by example cases 
where evidence of good character had more weight in one case than in 
another and told them that he admitted that in certain cases when the 
proof was not sufficiently positive for the jury to find the accused 
guilty, evidence of the good reputation of the accused in such 
circumstances had weight, but he pointed out that in the present case 
if they reached the conclusion that the accused had committed the 
crime charged against him, they would so find, no matter how good his 
previous reputation had been. I would answer this question in the 
negative". 
I agree that in forming a judgement as to a prisoner's intention, 
evidence that the party has previously borne a good character is 
often highly important, but I must say that I am not convinced as 
most of the foregoing dicta would want us to be, that the only time 
evidence of good character is admissible, is if there is a nearly 
even balance, and in such situations it should make it preponderate 
in the. accused's favour. This is well put by Lord Ellenborough in R 
V. Davison, 
1 
when he said: "Evidence of character is only of weight 
where the other evidence is in even balance, or where there is a fair 
and reasonable doubt of the prisoner's guilt". I do not agree with 
this, and Wigmore, 
2 is also of the opinion that the broad rule now 
being that accused's character is "always admissible" in criminal 
cases, the above limitations do not exist. And one important point 
1) (1808) 31 How St. Tr. 217 
2) Wigmore On Evidence, para. 56 
against the limitation that the jury must be directed only to consi- 
der evidence of good character if in doubt is that, if they are in 
doubt, the proper thing they should do is to acquit. Another impor- 
tant point which should be borne in mind is that, it has been held 
that, where evidence of good character has been given, there is no 
-rule that the judge must refer it in his summing up. 
2 
In recent times, emphasis has shifted, as there are largely two 
main prevalent views now, with regard to the purpose for which evi- 
dence of good character is relevant. The first is that evidence of 
good character goes only to credit of the defendant as a witness, and 
the other is that, it might actually go further than that; that. its 
main purpose is to cast doubt on the case for the prosecution, by 
showing that the defendant is less likely, because of his character, 
to have committed the offence. There seems to have been a sort of 
rivalry for recognition one over the other between. these two views, 
and it is only recently that a clear judicial preference appears to 
have emerged in favour of the latter view. But before going into all 
the arguments about that, I wish to point out that there is a diffe- 
rence between the present consideration of using good character to 
cast doubt on the prosecution's case, and the old limitation to its 
admissibility, when it was used only to tilt the balance when the 
decision could have been a hung one. As earlier pointed out, I 
disagree with this, and as I mentioned earlier ,I agree that 
in 
forming judgement as to a prisoner's intention, evidence that the- 
1) R V. Brittle (1965) 109 Sol. Jo. 1028; (1966) Cris. L. R. 164 
2) 2 V. Smith 1971) Crim. L. R. 531 
party is of good character may be useful, and that is the actual 
purpose it is supposed to serve under the mordern principle. I will 
like to point out that the need to make this distinction is as a 
result of fear that they may be confused with one another. This 
anticipation is reinforced by the confusion, arising from the lan- 
guage of Tindal L. C. J., in R V. Frost; 
' in this case he said that: 
"....... if the evidence which goes to the fact is sufficiently strong 
to convince you that the act of criminality which is imputed to him 
was actually committed, then it is no more than weighing probability 
against fact. If the scales are hanging even and you feel a doubt 
whether the party is guilty or not of the act charged against him, 
then undoubtedly you will give him the full benefit of such testimony 
of general character which he may have earned by his previous con- 
duct in life. Gentlemen you are to weigh it not as direct evidence 
in the case - not as positive evidence contradicting any that has 
been brought on the other side - but as testimony, probably, to 
induce you to doubt whether the other evidence is correct, and not to 
discard that evidence if you think that it is so". This dicta cer- 
tainly belongs to the old already discussed class of cases. However, 
its relevance here now, is that, it appears to me that Tindal C. J., 
has inexpicably and inadvertently confused the old and the modern use 
of evidence of good character, this results from the way he couched 
the tail end of his statement, but there is no doubt that his Lord- 
ship clearly favours the old limitation on the admissibility of good 
character - only when the jury is in doubt. The troubled part of his 
1) (1839) 4 St. Tr. (N. S. ) 85; (1840) Gurney's Rep. 749 
statement is where he said that: "... but as testimony, probably, to 
induce you to doubt whether the other evidence is correct,.... " This 
appears to me to be the 'improbability' doctrine - whereby the accu- 
sed adduces evidence of his good character to induce the jury to 
think that he is unlikely to have committed the offence, this will 
shortly be discussed in detail. This is incongruent with the earlier 
part of his statement that: "... If the scales are hanging even and 
you feel a doubt whether the party is guilty or not of the act 
charged against him, then undoubtedly you will give him the full 
benefit of such testimony of general character.... ", ' in such cases 
evidence of good character is of no help or use unless there is some 
legitimate doubt as to the guilt of a person. In the present modern 
use, which is to be considered, the reasonable operation of such 
evidence is to create a presumption that the party was not likely to 
have committed the act imputed to him. 
Going back however to the original matter, I suppose it will always 
be relevant, if we have the task of proving that A committed an act, 
to show that he is the kind of man who is likely to act in such a way 
or otherwise. Before going futher, I will like to make a fleeting 
mention about the question of . relevancy of evidence of good 
character, since it may be doubted whether good character is usually 
any more relevant in criminal than in civil proceedings. As Lush J., 
observed in Hurst V. Evans: 
' "As I pointed out during the argument, 
evidence of good character, though not revelant in either civil or 
1) (1917) 1 K. B. 352,357 
criminal cases, is always admitted in a criminal case". Willes, J., 
seems to think differently with regard to the relevance of character, 
and I quite agree with his view in R V. Rowton, 
I 
when he said of 
character that: "It is strictly relevant to the issue, but it is not 
admissible upon the part of the prosecution, because, as my Brother 
Martin says, if the prosecution were allowed to go into such 
evidence, we should have the whole life of the prisoner ripped up, 
and as has been witnessed elsewhere, upon trial for murder you might 
begin by shewing that when a boy at school the prisoner had robbed an 
orchard, and so on through his life; and the result would be that the 
man on his trial might be overwhelmed by prejudice, instead of being 
convicted on that affirmative evidence which the law of this country 
requires. The evidence is relevant to the issue, but is excluded for 
reasons of policy and humanity.... " This statement though is 
actually concerned with bad character, is ironically applicable to 
that of good character in two ways. First, I believe that evidence 
of good character of an accused is relevant, and secondly, unlike bad 
character, it is received for reasons of policy and humanity, that is 
for the same reason, it is claimed that bad character is excluded. 
Its relevance must depend on the assumption that the accused usually 
2 
acts 'in character'. The basic premise is the one by which we order 
our lives, that people generally act in keeping with their character. 
For instance, that a thief will often steal, but an honest man 
usually will not. It is exactly on this point that the modern notion 
of the purpose of evidence of good character is based. It is argued 
1) (1865) Le.. & Ca. 520, at 540 - 1; 169 E. R. 1497 
2) Nokes, An Introduction to Evidence (4th ed. ) at 138 
that character being thus relevant, it follows that a defendant may 
offer his good character to evidence the improbability of his doing 
the act charged, unless their is some collateral reasons for 
exclusion, and the law recognises none such. 
The above point that relevance depends on the assumption that the 
accused usually acts 'in character' is well illustrated by the 
interesting case recorded by Professor Kenny. 1 He recorded that at a 
charity bazaar at Lincoln, about 1900, when an alarm was raised that 
a purse had been stolen, the thief slipped it into the coat pocket of 
a bishop who was present; but any suspicions that might have been 
aroused by it being found in his pocket was effectively rebutted by 
the episcopal character of the wearer. 
This illustration, effectively shows, the sort of purpose that the 
evidence of good character would serve, and the illustration 
strenghtens the' argument of those who say that the purpose of 
evidence of good character is to cast doubt on the prosecution's case 
by showing that the accused is less likely to commit the offence 
because of his character. The imperative question was raised in R V. 
Shrimpton2 by Alderson, B., he said: "You say he is not likely to 
have committed this offence because he is a man of good character; 
then in answer to that, they say he is likely, because he is not a 
man of good character". Campbell C. J., in the same case said: "The 
question in issue is the good character of the prisoner - whether or 
not he was likely to commit the offence of which he was charged". In 
1) Kenny's Outline of Criminal Law at § 612 
2) (1851) 5 Cox 387 
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R V. Rowton, 
1 Willes, J., said: "It is a mistake to suppose that 
because the prisoner can only raise the question of character, it is 
therefore a collateral issue. It is not. Such evidence is admissi- 
ble because it renders it less probable that what the prosecution has 
averred is true; it is strictly relevant to the issue". 
In R V. Stannard, 
2 Patterson, J., observed as follows: 
III 
cannot in 
principle make any distinction between evidence of facts and evidence 
of character: the latter is equally laid before the jury as the 
former, as being relevant to the question of quit or not guilty: the 
object of laying it before the jury is to induce them to believe, 
from the improbability that a person of good character should have 
conducted himself as alleged, that there is some mistake or 
misrepresentation in the evidence on the part of the prosecution, and 
it is strictly evidence in the case". 
A strong support has also come from Strong, J., in the American 
case of Canceni V. People, 
3 
where he said: "The principle upon which 
good character may be proved is that it affords a presumption against 
the commission of crime. This presumption arises from the 
improbability as a general rule, as proved by common observation and 
experience, that a person who has uniformly pursued an honest and 
upright course of conduct will depart from it to do an act so 
inconsistent with it. Such a person may be overome by temptation and 
fall into crime, and cases of. that kind often occur, but they are 
exceptions; the rule is otherwise. The influence of this presumption 
from character will necessarily vary according to the varying 
1) (1865) Leigh & C. 520,540; 10 Cox C. C. 25 
2) (1837) 7 C. & P. 673; see also Attwood V. R (1960) 102 C. L. R. 353, 
359; s. 412 of the New South Wales Cri` mes Act expressly provides that 
evidence of character is always evidence on the question of guilt. 
3) (1858) 16 N. Y. 506 
circumstances of different areas". 
In another American case of State V. Lee, 
1 Berry, J., said: "The 
purpose of the evidence as to character of the accused is to show his 
disposition, and to base thereon a probable presumption that he would 
not be likely to commit and therefore did not commit, the crime with 
which he is charged". 
In the Canadian case of R V. Barbour, 
2 Duff, C. J., said: ".... a 
much wider latitude is allowed the accused, who may adduce any 
evidence of good character, for example, tending to show, not only 
that it was not likely that he committed the crime charged but that 
he was not the kind of person likely to do so". 
My main purpose of citing these cases, is not just for novelty, but 
to bring together decisions from a number of different jurisdictions 
with a serious view of showing that not a single one of the variety 
made any mention of character as a means of impeachment of 
defendant's credit, but they are all united in very clear terms on 
one view, which is, the probability or improbability of the accused 
being the perpetrator of the offence charged. It is also important 
to note that most of the cases cited were actually decided in the 
last century, thus showing that the 'probability or improbability' 
doctrine dates back for a long time, and it indicates its general 
popularity. So, one can say that it is generally agreed that the 
accused in all criminal cases may produce evidence of his good 
character as substantive evidence of his innocence. In the court 
1) (1876) 22 Min. 409 
2) (1938) 71 C. C. C. 1 (S. C. C. ) at 20; See also R V. Letain (1918) 
29 C. C. C. 389 (Man. C. A. ); R V. Carlin (No. 1) (1903) 6C. 365 
(Que. K. B. ); R V. Britnell (1912) 20 C. C. C. (ont. C. A. ) 85 at 87. 
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room parlance this is often termed as "placing his character in 
issue", but the phrase is misleading. Character is almost never one 
of the ultimate issues or operative facts determining guilt or 
innocence; it is merely circumstantial evidence bearing on the 
probability that the accused did or did not commit the act charged 
with the required guilty intent. 
1 
I certainly cannot see case of those who argue otherwise, that is 
that evidence of good character is meant to go to the credit of the 
accused - being presented as strongly as the former viewpoint. Sir 
James Stephen2 apppears to attempt to buttress this viewpoint when 
he put forward some credible argument to the effect that: "Evidence 
of character is, generally speaking a make-weight, though there are 
two classes of cases in which it is highly important: 1/ Where 
conduct is equivocal, or even presumably criminal. In this case, 
evidence of character may explain conduct and rebut the presumptions 
which it might raise in the absence of any such evidence. A man is 
found in possession of stolen goods. He says he found them and took 
charge of them to give them to the owner. If he is a man of very 
high character this may be believed. 2/ When a charge rests on the 
direct testimony of a single witness and on the bare denial of it by 
the person charged. A man is accused of an indecent assault by a 
woman with whom he was accidentally left alone. He denies it. Here 
a high character for morality on the part of the accused would be of 
great importance". 
Though Stephen appears to be more concerned in his statement above, 
1) See Commonwealth V. Beal, (1943) 314 Mass. 210,50 N. E. 2d 14; 
State V. Miiccci (1957) 46 N. J. Super 454,134, A. 2d 805; Morrison V. 
State (1965) 217 Tenn. 374,397 S. W. 2d 826 
2-) Introduction to Evidence pp. 167,168 
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with the issue of importance of character evidence, especially with 
regards to its probative value, and not specifically with the issue 
of its effects on or use by the jury it is undoubtedly a helpful and 
sound argument for those who see the purpose of admitting evidence of 
good character as being to determine the probability or improbability 
of the accused committing the offence. 
The controversy was squared up in open confrontation in the case of 
R V. Bellis. 1 Be was convicted of possessing explosives. He 
appealed on the ground, inter alia, of misdirection as to the 
significance of his previous good character in that the judge after 
saying that it was not a ticket to an acquittal continued: "but it is 
something which you must take into account in his favour really on 
the basis that a person of good character is less likely to commit 
this type of offence than a man of bad character". It was argued on 
appeal that the proper direction was that possession of good charac- 
ter makes the accused testimony more worthy of belief than that of a 
man of bad character, and that the statement should have been direc- 
ted to the credibility of the appellant rather than to suggest that 
possession of the good character made it less likely that he would 
commit that type of offence. The court of criminal appeal expressed 
the opinion that evidence of good character goes primarily to the 
credibility of the accused, but added that, a direction that evidence. 
of character was to be taken into'account as something rendering the 
commission of the crime by the accused less likely, was if anything, 
1) (1965) 50 Cr. App. R. 88; (1966) 1 All. R. 552 
more favourable to the accused than a direction that the jury should 
consider the evidence of character as something affecting the credi- 
bility of the accused. The view of the court is articulated in the 
view of Widgery, J., 
1 
who dismissing the appeal said: "Although 
...... there is no formal or standard direction in these terms, this 
court does take the view that possession of a good character is 
primarily a matter which goes to credibility, but it is to be obser- 
ved that the direction actually employed in this case ..... is cer- 
tainly not less favourable to the appellant, because, logically, if 
he directed them that the appellant was more credible by reason of 
his good character, it would have followed from that that he was less 
likely to have committed the offence". 
With respect, the proposition stated by the trial judge seems, to 
me, to be entirely correct. The reasons are not far fetched; apart 
from the impressive arguments which I have already discussed, long 
before the accused was entitled to give evidence (and so before his 
credibility could be an issue before the jury) it was well settled 
that he was entitled to introduce evidence of his good character. 
This could only be on the grounds that the jury were entitled to take 
into account as making it less likely that the accused committed the 
crime. I have already cited and quoted from numerous old cases which 
clearly establish this point. 
2 
These decisions were taken as having been supplanted by the 
decision in R V. Falconer-Atlee, 3 in which the "credit only" 
direction was strongly affirmed. The logical result of the case was 
1) (1965) 50 Cr. App. R. 88 at 89 - 90; Cf R V. Callum (1976) Crim. 
L. R. 257 
2) Stannard (1837) 7 C. & P. 673 per. Patterson J., Shrimpton (1851) 
5 Cox. 387; Rowton (1865) 10 Cox 25 
3) (1973) 58 Cr. App. R. 348 (C. A. ). 
that, if the defendant chose not to give evidence in his defence then 
evidence of good character elicited in cross-examination or given by 
character witnesses, would not be relevant for any purpose, and the 
jury should be directed to disregard it. 
This consequence arose and was squarely faced by the trial judge in 
R V. Bryant and Oxley. 1 In this case the defendants were jointly 
charged with robbery. One defendant applied for leave to appeal 
against his conviction on the grounds that the trial judge had misdi- 
rected this jury in stating that evidence given of his good character 
went to credibility and, in the circumstances, had little relevance 
to the issue whether he had committed the offence. Watkins, J., 
giving the judgement of the court said: "If ..... as seems to be so 
the judge was intending to convey to the jury the impression that a 
good character is relevant only when a defendant gives evidence and, 
therefore, is a matter only to be taken into consideration when the 
credibility of what he and other witnesses have said is being asses- 
sed, he was being too restrictive about its possible uses. The 
possession of a good character is a matter which does go primarily to 
the issue of credibility. This has been made clear in a number of 
recent cases. But juries should be directed that it is capable of 
bearing a more general significance which is best illustrated by what 
was said by Williams, J., in R V. Stannard2: 'I have no doubt, if we 
were put to decide the unwelcome question, that evidence to character 
must be considered as evidence in the cause. It is evidence, as my 
1) (1979) Q. B. 108 
2) (1837) 7 C. & P. 673 at 675 
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brother Patterson has said, to be submitted to the jury, to induce 
them to say whether they think it likely that a person with such a 
character would have committed the offence..... '. 
We have no doubt that the omission to direct in this way in the' 
present case could not possibly have had the effect of rendering the 
jury's verdict unsafe or unsatisfactory". The application was 
refused. This decision, which is the most recent seems to have 
settled the position the way I will like to see it. While it appears 
to show less sympathy for the use of evidence of good character as a 
means of determining the likelihood that the person to whom the 
character is attributed did or did not do an act alleged, at the same 
time it clearly acknowledges and gives more sympathy to the view that 
evidence of good character does go the credit of the defendant. At 
the present day, evidence of the accused's good character would be no 
less admissible because he did not give evidence. In such a case his 
credibility would not be before the jury but he would have a right 
that they should know of his good character and take this into 
account in deciding whether he committed the crime. Clearly good 
character is also relevant to the accused's credibility. 
Historically, this was not its primary purpose. 
So, if I may now answer the first question on which we set out, 
that is, what is the purpose for which such evidence of good 
character is relevant; it is respectfully submitted that whether good 
character is a matter going primarily to credibility or to the 
accused's guilt must depend on the circumstances of the case and the 
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nature of the evidence of character tendered. 
It is not unusual to plead good character in mitigation of sentence 
1 
after an accused has been pronounced guilty. Norton cites the case 
of an Irish judge who summed up thus: "Gentlemen of the jury, there 
stands a boy of most excellent character, who has stolen six pairs of 
. silk stockings", when evidence was given as to the good character of 
a boy who had been clearly found guilty of theft. In Scotland, 
however, the practice is to allow all evidence to go to the jury 
including that for mitigation of punishment. 
In answering the second question whether or not the good character 
of an accused person can be used as a defence to criminal liability, 
I can safely say, that till today, the good character of an accused 
has a limitation to its use; its scope is clear. In criminal cases 
it is clear that a man's character is often a matter of importance in 
explaining his conduct and in judging his innocence or criminality. 
Going back to that interesting illustration given by Kenny, 
2, it 
follows that if a bishop should be caught in the act of "shoplif- 
ting", the episcopal character would merely appear to be unmerited; 
in other words, if the evidence of guilt be complete and convincing, 
testimony of previous good character cannot and ought not to avail; 
3 
and this has been realised from any early time-that such evidence 
should be of no avail against credible proof of the offence. 
4 
1) Norton, Evidence, at p. 231 
2) Kenny's Outline of Criminal Law at para. 612 
3) R V. Broadhurst, Meanly and Bliss Hill, (1918) 13 C. A. R. 85,125; 
(1918) 82 J. P. 194 
4) Rex V. Davison (1808) 31 St. Tr. 99,217; Reg V. Frost (1840) 
Gurney's Rep. 749; Rex V. Haigh (1813) 31 St. Tr. 1092,1122; R V. 
Turner (1664) 6 St. Tr. 565. 
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Where the doing of the act is not in dispute, because conceded, it 
has been said that -character no longer has any probative function, 
and it cannot be set up merely in excuse. In Drapers Trial, ' a case 
involving criminal libel; to the question, "Do you think the 
defendant is capable or incapable of publishing any statement of 
facts of the truth of which he was not perfectly convinced? " The 
answer, "Perfectly incapable" was given. Commenting on this in his 
judgement, Lord Ellenborough said: "I cannot suppose you mean it for 
any other purpose than as going in mitigation of punishment..... It 
cannot be offered in the shape of a defence. Good God! because one 
man says a thing and because I may believe what he says, - am I at 
liberty to disseminate it all over the world? There is no colour for 
it. I receive this for the purpose of mitigation of punishment. If 
the fact of publication were doubtful, and if it were referred to a 
man (as defendant) who had such a character given to him, this would 
be evidence to go the jury in answer to the charge, and in that way 
it would be most material. Here you do not dispute that fact". 
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing dicta and other dicta in other 
cases, that the good character of the accused cannot be used as a 
defence to a case which has been properly "brought home" to him, 
"Whether, when admitted, it should -be given weight except in a doub- 
tful case, or whether it may suffice of itself to create a doubt, is 
a mere question of the weight of evidence, with which the rules of 
admissibility have no concern". 
2 
In all cases, too, when evidence is admitted touching the general 
1) (1807) 30 How. St. Tr. 1018 
2) Wigmore On Evidence, Para. 56. 
character of the party, it ought manifestly to bear reference to the 
nature of the charge against him. So it is doubtful if evidence of 
good reputation for one type of conduct will be held relevant when 
another type of conduct by the accused is in question. For example, 
I 
it is doubtful if a good reputation for honesty will be held relevant 
In a charge for assault; or in an offence involving fraud or dishone- 
sty, whether the good reputation of the accused for sobriety or for 
being a total abstainer from alcoholic drinks or of being a quiet and 
unquarrelsome man - will be held relevant. On the other hand, I 
suppose this group of evidence will match each other, for instance, 
if he be accused of theft, that he has been reputed an honest man; if 
of treason, a man of loyalty. Such evidence must be general and not 
relate to particular instances. 
' 
Finally, the character proved 
must relate to a period proximate to the date of the supposed 
offence; for, as Lord Holt once remarked, in RV. Swendsen, 
2: "A man 
is not born a knave, there must be time to make him so; nor is he 
presently discovered after he becomes one". 
(ii) 
BAD CHARACTER 
In discussing evidence of bad character of the accused, I- would 
like to consider it, under two subheads, namely (a) bad character not 
in issue and (b) bad character in issue. 
(a) Character Not In Issue 
An attack by the prosecution,. on the accused's character is genera- 
1) R V. Rowton, 34L. J. M. C. 57 
2) (1702) 14 iiow. St. Tr. 596. 
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lly inadmissible; in otherwords, the prosecution is generally prohi- 
bited from adducing at the first instance, evidence of the bad chara- 
cter of the defendant when offered merely to show that-he is a bad 
man and hence more likely to commit a crime. In India, this common 
law rule is contained in section 54 of the Indian Evidence Act1 which 
provides: "In criminal proceedings the fact that the accused person 
has a bad character is irrelevant, unless evidence has been given 
that he has a good character, in which case it becomes relevant". 
Just now, we shall concern ourselves with only the first part of the 
section which deals with the general inadmissibility of evidence of 
accused's bad character at first instance; 
2 for example in Batasimani 
V. R, 3 the court held inadmissible, the opinion of an excise officer 
that an accused charged with illicit sale and possession of cocaine 
had the reputation of being dealer in cocaine on a very large scale. 
Section 68 (1) of the Nigeria Evidence Act provides that: "Except as 
provided in this section, the fact that an accused person is of bad 
character is irrelevant in criminal proceedings". 
The position in Scotland is precisely the same as stated above, as 
clearly demonstrated by the case of Burns V. Hart and Young. 
4 In 
this case, a woman, who kept a broker's shop, was tried before a 
sheriff and a jury, on a charge of theft, or reset of theft, and 
convicted of the latter crime. In the course of the trial, evidence 
was admitted that the panel was habite and repute a resetter, and on 
an appeal the conviction was set aside, on the grounds that this 
evidence was incompetent and ought not to have been admitted. 
1) This section was substituted for the original by section 6 of the 
Indian Evidence Act (1872) Amendment Act, 1891 (3 of 1891). 
2) R V. Behar y, 7 W. R. 7; R V. Bykant Nath, 10 W. R. Cr. 17; R V. Kulum 
Sheikh, 10 W. R. Cr. 39; Ili Myin V R., L. B. R. 4: 2 I. C. 249; Phekan 
V 
R., A 1931, P. 345; 133 I. C. 449; R V. Gopal Thakur, 6 W. R. Cr. 72. 
3) 53 C. 707: 30 C. W. N. 854.4) (1856) 2 Irv. 571, and in Gaya V. 
RA 1946 0 233 it was held that a magistrate looking into the confid- 
ential police records of the accused and allowing his judgement to be 
influenced thereby violates the fundamental principles of criminal 
jurisprudence. 
The position is no different in America, as eloquently shown by 
Peckham, J., in People V. Shea, 
1 he said: "Two antagonistic methods 
for the judicial investigation of crime and the conduct of criminal 
trials have existed for many years. One of these methods favours 
this kind of evidence, in order that the tribunal which is engaged in 
. the trial of 
the accused may have the benefit of the light to be 
derived from a record of the whole past life of the accused, his 
tendencies, his nature, his associates, his practices, all the facts 
which go to make up the life of a human being. This is the method 
which is pursued in France, and it is claimed that entire justice is 
more apt to be done where such course is pursued than where it is 
omitted. The common law of England, however, has adopted another, 
and, so far as the party accused is concerned, a much more merciful 
doctrine...... In order to prove his guilt, it is not permitted to 
show his former character, or to prove his guilt of other crimes, 
merely for the purpose of raising a presumption that he who would 
commit them would be more apt to commit the crime in question". I 
must say that I find the above statement by Peckham, J., quite apt, 
especially the ingenius way it contrasted the common law adversorial 
system of justice with the continental inquisitorial system; and with 
this, one can say the rule is clear beyond argument. I will like to 
make one interesting allusion, with regard to how meticulous the 
judges may sometimes be in applying the rule. In R V. Flanagan, 
2 the 
question before the court 
involved whether the accused was known by 
1) 147 N. Y. 78,41 N. E. 508 
2) (1945) V. L. R. 265 
another name. The accused stated on oath that a certain document was 
signed by his wife. The signature at the foot of this document was 
"Nellie Hennessy". The trial judge, Lowe, J., refused to allow the 
accused to be cross-examined as to whether he had ever gone under the 
name of Hennessy as a suggestion that he had been living under an 
alias might suggest to the jury that he was a person of bad charac- 
ter. 
This point was also emphasised in the Nigerian case of Lawal V. The 
State. 1 There the appellant was tried and convicted of murder by the 
High Court. Part of the evidence given by a prosecution witness 
against him reads: "I gave the accused and his friends money, because 
when you saw masquerades you would find these men behind them, at 
election campaigns you would find them there. I did this to avoid 
trouble. The accused persons and their friends are popularly known 
as 'Ohio boys'". In his closing address the prosecuting counsel 
invited the court to "take into consideration the character of the 
deceased and the accused person as revealed in evidence". One of the 
accused's grounds of appeal was that the court wrongly allowed evide- 
nce of the accused's bad character to be wrongly given. The Supreme 
Court of Nigeria agreed that the "evidence and the comment were 
undoubtedly of the most prejudicial kind" and held that even though 
there was certainly "evidence on which a jury properly directed 
would, have been justified in convicting the appellant of murder 
...... by a grave error 
the prosecution called evidence showing that 
the appellant was a man of bad character, given to acts of violence, 
1) (1966) 1 All N. L. R. 107; See also Per. Blackall P., in R V. Osita 
Agwun (1949) 12 W. A. C. A 456; 
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and cross-examined the appellant to the same effect, although none of 
the circumstances in which such questions are admissible was pre- 
sent". The accused had not put his character in issue by giving 
evidence of his good character or asking questions which tended to 
involve imputation on the character of the prosecutor nor did he give 
. evidence against any other person charged with the same offence under 
section 159 (d)1 and section 68 (2) of the Nigeria Evidence Act. On 
this ground alone, the conviction was quashed. Similarly in the 
Irish case of The People (Attorney General) V. Lehan, 2 the appellant 
was convicted of the murder of his wife. At his trial when he had 
given evidence in his own defence, counsel for the prosecution cross- 
examined him in order to show, (a) that he was a deserter from the 
U. S. Forces, and (b) that he had at different times assumed different 
names; although he had at no time put his character is issue. Ma- 
guire, P., in his judgement observed as follows: "The first point 
made was that the accused was cross-examined in a manner contrary to 
section 1 of the Criminal Justice (Evidence) Act, 1924 (Ireland)3. 
The objection was directed to certain questions included in the group 
of questions numbered 107 to 262 on the seventh day of the trial.... 
In view of the conclusions reached by this court it is not desirable 
to particularise further this objection. It was sought to justify 
this cross-examination by reference to the proviso, paragraphs (i) 
and (ii), 
, 
contained in the section. In the opinion of this court the 
specified questions were irrelevant to any issue in the case and 
1) See s. 1 (f) Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 
2) (1947) I. R. 133 
3) See s. 1 (f) of The Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 
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tended in the eyes of the jury to prejudice the accused who had done 
nothing to deprive himself of the protection of the proviso". 
From all that has been said, the rule can be described as firmly 
and universally established in policy and tradition that the 
prosecution may not initially attack the accused's character. 
' 
It is however important to mention that a voluntary statement by 
the accused, which is admissible in evidence is not excluded merely 
because it incidentally betrays his previous bad character. A good 
illustration of this is, H. M. A. V. McFadyen: 2 here the accused was 
tried in the High Court of Glasgow, on. a charge of attempted house- 
breaking. In the course of the cross-examination of a police 
officer, who was a witness for the crown, the Advocate Depute asked 
the witness the following questions: (Q) "At the police office, was 
McFadyen charged and duly cautioned? " (A) "Yes". (Q) "What did he say 
after being cautioned? " Counsel for the panel objected to the 
question on the grounds of the nature of the answer which would be 
given. He did not dispute that, as a general rule, it was competent 
to lead evidence as to a voluntary statement made by an accused 
person who had been duly cautioned, but he contended that it was 
incompetent where the statement involved the previous character of 
the accused, and where the question and answer constituted, to all 
intents and purposes, an attack upon the accused's character. He 
argued that it was settled law that the prosecutor was not allowed to 
lead evidence of previous bad character (except in special 
circumstances, not here in point) and what the crown was now trying 
1) See Downey V. State (1897) 115 Ala. 108,22 So. 479; see also 
State V. Moelchen (1880) 53 Ia. 310,313,5 N. W. 186 
2) (1926 J. C. 93 
to do was to evade this rule of law. In his judgement, Lord 
Moncrieff held that evidence as to voluntary statement made by a 
prisoner to the police, after being cautioned, was admissible, al- 
though the effect of the statement was to indicate the previous bad 
character of the accused. The question was then put, and the answer 
was that the panel said: "The idea is ridiculous, it is big things I 
go in for". 
A similar decision as in McFadyen's' case was recorded in Turner V. 
Underwood2. Here the defendant was charged before the justices with 
indecent behaviour in a railway carriage to the annoyance of a fellow 
passenger contrary to one of the bye-laws of the railway company. On 
complaint being made to a railway police sergeant, the accused after 
being duly cautioned made a voluntary statement in the course of 
which he said: "I have done time for this before". The whole state- 
ment was read out at the trial as part of the evidence for'the 
prosecution. It was contended that the evidence of the defendant's 
having used those words was inadmissible as being tantamount to 
evidence of a previous conviction: (a previous conviction is relevant 
as evidence of bad character3). The court in its judgement held as 
follows; first, although as a general rule it was the practice in 
jury cases that where the court knew of something in'a defendant's 
statement which admitted a previous conviction or which otherwise 
reflected on his character it would not allow that part of the state- 
ment to be read out to the jury, nevertheless it was not a rule of 
1) (1926) J. C. 93 
2) (1948) 2 K. B. 284 
3) R V. Winfield (1939) 4 All. E. R. 164; see also section 68 (4), 
Nigeria Evidence Act; section 54, Explanation 2 of Indian Evidence Act 
- see Post. 
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law that what a man said in relation to the charge was not evidence 
against him. Secondly, the evidence to which objection had been 
taken was relevant in as much as it showed that the defendant was 
admitting that his conduct was a deliberate act of indecency. Final- 
ly, as such the evidence was rightly admitted. 
'RATIONALE 
The general rule having been properly stated, I think it would be 
appropriate to consider the reasoning or motivation behind the rule, 
recognising fully well that the relevancy of evidence of bad charac- 
ter has never been doubted and yet it is generally excluded. It has 
been said that-this policy of the Anglo-American law is more or less 
due to the inborn sporting instinct of Anglo-Normandon - the instinct 
of giving the game fair play even at the expense of efficiency of 
procedure. Even though it is arguable that the-rule does not in any 
way inhibit the efficiency of procedure, and that as a matter of fact 
if anything, it enhances it, one thing can however not be denied, and 
that is that, as a pure question of policy, the doctrine is and can 
be supported as one better calculated than the opposite to lead to 
just verdicts. The deep tendency of human nature to punish, not 
because our victim is guilty this time, but because he is a bad man 
and may as well be condemned now that he is caught, is a tendency 
which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in or out of court, and 
this is something that must be strongly guarged against. It is 
incontrovertible that there is just as much probative value in the 
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argument, "A is quarrelsome, therefore he probably committed this 
assault", as in the argument, "A is peaceful, therefore he probably 
did not commit the assault; " and this is acknowledged in judicial 
opinion. 
' Here, however, a dotrine of Auxilliary Policy, 
2 operates 
to exclude what is relevant, - the policy of avoiding the uncontrol- 
lable and undue prejudice, and possible unjust condemnation, which 
such evidence might induce. 
3 Before going into the possible ratio- 
nales of the rule, I would like to bring out clearly some of the 
delicate and dangerous problems the rule has managed to avoid, that 
way, we will appreciate better the reasoning behind this rule of 
evidence. 
A good illustration of the impact of the use of evidence of bad 
character and its potentially prejudicial operation is illustrated in 
Camus' novel 'The Outsider'. 
4 Meursault, a young French Algerian, 
was being tried for the murder of an Arab, whom he was alleged to 
rave shot on the beach, outside Algiers. Coincidentally, the shoo- 
ting took place a few days after his mother's death in an old age 
home. The court, as was the custom, saw fit to allow wide ranging 
character evidence to be admitted. The Warden and gatekeeper of the 
home gave evidence and Meursault recounts this court room scene: "To 
another question he (the warden) replied that on the day of the 
funeral, he was surprised by my calmness. Asked to explain what he 
meant by 'my calmness', the warden lowered his eyes and stared at his 
shoes for a moment. Then he explained that I hadn't wanted to see my 
mother's body, or shed a single tear, and that I'd left immediately 
1) See Ante 
2) See Wigmore On Evidence, § 29a 
3) The reasons for the rule were well and consisely put in a letter 
from the celebrated Dr. Parr to Sir S. Romily, in 1811 (Life of Romily, 
3d ed., II 180); See also Wigmore On Evidence, § 57. 
4) Penguin Modern Classics, 1971 at pp. 90 - 91 
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the funeral ended, 'without lingering at her grave. Another thing had 
surprised him. One of the undertaker's men told him that I didn't 
know my mother's age..... 
The prosecutor was then asked if he had any questions to put, and 
he answered loudly: 'Certainly not! I have all I want'. His tone 
and the look of triumph on his face, as he glanced at me, were so 
marked that I felt as I hadn't felt for ages. I had a foolish desire 
to burst into tears. For the first time I had realised how all these 
people loathed me. After asking the jury and my lawyer if they had 
any questions, the judge heard the doorkeepers evidence. On stepping 
into the box, the man threw a glance at me, then looked away. Repl- 
ying to questions, he said that I'd declinded to see my mother's 
body, I'd smoked cigarettes and slept, and drank cafe au , 
last. It 
was then I felt a sort of wave of indignation spreading through the 
court room, and for the first time I understood that I was guilty". 
The character evidence in this illustration is quite unrelated to the 
issue, but the prejudicial effect is overwhelming. I unhesitatingly 
agree with Wigmore, 
1 that it was perhaps because of this possible 
prejudicial effect on juries that for a period of time in English 
legal history the use of character evidence (essentially. bad charac- 
ter) was in disrepute, epitomized by the abolition of its use in 
criminal cases. 
In another book, 
2 the author, Judge Wiglittle, talking in the light 
of experience, wittily demonstrates the problem the general rule has 
1) Wigmore On Evidence at p. 451 
2) 'Ten Years a Police Court Judge', (1884) at p. 166 
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averted, with a strikingly typical conversation. The passage reads: 
"Take, for instance, an illustration of the uncasable crimes, the 
following: A man has had his horse stolen out of the barn. No matter 
whether a good horse or poor, here is something that law is bound to 
take notice of - that is to say, law is bound to open its ears and 
hearken to all that may be said on the subject. The fact that the 
horse is stolen is indisuptable, because the owner avers it. So far 
so good. Here is a foundation for a case, and nothing is lacking but 
the superstructure. For the rearing of that, the grave inquiry 
arises who stole the beast? The owner has not the slightest doubt 
in his mind that Ned Hubbard is the thief, and against Ned Hubbard he 
wants a warrant. 'What, Mr. Johnson, is the basis of your belief in 
Ned Hubbard's culpability? ' 'Why, it is just like him'. 'Anythig 
more? ' 'Yes; he was seen 'round my barn'. 'Has he since departed the 
vicinage, or does he continue at his usual place of abode? ' 'Oh! he's 
'round the same as ever, and that's just like him too. He's throwing 
dust, but he dusted off with the horse all the same'. 'Do you trace 
him to any act of taking or having the animal in his possession? ' 
'Well, no; as to that I can't say I do; but just put a warrant on 
him, and he'll show the white feather fast enough. I know him'. 
'But no warrant should issue against a fellow citizen unless for 
probable cause as shown by evidence more or less specific, tending to 
incriminate him'. 'Fellow citizen! The place for such fellow citi- 
tens as Ned Hubbard is state prison'. 'Granted if he have done 
aught to send him thither'. 'Well, I've told you what I know about 
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it'. 'True; but have you told me aught that is specific or even 
specious? ' 'Your'e the judge I suppose'. 'Exactly'. Exit Mr. 
Johnson, who goes abroad to dissiminate prejudice against the court. 
Logically speaking, as earlier observed, there is a natural incli- 
nation to say that, an antecedent bad character is as reasonble a 
-ground for the presumption of guilt as previous good character 
for the 
presumption of innocence. The soundness of such a view, however, may 
fairly be doubted. If we know that a man is generally respected for 
integrity and a blameless life, and believe that his nature and 
disposition are truely represented by the outward show, the natural 
conclusion is that it is extremely unlikely that he should be guilty 
of fraud, of highway robbery or murder, and unless the evidence 
against him be overwhelming, our mental attitude is likely to be that 
there is at least a reasonable doubt whether he could have committed 
the crime of which he is accused - in other words, the case is not 
conclusively made out and he ought to be acquitted. If, on the 
contrary, we are informed that he was a man of bad character, there 
is no room, as in the case just discussed, for the evidence to 
be 
corrected and a doubt raised on account of his character - and if it 
had any weight at all it would incline us to say that the probability 
of his being the culprit as raised by the evidence of facts was 
strengthened. 
A-number of arguments and issues can be raised. For example, it is 
arguable that the evidence of bad character ought not to go any 
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further, were it admitted, than to show that there was no inherent 
improbability in the supposition that the accused might have 
committed the particular crime in question. The only problem with 
this line of argument is that, constituted as the bulk of mankind is, 
not given to nice distinctions or severe logic, it would be very 
likely to go further, and it is therefore wisely excluded, whether 
strictly relevant or not. The point was deliberated upon in R V. 
Rowton, 1 a case with which facts we are quite familiar. In his 
judgement Willes, J., said: "(Character evidence) is strictly 
relevant to the issue; but it is not admissible upon the part of the 
prosecution because (as my brother Martin says) if the prosecution 
were allowed to go into such evidence, we should have the whole life 
of the prisoner ripped up, and, as has been witnessed elsewhere, upon 
a trial for murder you might begin by showing that when a boy at 
school the prisoner had robbed an orchard, and so on through the 
whole of his life; and the result would be that the man on his trial 
might be overwhelmed by prejudice, instead of being convicted by that 
affirmative evidence which the law of this country requires. The 
evidence is relevant to this issue, but is excluded for reasons of 
policy and humanity; because although by admitting it you might 
arrive at justice in one case out of a hundred, you would probably do 
injustice to the other ninety nine". Martin, B.: "There would be 
great danger that the prisoner would be tried on the evidence of 
character, instead of on that bearing more directly upon the offence 
charged". 
1) (1865) Leigh & Co 520,540 
Some people see the issue in a wider perspective and address their 
reason for the rule as such, with a concern for the morality of any 
rule to the contrary. Verplanck observed in People V. White': "The 
rule and practice of our law in relation to evidence of character 
rests on the deepest principles of truth and justice. The protection 
of the law is due alike to the righteous and unrighteous. The sun of 
justice shines for the evil and the good, the just and the unjust. 
Crime must be proved, not presumed; on the contrary, the most vicious 
is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The admission of a 
contrary rule, even in any degree, would open a door not only to 
direct oppression of those who are vicious because they are ignorant 
and weak, but even to the operation of prejudices as to religion, 
politics, character, professions, manners, upon the minds of honest 
and well-intentiond jurors". The last bit of this statement is 
however, open to question. 
In Darling V. Westmoreland, 
2 Doe, i, succinctly observed that: 
"(There is) an exception (which is a peculiarity of precedents of 
English origin) excluding relevant evidence of a defendant's general 
and notorious disposition to commit such crimes or torts as that with 
which he is charged.... That such evidence is relevant, the law 
acknowledges by receiving, in criminal'cases and in some civil cases, 
evidence of a defendant's good character in his favour, and allowing 
such evidence to be rebutted; and by receiving evidence of the 
character of witnesses and of other persons. The exclusion of such 
1) (1840) 24 Wend. 574 
2) (1872) 52 N. H. 401,406 
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evidence is a plain departure from the general principle which admits 
relevant and material evidence. There is reason to believe that this 
exception originated in a usurpation of legislative power by English 
judges, led by a merciful impulse to mitigate the cruelty of a 
bloody criminal code by throwing obstacles in the way of its 
operation". 
On the whole, may I remark that even if this part of the law of 
evidence were regarded as an anomaly, it is not the only anomaly one 
can point to in the criminal law of evidence. It is undoubtedly true 
as aptly pointed out in some of the dicta above, and from the general 
history of rules of criminal evidence, that many of the rules of 
evidence, have their origin in the Draconian severity of criminal 
law, especially in the 18th and part of the 19th century. This 
resulted in the consequent unwillingness of judges as well as juries 
to convict, where for a trifling offence the only sentence provided 
was that of death, all felonies being so punishable. This does'not 
however, mean that there is only one sole'rationale for the rule that 
prohibits evidence of bad character in the first instance by the 
prosecution. For instance, it is true that such evidence when led 
generally, would only injure the accused by creating a prejudice 
against hint for, a man's guilt is to be established by proof of the 
facts and not by proof of his character. 
' It is equally true that 
when character is not in issue, to admit evidence of bad character is 
to cause surprise and create bias, quite often against the accused. 
Having made the point that a number of reasons may have motivated the 
1) R V. Turburfield, 10 Cox, 1; See also Amrita V. R., 42 C. 958 p. 
1021. 
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rule, it is indeed my belief that the main reason for the rule is 
more as a result of policy and humanity rather than any, scientifit 
considerations as to the strict relevancy of the evidence in 
question. 
' Just as every person is assumed to be sane, an accused is 
assumed and should be assumed to be of normal moral character. There 
is therefore no need to prove character until his character is 
brought into question. 
(b) Character In Issue 
In criminal cases, the obvious prejudice to an accused, likely to 
result from any exposition of his bad character has led to consider- 
able reluctance in entertaining evidence of offences which makes a 
man's bad character part of the case against him. It is thus clear 
with regard to previous bad character, that the common law, and the 
legislatures in the respective countries with statutory provisions 
in this respect, in their anxiety that persons on trial should be 
treated with all possible fairness and even indulgence have as far as 
possible excluded evidence of bad character, apart from the special 
cases in which a person's bad character becomes or is a fact in 
issue. It is my intention to undertake the present discussion under 
two subheads. The first is when character becomes a matter in issue 
or rather is put in issue; in such a case, evidence of bad character 
becomes admissible, the second is when character is itself in issue; 
likewise in such a case evidence of bad character is admissbile, but 
there is certainly a marked distinction between the two. In the 
former, usually, it occurs when the accused either by himself or 
1) See Per Cockburn, L. C. J. and Willes, J., in Reg V. Rowton (1865) 
10 Cox C. C. 25; 34 L. J. M. C. 57. 
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through witnesses adduces evidence of his good character. As I 
shall reveal in a moment, this had generated quite some debate in the 
past, but the position of the law is quite settled today. On the 
other hand, the latter occurs in a limited number of cases. Such 
occasions in criminal cases are almost always because some aspect of 
character is an essential element of the offence (hence, in issue in 
the cases) and so may be proved by evidence like any other fact in 
issue. It appears that the distinction I am driving at is appre- 
ciated in the countries where this rule of evidence is contained in a 
statute. I hope that this point is put beyond argument by section 68 
(2) (a) and (b) of the Nigeria Evidence Act1 which states: "(2) The 
Fact that an accused person is of bad character is relevant - (a) 
when the bad character of the accused person is a fact in issue; (b) 
when the accused person has given evidence of his good character". 
In India, section 54 of the Indian Evidence Act2 provides as follows: 
"In criminal proceedings the fact that the accused person has a bad 
character is irrelevant UNLESS evidence has been given that he has a 
good character, in which case it becomes relevant. 
Explanation 1- This section does not apply to cases in which the 
bad character of any person is itself a fact in issue". 
i 
. suppose 
the statutes have made clear the need to sub divide the 
discussion at this junction; but before that there is one important 
addition to be made as section 68 (4) of the Nigeria Evidence Act 
shows. It states that "Whenever evidence of bad. character is 
1) Cap. 62, Laws of The Federation of Nigeria. 
2) This section was substituted for the original section 6 of The 
Indian Evidence Act (1872) Amendment Act, 1891 (3 of 1891) 
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relevant evidence of a previous conviction is also relevant". 
Explanation 2 to section 54 of the Indian Evidence Act similarly 
provides that "A previous conviction is relevant as evidence of bad 
character"; both explicitly saying the same thing. Now, going back 
to the discussion, I will like to follow the sequence adopted under 
section 54 of India Evidence Act, in the present discussion, purely 
for convenience, and that means I shall start by considering the 
situations when the accused bad character can be given in evidence as 
a result of his having given evidence of his own good character. 
As we know, the Indian Evidence Act came into operation in 1872, 
while the Nigeria Evidence Act came into operation in 1945, and it is 
clear that they both derive from the common law rules, both countries 
being members of the common wealth, with common historical back- 
ground. There is no doubt in my mind, that what the above sections 
embody is the common law rule as stated in R V. Rowton, 
1a 
case which 
predates both Acts; the case decided inter alia that evidence of bad 
character cannot in the first instance be given for the prosecution 
against the prisoner, but after a defendant has attempted to show his 
good character in his own evidence, prosecution may in rebuttal offer 
evidence of his bad character. It is interesting to note that the 
court in this case was not unanimous on that point. This dissension 
is significant as it contains some strong and germane criticisms 
worthy of consideration. Ironically, one can say that it was this 
case that gave the rule prominence and a lasting seal of authority. 
I intend to quote extensively from the case of R V. Rowton, 
2 being 
1) (1865) 34 L. J. M. C. 57 
2) (1865) Leigh & C. 520 
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the main authority on the issue, where all the arguments for and 
against were well put forward. I suppose there is no need to go into 
the facts again as we are quite familiar with it by now and I will 
like to commence with the dissension from no less a person than 
Martin B? He observed as follows: "... a practice has sprung up that 
witnesses are admitted to be called when a man is charged with an 
offence of any kind to give evidence as to his good character with 
respect to that-species of crime charged against him, and the likli- 
hood of his committing this crime. It seems to me that this is an 
anomaly. I gather from the books that it was permitted in favorem 
vitae, not as bearing upon the issue, but as a matter which was 
permitted by the benignity of the law to be given in evidence, and 
that occurred as long as two hundred years ago. In no one single 
instance during the whole of that period has evidence of general bad 
character been given. No case can be cited of any trial that has 
ever taken place on which such evidence was admitted. It is quite 
true that in several text books it is stated that such evidence is 
admissible, and the authors of those text books are persons whose 
expression of opinion is worthy, of the highest possible considera- 
tion. Not one of them has cited an instance in which the thing has 
been done. I am not at all unconscious of the strength of the 
observations made by the Lord Chief Justice. It is a common practice 
that when the counsel for the prisoner intimates an opinion about 
hearing witnesses to character, the counsel for the prosecution say 
1) (1865) 10 Cox C. C. Pp. 35 - 37 
- 615 - 
'Be careful what you are doing, for you may injure your client's 
cause'".. Making a somewhat cryptic admission, he continued; "On the 
other hand no doubt if this evidence in reply is admissible, there 
would be a stronger reason for it". To which he added with alacrity: 
"But what I rely on is that no single instance has been adduced.... 
in which evidence of this sort has been admitted, and therefore the 
doubt at present on my mind leads me to the conclusion that the 
better way of treating the matter is, not as though evidence to good 
character is an anomaly, but proceeding on a course of precedents, 
that it will be better to leave it as it stands. I own I do not know 
that much evil will arise from it, for probably not withstanding this 
judgement the criminal trials will go on pretty much in the way that 
they have hitherto done, but such is the extreme mischief of given 
evidence of bad character, given with a speech by the counsel for the 
defendant that he would be entitled to give, and then a general reply 
by the counsel for the prosecution upon the matter, that I can see 
cases in which far too much weight would be placed on such evidence 
of general bad character, and on which convictions might be obtained 
when convictions ought not to be got. If it rested with me I should 
take time for further consideration; but when I find that my learned 
brothers are of the opinion that the evidence is admissible, I can 
say nothing but that I concur with them, although I am disposed to 
act on what has been so far as I know the universal practice and the 
precedents for the last two hundred years. I do not myself believe 
that the course of the administration of the criminal law would be 
- 616 - 
altered by it. The matter may be carried to a greater extent. Sup- 
pose a man tried for a robbery in the street, and evidence given as 
to his good character, and a policeman is called to say that he had 
known him for years as a common thief in the street, and that he has 
been apprehended a dozen times,.. that he apprehended him himself, and 
that would appear from the decision of the magistrates - the man 
being tried for the offence with which he is charged, he is in 
reality tried on the evidence of generally being a, thief. It would 
be better to confine the real offence to that which is established by 
the evidence' applicable to it, leaving the evidence of character to 
make what weight it may with the jury without allowing any reply. I 
acquiesce in the opinion of the majority of my learned brethen, and 
of course will act upon their view in any court in which I may be 
called upon to act". Whatever Martin, B., may say in the last sente- 
nce, we are put in no doubt about his position. As I said earlier, 
he has some pertinent points with which to buttress his argument, but 
for now I will not comment, perhaps it will be better to consider the 
views expressed by the other judges in their judgements first, 
especially as they seem to answer most of the issues and questions 
raised in his judgement. Then we can see how much the answers put 
forward by the other judges have managed to detract from the strength 
of Martin B's argument. However, it is worth mentioning that in 
actual fact, Martin. B., had expresssed a similar though not as 
detailed view as above in the earlier case of Rec. V. Burt. 
' In that 
1) (1851) 5 Cox. C. C. 284 
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case, the accused, Burt, was indicted with other persons for stealing 
from a dwelling house with a count charging as a reciever. The 
prisoner, called a witness who gave evidence of his general good 
character. The prosecution, then proposed to give evidence of the 
prisoner's general bad character but Martin B., cut in saying: "I 
think you cannot do that". He was referred by the prosecution to 
Russel on Crimes where it said, "the prosecutor cannot enter into 
the defendant's character unless the defendant enable him to do so by 
calling witnesses in support of it; and even then the prosecutor 
cannot examine to particular facts, the general character of the 
defendant not being in issue, but coming in collaterally; " referring 
in a note to Buller's Nisi Prius, 
2 
citing Martyn V. Hind. 
3 However, 
Martin, B., retorted that "the authority cited from Russel is very 
old. Independently of other objections, the course would be very 
inconvenient in practice.... ". On the following day, Martin, B., 
4 
said: "With reference to the case of Burt, in which a question was 
yesterday raised, of whether or not after a witness had given eviden- 
ce of the prisoner's good character, it was open to the counsel for 
the prosecution to give evidence of the prisoners general bad charac- 
ter, I have consulted my brother Erle, and he agrees with me in 
thinking such evidence inadmissible. He says he has never known such 
a course pursued, and thinks it ought not to be allowed". 
One interesting fact that emerges from Reg V. Burt5 is that while 
Martin, B., maintains his view in R V. Rowton, 6 as we have already 
seen, Erle C. J., appears to have made a volte-face by the time of 
1) Russel On Crimes by Greaves, 
2) at p. 296 
3) Cowper's Rep. p. 437 
4) (1851) 5 Cox C. C. at p. 285 
5) (1851) 5 cox C. C. 284 
6) (1865) 10 Cox C. C. 25 
p. 786 
Rowton's case. (I assume it was the same Erle C. J., in Rowton's 
case, that Martin, B., asked for his opinion in Burt's case. ) Erle 
C. J., 
1 
without making any allusion to Reg V. Burt, (not totally 
surprising as Martin, B., did not either in his judgement) observed 
as follows: "I concur with the Lord Chief Justice in many parts of 
the judgement that he has just delivered. The admissibility of 
character for the prisoner stands on peculiar grounds, and the ques- 
tion of the admissibility of witnesses to say that that character is 
undeserved is now brought for the first time for adjudication before 
the court. I take the progress of our law to be according to the' 
great interests of society, and so the law is adapted with respect to 
the admissibility of evidence, and it ought to be regulated by atten- 
ding carefully to the interest of truth. If a prisoner having a bad 
character proposes to adduce witnesses to mislead the court by saying 
that he has a good character, contrary to the interest of truth, then 
the falsehood should be removed, and I quite agree with the Lord 
Chief Justice that the evidence in reply in this case was admissible, 
and that the first question ought to be answered accordingly". Be- 
fore going on to the judgement given by Cockburn, Lord Chief Justice, 
I would like to' observe that the above statement from Erle, C. J. 's 
judgement does not strike me at all as that of somebody who might 
have held'a contrary view before, infact he satisfactorily marshalled 
his points and I find his argument quite convincing. 
2 
After alluding to the questions before the court, Cockburn, C. J., 
1) Ibid at p. 32 
2) Ibid at p. 28 
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continued: "..... the first, whether when evidence in favour of the 
character of the prisoner has been given on his behalf, evidence of 
bad character can be adduced upon the part of the prosecution to 
rebut the evidence so given. I am clearly of the opinion that such 
evidence may properly be received. It is true, that probably in the 
experience of all of us no occasion has presented itself when such 
evidence has been given on the part of the prosecution. That may be 
easily explained by the circumstance that it seldom happens that 
evidence is called to the character of a prisoner, when those who 
represented the prisoner are aware that the character will be liable 
to be rebutted. Notice is often given from a sense or spirit of 
fairness by the prosecuting counsel, that if any attempt is made to 
set up the character of the prisoner against the facts adduced on the 
part of the prosecution, that will be met either. by a rigourous 
cross-examination or rebutting evidence; but it seems to me when we 
come to consider whether'such evidence is admissible, speaking logi- 
cally and reasonably, it is impossible to come to any other than one 
conclusion. It has been put, that evidence in favour of the charac- 
ter of a person on his trial raises a collateral issue. I can hardly 
think that it is a collateral. issue in the proper sense of, the term; 
it becomes one of the pivots on which the jury are to found their 
verdict and take into consideration with the evidence; and if the 
prisoner thinks proper to raise that issue as one of the elements for 
the consideration of the jury, nothing can be more unfair or unjust, 
and fata 
Il 
to the proper administration of justice, than that the 
evidence should go to the jury altogether one-sided in its nature, 
and that the prisoner should have on the consideration of his guilt 
or innocence, the advantage of an assumed unblemished character, when 
in point of fact, if his true character was known, it would be found 
to be just the reverse; and therefore that is a ground and reasonable 
ground for not excluding it". It is significant to mention that all 
the other judges including Martin, B., submitted a concurrence, and I 
do too. Finally, to the judgement given by Willes J., 
1 
which I must 
say I find somehow intrueguing in the sense that while on the one 
hand he confessed his support for the decision given by Martin, B., 
on the other hand for some unknown reason, he chose to follow the 
contrary viewpoint. He said, "With respect to the first question 
whether evidence was admissible on the part of the prosecution to 
answer evidence of character given by the prisoner, I own that I 
should be glad if the court could have come to the conclusion that 
such evidence should be rejected, and that for the reasons stated by 
my brother Martin; " The statement so far puts us in no doubt about 
his (Willes, J., ) own personal view. However he went on and said, 
"but I am clearly of opinion that the court could not come to that 
conclusion, because looking to the statements in the books of prac- 
tice, and especially those in the works of Roscoe, Phillips and 
Starkie, I think it is clear that such evidence must have been given 
for a series of years, and the practice must have been settled as 
stated. The learned writers have stated the fact, and they could not 
1) (1865) 10 Cox C. C. at p. 37 
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have derived their information from reported cases, because no such 
cases have been referred to, notwithstanding the industry of counsel. 
They must have spoken from practice, and what they had observed. My 
reason, therefore, for believing that this evidence is admissible is 
founded altogether upon the fact that such has, I believe, in former 
times been the practice, to a sufficient extent to settle the law; 
arid the fact that we find no case reported in which such evidence was 
given does not operate upon my mind, because the trials at which such 
a question could have arisen are not reported. There were not Nisi 
Prius reports until at a comparatively recent period. I must agree 
therefore, that the evidence was admissible. I have stated I should 
have been glad if I could hold that it was not, because I cannot help 
thinking that such a course is exceedingly unusual, and is one for 
which no precedent can be produced, and of which there is no informa- 
tion at the bar or upon the bench, and whatever may be the law upon 
the subject, it has been found inconvenient that that course should 
be resorted to, and it has become in modern times obsolete. However, 
as our law is not subject to a negative prescription, I must hold, as 
it appears to be settled that such evidence could be given when a 
person claims it for the interests of the cause he represents, that 
the judge is bound to receive it". There is a noticeable vacillation 
in Willes. C. J. 's judgement and it is a significant sympton of indeci- 
sion, which way to go, but I'm in no doubt that his sympathy lies 
with Martin, B., as he seems to emphasise over and over that he will 
settle for the opposing viewpoint just on the ground-that the'learned 
writers he cited had so pronounced. I must say that I find such a 
position uninspiring, he should have clearly pitched his tent one way 
or the other. Save for Erle, C. J. 's judgement, all the other judges 
appear to have repeated over and over the inavailability of any 
precedents on this point, and I think that is fallacious. To start 
with, the case of Reg V. Burt, 
1 considered the question, the deci- 
sion may have been though unacceptable to the court in Rowton's case. 
In R V. Burt, outside the citing of the learned writers, the case of 
Martyn V. Hind2 was cited to support the fact that the prosecution 
could adduce evidence of bad character if the defence gives evidence 
of good character. Furthermore, the cases of R V. Harrison, 
3 
and R 
V. Hampden4 show that since the last decade of the 17th century, the 
common law rule has been that the prosecution can tender evidence of 
bad character. These cases were apparently not brought to the atten- 
tion of the judges, and since a good part of Martin, B's argument 
rested on the ground that there were no decisions to back up the 
writers, it appears his position must be tenuous if not totally 
groundless. I would think that the reason the text books did not 
contain the cases is because they were written very long ago, and 
were not revised with time as we have today. However, it must be 
said that Martin, B., made some significant points like the mischief 
of giving evidence of bad character; this fact cannot be denied as 
evidenced in my earlier discussion, but in those cases, what has been 
anticipated was evidence of bad character given in first instance, 
1) (1851) 5 cox C. C. 284 
2) Cowper's Rep. p. 437 
3) (1692) St. Tr. 833,864 
4) (1684) 9 St. Tr. 1053,1103 
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and not in reply to evidence of good character. In that sense, I 
find myself agreeing with the view of Erle C. J. 
i 
when he said, "If a 
prisoner having a bad character proposes to adduce witnesses to 
mislead the court by saying that he has a good character, contrary to 
the interest of truth, then the falsehood should be removed...... ". 
2 
This is well in line with the view expressed by Cockburn, C. J., when 
he said: ".... if the prisoner thinks proper to raise that issue 
(good character) as one of the elements for the consideration of the 
jury, nothing can be more unfair or unjust, and fatal to the proper 
administration of justice, than that the evidence should go to the 
jury altogether one sided in its nature, and that the prisoner should 
have, on the consideration of his guilt or innocence, the advantage 
of an assumed unblemished character, when in point of fact, if his 
true character was known, it would be found to be just the reverse; " 
and I totally agree with the viewpoint. Clearly, the two main 
grounds on which Martin, B. 's argument was based has given way, so 
the argument cannot stand, just as Willes, J. 's3 sympathy can now be 
seen as freakish. In the United States, the propriety of such evide- 
nce has been uniformly conceded as the case of United States V. 
Holmes4 reveals. Clifford, J., in his judgement in the case said: 
"Such- evidence (referring to bad character) is never admitted until 
the accused .... has laid the foundation for its introduction by 
offering evidence to show that he is of good character, and then the 
counterproof is properly admitted as rebutting testimony". In Lord 
Mansfield's phrase, the defendant, *by going into his own character 
1) (1865) 10 Cox c. C. at p. 32 
2) (1865) 10 Cox C. C. at p. 28; see also Alderson, 
C. J. In R V. Shrimpton (1851) 2 Den. *Cr. C. 322; 
3) (1865) 10 Cox C. C. at p. 37 
4) (1858) 1 Cliff. 111,115 Fed. Cas. 382 
5) 2 Atk. 339 
B., and Campbell 
gives "a challenge to the prosecutor". 
Problems however arise as to the application of the rule 
_in 
some 
cases, for instance when one has to distinguish between evidence of 
bad character and moral character and demeanours. Such a situation 
arose in Attorney General V. Cornelius O'leary and Hannah O'leary. 
1 
In this case, two prisoners, brother and sister, charged jointly with 
the murder of another brother, were convicted and sentenced to death. 
During the course of the trial, the following questions were put by 
the judge to one of the witnesses: - The Judge: "What kind of a woman 
was Hannah (the female prisoner) in disposition - was she cross? " 
Witness: "She was not cross to us". The Judge: "Had you any opportu- 
nity of observing her demeanour about her own place? Was she cross 
or good tempered? " Witness: "When she would meet us she would not 
want to talk. That is how she would treat us". The Judge: "Was she 
different from Mary Anne (another sister)? " Witness: "Yes, she was". 
The Judge: "Mary Anne was a good tempered, pleasant woman? " Witness: 
"Yes, my Lord". On appeal to the court of criminal appeal, objection 
was taken, on behalf of the prisoners to the admissibility of this as 
evidence; it was submitted that it was evidence of the bad character 
or disposition of the female prisoner, which could only be admitted 
if evidence had first been offered by her as to her own good charac- 
ter; and could only be proved by evidence of general reputation and 
not by the experience of the particular witness. The court held that 
the evidence and the answers of the witness did not refer to moral 
1) (1926) Ir. Rep. 445 
character, nor to general * reputation, nor to a moral disposition or 
tendency to commit the crime of murder; and that the witness stated 
nothing but the demeanour and manners of the prisoner and of her 
sister as manifested to the witness, and accordingly, as the evidence 
was, in the circumstances, relevant, the objection to its admissibi- 
lity was unsustainable. In his speech to the court, Kennedy, C. J., 
1 
distinguished O'leary's case from Rowton's case. He said: ".... 
objection has been most pressed with reference to four questions put 
by the judge to Ellen O'Regan, a neighbour of the O'leary's. .... it 
is contended that this was not evidence, and was illegally admitted. 
It is urged that it comes within the rule stated in The Queen V. 
Rowton. 2 It is said that this was evidence of the bad character or 
disposition of Hannah, which (a) could only be admitted if evidence 
had first been offered by her as to her own good character; and (b) 
could only be proved by evidence of general reputation, and not by 
the experience of the particular witnesses. Apart from the question 
whether Rowton's case is an accepted authority regulating the mode of 
proving bad character, the court is of opinion that it does not refer 
to the type of evidence under consideration here. This evidence and 
especially the answers of the witness, does not refer to moral chara- 
cter, not to a reputation, nor to a moral disposition or tendency to 
commit the crime of murder. The witness does not state her opinion 
of the accused. She states nothing but the demeanour and manners of 
the prisoner and of her sister as manifested to her, the witness". 
Kennedy, C. J., continued by asking the question, "Was it relevant? " 
1) (1926) Ir. Rep. 445 at 453 
2) (1865) 10 Cox C. C. 25 
To which he answered: "One of the matters telling in favour of the 
prosecution was the sullen reticence of the accused, Hannah. It 
seems to the court to have been relevant, and in the prisoner's 
favour to show that reticence and sullenness were her normal manner, 
and not merely the outside signs of her now guilty conscience. 
Again, for the defence, a picture of Mary Anne as an unpleasant 
looking and powerful woman likely to do murder had been drawn. The 
court does not think it irrelevant to state that, on the contrary, 
her demenaour and manner were good tempered and pleasant". 
Although it has been stated that an attack by the crown on the 
accused's character is generally inadmissible, evidence otherwise 
relevant which indicates that the accused is of bad character, will 
not on that amount be excluded. For example, if a man is charged 
with the murder of his mistress, the immoral relationship between 
them must necessarily be disclosed. 
' 
The second part of our present discussion, that is, when character 
is itself in issue, is in respect of some special statutes2 which by 
their provisions bring character into issue. As these important 
statutes have already been discussed under similar fact evidence it 
will be unnecessary repeating the discussion. It is important to 
note that sections 54 of the Indian Evidence Act and section 68 of 
the Nigeria Evidence Act have no application when the bad character 
of any person is itself in issue. 
1) Walker and Walker - Law of Evidence in Scotland at Para. 21; 
2) See s. 27 (3) Theft Act 1968; s. 15 of The Prevention Of Crimes 
Act, 1871; S1 (2) of The Official Secrets Act, 1911 etc. 
- 627 - 
(iii) CROSS EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES AS TO ACCUSEP'S CHARACTER 
Where the accused brings a character witness to testify on his 
behalf, the restrictions on the adduction of evidence of bad 
character of the accused are, surprisingly, relaxed when that witness 
is cross-examined for the purpose of attacking the credibility of his 
character evidence; thus he may be cross-examined not only as to his 
own but also the accused's previous conviction. Using exactly the 
same words, sections 140, and 193 of the Indian and Nigeria Evidence 
Acts1 respectively, provides that: "Witnesses to character may be 
cross-examined and re-examined". It is significant to note the 
observation made by Taylor, 
2 to the effect that according to English 
practice it is not usual, except under special circumstances, to 
cross-examine witnesses simply called to speak to the character of 
the prisoner; but no rule of law forbids this course. The rule 
embodied in the sections above, is not a deviation from the English 
rule, as theword used is "may". The right has been given and when an 
accused calls witnesses to prove his previous good character they 
should, in proper cases be cross-examined, and the answers given by 
witnesses in cross-examination on the subject of the accused's chara- 
cter may be contradicted by other evidence. However, though it is 
clear that the character witness, is, cross-examinable about his own 
credibility, the accused reputation and his knowledge of it, difficu- 
lties have arisen with regard to some issues, like, rumours concer- 
ning the accused's conduct; the divisibility of the accused's charac- 
ter and his previous convictions; and it is with each of these that 
1) Indian Evidence Act 1872; Nigeria Evidence Act, 1945 
2) Taylor On Evidence, sec. 1429; Best on Evidence sec. 262 
the present discussion will be concerned. 
As pointed out in earlier discussions, under the common law, 
neither the defence nor the prosecution in rebuttal is permitted to- 
give evidence of particular instances to prove the good- or bad 
character of the prisoner. Particular good acts have been rejected 
in a number of known cases; 
1 in R V. Davison, 2 Lord Ellenborough, 
C. J., kept interrupting the defence witnesses to character to remind 
them that what was admissible was evidence of general character, and 
not of particular instances. This rule of exclusion is also 
supported by R V. Rowton, 
3 
where both counsel agree upon it; but 
there is at common law an exception that is of importance, and the 
exception arises where the prisoner produces a defence witness to 
character. -IA R V, Hodgkiss, 
4 Alderson, B., said: "It is 
not usual to cross-examine witnesses to character, except you have 
some definite charge to which to examine them". 
However, considering the later case of R V. wood and Parker, 
5 
one 
may be tempted to take the view that such cross-examination must be 
confined to rumours. It has been held in 12 V. Wood and Parker that a 
character witness may be cross-examined as to his knowledge of mere 
rumours concerning the accused's involvement in criminal activities 
for the purpose of showing that his evidence of the accused's charac- 
ter is unreliable. In that case, robbery was the crime charged, and 
the accused having called a witness to character, the question arose 
whether this witness might be cross-examined with regard to a rumour 
1) R V. Horne Tooke (1794) 25 St. Tr. 1,359; R V. O'Connor (1798) 27- 
St Tr. 1,31 
2) (1808) 31 St. Tr 99,187 - 193 
3) 11 L. T. 745,746 
4) (1836) 7 C. & P. 298 
5) (1841) 5 Jur. 225 
that the accused had committed another robbery. Questions on the 
subject were allowed because "character is made up of a number of 
small circumstances of which his being suspected is one". Though not 
explicitly stated it appears from this decision that a witness as to 
the accuae_dýs character may be cross-examined regarding a rumour 
about the accused. 
In Scott V. Sampson, ' however, Cave, J., observed as follows: "As 
to the ..... evidence of rumours and suspicions to the same effect as 
the defamatory matter complained of, it would seem that on principle 
such evidence is not admissible, as only indirectly tending to affect 
the plaintiff's reputation. If these rumours and suspicions have in 
fact, affected the plaintiff's reputation, thay may be proved by 
general evidence of reputation. If they have not affected it they 
are not relevant to the issue. To admit evidence of rumours and 
suspicions is to give anyone who knows nothing whatever of the plain- 
tiff, or who may even have grudge against him, an opportunity of 
spreading through the means of the publicity attending judicial 
proceedings what he may have picked from the most disreputable sour- 
ces, and what no man of sense, who knows the plaintiff's character 
would for a moment believe in. Unlike evidence of general reputa- 
tion, it is particularly difficult for the plaintiff to meet and 
rebut such evidence; for all that those who know him best can say is 
that they have not heard anything of these rumours. Moreover, it may 
be that it is the defendant himself who has started them". Cave, J., 
went on to cite a case decided on a contrary viewpoint; he said: "In 
1) (1882) L. R. 8 Q. B. D. 491 at 503 -'4 
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Leicester V. Walter, 
1 
evidence of rumours and suspicions was admitted 
by Sir James Mansfield against his own judgement; but in that case it 
was proposed to prove that the plaintiff's relations and former 
acquaintances had ceased to visit him on account of these rumours and 
suspicions, so that the evidence would seem really to have amounted 
to evidence of general reputation". He (Cave. J., ) then concluded by 
saying that, "upon the whole, both the weight of authority and prin- 
ciple seem against the admission of such evidence". Regardless of 
the above sentiment expressed by Cave, J., with regard to where the 
weight of authority lies, it is the general view2 that today there is 
no clear English authority on the subject. In view of this, it is 
unfortunate that this dire position of the law was ignored by the 
court of criminal appeal though applicable in R V. Savory. 
3 In this 
case the appellant was charged with indecent assualt on two young 
girls. The two girls, who were aged respectively nine and ten, 
stated that they had been indecently assaulted at Cromer Railway 
Station by a man whom they said was the appellant, who was an emplo- 
yee at that station. There was no corroboration of their evidence. 
The appellant gave evidence and put his character in issue, calling 
as a witness the station master, under whose immediate supervision he 
worked. That witness was cross-examined on a complaint alleging that 
the appellant had some time previously indecently exposed himself. 
No proceedings were taken in respect of that complaint. It remains, 
therefore, not a case in which the appellant had been tried and 
1) 2 Camp. 251 
2) Cross On Evidence, 5th ed. at p. 407 
3) (1942) 29 Cr. App. R. 1 
acquitted, but in which nobody has ever put him on trial or given him 
an opportunity of answering such a charge as was made against him. 
The court in giving its decision held that the conviction must be 
quashed on the grounds that, first, there was no corroboration of the 
girls' evidence and no reference had been made in the summing-up to 
the desirability of corroboration; and second, that the cross-exami- 
nation of the appellant offended against the rule laid down by the 
House of Lords in Maxwell V. Director of Public Prosecution. The 
court in its judgement, clearly failed to express any opinion with 
regard to the cross-examination of the character witness, as to the 
unprosecuted complaint. If a view was given on that, it would have 
gone a long way in helping to resolve the uncertain state of the law 
today. A similar opportunity also arose in the earlier case of R V. 
Waldman, 2 but the court failed to comment here too. The appellant 
was convicted, on a charge of receiving good knowing them to have 
been stolen. In his evidence at the trial, the appellant stated that 
he had bought the goods, which included articles of jewellery, on 
sale or return from a person whom he believed to be an honest busi- 
ness man, though he had since discovered that the person was arecei- 
ver of stolen property. A witness called for the defence said that 
he had known the appellant for twelve years and that the appellant 
bore a good reputation for honesty. Thereupon counsel for the prose- 
cution put the following question to the witness in cross-examina- 
tion: "Would you be surprised to hear that (the appellant) has actua- 
lly been convicted of receiving and charged afterwards with recei- 
1) (1935) A. C. 309; (1934) All E. Rep. 168; 103 W. K. B. 501 
2) (1934) 24 Cr. App. R. 204; 
- 632 - 
ving, but acquitted? " Later at the request of the prosecution the 
appellant was recalled, and admitted that he had been convicted of 
receiving stolen goods in 1920 and bound over, and that two years 
later, he had again been charged with receiving stolen property, but 
had been acquitted. In upholding the conviction, the court merely 
distinguished the case from that of Maxwell V. Director of Public 
Prosecution. Though the decision is perfectly correct, I would have 
thought that the court would at least comment on the cross-examina- 
tion of the defence witnes to character but instead Avory, J., said 
that: "it is not necessary either to consider or to express an opi- 
nion on the point". I will like to mention that in the United 
States, most jurisdictions admit the cross-examination to rumours. 
1 
Now with regard to the problem of the issue of divisibility, we 
should remind ourselves again, that though a prisoner is generally 
allowed to prove his good character, where he sets this up, evidence 
of his bad character may be tendered. The question then is, what 
limitations on the uses of the accused's character are imposed by the 
principle of relevancy; to which one would be tempted to answer that, 
the rule that evidence of bad character may be given when evidence of 
good character has been tendered is subject to 'the consideration that 
the evidence sought to be given must be one which is relevant and 
admissible. in other words, the evidence of character or disposition 
offered, whether for or against the accused, must involve the speci- 
fic trait related to in the act charged. However, as we shall soon 
1) Comm V. Becker 191 Atl. 351,356, Supreme Court of Pennysylvania. 
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find out, this issue has generated a lot of controversy, dating back 
into history, and even today one cannot say for sure that the issue 
has been conclusively resolved. One thing is however clear and that 
is that where evidence of character is offered it must be confined to 
general character; evidence of particular acts e. g., of honesty or 
benevolence or the like, cannot be received. 
' 
As I pointed out above, the issue has a long history behind it. 
for instance both R V. Faulconer, 2 and R V. Hawkins, 
3 
are decided on 
the ground that the prosecution could attack the prisoner's character 
without reserve or limit. On the other hand however, in R V. Dover, 
4 
a case of seditious publication; a witness testified that the defen- 
dant was a faithful member of the train-band. To which L. C. J.. Hyde 
interjected: "Do not mistake yourself. The testimony of your civil 
behaviour, going to church, appearing in the train-bands, going to 
Paul's, being there at common service, - this is well. ' But you are 
not charged for this. A man may do all this, and yet be a naughty 
man in printing abusive books, to the misleading of the king's sub- 
jects". This is not, however, a strong authority, as his Lordship 
and Keeling, J., interrupted the character witness suggesting that D. 
should be cashiered the band, an indication that their minds were 
already made up on on the issue before the jury. The decision in 
this case has been described as a very strict application of the 
rule, if rule there can be said to be at that stage, for good service 
-in the train-bands 
is thought to be evidence of loyalty, and loyalty 
is certainly a trait'relevant to a charge of sedition. But while 
1) J'Ansen V. Stuart 1 TR 754; See also Norton, Evidence at p. 234. 
2) 1653) 5 St. Tr. 323,354-6 
3) (1669) 6 St. Tr. 921,935,949 
4) (1663) 6 How. St. Tr. 539,552 
there was yet no hard and fast rule, common sense would dictate that 
character evidence should bear some analogy to the issue, and this is 
the type of evidence usually offered. For example, in R V. Turner, 
' 
on a charge of burglary, the defence seem to have produced evidence 
---ý 
of honesty; and in R V. Lowick, 
2 
on a charge of plotting to assasi- 
mate the king, the defence evidence was that L. was not "cruel or 
bloody-minded", and other examples of this line of reasoning abound. 
For instance in the first trial of Captain Kidd3 in 1701, for murder, 
he sought to lead evidence of his loyal service to the crown, but 
Ward, L. C. B., had already summed up to the jury, and rejected the 
evidence as offered too late, and also as of no avail on a murder 
charge. Captain Kidd pleaded: "My Lord, I have witness to produce my 
reputation; ...... I can prove what service I have done for the king 
(as king's officer. before I turned pirate)" to which L. C. B Ward 
replied: "What would that help you in the case of murder". 
It has been suggested that it was not until the two great treason 
trials of 1794, in which Thomas Erskine, later Lord Chancellor, 
figured so prominently as defence counsel, that a clear rule became 
discernible. In R V. Hardy, 
4 he argued that, the character proved 
must always be analogous to the nature of the charge, and the then 
solicitor general, Sir John Mitford, later Lord Redesdale, Lord 
Chancellor of Ireland, did not attack this principle,. but merely 
objected to evidence of particular facts. Again in R V. Horne 
Tooke, 
5 Erskine advanced a similar plea, he argued: "The meaning of 
1) (1664) 6 St. Tr. 565,613 
2) (1696) 13 St. Tr. 267,299 
3) (1701) 14 St. Tr. 123,146 
4) 24 St. Tr. 199,1076 
5) 25 St. Tr. 1,384 
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witnesses to character is this, for instance, put the case of a man 
who is charged with a crime of a particular description - suppose a 
man charged with an unnatural crime; would it be any evidence at all 
to that man's character that he paid his bills regularly, and that he 
was not a dishonest man, or anything of that sort? No, your examina- 
tion to character must always be analogous to the nature of the 
charge; and you would there inquire whether he was a man of chastity; 
you would inquire into his regard for women, into his morals, and 
into his conversation, so as it might rebuff any such horrible and 
detestable idea of having passed in his mind, that he was a man 
capable in the ordinary course of his life of entertaining such 
opinions and making use of such expressions ..... ". Sir John Scott, 
later Lord Eldon L. C. in reply, apparently agreed with this part of 
Erskine's argument. However, in neither case was the question expre- 
ssly declared, but Erskine's argument on the point went uncontrover- 
ted; but in R V. Turner, 
1 came a clear decision. In the case T. was 
indicted for treason, and his counsel cross-examined a prosecution 
witness as to T. 's general character. Abbot J., as Lord Tenterden 
C. J., then was, upheld the prosecution objection that the proper 
question was as to loyalty, as in rape it was to chastity, 
2 
and when 
the defence counsel was examining his own witnesses to character he 
took the hint and asked them as to T. 's character for loyalty. 
3 . He 
also asked permission to examine them as to T. 's reputation for 
humanity as this was not inapplicable to the charge. This was righ- 
tly allowed, as the alleged treason related to an armed attack plan- 
1) (1817) 32 St. Tr. 957 
2) Ibid at 1007 
3) Ibid at 1058 
ned upon Nottingham. This appears to be the last direct decision 
restricting the defence evidence of character to traits relevant to 
the charge, but the textbooks adopt this rule from Phillips' onwards, 
and there are supporting dicta in some very familiar later cases. 
For example, in R V. Shrimpton, 
2 
where S. was indicted for larceny in 
1851, and the indictment referred to a previous conviction for 
larceny in 1838. This case was ostensibly decided upon The Previous 
Convictions Act 1836. The pertinent aspect of the case for the 
present purpose is the question posed by the defence counsel, to the 
effect that, suppose the evidence was that the accused had been 
convicted of rape? (This being a case of larceny). Alderson B., 
3 
gave the answer: "It is not every sort of evidence as to character 
which would be relevant. It would be no answer to a good character 
for honesty, to show that he was an immoral man, that he had been 
convicted of rape or violent assault". R V. Rowton, 
4 seems to have 
confirmed the view expressed by Alderson B., by indicating that 
rebuttals should be confined to character evidence of the same kind. 
Martin 8., 
5 
said it must be "good character with respect to the 
species of crime charged against him". Even though these two cases 
above cannot be said to have involved exactly the same issue as the 
earlier cited cases, 
6 because while these two recent causes involved 
the questioning of the prosecution witnesses, the older cases 
actually involved the precise issue of cross-examination of the 
character witnesses for the defence, it is essential to note that 
1) 4th ed. (1820) Vol. It 191 
2) 2 Den. C. C. 319,322; 169 E. R. 521,522 
3) 2 Den. C. C. 322 at p. 388 
4) (1865) Leigh & C. 520 
5) Ibid at 537 
6) e. g R V. Hard 24 St. Tr. 1076; R V. Horne Tooke, 25 St. Tr. it 384 
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their dicta are of importance with regard to the matter. So, it does 
appear that for quite sometime since R V. Turner, 
1 
the court did not 
have to decide on this issue until it arose in the case of R V. 
Winfield. 
2 
In this case, the question arose whether the witness can 
be asked about any former conviction, or whether it must be relevant 
to the character trait under consideration. The facts were as fol- 
lows: - The appellant who was charged with indecent assault on a 
woman, called a witness and asked her questions to establish his good 
character with regards to sexual morality. The witness was then 
cross-examined by the prosecution on the appellant's previous convic- 
tions of offences involving dishonesty. The court held that the 
cross-examination was proper, as the appellant had by his questions 
put his general character in issue, and that he could not claim to be 
protected as having put in issue a part of his character only, or as 
Humphreys J., would rather put it: "There is no such thing known to 
our procedure as putting half a prisoner's character in issue and 
leaving out the other half". If I may just add, it appears that 
there are inaccuracies in the reporting of the case which may be due 
to the fact that the appellant was not represented at the trial, and 
the counsel who later took up the case at the appeal got mixed up 
with the facts. I have been able to figure that out from a statement 
3 
by the counsel in which he said that: "In the circumstances the 
appellant should not have been cross-examined with regard to his 
general character. He was unrepresented at the trial, and though 
admittedly the Deputy Chairman did give him some warning of the 
1) (1817) 32 St. Tr. 957 
2) 27 Cr. App. R. 139 
3) 27 Cr. App. R. at p. 140 
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danger of calling the witness, he did not represent to him that by so 
doing he would put his general character in issue. The appellant was 
not seeking to introduce evidence of his general character, but only 
of his character with regard to women". Anyhow, dealing with the 
more germane issue, the court of criminal appeal was clearly of 
'opinion that the conviction about which the character witness 'is 
asked need not concern the subject matter of the charge under inves- 
tigation; and this principle has been criticised by Noakes, 
' because 
in his words: "If a man is charged with forgery, cross-examination as 
to his conviction for cruelty to animals can have no purpose but 
prejudice". This criticism with respect goes to the root of the 
matter, to my mind, because prejudice is the ground for exclusion, 
and I share the opinion expressed in the criticism. It is clearly 
consistent with the rationales for a number of rules of evidence with 
regard to character. * Certainly, it is arguable that at common law 
this principle expressed in Humphrey J., 's statement is not borne out 
by principle or by authority. 
2 It is submitted that the criticisms 
are well founded, although Winfield's case appears to have been 
approved in the House of Lords in Stirland V. Director of Public 
Prosecutions, 
3 
a decision which is primarily concerned with the 
construction of the criminal Evidence Act 1898, and if Winfield was 
asked about his previous conviction under that Act, as may have been 
the case, 'the question would have been easier to justify on principle 
as a matter affecting the credibility of his own previous statement 
1) Noakes, Introduction To Evidence, 4th ed. at p. 140 
2) see Is The Prisoner's Character Indivisible? by R. N. Gooderson, 
11 C. L. J. at p. 377. 
3) (1944) A. C. 315, (1944) 2 All E. R. 13 
about his character. As earlier mentioned, the direct English autho- 
rity on the point came to an end as early as 1817 with R V. Turner, 
1 
an authority that character evidence offered by the defence should'be 
confined to the specific trait; and although R V. Winfield, 
2 gave a 
decision on the same point, there are serious doubts and misgivings 
about the case as an authority, however it is significant to note 
that it was decided on a contrary reasoning. I think enough has 
been said to show that the law as to putting any kind of character 
evidence of the accused to a character witness is somewhat uncertain, 
and a clear decision after a consideration of the two opposing views 
would be most helpful. Obviously, in the absence of modern English 
authority, it is instructive in order to realise that aim, to consi- 
der the law of the United States on the subject. Starting with 
Wigmore, 
3 he stated that the character offered must involve the 
specific trait related to the act charged, and as we shall soon find 
out there are a number of American authorities that line up behind 
him to confirm his view. In People V. Fair, 4 a case of murder by a 
mistress, the court held that the defendant's character for unchas- 
tity is not relevant to the act. It is observed that: "It is incor- 
rect to say that the general character of the prisoner is received 
even in his own behalf"; it must be "general character as to the 
trait involved in the offence charged". In State V. Bloom, 
5 
where 
B., was indicted for larceny she was permitted at her trial to prove 
that her general moral character or reputation was good. The State 
(prosecution) appealed to the Supreme Court of Indiana, and it was 
1) (1817) 32 St. Tr. 957 
2) 27 Cr. App. R. 139 
3) Wigmore On*Evidence, 1,458, Sec. 59 (1940) 
4) (1872) 43 Cal. 137,147, see also Bhagwan Swarup & Ors V. S, A 
1965, SC 682. 
5) (1879) 68 Ind. 54,57 
held that the evidence as to character must be confined to her gene- 
ral reputation for honesty and integrity. It is interesting to note 
that Warden J., supported his view by quoting from the leading text 
books on evidence, not only from the American writer, Greenleaf, but 
also from Phillips, 
1 
an English writer. The-i, earned judge gave his 
reasons as follows: "If a defendant, when put on trial for an alleged 
crime has a right to prove his good character in all respects and in 
all traits, without limitation to the traits supposed to render the 
commission of the crime improbable, and gives such evidence, it would 
seem to follow that the state would then have a right to attack that 
character in as broad a sense as that in which it was sustained by 
the evidence given by the defendant. The state would then have the 
right, in other words, to disprove the case made by the defendant as 
to character in all its parts. Nothing occurs to us that the def en 
dant may prove by way of defence, which the state may not disprove. 
Hence, if on the trial of a woman for larceny, she legally gives 
evidence of her general good character, without limitation, 
that 
evidence would include good character as to chastity, veracity, etc., 
as well as honesty. The state, it would seem, could then attack the 
case made by her in all its parts, and show that her general charac- 
ter for chastity, veracity, etc., as well as honesty was bad. The 
law does not contemplate the raising of such irrelevant issues". 
This view was confirmed 'by McClellan J., in Morgan V. State, 
2 he 
said: "The'object and effect of such evidence is to disprove guilt by 
1) Apparently from the 8th ed. (1838), 490 
2) (1889) 88 Ala. 224,6 So. 761 
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furnishing a presumption that the defendant would not have committed 
the offence; and hence the character sought to be proved must be such 
as would make it unlikely that the party would do the controverted 
act". This clearly means that the proffered evidence must have 
pertinence to the crime charged. 
A case illustrating that the state (prosecution) too, is confined 
to character evidence relating to the relevant trait (in rebuttal) is 
State V. Bell,. In this case, B. was indicted for offering a bribe 
to a public officer to procure the appointment of X. as a patrolman. 
Defence witnesses testified that B., 's general reputation for honesty 
was good. These witnesses were cross-examined as to offences against 
the liquor laws committed by B. On appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Iowa, B., 's conviction was reversed on the ground that the cross- 
examination should have been confined to what was said of B., in the 
community that would in any way affect the trait of character about 
which testimony was being given. 
Doubtless, in practice some courts often are liberal in permitting 
the defendant to offer his general character. But the prosecution's 
rebutting repute may be of the specific repute, even though the 
defendant has been allowed a wider scope to offer his general charac- 
ter; we can briefly look at some of the cases that have allowed or 
rejected more liberty to the defence. For example, in State V. 
Lee, 2 L., was indicted for rape, and it was held that the defence 
could prove L. -s character for peace and quiet. But while the court 
has allowed it in this case, some others may reject it, and I think 
1) (1928) 221 N. W. 521,523 
2) (1878) 22 Minn. 407 
it is because it is not that easy sometimes to tell whether or not a 
trait relates to the crime charged. For example, in Linececum V. 
State, 
1 L. was indicted for rape, and of fered" a witness as to his 
general reputation as a peaceable and law-abiding man. The trial 
court excluded this evidence, holding that it must be confined to his 
general character for chastity and morality, but the court of Appeals 
of Texas reversed the conviction, holding that in all cases where the 
accused is charged with personal violence upon another, he should be 
permitted to prove his general character for peace and quiet. How- 
ever, one could say that these two cases are not really instances of 
the rule being relaxed in favour of the defence, though the wider 
question was discussed, because to commit the offence of rape the 
characteristics of an unchaste and a violent disposition- must be 
combined. 
On the other hand, in Bell V. Comm., 
2 the accused was charged with 
theft of chickens. - An offer of the accused's reputation for "good 
moral character, for truth and honesty" was held properly rejected by 
the trial court because "truthfulness" was not relevant to the doing 
of the act charged, and was not admissible to support the defendant's 
credit as a witness. Rightly, the decision and reasoning in this 
case has been criticised by Wigmore as unsound. He said later that, 
"the court might well have held that if the defendant's guilt was 
plain on record, the rejection of this evidence did not harm; but the 
insistence on such quiddities in the definition of the rules of 
1) (1890) 15 S. W. 818,819. 
2) (1927) 222 Ky. 89,300 S. W. 365 
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evidence simply tends to artificialise them out of all touch with the 
facts of human nature". 
There are two other authorities, both from Texas, that make the 
point about "liberty to the defence" clearer. In Poyner V. State, 
' 
P. was indicted for incest, having been charged with seducing his 
niece. A defence witness was asked about P. 's "general reputation 
for gentlemanly deportment and good moral character", but this 
question was not allowed, the trial court holding that the evidence 
must be confined to reputation for virtue and chastity. The Court of 
Appeals of Texas reversed the conviction, holding the evidence 
rejected to be pertinent to the issue. 
An even stronger case is Johnson V. State, 
2 
where J., a negro was 
charged with an assault upon a "white" with intent to rape. J. 
offered that his general reputation was that of a peaceable negro and 
one polite to "whites", especially ladies. Later a state witness 
said that J. 's reputation as a law-abiding man was bad. The Court of 
Appeals of Texas observed that evidence should be restricted to the 
trait of character which is in issue, that is, it ought to have some 
analogy and reference to the nature of the charge. They held that it 
was wrong to permit the proseuction to investigate J. 's reputation as 
a "law-abiding man" when he had not put it as such in issue. Looking 
at the facts of this case, it is obvious that the contrast with 
Winfield's3 case is striking. If I may just review quickly the fact 
of R V. Winfield with particular regards to the question asked, the 
point will be clear. W. was indicted *for indecent assault, and he 
1) 48 S. W. 516 
2) (1885) 17 Tex. 565,573 
3) 27 Cr. App. Rep. 139 
produced a defence witness to character, and her examination-in-chief 
proceeded as follows: Questioned, "Have you ever known me misbehave 
myself before ladies or with ladies? Tell the court with regard to 
my character and behaviour", to which the answer, "Most exemplary 
... " was given. The point of contrasting the two cases is simply 
that, one could infer from the court's decision in Johnson V. State1 
that, had Winfield been tried in Texas, he would have had the option 
to put his general reputation as a law-abiding man in issue, but if 
he confined the evidence to his behaviour towards ladies (as he did) 
the prosecution could only attack his general character for virtue 
and chastity. In other American jurisdictions, there is no such 
option open to the prisoner, and there seems to be no common law 
authority conferring such an election upon the accused. In most 
American jursidictions, as earlier cited cases have shown, the priso- 
ner, if on trial for an offence must confine his character evidence 
to the relevant trait. For example, State V. Thompson, 2 where T. was 
charged with indecent assault the trial court refused to allow T. 's 
counsel to ask a defence witness as to T. 's general reputation as a 
law-abiding man, with special reference to his "personal" morality. 
The Supreme Court of Uttah affirmed that the inquiry must be restric- 
ted to the particular trait in issue, that is, sexual morality, 
though they noted that the doctrine was not of universal acceptance 
in all jurisdictions. - (A reference to the Texas practice just noted 
where the accused has an option of putting forward his general 
1) (1885) 17 Tex. 565,573 
2) (1921) 199 Pac. 161,165 
- 645 - 
reputation or restricting it to the character trait relevant to the 
offence charged). 
1 
Similarly, in State V. Moyer, a case involving embezzlement, the 
accused's character for honesty was held admissible; while in Harper 
2 
V. United States, where the accused was charged with false entry in 
a bank report, the court held that the accused's character for "mora- 
lity and sobriety" should be excluded. 
It seems clear from all that has been said above, that there is 
sufficient authority that at common law the cross-examination of 
witnesses as to the accused's character must be confined to the 
character trait, relevant to the offence charged. One should also 
3 
note that, as a matter of fact, the decision of R V. Winfield, is 
only a dictum, as Winfield's conviction was quashed on another 
ground, it was because the jury had been inadequately directed with 
regard to corroboration. Infact, I will like to submit further that, 
not only should the evidence trait to be admitted be seen to be 
relevant to the crime charged, but also the circumstances in which 
the crime is alleged to have been committed should be considered 
also. So, if for example, a murder was committed with a hammer, 
character for peace and quiet on the one hand and for violence on the 
other will be admissible; but I would not think that such evidence 
should be admissible if the murder case was for slow-poisoning. I 
hope one could conclude by saying that despite the contrary statement 
in RV Winfield, there is a procedure known to the common law of 
putting part of the prisoner's character in issue; indeed the common 
1) (1905) 58 W. Va. 146,52 S. E. 30 
2) (1909) 8th C. C. A, 170, Fed. 385,390 
3) 27 Cr. App. Rep. 139 
law prevents him from leading evidence as to any part of his charac- 
ter that is not relevant to the crime charged. 
I 
Although there is no 
decisive common law authority, the prosecution should in principle, 
be similarly confined as in the United States. 1 think such a 
principle amounts to- a -reasonable and merciful dispensation to the 
accused of hitherto unenviable life to disallow any such opening of 
the door to his whole character without confinement. It is a far more 
dangerous move to open the door than might at first glance be assu- 
med, because very few people could boast of a blameless life. 
We can now go on to consider the last of the difficult issues with 
regard to the cross-examination of character witnesses, and that is 
the issue of the accused previous convictions. Generally speaking, 
previous convictions may not be proved against the accused as facts 
relevant to the issue because they amount to nothing more than 
evidence of disposition and can have no additional relevance in the 
absence of evidence concerning the facts on which they were founded. 
However, on the other hand, two things must be noted and could be 
regarded as general exceptions to the principle just stated above. 
First, it is clear that in criminal cases a conviction of the accused 
may always be proved when it is a fact in issue, as would be the case 
on a plea of autrefois convict. The second as highlighted by 
3 
Phipson is that character witnesses called by the defence may be 
cross-examined not only as to his own, but -also the accused's 
4 
previous conviction, and whatever answers the witnesses give may be 
1) R V. Turner (1817) 32 St. Tr. 957 
2) gtate V. Bell (1928) 221 N. W. 521; Coram V. Maddocks (1910) 207 Mass, 
152,93 N. E. 253 
3) See Phipson On Evidence 
§ 531 (12th ed. ) 
4) See V. Redd (1923) 1 K. B. 104 
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contradicted by other evidence. So in effect, one can say that the 
fact that an accused has been convicted may be elicited on cross- 
examination, and if denied it may be proved by other evidence under 
section 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1865. 
Before going further in the present discussion, I will like to 
restate briefly some earlier mentioned rules of common law, which are 
available in statutory provisions in some common wealth countries, 
because the rules are closely linked with the present discussion. 
Section 68 (1) of the Nigeria Evidence Act, 
I 
provides that "except as 
provided in this section, the fact that an accussed person is of bad 
character is irrelevant in criminal proceedings". Section 68 (2) (a) 
and (b), and section 68 (3), create three exceptions to section 68 
(1); only the first two of the three exceptions are however, relevant 
to the subject matter of the discussion. It states: "(2) The fact 
that an accused person is of bad character is relevant - (a) 
bad character of the accused person is a fact in issue; (b) 
when the 
when the 
accused person has given evidence of his good character". Section 68 
(4) is actually the most material for the present purpose, but will 
be appreciated and understood better only when read along with the 
other provisions of the section. It provides as follows: "(4) 
Whenever evidence of bad character is relevant evidence of a previous 
conviction is also relevant". Similar provisions are contained in 
the Indian Evidence Act, under section 54 
? 
and the explanations (1) 
and (2) accompanying the section. It states:, "in criminal 
1) Cap. 62, Laws of The Federation of Nigeria 
2) This section was substituted for the original section by sec. 6 of the 
Indian Evidence Act 91872) Amendment Act, 1891 (3 of 1891). 
proceedings the fact that the accused person has a bad character 
is 
irrelevant, unless evidence has been given that he has a good 
character, in which case it becomes relevant. 
Explanation 1- This section does not apply to cases in which the 
bad character of any person is itself a fact in issue. 
Explanation 2-A previous conviction is relevant as evidence of 
bad character". One can easily identify the close similarities in 
the sections under the two statutes quoted above, and I have found it 
necessary to state the provisions fully, for the reason earlier 
mentioned - that is, to provide a good understanding of the relevant 
part of the section. It is thus clear, from all that has been said 
above that when evidence of bad character becomes relevant either on 
account of the tender of evidence of good character by the accused or 
on account of bad character being itself in issue, a previous convic- 
tion of the accused, becomes relevant as evidence of bad character; 
and the position is the same under the common law. Leaving for the 
moment the circumstances under which the bad character of the accused 
may be a fact in issue,, since it has earlier been discussed, we can 
now consider the issue regarding the cross-examination of character 
witnesses for the accused, as to the accused's previous conviction; 
there will still be more discussion about the issue under the provi- 
sions of section 1 (f) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898. 
First, by way of comment, I will like to make some observations on 
the material provisions of the relevant section cited from the Evi- 
dence Acts above. As noted earlier on, section 54 of the Indian 
Evidence Act is an amendment; the section, as it stood before its 
amendment by section 6 of Act 3 of 1891 departed from the rules of 
English law and treated previous conviction of any offence as rele- 
vant in all cases. It appears the amendment was in consequence of 
the decision in R V. Kartick Chandra 
1. This section as it stood 
originally ran thus: "In criminal proceedings, the fact that the 
accused person has been previously convicted of any offence is rele- 
vant; but the fact that he has a bad character is irrelevant un- 
less..... " (The remaining portion was the same as now, up to expla- 
nation 1). So the previous section, while it excluded evidence of 
bad character in the first instance, treated previous conviction of 
any offence as relevant in all criminal cases, with a view to preju- 
dice the accused or to suggest an inference as to his guilt with 
regard to the offence charged. The reason for this departure from 
the salutary rule of English law as given in the First Report of The 
Select committee - (Indian Parliament) was that the authors of the 
Act were unable to see why a prisoner should not be prejudiced by 
such evidence when true. However, it is note-worthy that in spite of 
the clear wording of the former section, evidence of previous convic- 
tion was not admitted in Roshan Dosad V. R, 
2 
where it was held that 
except under very special circumstances, the proper object of using 
previous conviction is to 
determine the amount of the punishment to 
be awarded should the prisoner be convicted of the offence charged. 
An important case under the section as it then stood, is R V. Kartick . 
1) 14 C. 721 
2) 5 C. 768; see also R V. Shiboo, 3 W. R. Cr. 38; R V. Phul Chand, 
8 N. R. Cr. 11; R v. Thakoordas, 1 W. R. Cr. 7 
Chandra, l in which a Full Bench of The Calcutta. High Court held that 
evidence of previous conviction was in -all cases admissible to prove 
the guilt of the accused person. Pigot, J., in delivering his judge- 
ment observed: "We are constrained to answer this reference by saying 
that previous convictions are in every case admissible. That must be 
the law so long as this section remains unaltered. We own that, 
could we come to any other conclusion, we should have done so; but it 
is our duty to carry out the intentions of the legislature". It was 
in consequence of the decision that the section was amended by Act 3 
of 1891; the present section is in accordance with the English rule, 
and also the view expressed in Roshan Dosad V. R, 
2 
cited above. A 
case decided on the present provision is Teka Ahir V. R3' in which 
the court held that, evidence of previous conviction amounts to 
evidence of bad character and is not admissible unless and until 
accused produces evidence of good character. 
Another observation I will like to make applies to the Nigerian 
Evidence Act, which states that "character' means reputation as 
distinguished from disposition; 
4...... 
evidence may be given only of 
general reputation, and ndt of particular acts by which reputation is 
shown". I suppose one could say that the foregoing definition is 
supplemented by section 68 (4) of the Evidence Act, which provides 
that "whenever evidence of bad character is relevant, evidence of a 
previous conviction is also relevant, " this is because, as I men- 
tioned in the opening paragraph of this discussion, previous convic- 
tion amounts to nothing more than evidence of disposition. 
5 
One 
1) 14 C. 721 
2) 5 C. 768 
3) 5 P. L. J. 706: 60 I. C. 331 
4) See ante; 
5) See ante; see also Cross On Evidence, 5th ed. at p. 355 and p. 403 
other comment I want to make, would apply to the Evidence Acts cited 
above and other common law jurisdictions. The common-law, and the 
provisions of section 68 (4) of the Nigeria Evidence Act, and section 
54, explanation (2) of the Indian Evidence Act, in so far as they 
tend to define the "bad character" of an accused person as meaning a 
previous conviction of that accused person for an offence, are mis- 
leading, because a previous conviction by a criminal court is clearly 
distinguishable from the character of the person convicted, for a 
'conviction is the legal consequence of particular conduct. Probably 
the only reason why the Act, following the English common-law prac- 
tice, makes a previous conviction admissible in proof of bad charac- 
ter is that this consequence of conduct is a recorded fact which can 
be conclusively proved, whereas conduct is easily disputable. 
1 
Going back to the actual disposition, I wish to stress that it is 
absolutely clear that after an accused has attempted to adduce 
evidence of his good character in his own defence, the prosecution 
may in rebuttal offer as evidence his bad character; and it is 
clearer still, that such bad character includes previous convictions. 
In other words, strictly speaking when evidence to prove good 
character has been adduced on the prisoner's behalf, the whole 
question of his character good or bad is opened, and evidence with 
regard to it, including evidence of previous convictions may be given 
in reply, 
2 but evidence of particular acts on his part which have not 
resulted in a conviction is not admissible. 
1) See Noakes, An Introduction to Evidence, at p. 105 
2) See Cross on Evidence, 5th ed. at p. 407 
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As pointed out in an earlier discussion, it was originally disputed 
that where defence witness gave evidence of accused good character, 
the prosecution was prohibited from replying by giving evidence of 
his bad character; 
' but as we know, the established and correct 
position is that the prosecution is invested with the right to offer 
evidence of bad character when the accused elicits evidence of good 
character by cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses or by 
himself giving evidence to that effect. It has been noticed2 that 
successive editions of Archbold3 have contained a statement to the 
effect that: "If the defendant endeavours to establish a good charac- 
ter, either by calling witnesses himself, cross-examining the prose- 
cution witnesses or by himself giving evidence to that effect, the 
prosecution is at liberty in most cases to prove his previous convic- 
tions". Although originally this passage is based on cases turning 
on special statutes as evidenced in R v. Shrimpton, 
4 
and in R V. 
Gadbu ,5 this passage was approved by a dictum in R V. Redd, 
6 a case 
to be considered subsequently. Cross, 
7 
says that in the absence of 
any judicial expression of doubt on the subject, it may be assumed 
that any character witness in any criminal proceedings may be asked 
about a previous conviction of the accused; and that as a matter of 
strict law, his previous convictions may it seems be proved in rebu- 
ttal, and I do share this view, which I hope will be confirmed as the 
discussion progresses. One of the special statutes of the 19th 
century on which the above statement by Archbold is based is the 
Previous Convictions Act, 1836, and it will be necessary to discuss 
1) See ante 
2) Cross On Evidence,. 5th ed. at p.: 407 
3) 40th ed, para. 558 
4) (1851) 2 Den. 319 
5) (1838) 8 C. &P. 676 
6) (1923) 1 K. B. 104 
7) Cross On Evidence, 5th ed. at 407 
the two leading cases listed above, which were decided upon the 
provisions of the Act. Starting with R V. Shrimpton, 
1 
which was a 
trial of a prisoner for larcerny, one of the witnesses for the prose- 
cution, in answer to questions by prisoner's counsel stated that he 
had known the prisoner ix or seven years, and that he had borne a 
good character for honesty. The counsel for the prosecution thereu- 
pon claimed, under the provisions of the statute, 
2 to give evidence 
of the previous conviction of the prisoner in 1838. This evidence 
was objected to by the prisoner's counsel as inadmissible, first, 
because the evidence of the good character of the prisoner elicited 
from the witness R., was confined to the period between the years 
1844 and 1851, and therefore evidence of the prisoner's conviction in 
1833 was not in answer hitherto; secondly, because R., being a wit- 
ness for the prosecution only, the prisoner did not, by the answers 
of R. to questions put to him in cross-examination give evidence of 
his (the prisoner's) good character within the meaning of the sta- 
tute. 
3 The court overruled the objection, -and the conviction of the 
prisoner in 1838 was thereupon given in evidence before the verdict 
was returned. The prisoner was found guilty and sentenced to nine 
months' imprisonment, but the court of Quarter Sessions reserved for 
the opinion of Her Majesty's judges the question of law whether, 
under the circumstances above stated, proof of the said previous 
conviction of the prisoner was properly received in evidence before 
the verdict of guilty was returned. The Court held that the previous 
1) (1851) 2 Den. 319 
2) 14 & 15 Vict. C"l9 Sec. 9 
3) See ante 
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conviction was admissible under 6&7 Will. 4, C-111, and 14 & 15 
Vict. C. 19. The words of the legislature are, "that if, upon the 
trial of any person for any such subsequent offence as aforesaid, 
such person shall give evidence of his good character, it shall be 
lawful for the prosecutor, in answer thereto, to give evidence of the 
conviction of such person for the previous offence or offences before 
such verdict of guilty shall have been returned and the jury shall 
inquire concerning such previous conviction or convictions, at the 
same time that they inquire concerning such subsequent offence". 
Lord Campbell, C. J., 
1 commented on this, that "The object of the 
legislature was to defeat the scandalous attempt often made by per- 
sons, who had been repeatedly convicted of felony, bringing witnes- 
ses, or cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution, to prove 
that the prisoner had previously borne a good character for honesty. 
The mischief is as great whether such evidence be elicited from the 
witnesses for the prosecution or from those who are called on the 
part of the prisoner. Indeed greater; for the jury are more likely 
to be deceived by evidence in favour of the prisoner which falls from 
the witnesses from the crown. The enactment would have been defec- 
tive, if it had allowed evidence of good character to be given, and 
not the evidence of bad character also. The question then is, did 
the prisoner in this case give evidence of good character so as to 
render it lawful for the prosecutor to offer the previous conviction 
in evidence? It seems to me, that the natural and necessary inter- 
pretation, to be put upon the words of the statute is, that if, 
1) (1851) 2 Den. 319. at 389 
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either by calling witnesses on his part, or by cross-examination of 
the witnesses for the crown, the prisoner relies upon his good chara- 
cter it is lawful for the prosecutor to give the previous conviction 
in evidence". The only comment I can make about Lord Campbell's 
speech is that, it must have put the whole problem about the cross- 
examination of character witnesses as to the accused's previous 
conviction beyond argument. It is however, important to take notice 
of the valuable contribution made by Alderson B., in the same case, 
he said, using the now familiar words: "You say he is not likely to 
have committed this offence, because he is a man of good character; 
then, in answer to that, they say he is likely, because he is not a 
man of good character; " to achieve that, evidence of his bad charac- 
ter has to be adduced, which includes evidence of previous convic- 
tions. 
A similar question as that dealt with in R V. Shrimpton, 
' was 
raised in R V. Gadbury, 
2 and a similar decision was also given. 
Here, the prisoner was indicted for breaking and entering the dwel- 
ling house of one James Chamberlain, and stealing a veil, a hanker- 
chief and things like that. Mrs Chamberlain stated, that she saw the 
window of her room down, but not fastened, at 10 am, and the property 
was not missed till between five and six pm; and that-a person had 
been in her room several times in the course of the day. A woman in 
whose house the prisoner lodged at the time of the robbery, stated 
that he had lodged there for a fortnight previous. She was asked, on 
1) (1851) 2 Den. 319 
2) (1838) 8 C. &P. 676 
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cross-examination, whether she had not herself taken the house only a 
fortnight before, and whether the prisoner was not living there at 
the same time, and was not recommended to her as a lodger by the 
previous landlord, of whom she took it? She replied in the affirma- 
tive. The prisoner was found guilty of larceny only. He was then 
charged with having been previously convicted of felony; having been 
found guilty on this part of the indictment. Parke, B., (after 
referring to the statute 6&7 Will, IV. C. 111, entitled "An Act to 
prevent the fact of a previous conviction being given in Evidence to 
the Jury on the case before them except when Evidence to Character is 
given"), observed, that there had been one question put in cross- 
examination by the prisoner's counsel, as to which he had some doubt, 
whether or not the object in putting it was to show that the prisoner 
had borne a good character; and in his opinion, if a prisoner's 
counsel cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution in order, to 
show that the prisoner had borne a good character, it would be the 
duty of the court to direct that the evidence of the previous convic- 
tion should be given in the first instance. But, as he was in doubt 
whether the object of the prisoner's counsel in the present case was 
such, he had not thought it right to do so. The counsel for the 
prisoner stated that the object he had in view was only to show that 
the prisoner had been living in the same house longer than the wit- 
ness had stated; and not to show that he had borne a good character. 
He admitted that under the words of the statute, which were "shall 
give evidence of his or her good character", the rule should be the 
same whether such evidence was obtained by cross-examintion or other- 
wise. Concurring with this view, Parke, B., said in his judgement: 
"Yes; the wörds are, 'shall give evidence', and not shall call witne- 
sses; and I am of opinion, that the rule should be so laid down, and 
it is important that in future it should be understood to be so, and 
"should be generally known". It should be noted that a similar remark 
was made by Alderson, B., in R V. Shrimpton, 
' 
where he said: "The 
words of the statute are 'give evidence' - not 'call witnesses', - 
and the two certainly are not equivalent". The significance of this 
dicta, is evident when one attempts the interpretation of the rele- 
vant sections of the Acts, 
2 I have referred to where similar phrases 
are used. In other words, the following words under section 68 (2) 
(b) of the Nigeria Evidence Act: "when the accused person has given 
evidence of his good character"; and a similar provision under sec- 
tion 54 of the Indian Evidence Act which states: "Unless evidence has 
been given that he (accused) has a good character", should not be 
interpreted in a limited sense only to mean that, unless evidence of 
good character has been given by witnesses called on the accused's 
behalf, but evidence of good character would also be dimmed given 
where the accused elicits evidence of good. character by cross-exami- 
nation of the prosecution witnesses too. It is abundantly clear that 
in either situation, the witesses may be cross-examined as to the 
accused's previqus conviction. 
Another important question was raised in R V. Shrimpton, 
3 to the 
1) (1851) 2 Den. 319 
2) Sec; 68 (2), Nig. Evidence Act: sec. 54 Indian Evidence Act 
3) (1851) 2 Den. 319 
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effect that: "Suppose a witness, under cross-examination, should of 
his own accord give evidence as to the prisoner's good character, 
would that let in the previous conviction? " To that question, not 
much was said in answer by Lord Campbell, who cautiously retorted by 
saying: "That would be a different question. I would think, at 
present, that in that case I should not admit the conviction". The 
question, however came up undiluted in R V. Redd, 
' 
and the court rose 
up to it decisively, saying that, a prisoner cannot be said to be 
endeavouring to establish a good character merely because a witness 
whom he called voluntarily and probably against the prisoner's own 
desire, made a statement as to his goad character and that does not 
entitle the prosecution to question the prisoner as to his previous 
conviction. The facts are as follows, an appellant, who was tried 
for house-breaking and robbery, called a witness for the purpose of 
producing certain letters. "This witness, without any question being 
put to him by the appellant, voluntarily made a statement as to the 
appellant's good character. The counsel for the prosecution then 
claimed that as evidence of the appellant's good character had been 
given he was entitled to cross-examine the witness as to the appel- 
lant's real character, and he thereupon proceeded to ask the witness 
as to the number of times the appellant had been convicted. The 
court held that the appellant was not under the circumstances endea- 
vouring to establish a good character. by calling a witness who volun- 
tarily made a statement as to the appellant's good character, and 
that therefore the question as to the appellant's previous convic- 
1) (1923) 1 K. B. 104 
tions were not admissible. Avory, J., 
1 
in his judgement said: "The 
question we have to determine is whether the suggestion of the pre- 
vious bad character of the appellant was properly put before the 
jury. So far as the evidence given by the witness Williams is conce- 
rned the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, has no application, but it does 
not fall within the authority of R V. Gadbury. 
2 In the opinion of 
the court, the rule in that case is correctly stated in Archbold's 
Criminal pleading3 as follows: 'If the prisoner endeavours to estab- 
lish a good character, either be. calling witnesses himself or by 
cross-examining the witnesses for the prosecution, the prosecution is' 
at liberty in most cases to prove his previous convictions'. The 
question is whether the appelllant was within the meaning of that 
rule endeavouring to establish a good character. In the opinion of 
the court, he was not endeavouring to establish a good character 
merely because a witness whom he called, voluntarily and. probably 
against the appellant's own desire, made a statement as to the appel- 
lant's good character ..... " I would like to add by way of comment 
that there is a distinction between R V. Redd4 and R V. Gadbury, in 
the sense that the issues adjudicated upon in both cases though may 
be similar are quite different. It has been suggested that R V. 
Redd 5 followed R V. Gadbuzy6, but for some reasons I think Gadbury's 
case cannot be taken as a precedent in R V. Redd. Redd's case could 
be charged to have erroneously indicated that the rule in Gadbury's 
case is correctly stated in the passage in Archbold, because R V. 
1) (1923) 1 K. B. 104 at Pp. 106-107 
2) (1838) 8 C. &P. 676 
3) 40th ed. Para. 558 
4) (1923) 1 K. B. 104 
5) (1923) 1 K. B. 104 
6) (1838) 8 C. &P. 676 
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Gadbury, and R V. Shrimpton are merely interpretations of the Pre- 
vious Conviction Act, 1836. Even though the passage in Archbold was 
cited and approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal in R V. Redd, the 
remarks were obiter as the court held that the accused had not put 
his character in issue; the passage in Archbold has not passed unno- 
ticed by Stephen, 
' 
and it has been pointed out that Cadbury and 
Shrimpton, are of course not authority for the wide proposition laid 
down in the passage. It is interesting to note that the accused's 
counsel in R V. Redd, cited R V. Cadbury to the court, not, curiously 
enough, to show that the passage in Archbolld was misconceived, but 
merely as an authority that on the facts in Redd, the accused had not 
put his character in issue. It is significant to note that in 
Canada, the effect of the decision in R V. Redd has since been 
overruled by section 573 of the Canadian Criminal Code. As a matter 
of fact, R V. Triganzie, 
2 had actually ruled long before it, against 
the admissibility of a conviction to rebut the evidence of a witness 
to character at common law, and-this signifies a significant parity 
within the common law system. However, as I said earlier on in the 
discussion, I share the view expressed-by Cross3 that as a matter of 
strict law accused's previous convictions may it seems by proved in 
rebuttal, and even though I agree that Cadbury, and Shrimpton cannot 
be said to have been confirmed by the passage in Archbold as they 
were decided upon a special statute, they undoubtedly serve as a 
guideline. There is also a distinction to be marked between 
Cadbury's case and Redd's case. In R V. Cadbury, I would think that 
1) A Digest of the Law of Evidence, 12th ed. (1948) 202 
2) (1888) 15 O. R. 294 
3) Cross On Evidence, 5th ed. at p. 407 
the decision was to the effect that where the object of a defence 
question was not to elicit evidence of good character, but an inno- 
cent mistake was made on the part of the witness and in his answer 
gave evidence of the accused's good character, the prosecution would 
not be allowed to give evidence of bad character of the accused by 
asking questions about his previous conviction Gadbury's case to my 
mind, shows the importance to be attached to the intention of the 
defence counsel in his questioning, - we should ascertain the object 
of his question, and where an inadvertent mistake was made about the 
intention or object of the question, it should not be used against 
the accused. On the other hand, I see the decision in R V. Redd' in 
a rather different light, because here, there was no qualm or misgi- 
ving about the object of the question, but the witness intentionally, 
out of his own volition and without any prompting whatsoever, gave 
evidence of good character of the accused; this was wholly a volun- 
tary act, it was not accidental, and there, I believe lies the basic 
and fundamental difference in the two cases. So if I may put it this 
way, the distinction is that while R V. Gadbury2 prohibits allowing 
the accused to suffer for a confusion that might have arisen from his 
or. -from the mind of the witness, R V. Redd, forbids the punishment of 
the accused for an act he could not be said to support or desire, and 
so should not be responsible for the consequence. Another case which 
emphasises the need for 'voluntariness' is R V. Beecham. 3 In this 
case, the court gave a decision to the effect that, a statement not 
1) (1923) 1 K. B. 104 
2) (1838) 8 C. &P. 676 
3) (1921) 3 K. B. 464; 90 L. J. K. B. 1370. 
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voluntarily made by an accused but extorted by repeated questions in 
cross-examination cannot be treated as evidence given by accused of 
his good character and does not justify the prosecution in letting in 
evidence of his previous convictions. 
In Scotland, ' there are similar cases involving the type of 
issues as those discussed above, and it is interesting to note that 
the Scottish cases are decided on special statutes, of a different 
kind from those discussed above though. I will like to start with 
the case of Kepple V. H. M. Advocate, 
2 in which the court held that 
accidental or incidental reference by a witness to a previous 
conviction may not necessarily be fatal to a conviction. This 
decision was based on the provisions of section 67 of the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887, which enacts: "Previous convictions 
against i _-erson accused shall not be laid before the jury, nor shall 
reference be made thereto in presence of the jury before the verdict 
is returned"; in the case, an accused was tried on an indictment 
which set forth that he had assaulted his wife, and had previously 
evinced ill-will and malice towards her. In the course of the 
trial the accused's wife gave evidence. The prosecutor asked her: 
"Will you tell us when he threatened to do you in, any of the date? " 
The witness answered: "On two previous convictions of thirty days, he 
go he threatened me. He said he would swing for me". In its 
judgement, the court held that this answer did not contravene the 
provisions of section 67, (stated above) in respect that it was given 
in reply to a competent question not involving any reference to 
1) See Walker and Walker, 
§ 22; Rention & Brown § 10: 07 Anon 
"Disclosure of Previous Convictions" , 
(1960) 76 S. C. L. R. 169 
2) (1936) J. C. 76. See also Deighan V. Macleod (1959) J. C. 25; 
Smith V. H. M. Advocate (1975) SLT (Notes) 89; Millar V. H. M. Advocate 
6 May 1976 unreported 
previous convictions; and as such, the appeal against the conviction 
was dismissed. I find it necessary to consider some aspects of the 
Lord Justice-General's (Normand) judgement. He said: 
' "The first 
question is whether a reference to previous convictions, occuring in 
the evidence in chief of a witness for the crown, but not brought out 
-in response to a question so framed as to elicit such a reference, 
may invalidate the verdict. The answer to this question depends on 
section 67 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887,. The 
2 
material words are .... (as stated above. ) It is clear that 
previous convictions cannot be laid before the jury by a witness on 
his own initiative but only by the prosecutor or by the judge, and 
the first limb of the prohibition is therefore addressed to the 
prosecution and to the presiding judge. In my opinion, the 
prohibition against referring to previous convictions is likewise 
addressed to the presiding judge and to the prosecutor. The section 
not only forbids a reference to previous convictions by the judge and 
prosecutor themselves, it also forbids any question by them which 
deliberately or carelessly suggests to the witness an answer 
referring to previous convictions, and it lays on the judge a duty to 
prevent, if he can, a witness from making any ultroneous reference to 
a previous conviction. If, however, in answer to an innocent' 
question, a witness blurts out a reference to a previous conviction, 
the prohibition is not infringed". It should be noted that section 
67 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, has come under judicial 
1) (1936) J. C. 76 at 79 
2) 50 & 51 Vict. Cap. 35 
consideration in several reported cases. In none of them did the 
question now at issue - (as in Kepple V. H. M. Advocate) 
' fall to be 
decided; but in some of them dicta occur which bear on the question. 
For example, in Corcoran V. H. M. Advocate2, Lord Anderson said: 
3 "I 
consider that the purpose of the enactment was to ensure that a case 
should be presented to the jury as if it were a first offence. The 
statute interpels the prosecutor and'judge from doing or saying 
anything, or leading a witness to do or say anything, which would 
convey to the jury that the panel had been previously convicted of 
crime. The accused, or the agent or counsel who represents him, may, 
during the trial, bring out the fact of a previous conviction, but 
disclosure so made can never furnish a ground of attack on a convic- 
tion". It is thought that that statement of the law is correct. 
However, Lord Ormidale in the same case said4: "I am content to take 
a. -. broader view of the meaning and effect of the section, to consider 
its spirit rather than its precise phraseology, and to treat as 
within its ambit anything said and done in the course of the trial 
which, although indirectly, necessarily brings to the mind of the 
jury the fact that the panel has been previously convicted". In 
Kepple V. H. M. Advocate, the Lord Justice-General (Normand)5 commen- 
ted on the view of Lord Ormidale in the following words: "This pas- 
sage was founded on as if it were to be taken as Lord Ormidale's 
considered opinion on the meaning and effect of the section. I think 
such a view is erroneous, and that, when the whole context is exa- 
mined, it is apparent that Lord Ormidale meant that, even if it were 
1) (1936) J. C. 76 
2) (1932) J. C. 42; See also Cornwallis V. H. M. Advocate, (1902) 3 Adam 
604, Lord Kyllachy 
3) (1932) J. C. 42 at 49 
4) Ibid at 47 
5) (1936) J. C. 76 at p. 80 
conceded that the broader meaning and effect should be given to the 
enactment, he would not in the case before him hold that it was 
transgressed. But, whatever be the meaning of the particular pas- 
sage in his Lordship's opinion, I cannot hold that something said by 
a witness, voluntarily, and under circumstances which prevent the 
, 
presiding judge from intervening before the mischief is done, is an 
infringement of the section if it discloses that the panel has been 
previously convicted. So to hold would be to open an easy way by 
which a witness favourable to the panel might afford ground for 
challenging a verdict of guilty". The later case of Haslam V. H. M. 
Advocate 
l, 
which was also decided on the provision of section 67 of 
the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887, reviewed and subtly 
criticised the decision of Kepple V. H. M. Advocate2. The facts of 
Haslam V. H. M. Advocate are as follows; at the trial of an accused, 
upon an indictment which set forth charges of obtaining board and 
lodging and money by fraud, a police officer stated in evidence that, 
at the police station, the accused had given his name as John Good- 
child, and on being charged, "at first" had denied all knowledge of 
the offences. The witness further deponed: - "Then I asked him if 
his name was John James Haslam and he said no. Then I compared the 
wound on his hand". Before the witness could proceed further the 
prosecutor interposed this question: - "(Question); He later admitted 
that he wis John James Haslam7 (Answer) Yes". The accused was 
convicted. The court held that the reference in this evidence to the 
1) (1936) J. C. 82 
2) (1936) J. C. 76 
name and the wound on the hand of the accused did not necessarily 
lead to the inference that he had been previously convicted, and the 
appeal against the conviction was dismissed. Lord Justice-Clerk 
(Aitchison) in his judgement made certain remarks worth mentioning. 
' 
He said, (after citing the provision of section 67 of the Criminal 
Procedure (Scotland) Act): ".... Now in the recent case of Kepple 
certain observations were made by the learned judges which may seem 
to limit the application of that section to cases where previous 
convictions are laid before the jury, or are referred to before the 
jury by the. presiding judge or by the prosecutor. I am not satisfied 
that a restricted meaning ought to be given to the section. When a 
reference is made to a previous conviction by an officer of police, 
who ought to know better, it is obviously prejudicial to a fair 
trial, and I have difficulty in understanding why it should be 
thought not to amount to a contravention of section 67. The purpose 
of section 67 is to ensure that an accused person shall be fairly 
tried, and an accused person is not fairly tried if a police when he 
gets an opening in a question inadvertently addressed to him, makes a 
reference, direct or indirect, to the record of the man who is stan- 
ding his trial. It may be for consideration whether the case of 
Kepple has not gone too far, and I desire to reserve my opinion upon 
the point". I would just like to say that I identify with the views 
expressed by Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison with regards to Kepple, as 
to the provision of section 67 of the 1887 Act2. Another interesting 
case to consider is Clark V. Connell, 
3 
which was decided under a new 
1) (1936) J. C. 82 at 85 
2) Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 50 & 51 Vict. Cap. 35 
3) (1952) J. C. 119 
statutory provision - section 46 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) 
Act, 1949. The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 1949, by section 46 
(2) enacts that section 34 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) 
Act, 1908, in so far as it requires previous convictions to be set 
forth in a summary complaint, shall cease to have effect, and, fur- 
. 
they, that "no such previous conviction shall be laid before the 
judge in any proceedings on such complaint until the judge is satis- 
fied that the charge is proved..... ". The facts of the case are as 
follows, the accused, William McIntyre Connell was charged in the 
Sherrif Court at Dundee on summary complaint with a contravention of 
section 15 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930. A police surgeon gave 
evidence that on apprehension the accused had been medically examined 
and that, inter alia, his handwriting had been compared with his 
signature on his driving licence. The Sherrif-substitute then asked 
for production of the licence, for the purpose of himself comparing 
the handwriting thereon with the handwriting obtained by the police 
surgeon; and the licence was produced by the prosecutor. While 
examining the licence, the sherrif-substitute inadvertently became 
aware that it contained an endorsation although he had no knowledge 
of the nature of the endorsation beyond the fact that it must have 
related to a conviction under the Road Traffice Acts. At the conclu- 
sion of the evidence objection was taken by the accused's solicitor 
to the competency of the procedure, in respect that a previous convi- 
ction had thus been laid before the sherrif-substitute and, the 
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sherrif-substitute sustained the objection. The court held that 
section 46 (2) of The Act of 1949 was concerned solely with previous 
convictions of offences forming an aggravation of the offence char- 
ged, and that, as the sherrif-substitute had remained unaware of the 
nature of the endorsation, the accused had not been prejudiced in his 
defence by the procedure followed, and the objection should have been 
repelled. I will like to draw attention to some of the significant 
observations made by Lord Justice-General (Cooper) in his judgement. 
He said: 
1 "This stated case raises an interesting question with 
regard to the application of the provisions of The Criminal Justice 
(Scotland) Act, 1949, with reference to previous convictions. There 
are two provisions in that Act - section 39 dealing with previous 
convictions in proceedings on indictment, and section 46, dealing 
with previous conviction in summary proceedings. It is with the 
second of these sections that we are alone concerned, ...... By 
section 67 of The Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887, provision 
was made as regards the non-disclosure of previous convictions to 
juries, and we are, of course, familiar with the rule thereby laid 
down and with the beneficial purpose which its application secures. 
The first observation I would venture to make is that there is a 
significant difference between the language used in section 46 of the 
new Act and in section 67 of the Act of 1887, and I think this 
distinction must be borne in mind when considering the observations 
of learned judges made before 1949 as to the effect and purpose of 
section 67 of the Act of 1887. There is also this to be said, that, 
1) (1952) J. C. 119 at 122. 
if the new provisions are read in the widest possible sense, they 
might result in the most remarkable consequences. Three illustra- 
tions occur to me. In the first place there are some habitual crimi- 
nals who are known to practically all the judges who could possibly 
try them. Again, there are those who are known to some of these 
. 
judges: and, if the judge who knows the accused has on that account 
to retire in favour of another judge, that other judge will inevi- 
tably infer the reason for the charge and will accordingly become 
acquainted with the fact that the accused has a previous record. 
Again, there is the case where an accused is charged on indictment 
with a relatively slight offence, from which any judge of experience 
would at once infer that the reason for an indictment was the pre- 
vious bad record which stood against the accused. If, therefore, the 
sections were read as prohibiting the trial of an accused person by a 
judge who had from any source whatever acquired information that the 
accused had a previous record, we would have to impute to Parliament 
the quite incredible intention of granting a licence to some habitual 
criminals to commit crimes without the possibility of being brought 
to account in any criminal court which could try them. The diffi- 
culty could not even be met by the-heroic expedient of appointing 
additional judges to try such cases, for the reasons for such appoin- 
tments could not be concealed ..... Turning to an examination of 
section 46, I note that the operative directions are concerned with 
two matters - (first) what shall not thereafter be contained in a 
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complaint, and what shall be contained in a separate notice, and 
(second) what shall not be 'laid before' the judge until the charge 
has first been proved. It is with the second of these matters that 
we are concerned here. The words 'laid before' must in my view be 
read as meaning, at least primarily, 'laid before by the prosecutor', 
for I find it impossible to entertain the suggestion that the section 
would be satisfied if the forbidden information were 'laid before' 
the judge by the accused or his representative, for such a reading 
would afford a very simple and easy method by which any accused could 
escape conviction". 
These observations made by Lord Justice-General Cooper are indubi- 
tably appropriate and useful. 
It is pertinent to point out as evident from the discussion that 
the previous convictions alluded to in England, are those voluntarily 
divulged by the accused himself or his witnesses - i. e., witnesses 
called by the defence as to the accused's character while in Scot- 
land, they are to the previous convictions inadvertently divulged by 
the prosecution witnesses. It should be made clear that if any of 
the cases came up in either jurisdictions they would certainly be 
decided in the same way. However, the pertinent question is, what is 
the significance of the difference between on the one hand previous 
convictions given by the accused or his witnesses and those given by 
the prosecution witnesses. The obvious answer is that the evidence 
of previous conviction given by the prosecution witness will be more 
frowned upon especially as it is prohibited to give evidence of the 
accused's bad character in the first instance but less fuss would be 
aroused by evidence of previous conviction given by the defence 
witnesses not because in actual fact it would be less prejudicial, 
but rather as a result of natural human psychology. A parallel that 
one can draw is when the prosecution voluntarily 4tves evidence of 
the accused's good character, surely such evidence will carry more 
weight than when it is given by the accused himself - it is simple 
human logic. However, it appears that contrary to the view that I 
have just expressed, there is no significant difference between the 
evidence of previous conviction of the accused given by the prosecu- 
tion or the defence witness.. This point is buttressed by the atti- 
tude of the court when it happens, and it happens not infrequently 
that, because of some inadvertent reference in the witness-box, or 
the wrongful exposure to the jury of some document, part of the bad 
character of the accused, of which his previous conviction is a part, 
is unintentionally exposed to the jury, when it is not admissible for 
any purpose. 
A number of examples have been highlighted in earlier discussion 
and we shall now consider how the problem is to be properly tackled 
when it arises. If, as may easily occur, a defence witness inadver- 
tently says that he "first met the accused in prison", or a policeman 
is asked questions about why he chose to suspect the accused and 
answers by referring to the accused's past record, the problem arises 
whether the jury should automatically be immediately discharged. In 
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such a case, the judge has power to discharge the jury and order a 
new trial, if application is made to him on behalf of the accused 
affected, or presumably of his own motion. The question of discharge 
of the jury is in all cases one within the discretion of the judge. 
It by no means follows that the jury must in every case be dischar- 
ged. The judge, must weigh the gravity of the revelation to the 
case for the defence, and must take into account the prejudice and 
inconvenience which a retrial may cause. If the slip is inconse- 
quential, or occurs in the course of a long trial and is likely to be 
forgotten by the jury, ' or where the matter can be dealt with by a 
firm direction, it will be proper to continue. It would also be 
manifestly right to continue where the accused, seeing the trial go 
against him "inadvertently" lets slip something of his past record. 
Generally, the cases show a development. In R V. Peckham, 2 the Court 
of Criminal Appeal apparently laid down a rule that when a statement 
with regard to a prisoner's previous record is inadvertently made 
from the witness-box to his prejudice, and his counsel applies for 
the trial to be begun again before another jury, the court ought to 
discharge the jury and begin again. More recently, the Court of 
Appeal in R V. Weaved has said that whether or not the jury should 
be discharged is a matter within the trial judges discretion on the 
particular facts of each case, and that an appellate court will not 
lightly interfere with the exercise of that discretion. Moreover, it 
is relevant for an appellate court to inquire whether the judge did 
all he could to dispel any prejudice to the accused arising from the 
1) As in R V. Coughlan & Young (C. A. ) (1976) 63 Cr. App. R. 33, where 
the slip was "sensibly" ignored by all concerned, and mentioned later 
to the judge. 
2) (1935)25 Cr. App. Rep. 125; Cf R V. Firth (1938) 26 Cr. App. Rep. 
148 and R V. Schipper & Fieret (1961) NZLR 85852 
3) (1968) 1 Q. B. 358 
inadvertent reference to his past. 
' By way of illustration, trials 
have been allowed to continue when the appellant showed familiarity 
with the words of the caution when approached by the police, - and a 
policeman had been obliged to disclose that the accused's address was 
known to the police; 
2 
and when one witness gratuitiously referred to 
the accused's statements, near the time of the commission of the 
offence, about having to go to court and to prison in respect of 
other indecent acts 
3 
On the other hand, in R V. Knape, 
4 The Supreme 
Court of Victoria held that the judge had erred in allowing a trial 
to continue after a defence witness had referred to meeting the 
accused at a prison farm, and by this answer, which was "unrespon- 
sive" to the question asked, had destroyed the whole strategy of the 
defence. There is no general rule that when one co-accused says 
something prejudicial about another the jury must automatically be 
discharged. It would make it too easy if a fair trial were not going 
well for one co-accused for another to obtain a retrial for him in this 
ways But in general, it is submitted that the interests of justice 
require the discharge of the jury, the appearance of a fair trial 
being as important as the reality. It is difficult wholly to exclude 
the possibility that the jury will be influenced wrongly against the 
accused. 
It should be pointed out that there are cases in which counsel for 
the prosecution may be aware, from the depositions or otherwise, of 
the possibility that one of his witnesses may blurt out something 
1) Ibid 
2) Ibid 
3) R V. Palin (1969) 3 Atl E. R. 689 
4) 71965 Y. R. 469, reviewing earlier Victorian cases. Cf R V. 
Campbell (1970) -VR 120; R V. Boland (1974) VR 849; V. Kopper (1975) 
11 SASR 182; Presta a V. R (1976) Tas. S. R. 16. 
5) R V. Sutton b Crta. L. R. 435 
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indicating that the accused has previously been convicted of an 
offence. He should take precautions against this happening, and an 
accused's statement may, according to English authority, be "edited" 
to avoid prejudicing the prisoner. The best way for this to be done 
is for the evidence to appear unvarnished in the depositions. Then 
at the trial counsel can confer and judge can take a part in ensuring 
that any editing is done in the right way and to the right degree. 
1 
The general rule that the accused's previous conviction should not 
be disclosed to the court before the verdict was examined by the 
Thomson Committee. 
2 They considered the discussion of the issue in 
the Eleventh (11th) Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, 
3 
and in an article by Henry Brinton and Lard Fraser4 and came to the 
conclusion that while certain circumstances might be considered as 
justifying some relaxation of the general rule prohibiting disclosure 
of an accused's previous convictions, it would not be practicable to 
frame a rule which would satisfactorily cover only those 
circumstances-5 The Criminal Law Revision Committee's proposals for 
making previous convictions more widely admissible were widely 
criticised, 
6 
and the Thomson Committee took the view that these 
proposals were so prejudicial to accused persons that they themselves 
did not propose anything on these lines being introduced in 
Scotland.? It is submitted with respect that the Thomson Committee 
reached the correct conclusion. Recent research supports the view 
that the disclosure of the accused's record may significantly 
increase the chance of conviction. It was found in an American study 
1) R V. Weaver (1968) 1 Q. B. 353,357-8; Cf R"V. Moriarty (1969) Crim. 
L. R. 659.2 see Thomson Rept Chap. 54.. In civil law countries the 
accused's character and background, including previous convictions 
are regarded as fully admissible on the question of whether or not he 
is guilty; Williams, Proof of Guilt (3rd ed. ) pp. 213-4; (3) CLRC, 
§§ 70 - 101. (4) "Trial and Pre- rial Procedures (1971) 135 J. P. 
827; (5) Thomson Committee Rept. 
s 
54: 07. (6) e. BC, § 92 - 110, 
338 H. L. Deb, 14 Feb 1973, Cols 1553,1577,1623,1632,1648,1661. (7) 
Thomson Rep. §54107. For a comment on the severity of Thomson's criticism 
see J. E. Adams "An Englishman 
Looks at Thomson" (1976) Crim. L. R. 609. 
- 675 - 
that where the judge disagreed with an acquittal by a jury the most 
common differential feature was the jury's ignorance of the accused's 
previous record. 
' 
In England, the following conclusions have been 
tentatively suggested from the research of the London School of 
Economics Project. (1) The admission of previous convictions 
"increases the chance of a guilty verdict, but only if those convic- 
tions are for offence similar to that charged. If they are dissimi- 
lar it is possible for them to have an effect that is positively 
favourable to the accused. Similar previous convictions may adver- 
sely affect the outcome for a co-accused. (2) Contrary to commom 
supposition, juries give real weight to an instruction to disregard a 
previous record wrongly admitted. 
2 
If similar convictions assist the 
Crown while dissimilar ones may favour the defence, it seems best 
that the jury should not be prejudiced in either direction by the 
disclosure of any convictions other than by virtue of section 1 (f) 
of The Criminal Evidence Act, 1898. 
(5) CHARACTER OF THIRD PARTIES 
In criminal cases, the general character or reputation of the 
complainant is as a rule immaterial, and no evidence can be given of 
it. The ? rosecutor in criminal cases is not a party to the 
proceedings, and as such, except in so far as it may be elicited in 
cross-examination, his character may generally not be proved. For 
example, in R V. Wood, 
4 
the defendant was charged in the first count 
of the indictment with robbing one C. of £1.35 with violence, and in 
1) Kalven V. Zeisel, The American Jury (1966) p. 131, Table 31 cit 
Colin Taper (197 36 MLR 56 at 57 
2) W. R. Cornish and A. P. Sealy. "Juries and The Rules of Evidence". 
(1973) Cris L. R. 208, at pp. 221-222. - 
3) See Ss, 141 (f) & 346 (f) of the (Scotland) Act of 1975; s: 159 
(d) of The Nigeria Evidence Act; s. 1 
(f) of the Criminal, Justice 
(Evidence) ACt, - Ireland. 
4) (1951) 2 All E. R. 112 
the second count with assaulting C. thereby occasioning him actual 
bodily harm. During the cross-examination of c., counsel for the 
defendant asked whether on the night relating to the charge he made 
an improper suggestion to the defendant and committed an act of gross 
indecency against him. The prosecution, proposed to call evidence in 
rebuttal to prove that C. was a person of good general reputation. 
The defence counsel submitted that such evidence was inadmissible, 
arguing that to prove that he (C) was a person of good general 
reputation could only prejudice the jury in his favour against the 
defendant. The court held that in the circumstances, the evidence 
was not admissible. 
There is an exception to the rule. Where a man is prosecuted for 
rape or an attempt to ravish, the position at common-law is that, the 
accused may adduce evidence in chief concerning the complainant's bad 
reputation for chastity.; The complainant may be cross-examined 
about her intercourse with other men and the accused; however, in the 
former? but not the latter3 event, her answers must be treated as 
final. The complainant may also be contradicted by other evidence if 
she denies that she is a prostitute or a woman who has demanded money 
4 
after consensual intercourse. The victim's character may be proved 
by the accused to establish provocation but not to justify the offe- 
nce committed especially in homicide casess. It is on these briefly 
described issues that the present discussion will mainly focus. It 
should be mentioned at this stage that in Scotland, there are some 
minor though important differences from the law of England and the 
1) R V. Clarke (1817) 2 Stark. 241 
(1817) L. R. 1 C. C. R. 344; Stokes V. R (1960) 105 C. L. R. 2) R V. Holmes 
279 
3) R V. Ri1ev (1887) 18 n. B. D. 481 
4) R v. 'Ba it and R V. Manzur (1969) 3 All E. R. 692; R V. Krauz (1973) 
9'7 Cr. R(ýp. R. 466.5) 
R V. Biartin (1920) 1 K. B. 213f R V. Macarthv, Russ. Cr. (8th ed. ) 
1931, n (b) & 1932 note ((L) . -"'-'- 
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Commonwealth regarding the extent of cross-examination of rape vic- 
tims. These differences will be highlighted while considering the 
matter in further detail. By and large the law in England which 
obtains in most of the dommonwealth, bears a close similarity with 
the Scottish law. Under the Scottish law, the accused may if notice 
. has been given attack 
the character of the injured person in cases of 
murder or assault, 
1 
and in cases of rape, attempted rape or similar 
assaults on women? In Dickie V. H. M. Advocate, 
3 
the Lord Justice- 
Clerk observed that "where a woman maintains that she has been inde- 
cently attacked, it is competent, upon notice being given, to attack 
her character for chastity, and to put questions to her involving the 
accusation of unchastity". In other words, if the person accused 
intends to attack the character of the person whom he is charged with 
injuring - if, for example, he is to prove immorality on the part of 
. 
the woman in a charge of rape, or quarrelsome disposition on the part 
of the person assaulted - he must give notice of his intention to the 
prosecutor and to the court. However, in one murder case, notice was 
given of intention to attack the character of the deceased, but this 
seems to be unnecessary; 
4 
it has not been unusual to take special 
recognition o: the particular circumstances of a case in order to 
waive the general rule which requires notice to be given. 
5 
In Falco- 
ner V. Brown; it was held that a complainer or the victim may be 
cross-examined, apparently without notice, as to his insobriety at 
the time of the assault, and that evidence may be led for the defence 
1) H. M. Advocate V. James Irving, (1838) 2 Swine 109 
2) H. M Advocate V. Walter Blair (1844) 2 Brown 167; H. M. Advocate V. 
Allan, 1 Brown, 500 
3) 1897) 24 R. (J) 82, at 83, see also at 87 
4) H. M. Advocate V. Peters and Others (1969) 33 J. C. L. 209 
5) H. M Advocate V. Kay (1970) S. L. T. (Notes) 66. 
6) (1893) 21 R. (J) 1. 
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regarding it. Having stated some of the general principles, we may 
now consider in detail the rules under some specific offences. It 
should be mentioned that in actions for malicious prosecution or 
false imprisonment, the bad character of the plaintiff is not admis- 
sible to show reasonable and probable cause on the part of the defen- 
dant. 
) 
And in civil cases, if the character of a third party were in 
issue or relevant to the issue, it could no doubt be proved as there 
are no special exclusionary rules that might be applicable. 
In a case of homicide, when the'accused has produced evidence that 
the deceased attacked him, - thereby grounding a claim of self defe- 
nce, - this when met by counter evidence raises an issue of conduct. 
Naturally, in a case of this type, when the issue of self-defence is 
made in a trial for homicide, and thus giving rise to a controversy 
whether the deceased was the aggressor, one's persuasion and intui- 
tion will be more or less affected by the character of the deceased. 
It is almost universally held that when such situations arise, the 
accused may introduce evidence of the reputation of the deceased for 
turbulence and violence. In R V. Thomas Hopkins2 on the trial of an 
indictment for murder, it was proved that the deceased rushed at the 
prisoner, her husband with whom she had been quarrelling, took his 
hat off, and caught him round the neck; and she then received a 
mortal wound inflicted by him with a knife which he had in his hand. 
To show the nature of the assault by the wife that the prisoner had 
reason to apprehend at the time, evidence of former attacks of this 
sort was allowed to be given; the prisoner was sensitive about the 
1) Newsman V. Carr, 2 Stark. 69;. Cornwall V. Richardson, Ry. & M.. 305 
Downie V. Butte er. 2 M. & Rob, 374. 
2) (1886) 10 Cox 229; R V. Biggin (1920) 1 K. B. 213; R V. MaCarthy, 
Russ. Cr. (8th ed. 
) 1931, note (b) and 1932, note (g). 
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neck from old sores, because the deceased used to seize his necker- 
chief, twist it round so tightly as almost to strangle him and his 
neckerchief had to be cut on one occasion to release him from his 
wife's violence. It is clear from the facts that the deceased woman 
was a strong, powerful woman, and also a very violent one; and the 
accused was apprehensive of a similar attack on the unfortunate 
occasion in question. The position is the same in Scotland 
land 
in 
the commonwealth countries. In America, the law is no different as 
shown in Williams V. Fambro. 
2 
In this case, Stephens J., while 
admitting the turbulent character of a slave, as indicating that he 
was killed in an act of insurbordination as claimed by the defendant, 
W., said: "To prove a proneness to insubordination, to be sure, does 
not prove an act of insubordination, but it does increase the proba- 
bility of the story where there is, as there was in this case other 
evidence suggestive of such an act. Such a story of the rebellion 
(as the defendant's) if told by a witness or indicted by circum- 
stances ought to be more easily believed concerning a violent, turbu- 
lent negro, than concerning a meek, humble one. I think that any 
mind in search of truth in such a case, or finding itself in doubt, 
would want to know the character of the negro ..... (the defendant) 
William's knowledge or ignorance (of the character) has nothing to do 
with that bearing of the character which I have pointed out. The 
sole purpose for which character was admissible in this case on the 
question of justification was from the negro's general readiness for 
1) Irving, (1838) 2 Swin. 109 yBlair (1836) Bell's Notes 294; Fletcher 
(1846) Ark. 171 
2) (1860) 30 Ga. 233,235: State V. Wilson (1945) 235 Iowa, 538,17 N. 
W. 2d. 138; Ball V. State (1929) 113 Tex. Cr. 58 S. W. 2d, 641. 
rebellion, to render more probable the evidence which tended to show 
an act of rebellion at the time he was killed; and this probability 
is evidently not affected in the slightest degree by William's pre- 
vious knowledge. The light comes from the fact that the negro was 
one who was apt and likely to do such an act as the one imputed to 
him, and not from William's knowledge of the fact". The main bone of 
the contention in the above decision is that, the character of the 
deceased may throw much light on the probabilities of the deceased's 
action. In Fields V. State, 
1 the deceased's character as a 'violent, 
turbulent, revengeful, blood thirsty, dangerous man, ' was held admis- 
sible for 'determining the turpitude of the crime and what should be 
the measure of the punishment to be inflicted'. 
There is a difficult recurring problem with regard to the 
circumstances in which the accused may adduce evidence of the vic- 
tim's character. Essentially, the problem is one. of undue prejudice 
- protecting the prosecution against jurors improperly permitting an 
accused to go free because the person he victimised may have been an 
unsavoury individual. It has been vigorously argued that the charac- 
ter of the victim should always be immaterial since all, men regard- 
less of their character are entitled to equal protection of the law, 
and admission of this evidence creates a danger that the jury will 
improperly empathise with the defendant because of the victim's 
undesirable nature. While it appears that in the British isles and 
the commonwealth, most is left to the discretion of the judge, in 
the United States of America, to prevent undue prejudice to the 
1) (1872) 47 Ala. 603 
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prosecution, most states impose a condition precedent to the admissi- 
bility of the evidence. 
' 
Ordinarily in a trial for homicide evidence of prior threats or the 
dangerous character of the deceased are inadmissible. However, if 
the accused claims the killing was in self-defence, it becomes incum- 
bent on him to satisfy the jury that he acted in a reasonable belief 
that he was in imminent danger of life or limb at the time he 
perpetrated the homicide. Hence, his knowledge of the dangerous 
character of the deceased or threats on the accused's life made by 
him and communicated to the latter are admissible for this purpose. 
In most United States' jurisdictions the accused must introduce some. 
proof of an overt aggressive act or hostile demonstration by the 
deceased before evidence of prior threats or the dangerous character 
2 
of the deceased is admissible. It is generally provided that in the 
absence of proof of hostile demonstration or overt act on the'part of 
the person slain or injured, evidence of his dangerous character or 
of his threats against the accused is not admissible. An 'overt act' 
is deemed to mean a hostile demonstration of such a character as to 
create in the mind of a reasonable person the belief that he is in 
immediate danger of losing his life or suffering bodily harm; need- 
less to say that the proof of such hostile. demonstration must be made 
to the satisfaction of the court. I agree that there ought to be 
some appreciable evidence of the deceased's aggression, for the 
character evidence can hardly be of value unless there is otherwise a 
1) 1 Wigmore, § 111 at 552; 2 Wigmore 
§ 246; Under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence however, no prerequiste is required to introduce evid- 
ence of the victim's character to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. See Fed. R. Evid. 404 (a) (2) (1975) 
2) 2 Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 246 
fair possibility of doubt on the point. Thus the purpose of the rule 
is to prevent the jury from becoming prejudiced in the defendant's 
favour where no situation which could even remotedly be termed "self- 
defence" is presented by the evidence. Thus by requiring preliminary 
proof of an overt act, the court demands some guarantee that the 
evidence will be employed for its proper purpose. Otherwise the 
deceased's bad character is likely to be put forward to serve impro- 
perly as a mere excuse for the killing, under the pretext of eviden- 
cing his aggression, and it is often possible to obtain untrustworthy 
character testimony for that purpose. The rule for the prerequisite 
overt act has been applied whether the evidence is offered for the 
purpose of showing who was the aggressor or of showing the defen- 
dant's state of mind to prove the reasonableness of his apprehension. 
I would strongly recommend the rule to the commonwealth countries at 
least as a guideline when dealing with the admissibility of a vic- 
tim's history in homicide cases. On the other hand I would not think 
that the absence of an overt act should always preclude an accused 
introducing evidence as to the dangerous character of the victim of a 
crime, the judge should be able to use his discretion in some circum- 
stances. The question of whether a particular hostile demonstration 
was of such a nature as to place the defendant in a reasonable fear 
of immediate death or bodily injury is one which must be determined 
by the jury. Thus the inquiry is directed to the situation as it 
appeared to the defendant at the time of the killing. Evidence-of 
prior threats by the deceased which are known to the defendant or 
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evidence of his bad character, is important only in determining the 
reasonableness of the accused's belief that the defensive measures 
were necessary. 
The admissibility of evidence of the victim's dangerous character 
to show that he was the aggressor is but one instance of the broader 
question concerning the use of character evidence to prove conduct. 
Although an individual's character is logically relevant to show the 
probability of that person engaging in certain conduct, it is weak 
evidence and tends to be given improper weight. Thus circumstantial 
use of character evidence is generally not allowed, but under certain 
circumstances this rule of exclusion is relaxed. If the prerequisite 
overt act is shown, the accused is generally. permitted to support his 
plea of self-defense by adducing evidence of the victim's. dangerous 
character. Only relevant character trait of the victim may be shown; 
a victim's character for chastity is irrelevant in a case of homi- 
cide. - It is well settled that where the accused has introduced 
evidence tending to show the victim's dangerous character, prosecu- 
tion may rebut the evidence by showing the victim's peaceful charac- 
ter. However conflict has arisen as to the condition under which the 
state may offer such proof in rebuttal. By one view, it is allowed 
only when the accused directly opens the character-door by adducing 
evidence of bad character reputation for violence. 
' This has the 
advantage of permitting the accused to give evidence of self-defence 
and still keep out altogether this 'collateral' evidence of charac- 
1) People V. Hoffman (1925) 195 Cal. 295,311,232 P. 974,980; 
Richardson V. State (1920) 123 Miss. 232,85 So. 186. 
ter, in keeping with the general tradition against using evidence of 
character to show conduct. It restricts the opportunity for the 
appeal to pity and vengeance implicit in the praise of the character 
of the deceased. It is, moreover in an attractive consonance with 
the rule as to the exclusive privilege of the accused to put his own 
character 'in issue'. On the other hand, when the crucial question 
as to who was the first attacker, on which the just decision of the 
murder charge may depend, is in doubt, the character of the dead man 
for peace or violence has a revealing significance which may well be 
thought to outweigh the possibility of prejudice, here so much less 
than in the case of an attack on the character of the accused. 
Accordingly, Wigmorel supported by some court decision, 
2 
has favoured 
the view that whenever the accused claims self defence and offers 
evidence that the deceased was the first aggressor, the state 
in 
rebuttal may produce evidence of the peaceful character of the 
deceased. Some other decisions reach like results by holding that in 
the particular case the threats or acts of aggression of deceased 
proved by the accused were such as to constitute an attack on 
his 
3 
character for peacefulness. But to draw a line between those acts 
of aggression sufficient to raise the issue of self-defense which are 
and those which are not attacks on character seems unrealistic. 
Allowing character evidence to be introduced raises the further 
consideration of permissible method of proving character. There are 
as we know at least three logical methods of proof: it could be 
by 
testimony as to specific acts, or by testimony in the form of perso- 
1) 1 Wigaore, Evidence, 
§ 63 at 471 
2) Sweaz State (1937) 210 Ind. 674,5 N. E. 2d 511; State V. Hol- 
brook, (1920 98 Ore. 43,192 P. 640. 
3) S V. Rutledge (1951) 243 Iowa 179,47 N. W. 2d 251. 
nal opinion and lastly it could be by testimony as to reputation. 
Although testimony of specific acts and personal opinions may better 
reveal the actual character of an individual, these types of proof 
are thought to involve a greater risk of undue prejudice, confusion 
of the issues, and comsumption of time. 
1 
In Scotland, though the 
'accused may prove that a complainer was of a quarrelsome or violent 
disposition, he may not normally prove specific acts of violence 
commited by him. The court held in H. M. Advocate V. James Irving, 
2 
that it is competent for the panel to lead evidence of passionate 
diposition of the party assaulted, having given notice in his defen- 
ces of his intention to do so; but he cannot prove specific acts of 
violence commited by him. In the case, the accused - James Irving - 
was charged with cutting and stabbing. The party on whom the assault 
was charged to have been commited was Theodore Blaikie, a blind 
fiddler. The panel pleaded not guilty, and the following defences 
were lodged for him: "The panel admits having inflicted a cut with a 
knife on Theodore Blaikie, as set forth in the indictments, but avers 
that he did so in order that he might liberate himself from the grasp 
of the said TheodoreBlaikie, by which he. was in danger of being 
strangled. The panel farther avers that the said. Theodore Blaikie is 
of a fierce and violent disposition, or at least that he is subject 
to strong gusts of passion; and the panel offers to prove by compe- 
tent evidence, that on various occasions, and while under their 
influence, he endeavoured to strangle various persons, and was preve- 
1) 9. McCormick, Evidence, 
§ 186 at 443 (Cleary ed. 1972); Cf I Wigmore 
198 at 676-77 Wigmore argued that the considerations which exclude 
specific acts to show the defendant's character were of little or no 
force when the defendant sought to prove the victim's dangerous char- 
acter. He favoured admitting such evidence subject to the trial court' 
discretion to control the number of incidents. 
2) (1838) 2 Swin. 109; Fletcher (1846) Ark. 171. 
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nted from doing so only by the forcible interference of third par- 
ties". On the defences being read, the Lord Justice Clerk observed 
that proof of individual acts of violence by Blaikie was certainly 
incompetent and clearly inadmissible; but he would allow it to be 
proved that he was a passionate man. Thus the prosecutor is only 
entitled to put a general question as to the peaceable disposition of 
the injured person and ask whether the victim was quarrelsome or 
inoffensive. It is however, clear that in Scotland, the judge has a 
discretion to allow proof of specific acts of violence, if such 
question would be in the interest of justice as -in the case of H. M. 
Advocate V. Kay. 
2 In this case, Kay was charged on indictment with 
the murder of her husband. In the course of the trial which took 
place before Lord Wheatley and a jury counsel for the panel sought 
leave of the court to lodge out of time certain hospital records 
dealing with injuries suffered by the accused which resulted from 
specific assaults by her deceased husband. The advocate-depute did 
not object to the lodging of the productions but directed the 
attention of the court to Macdonald on Criminal Law, 
3 
where the 
learned' author states: - "The accused may, on notice, prove that the 
injured party was quarrelsome, but he may not prove acts of violence 
committed by him"' Reference was also made to Fletcher, 
4 
where the 
rubric states: - "It is not competent for a panel'accused of culpable 
homicide to lead evidence of specific acts of violence alleged to 
have been committed by the deceased upon the panel some time 
previously". Counsel for the panel argued that the case of Fletcher 
1) Robt. Porteous (1841) Bell's Notes 293; Blair (1836) Bell's Notes 
294 
2) (1970) S. L. T. (Notes) 66, See also H. M. Advocate V. Cunningham 
High Crt. Glasgow; Glasgow Herald 14 Feb, 1974. 
3) at P. 309 
4) Arkley's Justiciary Reports (1846 - 1848) p. 171. 
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could be distinguished since (1) the indictment referred to malice 
"previously evinced" by the panel; and (2) the special defence alle- 
ged that she was acting in self-defence "reasonably believing that 
there was imminent danger to her life due to an assault intended by 
the deceased, David John Kay". He contended that the defence could 
not lead evidence of a general propensity to violence on the part of 
the deceased, particularly having regard to the statement in the 
special defence that the panel reasonably believed that she was in 
imminent danger of her life, unless she was allowed to establish that 
she had been assaulted with a knife by him before. Only by adducing 
such evidence could she establish her reasonable. belief that violence 
would be inflicted upon her. In allowing the hospital records to be 
lodged and evidence of specific previous assaults by the deceased 
upon the panel to be tendered Lord Wheatley said: - "While the law as 
set forth in Macdonald's Criminal Law, 
' 
and the case. of Fletcher, 
2 
which is cited in support of the proposition therein stated, is 
understandable in the normal case - since normally it would be unde- 
sirable to allow evidence on collateral matters in a criminal trial - 
in the circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that the 
evidence in relation to these five assaults, if it is tendered, 
should be allowed. The reason for my decision is that the indictment 
narrates that the accused evinced malice and ill-will against the 
deceased on previous occasions. The defence which has been lodged as 
a special defence is to the effect that the accused was acting in 
self-defence, she reasonably believing that there was imminent danger 
1) at p. 309 
2) Arkley's Justiciary Reports (1846 - 1848) at p. 171 
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to her life due to an assault intended by the deceased. I consider 
that it would be unfair to allow detailed evidence by the Crown in 
support of. that part of the indictment which alleges, that the accused 
had previously evinced malice and ill-will towards the deceased, 
without allowing the accused the opportunity of proving in turn by 
detailed evidence that she had reason to apprehend danger from the 
deceased. It seems to me that in the circumstances of this case 
equity demands that such evidence should be allowed. In reaching 
this decision, I wish to make it clear that I am not seeking to 
establish any new rule of law. It may well be that normally the 
general rule referred to by Macdonald would have to be given effect 
to, but if special circumstances be shown, and justice demands a 
departure from that rule then, of course, such a departure requires 
to be made. Each case will be dependent on its own circumstances. I 
am of opinion that the circumstances of this case as explained to me 
both by the learned advocate-depute and by learned counsel for the 
accused entitle me to regard this as an exception justifying a depar- 
ture from the general rule". I think this is a good and fair deci- 
sion, and it. shows that judges should use their discretion where 
necessary and not always feel bound by the shackles of a chain which 
they themselves locked and can unlock. Evidence of specific acts of 
violence by the victim, it should however be made clear is usually 
excluded being an attempt to prove character by particular acts and 
that is even acknowledged in the above decision. 
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The relevance of prior threats by the victim against the defendant 
is closely associated with the use of the victim's dangerous charac- 
ter to show who was the aggressor. Generally, when the defendant in 
a homicide case claims he acted in self-defence, evidence of the 
character and background of the victim may be relevant for two dis- 
tinct issues: first, who was the aggressor in the encounter, and 
second, whether the defendant's apprehension of grevious bodily harm 
was reasonable. In determining the admissibility of the tendered 
evidence, the probative value of the evidence must be evaluated in 
light of the purpose for which it is offered. When character eviden- 
ce and prior threats are offered for the limited purpose of showing 
the probability of the victim's actions, prior knowledge by the 
defendant is immaterial as "(t)he inquiry is one of objective occur- 
rence, not of subjective belief". 
' On the other hand, where the 
evidence is directed toward showing the state of mind of the defen- 
dant as to what he reasonably apprehended, his prior knowledge as to 
the information involved may be all important. The victim's expres- 
sed declaration of intention tends to show that such intention was in 
fact carried out; the threats are admissible under the "declarations 
of mental state" exception to the rule excluding hearsay. 
2 
Evidence of the character and background of the victim as earlier 
indicated is relevant to show the reasonableness of the accussed's 
apprehension of serious bodily harm. When the accused pleads self- 
defence, his state of mind at the time of the offence becomes a 
material issue. It is undoubted that a homicide is excusable when 
1) 1 Wigmore, Evidence, 
§ 63 at 471 
2) McCormick, Evidence (Cleary ed. 1972)'§ 295 at 697 - 701 
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committed in self-defence by one who reasonably belives that he is in 
imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and 
that the killing is necessary to save himself. Since an act by one 
known to be a violent person may justify a more prompt and decisive 
response, circ imstances known to the defendant at the time of the 
. 
affray are relevant to show the reasonableness of his belief of 
imminent danger. In contrast to showing the probability of the 
victim's aggression, it is the reputed character of the victim, 
irrespective of his actual character, that is relevant to show the 
defendant's state of mind. Similarly, whether or not the threats 
attributed to the victim were actually made is, for this purpose, 
irrelevant if the defendant is shown to have believed that they were 
uttered. 
' If the threats were actually made, however, they are 
additonally relevant to show the probability of the victim's aggres- 
sion. The other problem one is confronted with here, is the issue of 
whether -evidence of the victim's prior conduct against third persons 
is admissible in support of a plea of self-defence. One could ap- 
proach the question of its admissibility by examining the two dis- 
tinct purposes for which evidence of the victim's character and 
background may be admissible. As stated above, when self-defence is 
pleaded, evidence as to the character and prior conduct of the defen- 
dant may be relevant on either of the two issues: (1) state of mind 
of the defendant as to his reasonable apprehension or (2) ascertai- 
ning whether the defendant or the victim was the aggressor. It has 
1) 2 Wignore, Evidence, 
§ 247 
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been argued in America that since the jurisprudence recognises that 
the accused's apprehension may be affected by his knowledge of the 
victim's dangerous reputation and prior threats and acts against the 
accused, the exclusion of violent acts against third persons of which 
the accused had knowledge would be logically and constitutionally) 
questionable. Knowledge that a person has acted violently in the 
past may have an even greater bearing on the accused's belief of 
danger than his knowledge of the victim's reputation. It is widely 
thought that the victim's prior threats against other persons, if 
known to the accused, similarly may be admissible. It is arguable 
that by admitting such evidence for the limited purpose of showing 
the accused's state of mind, the traditional rule against proof of 
character by particular incidents is not disturbed. 
Lastly, it should be mentioned that the state can offer the de- 
ceased's peaceable character when the issue of self-defence has been 
raised, even though the accused has not first introduced the deceased 
violent character; however most courts thus far seem reluctant to 
accept this dictate of logic and fairness. A similar problem may 
arise where the homicide is said to have been provoked by some other 
immoral acts of the deceased, as it was in the case of Gregory V. 
State. 
2 
This was a case involving murder; the state alleged that the 
motive was a quarrel over rents but the accused alleged that it was 
his discovery of the deceased in intended adultery with his wife. 
After evidence of the latter fact, the state was not allowed to show 
the deceased's good reputed character for chastity or virtue, holding 
1) The exclusion of this evidence may be denial of due process since 
the accused is entitled to fair opportunity to present his defense. 
Cf Davis V. Alaska, 415 LL S. 308 (1974); Chambers V. Mississippi, 
10 -U. 5 284 1973) 410' 
2) (1906) 50 Tex. Cr. 73,94 S. W. 1041 
that such evidence was admissible only if the defendant had offered 
the deceased's reputed bad character for chastity. Criticizing the 
decision Wigmorel, said: "of such a rule, all that can be said is 
that it would be regarded as perverse, in any other community; appa- 
rently, the innocent dead are to receive no right to defend themsel- 
ves in this court". 
In the same way as character of the victim may be received in 
homicide cases, under certain circumstances, character may equally 
well be received if some act is involved upon the probability of 
which a moral trait can throw light. On this principle it has been 
allowed to evidence the illegitimacy of one claiming an inheritance? 
and the ill-fame of a child's mother has been received on question of 
legitimacy, as in Pendrell-V. Pendrell, 
3 
where on an issue to try 
heirship, the defendant was allowed "to prove the mother to be a 
wanan of ill-fame", as tending to show the plaintiff a bastard. 
In divorce cases, the moral character of the co-respondent or other 
person with whom adultery is charged is relevant. 
4 
For example, in 
Com. V. Grays on a charge of adultery against a husband, after 
showing suspicious association with a woman, the court held that the 
character of the woman as a prostitute or the contrary may be shown. 
In Blackman V. State, 
6 
on a charge of adultery with a woman M, the 
reputation of M. for unchastity was admitted as corroborative 
evidence. However, the Position in Scotland seems to'be rather 
different, this is because in Scotland, the pursuer may not found on 
1) 1 Wigmore Evidence § 63 
2) Legge V. Edmunds (1856)26 L. J. ch. 125,135 
3) (1732) 2 Str. 924; See also Kennington V. Catoe (1904) 68 S. C. 
370,47 S. E. 719. 
4) Astley V. Astley, 1 Hag. Ecc. 714; Buchart V. Buchart, The Times, 
March 24,1899; Von Eckhardstein V. V- ckhardst The Times 
July 5,1907 
5) (1880) 129 Mass. 476 
6) (1860) 36, Ala. 295,297 
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the paramours sexual misconduct with persons other than the 
defender. 1 
In affiliation proceedings, evidence may be given by the defendant 
that other men had intercourse with the complainant, provided it was 
at a time which would affect the paternity, 
2 
otherwise, the question 
is only admissible in cross-examination and her denials cannot be 
contradicted. 
3 
By the same token, where A sued an insurance company for loss 
sustained by a burglary, to which the defence was that the loss was 
caused by the dishonesty of B, A's servant, evidence was recevied 
that B was an associate of burglars and had entered A's service by 
means of a forged character. 
4 
Another important area with regard to the discussion of character 
of third parties - complainants - is the consideration of the charac- 
ter of the alleged rape victim. Problems in this area are especially 
challenging when they concern the prior sexual history of the victim 
in a sexual assault case. The most crucial question is that, to what 
extent, if at all, should the accused be permitted to inquire into 
the prior sexual history and reputation of the alleged victim. This 
very delicate and'serious issue has engendered much discussion and 
legislation, especially recently. Let's consider an example of a 
case in which the problem would be presented; assume that a man and a 
woman in a bedroom are suprised by the police in a most embarrassing 
situation. Assume further that the woman on seeing the police, cries 
"rape". Assume that accused's defence is that the woman had consen- 
1) King V. King (1842) 4 D. 590; Johnston V. Johnston (1903) 5 F. 
659; Duff V. Duff, (1969)SLT (Notes) 53. Such evidence was, however 
admitted in Stirlin V. Stirling, (1909) 1 SLT 288 
2) Garbutt V. 3(1863) 32 L. J. M. C. "186; Fall V. Overseers, (1811) 
3 Mý 495,497,502. 
3) See Ibid, see also R V. Gibbons (1862) 31 L. J. M. C. 98 
4) Hurst V. Evans (1917) 1 K. B. 352. 
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ted to sexual intercourse for stipulated pre-paid fee. At an ensuing 
trial for rape, is the accused to be precluded from adducing testimo- 
ny that the woman was widely reputed in the community to be a prosti- 
tute, that the premises involved had been used regularly during the 
prior months by the 'victim' as a house of prostitution, and that 
. several other 
designated men had had similar relations with the 
'victim' during the prior week? - Here are some of the issues that 
would have to be examined. From the questions raised in the hypothe- 
tical situation above, it is no surprise that of all aspects of laws 
relating to the crime of rape, it is the issue of admission of sexual 
history evidence that has sparked off the most controversy and criti- 
cism. 
Much has been written about the many problems which rape victims 
face in prosecuting their charges. The debate has involved champions 
of 'victim's rights' on 
the one hand and 'civil libertarians' on the 
other, and views range from that which holds admission of any sexual 
history evidence of the victim to be misguided and as a policy issue 
necessarily to be excluded from the trial, and that contending cur- 
rent limitations upon admission of sexual history evidence should be 
done away with, rules being expanded to allow all manner of inquiry 
into a victim's past sexual encounters. No doubt it seems impossible 
to resolve the controversy to the satisfaction of all. It will be 
worthwhile to examine some of the thought provoking arguments put 
forward by both sides. The champions of 'victim's rights' contend 
1) See e. g. Bergei, 
"Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation's Rape Cases 
in the Courtroom" (1977) 77 Columb. Law Rev. 1. 
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that current rules and procedure must be changed, so that the rape 
victim is not in their words 'twice traumatised' - once during the 
crime, once during the trial. It has been said that: "(m)ost judges, 
lawyers and those experienced in the trial of rape cases would tell a 
female member of thier household if she were raped that it would be 
much better not to complain about it because to the victim the trauma 
of a rape trial can be often more serious than the original as- 
sault". 
1 This it is argued is because the victim has often been 
portrayed as being on trial herself, at the mercy of a highly preju- 
diced jury, and suffering from a double trauma, all for the sake of 
bringing a rape charge which statistically results in acquittal in 
most cases. 
2 Instances have been dramatised when a rape victim 
during her cross-examination had to cry out of frustration and in 
anguish and desperation - I'm not 
guilty! which explains the senti- 
ments expressed by an editorial in the Toronto Globe and Mail of the 
25th June, 1974 entitled 'The Second Ordeal for Victims of Rape'; it 
described the predicament of a rape victim as follows: "In a rape 
trial it is often difficult to tell who is on trial, the victim or 
the accused rapist. That's something every woman has to think about 
before she calls the police, because if the case comes to trial she 
will be under the most brutal kind of cross-examination about past 
affairs, about her sexual habits and preferences and about what she 
was thinking and feeling as she was being raped. This kind of ques- 
tioning is permitted by the law as a means to determine whether she 
consented in any way to the encounter or whether she in fact invited 
1) "The Character of the Rape Victim", (1975) Chitty's Law Journal 
vol. 23 No. 2 at p. 57 
2) See Bohmer & Blumberg, 'Twice Traumatized: The Rape Victim and the 
Court', (1975) 58 Judicature 391; see also Comment, Rape and Rape 
Laws: Sexism in Society and Law (1973) 61 Cal. L. Rev. 919. 
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it through provocative conduct. It has always been puzzling why a 
victim of rape is not entitled to the same protection as a person 
accused of a crime. For instance, if a man is charged with robbing a 
bank, it usually may not be mentioned during the trial that he has 
robbed banks in the past, for the simple reason that previous robbe- 
ries do not have a bearing on whether he did, infact, rob the bank in 
question. When it comes to rape, a woman can be asked how often she 
goes to bed with men and whether she ever does it for money. It's 
degrading and it's unnecessary in determining guilt or innocence. 
Surely we are past the stage of thinking that if a woman is no longer 
a virgin, she is no longer chaste; that if she has known men before 
that there is a good chance she invited the assault, or, at least was 
prepared to co-operate". 
1 This aptly shows the problems faced by a 
rape victim and it also highlights some important arguments which 
would be considered shortly. May I just say that most of 
the things 
said if not all, are as true of the Canadian and American Courts as 
they are of the commonwealth countries. In recognition of the prob- 
lems faced by rape victims who testify as prosecution witnesses at 
trials in which evidence of their sexaul histories may be introduced, 
many of the. countries have enacted "rape shield statutes". 
2 These 
laws shield complaining witnesses from invasions of their sexual 
privacy by prohibiting the admission of irrelevant evidence of prior 
sexual conduct and reputation for chastity at trial. The legislative 
protection of rape victims has been deemed necessary because - as 
1) See at 'The Character of the Rape Victim' - (1975) Chitty's'Law 
Journal at p. 57. 
2) See e. g. Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act 1976 (U. K. ); New South 
Wales Depart. of Att. Gen and of Justice Criminal Law Rev. Division 
Rept, on Rape and Various other Sexual Offences (1977). 
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already indicated - of the abuse and humiliation frequently. suffered 
by them at the hands of police, judges and defence lawyers. 
On the other hand however, 'civil libertarians' have argued the 
case for the accused fervently and with equal vigour, contending that 
limitations upon interrogation of the chief witness for the prosecu- 
tion would serve to abrogate the right to a fair trial, thereby 
encroaching upon the accused's inalienable rights. It has also been 
criticised as expunging logically relevant evidence. But the oppo- 
sing argument is that it is legitimate for the state to take a policy 
stand on the question, in order to rectify what is seen as an extreme 
lack of justice resulting from the current judicial process. In 
addressing the problem in relation to the Michigan Law' for instance, 
it was remarked: "It has been argued that the evidentiary limitations 
provided for in the new law (i. e., total exclusion of any testimony 
of prior sexual relations between the victim and third parties) 
abridge the defendant's constitutional right to due process and to 
confrontation. Admitting such evidence may be logically relevant 
(i. e., that the existence of A makes it more likely that B has 
occured), the legislature has, in the new law, determined that this 
testimony is not legally relevant. Courts have in numerous circum- 
stances, where overriding policy considerations were at stake, tot- 
ally excluded evidence which may be logically relevant but which is 
held as a matter of law not to be legally relevant". 
2 
At common law an individual accused of a crime has a right, as a 
general rule, to confrontation with witnesses upon whose evidence the 
1) See Scutt, "Reforming the law of Rape; The Michigan Example" (1976) 
50 A. L. J. 615 
2) See "Michigan's Criminal Sexual 
Assault Law"-(1974) 8 Uni. Mich. 
Jrn. Law Ref. 217 at 229 
proseuction relies to obtain a committal, and, later a conviction . 
In the United States of America, this right has been embodied in the 
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution providing that2 "(I)n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .... to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him ..... " Just as confrontation of 
witnesses is provided for in other crimes, in rape those witnesses 
whose evidence forms the foundation of the case for the prosecution 
are required to appear; thus the complainant is not excused. No 
suggestion has been made in the rape case that due to the adverse 
pressures attendant upon the appearance of the victim as complainant 
in a rape trial, she should be generally exempt from presenting 
herself. Such a move would very probably meet with little or no 
acclaim, being directly in conflict with principles of fairness and 
the rights of accused persons to confront witnesses. However, a 
sympathetic view has been put that complainants other than those in 
the rape case: """"""" can go to court to seek redress for their 
victimisation without incurring (a) painful, prejudicial attack on 
his or her private life and intimate conduct ... Rape" targets on the 
other hand, are disproportionately discouraged from prosecuting their 
violaters .... Those victims who 
do invoke the legal process, paying 
the price in personal exposure, often find that their sacrifice has 
netted them absolutely nothing: the jury acquits the man of rape but 
convicts the woman of loose behaviour". 
3 Furthermore, it is accepted 
that policy reasons exist in some crime-situations that support the 
1) Halsbury's Laws of England, vol 17, (4th ed. ) 1976) § 231 
2) See Westen "The Compulsory Process Clause" (1974) 73 Mich. Law 
Rev. 73 at 73 - 74 
3) Berger, "Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation"...... (1977) 77 Columb. Law 
Rev. at p. 45 
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failure to disclose the identity of a person giving the primary 
information that ultimately leads to arrest and prosecution of an 
individual. For example, where a case is built on information given 
to police by a criminal-informer, the identity of the informer will 
not be disclosed. The informer will not be confronted by the ac- 
cused. 1 But it has been contended that 'compelling reasons of jus- 
tice' will always be present to require personal appearance of the 
victim of an alleged rape. 
It is at the stage where the complainant comes to be examined 
during the rape trial that a very real divergence between the appli- 
cation of rules of admissibility and relevance in 'ordinary' trials 
and trials where the crime charged is rape is observable. It has 
been seen that sometimes it is 'relevance' that is questionable; 
2 
sometimes it is the 'guidelines' from common law which are questiona- 
ble3 or as it sometimes happen are applied unthinkingly by judges; 
4 
also sometimes information which would appear to do more to inflame 
the jury or to confuse them rather than enlighten thems is allowed 
into the forum. I think it is important to point out that a jury is 
just a body of reasonable people like an average human being; defence 
lawyers know this and realise that if, they can demean the victim they 
increase their client's chances of acquittal, and they certainly 
spare no time in so doing. Under the guise of enquiring into consent 
they engage in character assasination which can be absolutely devas- 
tating to the female, and in many cases the range of these questions 
is only limited by the ingenuity of the counsel and the interference 
1) See'Rogers V. Lewes Justices; Ex parte Home Sec. (1973) A. C. 389 
Duncan V. Cammell-Laird (1942) A. C. 624 
2) R V. Clay (1851) 5 Cox C. C. 146 
3) See e. g. R V. Clay, Ibid, and per Wells J. in R V. dun; Ex parte 
Stephenson (19711 17 S. A. S. R. 165 at 179. 
4) R V. Clay (1851) 5 Cox C. C. 146 
5) See Wilson, 'Victims of Rape: The Social Context of Degradation' 
(1976) 9 A. N. Z Jrn. Criminel. 249; and H. Kalvan & H. Zeisel, 
The American Jury (1966) at p. 259 
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of the judge. A whole series of examples can be cited of especially 
humiliating and embarrassing sequence of irrelevant cross-examination 
questions, 
1 like asking if the woman were on the pill; or if she ever 
had an illegitimate child; or ever had an abortion; or ever smoked 
marijuana or took drugs; or and infact frequently asked how old she 
. was when 
she first had sexual intercourse. In most cases, these set 
of questionings merely prejudice and bias the minds of the jury 
against the raped and in fact has nothing to do with consent which is 
the cross of the matter, and it is no exaggeration, as would soon be 
demonstrated, to say that it is not unusual for the counsel of the 
accused to get away with such questioning and what more, actually 
succeeding in his quest. 
It is interesting though not surprising to note that evidence of a 
complainant's sexual conduct and reputation for chastity will 
normally be irrelevant, both for substantive and impeachment 
purposes, to the issues considered at rape trials. In California V. 
Blackburn, 2 the court stated: - "The relevance of past sexual' conduct 
of the alleged victim of the rape with persons other than the 
defendant to the issue of her consent to a particular act of sexual 
intercourse with the defendant is slight at best". In Dickie V. H. M. 
Advocate, Lord Adam reiterated the same view when he said: "There is 
3 
no doubt that it is not a relevant defence to a charge of rape, that 
the person alleged to be injured was unchaste, -however bad her 
character may be in that respect. ... But cases, such as this, are 
1) See B. Babcock - Sex Discrimination And The Law (1975) at 833; 
see also 'The Victim in a Forcible Rape Cases A Feminist View' 
11 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 335 (1973) 
2) (1978) 56 Cal. App. 3d 685,128 Cal. Rtpr. 864 
3) (1897) 2 Adam 331 at 338 
exceptional in this respect, that although unchastity is not a 
relevant defence to the charge, yet nevertheless it is competent, 
upon due notice given to the Prosecutor, to lead evidence to impeach 
the chastity of the person alleged to be injured. The difficulty is 
to determine the limits within which such evidence must be 
confined"; and we shall endeavour to define the confinement later 
in the discussion. - 
In Scotland, it has been often held by the courts that in cases of 
rape or of similar assaults upon woman the accused may attack charac- 
ter for chastity, and may-lead evidence that at the time she was 
reputedly of bad character. 
1 The Lord Justice Clerk observed as 
follows in Dickie V. H. M. Advocate2 "The right to attack the charac- 
ter of a witness, and to bring evidence in support of the attack, is 
one which has always been carefully kept within very limited bounds. 
.... Accordingly, 
in the ordinary case, while it is competent to ask 
a witness whether he has been convicted of a crime, the fact cannot 
be vouched except by an extract conviction, it is not competent to 
enter upon an enquiry into his general antecedents, and to try to 
prove that he has committed a crime. It is only competent to inquire 
into matters directly connected with the subject of the trial then 
proceeding. In the case of injuries to women, some specialities have 
been introduced for obvious reasons. Where a woman maintains that 
she has been indecently attacked, it is competent, upon notice being 
given, to attack her character for chastity, and to put question to 
her involving the accusation of unchastity". The message in England 
1) See Dickie V. H. M. Advocate, - (1897) 2 Adam 331; H. M. Advocate V. 
Reid and ors. 18 11) 4 Irv. 124; H. M. Advocate V. David Allan (1842) 
1 Brown 500 at 504 per Lord Moncrieff 
2) (1897) 2 Adam 331 at 336 
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is the same as one could gather from the decided cases. A good 
example is the case of R V. Greatbanks, 
1 
where G was indicted with 
rape. The defence was that the prosecutrix had consented to the act 
of sexual intercourse. The prosecutrix denied consent and the ques- 
tion arose whether witnesses could be called by the defence to show 
that the prosecutrix was a woman of notoriously bad character for 
want of chastity or common decency. Counsel for the defendant submi- 
tted that such evidence was admissible and cited authorities2 in 
support. In its decision the court held the view that the evidence 
was admissible, though 'it went on to remind us that in a case other 
than rape, such evidence would clearly not be admissible; in rape 
cases however, special rules apply. It was also pointed out that 
certainly evidence of intercoursse with named men could not be 
admissible in a rape case, but evidence showing that the woman was a 
prostitute or as in this. cae, that she was a woman of loose character 
or notorious for want of chastity or indecency was, on the authori- 
ties, admissible. In the earlier case of R V. Thomas- Tissington, 
3 
the court had made a similar declaration when it held that on a trial 
for rape, witnesses may be called on the prisoner's behalf to prove 
general indecency of the prosecutrix and witnesses for the prosecu- 
tion may then be called to rebut their testimony. However, the 
decision in this case was only delivered after the presiding judge 
had expressed some doubts and hesitation. The prisoner(T) was indic- 
ted for a rape upon a child between the age of ten and twelve years 
of age. The counsel for the prisoner, cross-examined the witnesses 
1) (1959) Crim. L. R. 450 (C. C. A. ) 
2) See R V. Clarke (1817) 2 Stark., 241; R V. Tissington 1 Cox 84 
3) 1 Cox. 84 
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for the prosecution as to particular facts of indecency on the part 
of the prosecutrix, and of solicitation by her previously made to men 
to have connection with her. For the prisoner, witnesses were called 
to prove these facts, but Abinger C. B., objected to their being 
examined, referring to a case upon the Northern Circuit, but not 
naming it, before Wood, B., in which he was counsel, where such a 
course was disallowed, and where witnesses for the prosecution were 
not permitted even to be cross-examined as to such facts. However 
Abinger, C. B., later assented, on Clarke'sl case being cited; he 
allowed witnesses to be called to prove general want of decency in 
the prosecutrix, and then permitted the prosecutrix to call witnesses 
to rebut their evidence. 
The interesting issue here, in studying the state of 'relevance' of 
evidence pertaining to sexual history of the complainant is that as a 
factual matter courts have concentrated upon the consent of the woman 
as being indicated by her previous sexual experience, rather than 
considering that question from the viewpoint of the mind of the 
accused. The concentration upon the reputation of the complainant, 
almost as if she were the one whose guilt or innocence were to be 
determined, is an indication of the bias against the rape victim in 
the current system. Also rather than considering that as a 'fact' 
the woman must - or is likely to - have consented to the act, it 
would be more in concert with fairplay to say in such a case that 
evidence of the prior sexual conduct of the complainant may be 
1) (1817) 2 Stark. 241 
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extremely relevant to a defence of consent or a reasonable belief of 
consent. 
Lack of consent on the part of the victim is an essential element 
of these crimes, except in cases of sexual offences committed upon 
minors. In the latter cases, express statutory language provides 
that lack of knowledge of the victim's age shall not be a defence; 
thus, not only will evidence of a reasonable belief of consent be 
irrelevant, but also evidence of actual consent is irrelevant. How- 
ever, in other cases of rape which require proof of lack of consent 
of the victim, the reasonableness of the defendant's belief of con- 
sent should be probative of the complainant's actual consent to the 
conduct in issue, since consent is an issue of fact. It has also 
been suggested that it would be in concert with general standards of 
criminal law for the courts to admit prior sexual activity and know- 
ledge of the woman's past experience that the accused possessed at 
the time of the alleged crime as indicating that the accused may have 
honestly believed the woman to be consenting, whether or not she was 
consenting in reality. 
At anyrate, the basis upon which the courts admit evidence in rape 
cases is patently clear; as authorities abound to indicate that the 
general assumption is that an unchaste woman is more likely to 
consent, 
1 and it is generally not infrequent for the courts to 
disregard the actual state of mind of the complainant as it were at 
the time of the particular instance charged. In the American case of 
People V. Johnson, 
2 Garoutte, J., said that: "It is certainly more 
1) See People V. Collins (1962) 186 N. E. (2d) 30; People V. Abbot 19 
Wend. 192 (N. Y. 1838) R V. Clarke (1817) 2 Stark 241; R V. Barker 
(1829) 3C&P 589; Keramat V. 42 C. L. J. 524 
2) (1895) 106 Cal. 289 
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probable that a woman who has done these things ... in the past would 
be much more likely to consent than one whose past reputation was 
without blemish, and whose personal conduct could not truthfully be 
assailed". In another American case of State V. Johnson, 
' Isham, J., 
said: "In all cases of this character, the assent of the witness to 
. 
the act is the material matter in issue, and on that question the 
defence generally rests on circumstantial testimony. In determining 
that question, which is purely a mental act, it is important to 
ascertain whether her consent would from her previous habits be the 
natural result of her mind, or whether it 
would be inconsistent with 
her previous life and repugnant to all her moral feelings. Such 
habits as are imputed to the witness by this. inquiry have a tendency 
to show such a consent as the natural operation of her propensities, 
and rebut the inference or necessity of actual violence". 
With regards to the issue of. consent of the rape victim, it is 
obvious that English courts favour the American line of thought, as 
evidenced in a number of the authorities. 
2 However, it is interes- 
ting to note that Scotland does not share the view; In Dickte V. H. M. 
Advocate, the Lord Justice Clerk criticised the assumption by 3 
saying: .... it seems a . 
relevant subject of enquiry whether the 
woman was at the time a person of reputed bad moral character, as 
bearing upon her credibility when alleging that she has been subjec- 
ted to criminal violence by one desiring to have intercourse 
with 
her. Such evidence may seriously affect the inferences to be drawn 
1) (1856) 28-Vt. 514 
2) R V. Tissington I Cox 84; RV. Gibbons 31 L. J. M. C. 98; R V. Clarke 
71817) 2 Stark 241 
3) (1897) 2 Adam 331 _ 
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from her conduct at the time. (But) .... I am not aware that .... a 
female who yields her person to one man will presumably- do so to any 
man -a proposition which is quite untenable. A woman may not be 
virtuous, but it would be a most unwarrantable assumption that she 
could not therefore resist, and resist to the uttermost, an attempt 
to have connexion with her by any man who might choose to endeavour 
to obtain possession of her person, and to whom she might have no 
intention to yield. Every woman is entitled to protection from 
attack upon her person. Even a prostitute may be held to be ravished 
if the proof establishes a rape although she may admit that she is a 
prostitute". This tallies with the observation made by. Ordoveri 
that: "(T)he traditiional rule (i. e., that an unchaste character 
trait is predictive of present consent) is wrong. It proceeds, from a 
faulty premise (i. e. that all non-marital intercourse is abnormal, 
immoral, reprehensible and uncondoned by contemporary society) and 
contravenes principles and policies long embodied in the law of 
evidence". May I just say that such antiquated victorian concept 
bears no relation to the reality of today, or will in some future 
generation be so esteemed. Berger, 
2 
also hold the view that the use 
of general reputation evidence to show a propensity for a particular 
type of activity maybe criticised in the context of the rape trial. 
Berger pointed out that two exceptions to the usual rules of evidence 
3 
apply in this regard: "When the accused in a homicide prosecution 
claims that he acted in self-defence, he may show the victim's chara- 
cter for violence. The latter exception to the usual ban on this 
1) 'Admissibility of Patterns of Similar Sexual Conduct: The Unlamen- 
table Death of Character for Chastity (1977) 63 Cornell L. Rev. 
90, at 97. 
2) (1977) 77 Columb. Law Rev. at p. 19 
3) See Ibid - 
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kind of proof - and its close analogy, the use of the complainant's 
sexual history to evince consent - are somewhat less fraught with 
danger than introduction of the character of the person charged, 
which might . prejudice 
the trier of fact so as to lead to an unjust 
conviction... However, as between the two exceptions in homicide and 
, 
rape, the latter seems less justifiable since the putative victim is 
alive and a witness and subject to cross-examination in cases where 
the defence is consent. Thus, the accused will ordinarily have 
little need to rely on the fairly dubious inference from the charac- 
ter to present conduct (which, in any event, is probably weaker in a 
sexual context than on the issue of aggressive tendencies). If the 
defendant in a prosecution for theft were to claim that the complai- 
nant had made him a gift, it is most unlikely that the court would 
allow him to offer proof of the alleged donor's prior generosity to 
third parties ... The burden should fall on proponent's of the pre- 
vailing practice to show why a claim of consent in a prosecution for 
rape warrants different evidentiary treatment from that accorded 
similar issues in other settings". 
In Scotland, the prosecutor may lead evidence that the victim was a 
good character; 
1 he is entitled to put a general question as to the 
respectability of females alleged to have been abused, 
2 
even where no 
notice of attack has been given by the defence. 
3 However it has been 
indicated that such questions should not be put before the complainer 
has given evidence. These principles are clearly stated in H. M. 
1) Dickson, ' Evidence (3rd ed. ) at 
§ 7; see also H. M. Advocate V. 
McMillan (1846) Ark. 209 
2) Malcolm Maclean (1829) Bell's Notes 294; Robertson Edney (1833) 
Bell's Notes 293 
3) Porteous (1841) Bell's Notes 293 
- los - 
Advocate V. John McMillan. ' The accused, an upholsterer 
in Rothesey, 
was charged with the crime of rape, in so far as he had ravished a 
young woman of the name of Mary Paton. The panel pleaded not guilty. 
The first witness called was a person in whose service Mary Paton had 
been during the previous three years. Counsel for the prosecution, 
proposed to ask him if Mary Paton was a girl of good character. 
Counsel for the panel, objected to such a line of examination. He 
contended that it was unusual for the prosecution to offer evidence 
of the good character of a witness in such a case, unless special 
defences were lodged impeaching her good character. The panel was 
willing that this witness should have the full benefit of a general 
good character up to the time when he had connection with her, but 
the issue for the Jury to try was, whether or not this connection 
took place by violence or with consent - whether his or her story was 
correct - and they, must judge of this by looking to the circumstances 
that occured at the time, and not the general character of the prin- 
cipal witness. In his judgement Lord Moncrieff 
2 
said:. "I have no 
doubt whatever on the point. In any case of this kind, where the 
evidence so much depends upon the character of the woman, would it 
not be of great importance to the panel if witnesses could say, that 
she was of such a character as would make it likely that she yielded 
to his solicitations? On the other hand, is it not important for the 
Prosecutor to show, that the woman was of such a character as would 
render that highly improbable? " Lord Wood said while concurring.. 
3 
have no doubt whatever that the examination is perfectly competent". 
1) (1846) Ark. 209 
2) Ibid at 211 
3) Ibid 
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And sharing that view the Lord Justice-Clerk said: 
l "No one is more 
inclined than I am to allow the character of witnesses to be investi- 
gated by the panel; but, on the other hand, such evidence is equally 
competent to the crown". However, the Lord Justice-Clerk had earlier 
remarked that: 
2 
It is a thing unknown to put such a question at the 
commencement of a trial, and before the principal witness. has been 
examined". 
Other factual situations arise which qualify as exceptions to the 
general rule, that a victim's sexual history is irrelevant; for 
instance, - (outside proving the victim's character for chastity or 
unchastity) - many courts and statutes in the different countries, 
recognise the relevance of past voluntary sexual relationships 
between the victim and the accused himself. Thus evidence that the 
victim has voluntarily engaged in sexual intercourse with the accused 
is deemed to have strong probative value in so far as it concerns the 
issue of her consent to the sex act in question. In Dickie V. H. M. 
Advocate, 
3 
the Lord Justice-Clerk in his judgement said that: ".... 
it has been held competent for the accused to prove that the witness 
voluntarily yielded to his embraces a short time before the alleged 
criminal attack. That such proof should be allowed is only 
consistent with the clearest ground of justice, for, in considering 
the question whether an attempt at intercourse be criminal, and to 
what extent criminal, it, 
is plainly a relevant matter of inquiry on 
what terms the parties were 
immediately before the time of the 
1) (1846) Ark. 209 at 211 
2) Ibid at 20 
3) (1897) 2 Adam 331 at 337; see also Walter Blair (1844) 2 Brown 167 
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alleged crime". In Rex V. Martin, 
l it was held by Williams, J., 
that, on the trial of an indictiment for rape, the prosecutrix may be 
asked whether previously to the commission of the alleged offence, 
the prisoner has not had intercourse with her by her own consent, on 
the ground of the relevancy of question. 
When the rape victim is being cross-examined about her sexual 
relationship with the accused, whatever answers she gives may be 
contradicted by the accused as clearly pointed out in R V- Riley. 
2 
In this case, the accused, (James Riley), was tried upon an 
indictment charging him with an assault upon one Alice Cresswell with 
intent to commit a rape upon her; there were two other counts in the 
indictment, one charging an indecent assault, the other common 
assault. The defence raised by the prisoner's counsel was that 
whatever was done by the prisoner to the said Alice Cresswell was 
done with her consent. The said Alice Cresswell was at the time of 
the commission of the alleged offence by the prisoner a woman of or 
about thirty years of age. She was cross-examined by the counsel for 
the prisoner as to previous repeated voluntary acts of connection 
with the prisoner at specified times and places before the time of 
the commission of the alleged offence, which she denied, and swore 
that she never at any time or place had had connection with the 
prisoner. Counsel for the defence proposed to call several witnesses 
to prove these several alleged acts of connection between the 
prosecutrix and the prisoner, but the court refused to allow the said 
witnesses to be called or examined for the purpose of giving such 
1) 6 C. &Y. 562; see also R V. Riley 16 Cox-c. C. 195; (1887) 18 
Q. B. D. 481 
2) (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 481; see also R V. Holmes & Furness (1871) L. R. 
1 C. C. R. 344 
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evidence, upon the ground that such evidence was not admissible for 
the prisoner upon the said indictment, and that the counsel for the 
prisoner was bound to take the answer of the prosecutrix for the 
purpose of that trial, but the court reserved for the opinion of the 
higher court the question as to whether they were right in so ruling. 
'The prisoner was convicted on the first count of the said indictment, 
but the court respited judgement and admitted him to bail pending the 
decision of the higher court. 
It appears that doubt had arisen from the use of the word 'prob- 
ably' in art. 124 of Stephen's Digest of The Law of Evidence, where 
it is stated that a woman against whom an attempt to ravish has been 
committed may be asked whether she had connection on other occassions 
with prisoner, "and if she denies it she probably may be contradic- 
ted". It is undoubted that Lord Coleridge, C. J., was certain about 
the correct position when he said: "I am of opinion that this convic- 
tion must be quashed, on the ground that evidence material to the 
issue was rejected by the court. The indictment was for an assault 
commited by the prisoner upon a woman with intent to commit a rape 
upon her; and the questions and answers that were rejected were 
tendered for the following purposed; namely, that the. woman having 
denied that she had had connection with the individual accused of 
assaulting her, it was sought ab aliunde to prove that at certain 
specific times and places 
before the time of the commission of the 
alleged offence, she had voluntarily had connection with the priso- 
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ner. It appears to me that such evidence was admissible. Now, it 
has been held over and over again that where evidence is denied by 
the prosecutrix with regard to acts of connection committed by her 
with persons other than the prisoner, she cannot be contradicted. 
... but to reject evidence as to the particular person is another 
matter. Because not only does it render it more likely that she 
would or would not have consented, but it is evidence which goes to 
the very point in issue. Take the case of a woman having lived 
without marriage for two or three years with a man before the as- 
sault; could it be contended that, had she denied it, proof of that 
sort was not material to the issue; and if material to the issue, 
that if denied evidence to contradict it could not be given". I must 
say that I agree with this judgement not only on ground of authority 
but also of good sense. But it seems that the counsel for the 
defence cannot go further,. and prove specific immoral acts with the 
prisoner, unless he has first given the prosecutrix an opportunity of 
denying or explaining them. 
l 
There is however, an inverse relation- 
ship between the remoteness in time of voluntary consent previously 
given by the victim and its relevancy to the present issue of con- 
sent. In other words, the more distant in time the earlier consent 
was given, the less likely it is that the consent continued to exist 
at the time of the act in question. Thus, under ordinary circum- 
stances, the"fact that the victim once had a sexual relationship with 
the accused in the remote past has very little relevance to the issue 
of whether a current voluntary relationship existed. 
1) R V. Cockcroft 11 Cox. c. C. 410; see also R V. Martin 6 C. &P. 562 
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On the other hand, although the prosecutrix may be cross-examined 
as to particular acts of immorality with other men, she may decline 
to answer such questions, while if she answers them in the negative, 
witnesses cannot be called to contradict her. 
1 For instance, in R V. 
Cockcroft, 2 where the accused was charged with having committed a 
. rape on one 
Mary Jackson. The defence counsel asked the prosecutrix 
whether she ever had connection before with other men; she declined 
to answer. Willes, J., interjected to point out that "the 
prosecutrix need not answer the question unless she likes". The 
defence then proposed to call witnesses to prove particular acts of 
connection with the prosecutrix and other men, and cited R V. 
Robins, 
I to support this move. Willes, J., in his judgement said: 
"You may cross-examine the prosecutrix with respect to particular 
acts of connection with other men, but if she denies them you are 
bound by her answer. You' may not call those men to contradict her; 
you may, however, examine her with respect to particular acts of 
connection with the prisoner, and if she denies them you may call 
witnesses to contradict her". This decision effectively overruled R 
V. Robins-3 a case which is a direct authority in favour of the 
admission of the evidence. In that case the prosecutrix denied 
having had connection with a man named. Coleridge, J., after 
consulting with Erskine, J., said that neither he nor that learned 
judge had any doubt on the question, and that it was not immaterial 
to the question whether the prosecutrix had had this connection 
1) Stokes V. R (1960) 105 C. L. R. 279; R V. Cargill (1913) 2 K. B. 271; 
R V. Thom son (1951) S. A. S. R. 135 
2) 11 Cox C. C. 410 
3) (1843) 2 M. & Rob. 512 
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against her consent to show that she had permitted other men to have 
connection with her, which, on. her cross-examination, she had denied. 
Martin, B., in a later trial of R V. Cockcroft, commented on R V. 
Robins when it was raised again before him by the defence counsel 
that he considered the decision in the case wrong, and so would not 
---ý 
allow witnesses to be called to prove particular acts of connection 
between the prosecutrix and other men. His judgement therefore, 
agrees with that of Willes, J., in the same case. Another case, that 
reinforces the line . 
taken by R V. Cockcroft 1 is R V. Hodgson2, which 
is a decision that the prosecutrix is. not bound to answer the 
question whether she has not had connection with another man named, 
and that evidence cannot be called to show that she had had such 
connection. R V. -Holmes and Furness, 
3 
is a very significant case in 
this respect. Holmes and Furness were tried upon an indictment 
charging them with indecently assaulting one Sarah Palmer. The 
prosecutrix, in her cross-examination, was asked by the prisoner's 
counsel if she had had connection with Robert Sharp, and she denied 
it. The prisoner's counsel called the said Robert Sharp, and asked 
him if the prosecutrix had ever had connection with him, but the 
counsel for the prosecution objected on the authority of R V. 
Cockcroft, and the court refused to allow the question to be 
answered, but reserved the point whether such answer ought to have 
been allowed to be given, for the 'decision of the Court for Crown 
Cases Reserved. The jury found both prisoner's guilty, and the court 
sentenced them but respited the execution of the said sentences until 
1) 11 Cox. C. C. 410 
2) Russ & Ry. 211 (1811) 
3) 25 L. T. Rep. N. S. 669; 12 Cox C. C. 137; 1 C. C. R. 334 
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the decision of the Court for Consideration of Crown Cases Reserved 
should be known. Kelly, C. B., giving the decision of the court 
said: 
1 
"The question in this case is of very great importance, and if 
we had entertained a substantial doubt upon it, we should have 
desired the case to be re-argued before all the Judges: but looking 
to the principle of evidence and the authorities upon it, it seems 
impossible to entertain a serious doubt that the evidence tendered to 
contradict the prosecutrix was inadmissible. On the trial of an 
indictment for a rape, -or an attempt to commit a rape, or for an 
indecent assault, which in effect may amount to an attempt to commit 
a rape, if the prosecutrix is asked whether she has not had 
connection with some other man named, and she denies it, we are 
clearly of opinion that that man cannot be called to contradict her. 
The general principle is that, when a witness is cross-examined as to 
a collateral fact, the answer must be taken for better or worse, and 
the witness cannot be contradicted as to thAt by a third person. If 
the proposed evidence were receivable, the prosecutrix might be 
cross-examined as to the whole history of her life, and one, ten, or 
even fifty persons might be called to contradict her on-various 
points of the evidence, and she be totally unprepared to meet the 
evidence of contradiction of any one of them. On principle, 
therefore, I am of opinion that the party cross-examination on such 
collateral facts must be bound by the answers,. otherwise it woulld 
lead to a multiplication of collaterall issues, and would be attended 
1) 12 Cox C. C. at 143 
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with great inconvenience and injustice to the prosecutrix". 
Also in Scotland, the accused is not permitted to prove individual 
acts of unchastity on her part with other men. In H. M. Advocate V. 
David Allan, ' the court held that the principal witness in a charge 
of rape or assault with intent to ravish, was not bound to answer the 
question whether on particular previous occassions she had had 
criminal intercourse with other men; and that it was incompetent for 
the panel to prove by the evidence of witnesses such criminal 
intercourse, although notice had been given in special defences that 
the proof was proposed. This matter also came up for discussion in 
H. M. Advocate V. James Reid and others. 
2 
In this case, James Reid, 
George Davidson and George McNeill were charged with rape, or assault 
with intent to ravish, commited on the person of one Agnes Edington. 
The panels pleaded not guilty, and they lodged special defences, in 
which besides a plea of alibi, 'they farther state, that Mrs Agnes 
Edington is a person of unchaste character and has had carnal conne- 
xion with men other than the person said in the indictment to be her 
husband'. The court directed the allegation of unchastity to be 
deleted as a special defence, and to be stated merely as a notice of 
the panels' intention to lead evidence of the unchastity of the woman 
said to have been ravished. Lord Neaves, 
3 
in his judgement gave his 
view as to the attempt by the defence to give evidence of specific 
acts of unchastity between the complainant and some other men, he 
said: "Here the enquiry is, whether these panels had forcible conne- 
xion with the witness. If in the trial of such a case, the woman may 
1) (1842) 1 Brown 500 
2) (1861) 4 Irv. 124 
3) Ibid at 128 
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be made to answer twenty different questions, as to whether on twenty 
different occasions she had connexion with as many different men, we 
might sit to the end of our lives investigating such cases. I 
conceive that such a course would be contrary to the principles of 
justice, and of judicial inquiry. In the present case, no specific 
notice has been given of such an enqiry, but even if there had, I 
should regard such an enquiry into the whole latent life of the 
witness as a cruel and grevious evil". The Lord Justice-Clerk in his 
own contribution started by asking: "Is the panel'in such a case 
to be allowed without notice or even with notice, to prove specific 
acts of unchastity ...... It is for the panels to show that at the 
time when the offence is said to have been committed, the woman was 
of loose and immoral character, not as matter of defence, but as 
bearing very materially on the effect of the evidence on the minds of 
the jury. The law has done wisely in making an exception in the case 
of rape from the general rule, that you cannot raise up a collateral 
issue, and allow a proof of a witness' character and repute. But to 
extend this to particular instances of unchaste conduct would be most 
unfair to the witness especially without very pointed and distinct 
notice, and even with such notice .... The proof attempted of 
particular circumstances and incidents in this woman's life, merely 
for the purpose of contradicting the statements made by her on cross- 
examination, seems to me to have no pertinency or relevancy at all. 
I hold it to be established law, that such proof is inadmissible, and 
the laws of all countries agree in disallowing it". 
1) (1861) 4 Irv. 124 at 129 
It is necessary to highlight the opinion of the Lord Justice-Clerk 
in H. M. Advocate V. Walter Blair' on this matter. He said: "I may 
state, however, that, af ter a careful consideration of the authori- 
ties, I would be prepared, if necessary, to admit proof of particular 
acts of carnal connection between the injured party and other men, as 
bearing most materially upon the guilt or innocence of the accused, 
in a charge of rape, provided special notice had been given to the 
public prosecutor, that such proof was proposed". I must say that 
this does not seem to be an isolated view, because in the earlier 
cited case of H. M. Advocate V. Reid and others, 
2 Lord Ardmillan said: 
"Farther, as I understand from the prisoner's counsel, what he pro- 
poses to adduce is not a proof of prostitution, or even of reputed 
and notorious unchastity, but proof of particular acts of unchastity, 
or particular unchaste connection or relations as 'kept mistress' of 
a particular man, while in. regard to the man, or'the relation, no 
name, or date, or place, is specified in the defences. To allow this 
proof, without the most specific and distinct notice as to name, 
place, and date would, in my opinion be unjust to the witness, whom 
the court is bound to protect against-an attack without notice". The 
last bit of the above passage by Lord Ardmillan appears to be a sort 
of tacit support for the view expressed in H. M. Advocate V. Blair. 
3 
in that he seems to indicate that where adequate notice was given, he 
would give some consideration as' to admitting or actually admit the 
evidence. 
1) (1844) 2 Brown 167 at 171 
2) (1861) 4 Irv. 124 at 127 
3) (1844) 2 Brown 167 
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However the position in Canada is clear enough; and one of the most 
recent exposition of the law in Canada is stated by Culliton, C. J., 
of Saskatchewan Court of Appeal on the 29th November 1974, he said: 
"... In the course of cross-examination of the prosecutrix, learned 
counsel for the appellant's said to the court: - 'My Lord I have a 
question I want to ask this witness pertaining to conversation she 
had with Dr. Fanner and the police. It has to do with the question 
of previous sexual intercourse'. - After discussion in which counsel 
for both the Crown and the appellant's. participated, the learned 
trial judge said: - 'You can ask her if she had any previous acts of 
sexual intercourse with the accused .... and you can ask her as to 
the alleged acts of intercourse between her and men other than the 
accused. Now you have to name the men and if she denies it, that's 
it. I think that is as far as you can go'. - Then in the absence of 
the jury the learned trail judge instructed the complainant as 
follows: - 'I wish to indicate to you that before the jury is brought 
in that defence counsel may ask you in cross-examination if you have 
had sexual relations with people other than the accused. He may name 
somebody. I am telling you now that you can refuse to answer, but if 
you do answer, if you say 'Yes' or if you say 'No' then that's the 
end of it. He can't go behind that and ask you any more questions 
than that. Alright do you understand now? ' - The law respecting the 
right to cross-examine the complainant in a rape case in respect to 
other acts of intercourse is in my opinion properly stated by Osler, 
J. A., in The Kin V. Finnessey, 
1 
as follows: - 'The prosecutrix may 
1) 10 C. C. C. 347 at 351 
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be asked questions to show that her general character of chastity is 
bad. She is bound to answer such questions and if. she refuses to do 
so the fact may be shown. 
' So too she may be asked whether she has 
previously had connection with prisoner and if she denies it that may 
be shown. 
2 
Such evidence is relevant to the issue since in both 
cases'it bears directly upon the question of consent and the improba- 
bility of the connection complained of having taken place against the 
will of the prosecutrix. And she may be asked, but, in as much as 
the question is one going strictly to her credit, she is not 
generally compellable to answer whether she has had connection with 
persons other than the prisoner. This seems to rest to some extent 
in the discretion of the trial judge. Whether, however, she answers 
it or not that is an end of the matter, otherwise as many collateral, 
and therefore irrelevant issues might be raised as there were 
specific charges of immorality suggested, and- the prosecutrix could 
not be expected to come prepared to meet them, though she might well 
be prepared to repel an attack upon her general character for chas- 
tity'3 -I am sätisfied that the ruling made by the learned judge was 
in accordance with the established and accepted principles". 
It is clear from the dicta above and others like R V. Holmes4 that 
the reason for the principle of exclusion with regards to evidence of 
particular acts of immorality with other men, is the rule which 
forbids the adduction of evidence to contradict a witness on a 
collateral matter. Lord Coleridge stated in R V. Riley5 that ... 
1) R V. Clarke (1817) 2 Stark 244; R V. Barker (1829) 3 C. &P. 589; 
V. Holýmes (1871) L. R. 1 C. C. R. 334 
2) V. Ma- rtin (1834) 6 C. &P. 562 
3) V. Hoson (1811) R&R. 211; RV. Laliberte, 1 S. C. R. 117; R V. 
Holmes (1871) L. R. 1 C. C. R. 334; see also R V. Boucher et al, 38 C. R. 
242; and R V. Dyment (1966) 55 W. W. R. 575- 
4) (1871) L. R. 1 C. C. R. 334 
5) (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 481 
- 721 - 
"where evidence is denied by the prosecutrix with regard to acts of 
connection committed by her with persons other than the prisoner, she 
cannot be contradicted. The rejection of such evidence is founded on 
good common sense, not only because it would put very cruel hardship 
on a prosecutrix, but also on the ground that the evidence does not 
go to the point in issue, that point being whether or not a criminal 
assault has been made upon her by the prisoner. To admit evidence of 
connection previously with persons other than the prisoner would be 
plainly contrary to the most elementary rules of evidence". As 
earlier pointed out, if such evidence were admitted, the whole 
history of the prosecutrix's life might be gone into; if a charge 
might be made as to one man, it might be made as to fifty, and that 
without notice to the prosecutrix. It would not only involve a 
multitude of collateral issues, but an inquiry into matters as to 
which the prosecutrix might be wholly unprepared, and so work great 
injustice. So far as sexual experience with men other than the 
defendant is concerned, the effect of section 2, of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1967 is that no evidence on this subject may be adduced 
and no question about such experience may be asked of the complainant 
without the leave of the judge to be sought in the absence of the 
jury and only to be granted on the ground of fairness to the 
defendant. 
However, although the accused many not lead evidence to prove 
specific acts of intercourse with other men, it may be that such 
proof would be competent if the acts in question occured just before 
722 
and practically on the same occasion as the crime charged, on the 
ground that they formed part of the res gestae. The Lord Justice- 
Clerk observed in Dickie V. H. M. Advocate' as follows: "... while it 
is competent to prove a general bad repute at the time of the 
offence, or to prove that the woman said to have been attacked had 
yielded her person recently to the man, it is not competent to prove 
individual acts of unchastity with other men. Whether proof of such 
unchastity might be allowed if it occured just before and practically 
on the same occasion, I do not say. Such a case might be held as 
falling within the doctrine of the competency of proof of all matters 
forming parts of the res gestae. Such facts might have an important 
bearing on that branch of evidence in such cases which relates to the 
appearance of the private parts when examined". Also in H. M. Advo- 
cate V. James Reid and others, 
2 Lord Neaves made a similar observa- 
tion. He said: "The. only instances I can imagine where such proof 
would be admissible, would be where the alleged occurrences were so 
closely connected with the crime charged, as to form, in fact, part 
of the res gestae, as where, for example, as happended in one case, 
the woman alleged to have been ravished had connexion with another 
man on the night of the alleged occurrence". 
It is a question of circumstances whether evidence of subsequent 
conduct is competent .3 In one case evidence was allowed of an act of 
immorality of the same day- as, and subsequent to, the offence char- 
ged, but generally proof of subsequent character, that is, evidence 
1) (1897) 2 Adam 331 at 337 --'338' 
2) (1861) 4 Irv. 124 at 129 
3) Macdonald, Criminal Law at 309 
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of unchastity after the date of the crime is inadmissible, as the 
case of H. M. Advocate V. Hugh Leitch' demonstrates. In the case, 
Hugh Leitch was charged with rape or assault with intent to ravish. 
He pleaded not guilty, and special defences were lodged, offering to 
prove that Elizabeth McLachlan, on whose person the offence was said 
to have been committed, was at that time, and still continued to be, 
a person of loose and immoral character, and that de recenti after 
the alleged injury, and on the same evening, she had been found in 
bed with another man. The prosecution objected to any evidence being 
led regarding the character or conduct of the woman subsequent to the 
offence charged. The counsel for the panel on the other hand argued 
that proof of the averments contained in the defences ought to be 
allowed as showing, not only the loose and immoral character of the 
woman, both before the alleged offence, and down to the present time, 
- but also the extent of the injury said to have been inflicted on 
her person. Lord . 
Medwyn allowed the proof only in respect of its 
bearing upon the quality of the assault, and the extent of the injury 
said to have been inflicted upon the woman, but refused to allow 
evidence of her alleged immoral character subsequent to the offence 
charged. 
Generally, where the question of intercourse with another is 
material to the issue of consent, such evidence we know is 
admissible. Thus evidence tending to show that a woman is highly 
promiscuous 
2 
or is a prostitute will be admissible, and she may be 
contradicted by other evidence if she denies the fact. In R V. 
1) (1838) 2 Swin. 112 
2) R V. Greatbanks (1959) Crim. L. R. 450 (C. C. A. ) 
Manzur, 
1 
the defendant's were charged with rape on the complainant. 
The defence was consent. In cross-examining the complainant, one of 
the defending counsel suggested that she had been guilty of various 
immoral acts and had made statements to another man tending to show 
that she was a common prostitute. These suggestions were denied, the 
defence then sought to call the man to whom it was alleged, the 
statements had been made. And the court held that this evidence was 
admissible. Evidence to contradict answers to cross-examination 
merely to credit was not permitted, nor was evidence of intercourse 
, 
with other men, for that was not relevant. But evidence. might be 
given which showed that the complainant was of notoriously bad chara- 
cter for chastity, or was a prostitute, for that was relevant to the 
issue of consent. A witness to prove that the complainant was of 
such character might go on to give reasons supporting his evidence 
provided his evidence was directed to prostitution as opposed to mere 
sexual intercourse. 
However, it appears that recent changes in the moral climate have 
been judically acknowledged as affecting the way in which these rules 
2 
operate, and R V. Krauz, just shows that. In that case, the accused 
(K) was convicted of raping J. They met casually at a public-house 
and went to his flat and had intercourse. K said it was with i's 
consent but afterwards she asked for money and they quarrelled. He 
called S. who said that the public-house was of ill-repute and J. 
frequented it for the purpose of being 'picked up'. The judge re- 
1) (1969) 54 Cr. App. R. 1 (C. A. ) 
2) (1973) 57 Cr. App. R. 466 
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fused leave for S. to be asked whether he had had. intercourse with J. 
after a first meeting at another 'pick up' place and J. had asked for 
money afterwards. He also refused leave for H. to give evidence that 
he had met J. at a public-house and had intercourse with her on that 
and other occasions. In its judgement, the court held, . allowing the 
appeal, that in an age of changing standards of sexual morality it 
might be harder to say where promiscuity-ended and prostitution 
began, and it might be necessary to decide on which side of the line 
conduct fell. Evidence which proved that a woman was in the habit of 
submitting her body, to different men without discrimination, whether 
for money or not, would seem to be admissible. The court had some 
doubt whether the evidence of H. would have gone far enough to take 
it outside the authorities which excluded the evidence of other men 
merely proving acts of intercourse between them and the complainant. 
However, the evidence of S. went near enough to proving prostitution 
in its accepted sense to justify its admission even on the old autho- 
rities. It would have tended to prove J. 's loose sexual morals and 
that she was not merely promiscuous but in the habit of having . -inte- 
rcourse with first acquaintances for money. Further, her practice 
included a first demand for payment after the act was over, and 
tended 
. 
to prove not merely consent but consent in. special circum- 
stances described by K. To admit the evidence would not have been 
inconsistent with any authorities the court was aware of or given 
rise to the objectionable consequences which had led to the general 
exclusion of evidence of particular acts of intercourse with other 
men. On the contrary, without substantially lengthening the case or 
distracting the jury into side issues, it would have thrown light on 
the sole issue. Thus, the exclusion of the evidence rendered the 
verdict unsafe and unsatisfactory, and hence set aside. From this 
decision it is clear that in discussing the issue in contemporary 
times an emphasis has been laid on changing moral values. In the 
present case -RV. Krauz, 
1 
- the evidence seems to have been held to 
be admissible because it was to the effect that the proxecutrix was 
in the habit of having sexual intercourse with first acquaintances 
for money. It is not easy to see why it would have been less cogent 
evidence of consent if it had shown that she had the same habit, but 
made no charge of money. Again the answer may be the social permis- 
siveness of today, because while society might tolerate the freakish 
tendencies of a woman it does not condone soliciting or living on the 
evidence, =of, 'prostitutiDn, which 
in most societies is a criminal offence; 
so the exchange of money appears to have a significance, as it does 
seem to set a line of demarcation between the societal's acceptable 
phase of promiscuity and the unacceptable phase. It was, for ins- 
tance, recently stated by the English committee convened to determine 
whether and how rape laws should be reformed subsequent to the pub- 
lic outcry resulting from Director of Public Prosecutions V. Morgan2 
that: ' ".. "" previous sexual 
history of the alleged victimµ with third 
parties is .... only rarely 
likely to be relevant to issues directly 
before the jury. In contemporary society sexual relationships out- 
1) (1973) 57 Cr. App. R. 466 
2) (1976) A. C. 182 
3) Report of the Advisory Group on Rape and other Sexual Offences 
(H. M. S. O., 1975) at p. 22 
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side marriage, both steady and of a more casual character, are fairly 
widespread, and it seems now to be agreed that a woman's sexual 
experiences with partners of their own choice ... are (not) indica- 
tive of ... a general willingness to consent. There exists, in our 
view, -a gap between the assumptions underlying the law and those 
public views and attitudes which exist today which ought to influence 
today's law .... " 
In Scotland, it has been held that evidence may also be led that 
the woman associated with prostitutes, but not that her friends were 
otherwise of bad character, as the decision in H. M. Advocate V. 
Webster and others1 confirms. James Webster, James Stirling and 
William Campbell, carters in Dundee, were charged with the crime of 
rape, as also with assault, especially when committed with intent to 
ravish. The pannels pleaded not guilty, and special defences were 
lodged on their behalf, setting forth that the party alleged to have 
been ravished, was a-woman of unchaste and immodest character. The 
principal witness deponed, on cross-examination that she was on 
intimate and familiar terms with a certain girl who had not been 
cited as a witness. The defence proposed to examine a subsequent 
witness, a female neighbour of the principal witness, as to the 
general character with respect to modesty and propriety of demeanour 
of the said girl. The Lord Justice-Clerk remarked: "Unless you state 
that your information is, that this girl is a common prostitute, we 
cannot allow this line of examination. We are not to put this absent 
party on her trial for chastity". And the examination was not pro- 
1) (1847) Ark. 269 
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ceeded with. 
In India, the court has held that it is not enough to show the 
general character of the woman that she ran away with a man once or 
twice or that she had on specific occasions done something immoral. 
But I have no doubt that evidence of prostitution will be admissible. 
In England, evidence remote in time is sometimes entered into the 
2 
courtroon, as in the case of a V. Clay, where the court admitted as 
relevant to the issue of consent the evidence of a police officer 
that "some twenty years" prior to the alleged rape, the victim has 
been "sighted on the streets of Shrewsbury" as a common prostitute. 
If for nothing else, this case seems to typify the difficulties 
experienced by judges in the application of rules of evidence to 
trials where the offence charged is one of rape. Thus the report 
reads3 "Patterson J., at first seemed to think the evidence was 
inadmissible, but, on referring to the authorities, said, - in R V. 
Barker, 
4 
... the question was allowed to be put, as to whether the 
prosecutrix had walked the streets of Oxford at a period subsequent 
to the alleged rape. I cannot understand why that should be. I 
should have thought the question would more properly refer to the 
conduct of the prosecutrix before the act she complained of. 
However, upon the authority of that and two or three other cases, 
very like the present, I will allow the general evidence to be 
given". It is notable that the actual relevance of a long past event 
was not looked at in the context of the instant case; rather rele- 
1) Wahid v. R 36 C. W. N. 356 
2)' (1851) 5 Cox. C. C. 146 
3) Ibid at 157 
4) 3 C. &P. 589 
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vance was sought to be adduced in looking at previous cases unlike 
that in question. Even in doing so, the judge was not able to admit 
the evidence in any firm belief that it was relevant: 
' 
".... he seemed 
at first to think the evidence was inadmissible ... ". The doubts 
expressed are indicative of a fear that by declaring evidence inadmi- 
ssible and excluding it, the way may be opened to a successful appeal 
against conviction on ground of wrongful exclusion of evidence. 
Judges have admitted much that is on its face seemingly irrelevant to 
the case in point when counsel have apparently taken advantage of 
uncertainties in application of rules of evidence to this type of 
2 
case. 
The decision in R V. Clay, 
3 
to mind, is shaky on a number of 
grounds. First going into the facts, the evidence on its face was 
seemingly of little help: the officer on cross-examination said he 
was "not then a constable (at the time of the stated sighting), and 
it was no part of his duty to take notice of persons of that 
description; that he had never addressed the prosecutrix as a 
prostitute, and that she was living at the time he referred to with a 
plasterer in Shrewsbury, but subsequently remove from the town". 
Another important thing to note about the case is its implications, 
which seems to be "once a prostitute always a prostitute", and that 
cannot be fair. 
It is gratifying to note that the criticims of R V. Clay appears 
to be vindicated by the line of reasoning in Scotland: a similar 
matter came up for consideration in the case of H. M. Advocate V. 
1) (1851) 5 Cox. C. C. 146 at 147 
2) R V. Gun; Ex Parte Stephenson (1977) 17 S. A. S. R. 165 
3) (1851) 5 Cox C. C. 146 
4) (1851) 5 Cox C. C. 146 
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Reid and others. 
' 
In that case it was proposed, in defence, to 
establish the unchaste character of the injured party at a past 
period, the exact date of which could not be precisely stated. This 
was objected to, and the objection was sustained. In giving judge- 
ment Lord Ardmillan said: 
2 
"I am of opinion, that the proposal now 
made to lead evidence in regard to the previous character and conduct 
of this woman is of a very unusual description, and one which would 
require to be most strictly looked to on the part of the court. The 
time to which the proposed evidence relates is very remote, and the 
counsel for the panels is not prepared to state that he can connect 
that remote period with the more recent history of the woman, by 
other evidence bringing it down to the present time. It would, in my 
opinion, be most unfair to the woman, to admit evidence of what is 
said to have taken place, it may be twelve, fifteen or eighteen years 
ago; at all events, without much more distinct and specific notice 
than has been given in this case. I do not think that what is here 
proposed is at all within the recognised rule as applicable to char- 
ges of rape. That rule, as I understand it, applies to proof of 
unchastity at and immediately before the time when the rape is said 
to have been committed. The prisoner's counsel may, if he thinks 
fit, carry that evidence of repute as far back as he pleases in order 
to comfirm it, but to begin the proof at a period many years back - 
more especially as no precedent or authority has been shown to us for 
such a course - appears to me to be a proceeding which cannot be 
1) (1861) 4 Irv. 124 
2) Ibid at Pp. 126-7 
sanctioned by the court". And Lord Neaves reiterated the same view 
when he said while giving his judgement) "I think, in the first 
place, that it is clearly competent to impeach the character of the 
principal witness in a case of rape, to allege and to prove her bad 
character at the time when the injury results. If it is alleged that 
this character was acquired at an earlier period, still it is neces- 
sary that it be established by something like continuous evidence up 
to the time of the alleged offence. This is of great importance to 
the witness, because it may be easy for her to contradict proof of 
bad conduct at a particular time and place. She may prove, for 
example, that she was not there, but in another part of the country, 
at the time. The proof here offered seems to be inadmissible. I 
think there is no real pertinency in it, and that it would be most 
dangerous. To attempt to lead evidence as to a course of conduct 
many years back - perhaps in another country - would be quite irrele- 
vant - at least unless under very special circumstances, and with 
most distinct and special notice as to the party, the place and the 
time". 
Another relevant case in this respect is that of H. M. Advocate V. 
Forsyth and others. 
2 In that case, a special defence having been 
lodged in a case of rape, averring acts of unchastity on the part of 
the woman three months before the alleged crime, it was proposed to 
ask a witness as to an act. of unchastity six or seven years before, 
but the question was disallowed by the court. 
There are still some exceptions to the general rule with respect to 
1) (1861) 4 Irv. 124 at 128 
2) (1866) 5 Irv. 249 
the sexual history of a rape victim. For instance, evidence of prior 
sexual conduct may be highly relevant where the circumstances of the 
previous conduct are so distinctive and so closey resemble the 
defendant's version of the alleged encounter with the complainant 
that the evidence could be classified as 'modus operandi'. We know 
. 
that in order to show intent, evidence is admissible of similar 
acts, ' independent of the act charged as a crime in the indictment, 
for though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a 
fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. 
An analogy can be drawn between such 'signature crimes' previously 
commited by a defendant which are admitted to show intent and 
distinctive past sexual behaviour on the part of a prosecutrix which 
could be relevant to show voluntariness (or consent) with respect to 
the sex act in issue. 
Additionally, if the accused wishes to defend on the basis of 
evidence that some other person is responsible for the complainant's 
abused condition, then evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct 
which ooccured near the time in question would be relevant to 
establish the origin of semen, pregancy, disease or injury allegedly 
arising from the rape. 
Further, sexual history evidence involving victim with accused is 
admitted sometimes, as relevant to the credibility of the victim. 
2 
However, to my mind, chastity per se should have little or no releva- 
nce as factor in judging the 'credibility' of the prosecutrix as a 
1) See Post 
2) R V. Cockcroft (1870) 11 Cox C. C. C. 410; R V. Holmes (1871) L. R. 
1 C. C. R. 334; R V. Riley (1887) 18 Q. B. D. 481; R V. Cargill (1913) 
2 K. B. 271 
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truthful witness. Although today in the United States of America, 
the position gaining favour is that the "notion that a female's sex 
life bears on her credibility" should be rejected, as I mentioned 
earlier, in English law and in the United States lack of chastity and 
dishonesty have sometimes been linked. However, Scotland does not 
appear to have ever taken a similar view as is farily discernible 
from the Lord Justice-Clerk statement in Dickie V. H. M. Advocate, 1 
when he said: "I am of opinion that the sound and safe rule is that 
applied to all other cases viz, that the credibility of witnesses 
may not be attacked by raising proof on collateral issues as to their 
previous history, except where they are tainted with crime, convic- 
tion of which can be proved by extract record of a court of Justice, 
or where there is evidence of general repute immediately before the 
time of the alleged offence which may affect credibility". It is 
interesting to note that recently in a Report of the Advisory Group 
on Rape2 they remarked 
that: ".... previous sexual history of the 
alleged victim with third parties is only rarely likely to be rele- 
vant to the issue before the jury .... (A) ..... woman's sexual 
experiences with partners of her own choice ... (is not) .... indica- 
tive of untruthfulness .... " This I believe is a firm confirmation 
of the argument that in terms of standard rules of relevance, such 
linking, seems not to be justified. 
The approach taken by Wigmore3 is fairly more elaborate; he is of 
the view that "(the) value of character evidence, impeaching or 
sustaining a party or a witness is commonly much exaggerated"4 and 
1) (1897) 2 Adam 331 at 338 
2) (H. M. S. O. 1976) at p. 17 
3) Wigmore On Evidence (1970) Vol. 6 at p. 580, § 1908 
4) Ibid 
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in the "ordinary case" is comparatively futile, with a "tendency to 
degenerate into a mere exhibition of petty local jealousies and 
animosities, of no real probative service ... "1 Wigmore stated 
further: 2 ".. " as a matter of human nature, a bad general disposition 
does not necessarilly or commonly involve lack of veracity, and ... 
therefore the former is of little or no bearing probatively; .... the 
estimate of an ordinary witness as to another's bad character is apt 
to be formed loosely from uncertain data to rest in large part on 
personal prejudice and on mere difference of opinion on points of 
belief or conduct -a chance of error which is relatively small in 
the specific inquiry as to the other's notorious untruthfulness; and 
.. the incidental unpleasant 
features of the witness-box are largely 
increased when the way is opened to this broad and loose method of 
abusing those who are called as witnesses ..... " But where the 
crime is one of rape, statutory rape, seduction or assault with 
sexual element, Wigmore took the view that chastity and veracity were 
in some manner linked and thus the issue of unchastity would be 
relevant on this basis and should be admitted into evidence. 
3 
How- 
ever, it has been said that, any contention that rules of evidence 
should be premised upon-4 "... (a) matter of common knowledge that 
the bad character of a man for chastity does not even in the remotest 
degree affect his character for truth when based upon that alone, 
whilst it does that of a woman ... What destroys the standing of the 
one in all walks of life has no effect whatever on the standing for 
1) Ibid 
2) Ibid at Vol. 3A., 
§ 922 at, p. 727 
3) Wigmore On Evidence (1970) Vol. 3. A 924 a, at p. 736 
4) State V. Sim (1895) 33 S. W. 167 at 171 per Burgess J. cited in 
Wigmore Ibid at p. 735 
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truth of the other", ought not even remotedly be adhered to in the 
courts of justice of the present day. 
Additionally, evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct will be 
relevant for impeachment purposes in cases where the defendant seeks 
to introduce it in support of expert psychological or psychiatric 
opinion that the complainant fantasized or invented the act or acts 
charged. 
' Some courts and commentators have2 expressed concern that 
many sexual offence accusations are made by "psychologically distur- 
bed individuals"; 3 therefore such evidence, where relevant and relia- 
ble, should be admitted in order to protect the falsely accused. The 
problems of psychiatric evidence of character will be considered in 
further detail in subsequent discussion. 
It should be made clear that evidence of the prior sexual history 
of the victim may be adduced without putting the character of the 
accused in question. 
4 In R V. James Turner, 5 the court held that 
where a prisoner charged with rape puts forward the defence that the 
prosecutrix consented to the act, he does not make an imputation on 
her character within the meaning of s. 1 (f) (1 1) of The Criminal 
Evidence Act, 1898,6 so as to render himself liable to cross-examina- 
tion on previous convictions or bad character. Further, questions 
and evidence which are directed to the proof of consent do not cause 
him to lose the benefit of the opening words of the section or render 
such cross-examination admissible. 
Finally, one can conclude from the diGcussion that generally sexual 
history evidence is admitted into rape trial on two broad grounds. 
1) See generally - "Complainant Credibility in Sexual Offence Cases: 
A Survey of Character Testimony and Psychiatric Experts. (1973) 
64 J. Crim. L. 67. 
2) Id. at 67 nn. 2-3 
3) Id. at 67 
4) Halskury's Laws of England (4th ed. ) 1976, Vol. 11 § 1230 at p. 655 
and 
1? 
374 at p. 207 
5) (1944) K. B. 463 
6) See Post 
First, sexual history may be introduced to show that the woman who is 
complainant is of "notoriously bad character", of "abandoned 
character", 'who engages in an established pattern of indiscriminate 
sex as a prostitute' - i. e. living the life of a 'common prostitute'. 
The evidence purportedly relates to the issue of consent, it being 
contended that such a woman would be more likely to have consented to 
the sexual intercourse. Second, any woman may be cross-examined as 
to sexual history as a general matter where it is not put forward 
that she is "living the life of a common prostitute", but simply that 
as she had consented in the past, this has a bearing on whether there 
was consent in the instant case. So, as we have seen, evidence can 
be entered to show that the woman is "in the habit of having 
intercourse on first acquaintance, whether for money or not". 
2 And 
when the issue goes to sexual history'with the defendant prior, to 
event, evidence will be admitted not on the basis that a defence to 
the charge lies in that the victim was the mistress of the accused, 
but as having a bearing on the issue of consent. I hope the 
arguments for and against the propositions have been effectively 
mounted. 
Statutes have been introduced in various jurisdictions to restrict 
admission of sexual history evidence, 
3 but such have been criticised 
as encroaching upon the defendant's inalienable rights. 
4 The 
opposing argument is that it is legitimate for the state to take a 
stand on the question, in order to rectify what is seen as an extreme 
1) R V. Tissington (1843) 1 Cox C. C. 48; R V. Holmes (1871) L. R. 1 C. C. 
R. 334 
2) RV, Cockcroft (1870) U. Cox C. C. 410; R V. Greatbanks (1959) Crim. 
L. Rv. 450 
3) See Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 (U. K. ) 
4) Berger "'Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation': Rapes Cases in'the Court- 
room" (1977) 77 Columb. Law Rev. 1, at 32 et seq. 
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lack of justice resulting from the current judicial process. In 
America, many states and Congress2 have endeavouredto draft rape 
shield statutes which recognise the delicacy of balancing opposing 
interests "in such a way as to dignify the complainant's role without 
imperiling the person accused". 
3 By incorporating provisions for 
flexibility and discretion into the shield laws, allowance has been 
made for the admission of highly relevant defence evidence which is 
likely to be "critical" in cases where it would otherwise be ex- 
cluded. In addressing the problem in relation to the Michigan Law4 
it was said: 
5 "It has been argued that the evidentiary limitations 
provided for in the new law (i. e. total exclusion of any testimony of 
prior sexual relations between the victim and'third parties) abridge 
the defendant's constitutional right to due process and to confronta- 
tion. Admitting such evidence may be logically relevant (i. e. that 
the existence of A makes it more likely that B has occurred), the 
legislature has, in the new law, determined that this testimony is 
not legally relevant. 
Courts have in numerous circumstances, where overriding policy 
considerations were at stake, totally excluded evidence which may be 
logically relevant but which is held as a matter of law not to be 
legally relevant". 
Comparing the policy statements eliminating admission of certain 
sorts of evidence in particular cases, it is further stated: 
6 "An 
example of overriding policy considerations excluding evidence of 
1) Ibid at 100 - 103 
2) See Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1978 Pub. L. No. 
95-540; § 2(a), 92 Stat. 2046 (1978) 
3) Berger, "'Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation': Rape Cases In the 
Courtroom", (1977)TlColumb. Law Rev. I at 100 
4) For a general review of the Michigan Law, see Scutt, "Reforming 
the Law of Rape; The Michigan Example" (1976) 50 A. L. J. 615 
5) Legislative Note, "Michigan's Criminal Sexual Assault Law" (1974) 
8 Uni. Mich. Jrn.,. Law Ref. 217 at 229 
6) Ibid. 
this sort is the case of subsequent repairs made to a facility which 
may have caused an injury. Presently in many jurisdictions, it is 
clear error for a trial court judge to admit such evidence. The 
analogy of this example to the statutory rule excluding evidence of a 
victim's prior sexual conduct with third parties is compelling. In 
---, 
cases involving evidence of subsequent repair, the courts evolved a 
fixed rule of law through 'policy balancing' in individual cases: in 
the Sexual Assault Act, the legislature enacted a fixed rule of law 
after it balanced the countervailing polices for and against admision 
of such evidence. The distinction between the two law-making 
processes is probably too slight to support a finding that one is 
constitutionally valid and the other is not". 
The method of drafting reforms have been categorised into three 
broad heads: - those with the "Loop-hole" approach; those with the 
Exclusionary approach and lastly those with the Procedural approach. 
We can start with examination by looking at the "loop-hole" approach. 
Early experience in the application of some recently drafted rape 
shield laws in the United States of America indicates that the exclu- 
sion of evidence of prior sexual conduct may cause constitutional 
problems unless the judge has discretion to admit reliable and proba- 
tive, but otherswise inadmissible, evidence when it is critically 
relevant to the accused's defence. For instance, the New York sta- 
tute, ' was recently threatened by a constitutional challenge in the 
case of New York V. Conyers? Citing Davis V. Alaska, 
3 the New York 
Supreme Court held that "but for" the statute's omnibus clause, which 
1) N. Y. Crim. Proc. Law 
§ 60.42 (McKinney 1975) 
2) 382 N. Y. S. 2d 437,86 Misc. 2d 754 (1976) 
3) 415 U. S. 308 (1974) 
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allowed the court discretion to admit evidence of the victim's sexual 
conduct, the statute would have serious constitutional problems. 
l 
The relevant part of the statute provides: "Evidence of a victim's 
sexual conduct shall not be admissible in a prosecution for (rape) 
unless such evidence: ..... (5) is determined by the court after an 
offer of proof. by the accused outside the hearing of the jury ... to 
be relevant and admissible in the interests of justice". 
it is arguable that such laws go no further than current rules of 
evidence and may in fact be more harmful to the rights of the victim 
than of help: 
2 "Arguably, laws like (these) may admit certain evi- 
dence absolutely while automatically barring nothing, thus narrowing 
the court's inherent powers of exclusion and expanding the material's 
admissibility ... At minimum the laws fulfil the purpose of flagging 
attention to the problem: warning defendant's not to count on using 
evidence of unchastity spurring prosecutors to object to its intro- 
duction, and reminding judges that this kind of proof is presump- 
tively inadmissible and merits extremely careful scrutiny. The hope 
is that a clear change in the spirit of the rules will lead to a 
change in their application". The South Australian law illustrates 
the innocuousness of the "loop-hole" approach, as well as clearly 
demonstrating the danger that may be inherent, from the victim's 
perspective, in attempting to define relevance and admissibility. 
The Evidence (Amendment) Act, 1976 (S. A. ), s. 34 (1) provides: "(2) 
in proceedings in which a person is accused of a sexual offence, 
1) 382 N. Y. S. 2d 437 at 444,86 Misc. 2d. 754 at 763 (1976) 
2) Berger, op. cit. (1977) 77 Columb. Law. Rev. 1 at p. 38 
evidence of - (a) sexual experiences of the alleged victim of the 
offence prior to the date on which the offence is alleged to have 
been committed; or (b) the sexual morality of the alleged victim of 
the offence, - shall not be adduced (whether by examination in chief, 
cross-examination, or re-examination) except by leave of the judge. 
(3) Leave to adduce evidence under this section shall not be granted 
except where the judge is satisfied that - (a) an allegation has 
been, or is to be, made by or on behalf of the prosecution or the 
defence, to which the evidence in question is directly relevant; and 
(b) the introduction of the evidence is, in all the circumstances of 
the case, justified". Yet without such a provision, judges are 
required not to admit evidence which is not relevant to the case in 
point. 
As was stated by Wells, J., in R V. Gun; Ex parte Stephenson' ".... 
s. 34 (i) (should be subjected) to .. a close and critical scrutiny. 
(This is) necessary ...... because the section is one likely to be 
placed under the considerable stress and strain created by forensic 
struggles arising in trials of persons for serious offences ... "2 
And: "It is unfortunate that (s. 34 (i)) is likely to beset the path 
of a court conducting a trial for a sexual offence, already thorny 
enough, with a new and luxuriant crop of briars ... "3. As pointed out 
by Wells, J., the section may be interpreted to enable an accused to 
make an unsworn statement as to the "sexual experiences" of the 
alleged victim, but would restrict the victim from being cross- 
examined on the allegations. Thus, the rights of the alleged victim 
1) (1977) 17 S. A. S. R. 165 
2) (1977) 17 S. A. S. R. 165 at 185 
3) Per. Bray C. J. (1977) 17 S. A. S. R. 165 at 170 
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1 
could be severely hampered. - But a different view was expressed in R 
V. De Angelis, 
2 
where it was held that the word "evidence" in 
s. 341(2) has "an enlarged meaning so as to include unsworn state- 
ments". Another question is, what is to be included within the 
expression "sexual experiences"? The statement "I am a virgin" is 
not "evidence of .... sexual experiences", but in the words of Wells, 
J., "is some evidence of the lack of such experiences" 
3 
Thus, the 
problem arises of whether such affirmation by an alleged victim would 
be within the prohibition. Again, it could be regarded by those 
advocating more rights for the victim that a restriction upon putting 
into evidence a lack of sexual experiences would be negative toward 
those rights. 
Furthermore, by restricting the evidentiaary provisions to the 
"alleged victim" this means that no such protection can be extended 
to other witnesses who come before the court not to give evidence as 
alleged victims of the particular ofence, but as alleged. victims of a 
rape "perpetrated by the accused in strikingly similar circum- 
stances". 
4 If the victim is to be protected, why not other, simi- 
larly placed witnesses? Finaly, the requirement that s. 34 (i) 
should come into operation only when "an allegation has been, or is 
to be made"- is in itself difficult to interpret, in view of the 
apparent desire of the Parliament to relieve the court scene from the 
admission into evidence of information both damaging and distressing 
and not pertinent to the crime charged. In R V. Gun; Ex parte 
1) R V. Gun; Ex parte Stephenson (1977) 17 S. A-. S. R. 165 at 181-182; 
2) 71979) 20 S. A. S. R. 
3) R v. Gun; Ex parte Stephenson (1977) 17 S. A. S. R. 165 at 181-182 
4) Ibid 
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Stephenson, ' Wells, J., alluded to this problem: ".... what is there 
in s. 34 (i) that determines what 'allegation' may or may not be 
made? How are the metes and bounds of the area of permissible alle- 
gation to be drawn? Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? I could imagine 
a trial judge being placed in a hopeless predicament if counsel were 
to make allegation, in flat defiance of the spirit of the legisla- 
tion, that the (alleged victim) led an immoral life, and then ten- 
dered evidence that was plainly relevant to the allegation and of 
indisputable cogency. I cannot at present, see how the judge could 
satisfactorily extricate himself from that predicament". 
2 Thus it is 
clear that the attempt contained in the Evidence (Amendment) Act 1976 
(S. A. ) to have the courts administer appropriate rules fails and 
possibly results in a worse position for the victim. 
The second most commonly taken approach in drawing up "rape-shield" 
laws of evidence is that of adumbrating specific types of evidence to 
be taken into consideration by a court, and outlawing all reference 
to any other evidence. This was the position taken in the original 
Women's Electoral Lobby Draft Bill of New South Wales, Australia: 
3 
"(2) Opinion evidence relating to the chastity or unchastity of the 
victim, and the evidence of the sexual reputation of the victim will 
not be admissible as evidence of the credibility of the victim. (3) 
Evidence of the existence of a sexual relationship between the 
accused and the victim will be admissible only where consent is in 
issue. (4) Evidence of prior consensual sexual intercourse or prior 
consensual sexual acts between the victim and any person other than 
1) (1977) 17 S. A. S. R. 165, 
2) R V. Gun; Ex Parte Stephenson (1977) 17'S. A. S. R. 165 at 183-184 
3) Published as Appendix B in the New South Wales Department of the 
Attorney General and of Justice, Supplement to Report (1977). 
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the accused shall not be admitted into evidence in any prosecution 
under this Amendment, except where evidence of specific instances of 
sexual intercourse or sexual acts are required to show the origin of 
semen, pregnancy, disease or injury". 
The provisions were based upon the Michigan legislation 
1 Modif i- 
cations were made in view of possible criticisms; for example, under 
the Michigan provision, evidence or prior consensual sexual inter- 
course or acts between the victim and any person other than the 
accused will not be admitted except where evidence of specific insta- 
nces of consensual sexual activity are required to show the origin 
of semen, pregnancy or disease. This ignores the proposition that an 
accused may wish to bring evidence of a prior sexual relationship in 
order to show that it was through such relationship that the victim 
was "injured" rather than the "injury" having been effected by h m- 
self. Such would be particularly pertinent to the case where the 
victim was alleged to have been a virgin prior to the act which is 
the subject of the charge. Such evidence would be relevant also in 
cases where the defendant declared that he had not had intercourse 
with the victim, but this was a case of mistaken identity, _ 
and so on. 
It would not be relevant where consent was in issue, the victim being 
alleged to have consented to the accused. It is difficult to under- 
stand the rationale of the provisions contained in the Report of The 
Royal commission into Human Relationships, 
2 
on this point, where it 
seems evidence of prior sexual acts "to explain the source or origin 
1) See Scutt "Reforming the Law of Rape; The Michigan Example" (1976) 
50 A. L. J. 615 
2) Royal Commission Into Human Relationships, Final Report, vol. 5 Pt. 
VII "Rape and other Sexual Offences" and "Recommendations" (1977) 
at pp. 192 and 233. 
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of semen, pregnancy or disease" are to be introduced "only in a trial 
in which consent is in issue". A successful constitutional attack on 
the exclusion of similar evidence in a sex offence trial resulted in 
a reversal of a carnal knowledge conviction in Maryland V. De Law- 
der. 
l 
Because of jurisprudential rule excluding evidence of prior 
sexual conduct in prosecutions for carnal knowledge of a juvenile - 
under the rationale that such females were legally incapable of 
consenting to sexual intercourse - the accused in De Lawder had not 
been permitted to introduce evidence relating to prior acts of sexual 
intercourse by the prosecutrix with other men. The defendant had 
made an elaborate offer of proof indicating that the alleged victim 
had accused him of rape only because she believed she was pregnant by 
another man and was afraid to tell her mother that she had had 
voluntary sexual intercourse with others. On the strength of Davis 
V. Alaska, 
2 
the court held that the exclusionary rule had been 
unconstitutionally applied to prevent the defendant from effectively 
exposing the possible bias, prejudice, and ulterior motive of the 
prosecutrix. 
Such provisions as that of The Women's Electoral Lobby Draft Bill 
earlier cited, 
3- though detailed are arguably narrowly drawn. Some 
commentators have contended that an additional situation should be 
taken into account, namely, evidence of prior sexual acts should be 
introduced: 4 ".... where the prior sexual acts were part of a pattern 
of behaviour which was strikingly similar to (the alleged victim's) 
alleged behavior at or about the time of the alleged offence ... ". 
1) 28 Md. App. 212,344 A. 2d 446 (1975) 
2) 415 U. S. 308 (1974) 
3) Published, as, Appendix "W tn'the' New South Wales Department of the 
Attorney General and of Justice. Supplement to Report (1977). 
4) This is the approach taken in the Report of the Royal Commission 
into Human Relationships op. cit, ante. 
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This inclusion has not, however gone uncriticised, primarily on 
grounds that "pattern behaviour" and "striking similarity" would be 
difficult to determine. 
In answer to criticisms directed at exclusionary rules of evidence 
for rape cases, Berger' has opted for a series of guidelines to be 
introduced to control admissibility of evidence in the sexual history 
sphere. The argument put forward as a justification for the drafting 
of guidelines is that laws such as that of Michigan are too strict 
and encroach too far on the legitimate rights of the accused. Under 
the scheme proposed by Berger the type of evidence to be admitted 
includes evidence of the complainant's sexual conduct with the defen- 
dant: this will not in any way be restricted. 
2 Evidence of specific 
acts with others than the accused will be admissible where it is 
sought to show that the person responsible for the act charged is not 
the defendant but some other person, or that the victim herself 
committed the injury giving rise to the charge. 
3 A "pattern of 
sexual conduct" leading the accused to believe the woman consented 
will be admitted. 
4 Other types of evidence include that of sexual 
conduct tending to prove the complainant has "a motive to fabricate 
the charge" and: 
5 "Evidence of sexual conduct offered as the basis 
of expert psychological or psychiatric opinion that the complainant 
fantasized or invented the act or acts charged". 
However, the approach of drawing-up guidelines to restrict admissi- 
bility of prior sexual history raises problems even apart from con- 
1) Berger, op. cit, (1977) 77 Columb. L. R. 1. 
2) Berger, (1977) 77 Columb. L. R. 1 at p. 99 (sub-s(1)). 
3) Ibid. (sub-s. (2)) 
4) Ibid at p. 100 (sub-s. (7)) 
5) Ibid at p. 38 
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tentions that schemes abrogate the rights of the accused, or imply 
that certain sorts of assumptions may validly be made from certain 
types of information. It is not only sexual history evidence that 
may interfere with a "proper" finding by the jury, but other informa- 
tion of an extraneous kind - such as the clothes the woman was wea- 
ring; 
1 
that the parties were drinking together before the incident; 
2 
that the woman was hitch-hiking and accepted a life from the alleged 
attacker. 
3 
It is interesting to note that this evidence would not be 
eliminated by "rape-shield statutes" that concentrate solely upon the 
sexual history in terms of sexual relationships with persons other 
than the accused, 
4 
or with "general reputation" or "general charac- 
ter". 
5 In the light of the opinions expressed, exclusionary rules 
cannot be mechanistically applied to deny admission of highly reli- 
able and relevant'evidence which is "critical" to an accused's rape 
defence. 
Lastly, the Procedural approach is another method of drafting a 
"rape-shield" statute. By this, rather than restricting application 
of current rules of evidence by devising guidelines that may unduly 
restrict the rights of accused, or alternatively may abrogate the 
rights of a victim or other witnesses, the solution may lie in 
changing court procedures. 
Under several schemes6 a written motion must be made by the defen- 
dant where sexual history evidence is sought to be entered into 
proceedings. A hearing in camera is then' to be held to determine 
relevance and ailmissibility. 
7 
One such scheme also provides .8 
"The 
1) See Wilson, "Victim's of Rape: The Social Context of Degradation" 
(1976) 9 A. N. Z. Jrn. Criminal. 249. (2) See H. Kalvern and H. 
Zeisel, The American Jury (1966) at 250. (3) See e. g. Report 
of the Select. Comtee. on Crimes of Violence in Queensland 
(1974) 
S. 9 at p. 5. (4) But note the recent Resolution on evidence 
in 
rape cases passed at the U. S. National Women's Conference in Houston, 
Texas, 18th-22nd Nov, 1977, that sought to oust inquiry into any 
sexual history, including that with the accused. (5) See Berger, 
op. cit. ante. (6) see e. g. Berger, op. cit. Ibid; Women 
Electoral Lobby, Sydney Draft Bill op. cit ante. (7) Women 
Electoral Lobby, Sydney Draft Bill, op. cit. ante. (8) Ibid. 
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court shall ensure that no questioning of the complainant is carried 
on in any unduly harassing or degrading manner and shall cut off any 
line of inquiry at the point where it is clearly exhausted or futile 
... At the end of the hearing, if the court finds that the offered 
evidence fulfils the criteria (otherwise stated in this law) and is 
not otherwise inadmissible, it shall issue an order stating its 
findings and the evidence that may be introduced. The defendant may 
then use such evidence pursuant to the order of the court". A scheme 
of this nature could be introduced without the additional change of 
rules of evidence: that is, it would be more acceptable from both 
victim's and accused's viewpoint to retain rules without "guide- 
lines", yet to formulate a procedure for determining admissibility. 
The advantage of introducing such a scheme, without tampering with 
rules of evidence as they exist, is that the attention of judges will 
thus be drawn to the need for thinking through the relevance and 
admissibility of the evidence. One complaint is that interjections 
may be made and imputations placed before a jury, so that the jury is 
alerted to some matters pertaining to sexual history before the judge 
is able to step in to rule as to admissibility. The requirement of 
an in camera or in chambers hearing will eliminate difficulties of 
this nature. Further, as the judge is required to set out the para- 
meters of evidence to be admitted, "counsel tactics" in commencing to 
enter inadmissible or inflammatory evidence will be thwarted. - 
An addition to these procedural rules would be a requirement that 
the judge formulate reasons for the conclusion that the evidence is 
relevant and admissible. Again this would serve the purpose of 
drawing the attention-of the court to the necessity for dealing with 
the evidence in the context of the case itself, rather than by 
recourse to generalised patterns of thought. 
The proposals of the Women's Electoral Lobby of Australia are 
noteworthy in this respect: 
' "(1) All rules of evidence and procedure 
applicable generally to crimes of assault under the Crimes Act 1900 
(N. S. W. ) will be applicable to the crime of sexual assault, unless it 
is stated otherwise in this Amendment (2) Prior to the introduction 
of sexual history evidence, the accused must seek leave from the 
judge sitting in chambers. - Such application must be accompanied by a 
statement outlining relevance of the evidence to a material fact of 
the crime charged. (3) If the judge considers the statement 
sufficient, a hearing must be held in the absence of the jury to 
determine whether the evidence is admissible. (4) At the conclusion 
of the hearing, the judge must issue an order stating the findings 
and the evidence that may be admitted. (5) Reasons for admitting the 
evidence must be clearly stated by the judge in the order". 
If due to difficulties outlined in terms of the "loop-hole" 
approach and the exclusionary approach to evidence reforms in rape 
cases the procedural approach is to be adopted it would be worthwhile 
to remind oneself of the words of Professor John Wigmore; 
2 in his 
discussion of the need for judges and practitioners to improve in 
spirit as a prerequisite for any hope of any real gain, he expressed 
1) Women Electoral Lobby, Sydney Draft Bill (June 1978 Draft) 
2) Wigmore On Evidence, 3rd ed. Vol. 1 at 263 
the opinion that in the end the man is more important than the rule. 
He said: "All the rules in the world will not get us substantial 
justice if the judges and the counsel have not the correct living 
moral attitude towards substantial justice". 
Despite the fact that evidence reform is a laudable goal, I reckon 
that the admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct will 
continue to be an issue of debate among legal scholars, since not- 
withstanding its legitimate purposes, a shield statute may conflict 
with the legal and fundamental rights of the accused. 
(6) PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE OF CHARACTER 
Despite trenchant criticism by Stephen' of the majority decision in 
R V. Rowton, 
2 to the effect that reputation may well be based on good 
fortune rather than good character, in R V. Butterwasser, 
3 Lord 
Goddard C. J., was of the view that courts would do well to pay 
stricter attention to the principle laid down in Rowton. If we may 
remind ourselves of the decision in Rowton's case; the Court of Crown 
Cases Reserved refused in the case to admit the opinion evidence of a 
witness called by the prosecution in a charge of indecent assault on 
a fourteen (14) year old boy preferred against a schoolmaster, on the 
grounds that it did not refer to the accused's reputation, a matter 
of which the witness- had admitted he knew nothing. in the words of 
Cockburn C. J.,: 
4 "What you want to get at is the tendency and 
disposition of the'man's mind towards committing or abstaining from 
committing the class of crime with which he stands charged; but no 
1) Digest of the Law of Evidence (12th ed. ) at p. 201 
2) (1865) Le & Ca. 520 
3) (1948) 1 K. B. at p. 7 
4) (1865) Le & Ca. 520 at p. 529 
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one has ever heard the question - what is the tendency and 
disposition of the prisoner's mind? - put directly. The only way of 
getting at it is by giving evidence of his general character founded 
on his general reputation in the neighbourhood in which he lives". 
Yet times change and it is clear that personal observation by 
trained observers may be of great importance in assisting the court 
to arrive at a proper conclusion. Accordingly, it is the purpose of 
the present discussion to examine judicial attitudes towards 
psychiatric evidence of character in criminal cases and to consider 
what the correct approach ought to be. 
It has been reasonably suggested that generally, evidence should be 
admissible to show that a witness suffers from some mental or physi- 
cal condition which affects the reliability of his evidence. 
' As 
pointed out in Walker and Walker, 
2 
evidence may be led before the 
judge as to the mental condition of a person who is alleged to be 
incompetent to testify by reason of mental incapacity, but in such a 
case the question is whether the person should be allowed to give 
evidence at all. It is not clear whether evidence may be given about 
the condition of a witness who actually gives evidence to the tribu- 
nal of fact. An example of a restrictive attitude towards such 
evidence is provided by the case of R V. Gunewardene3 where the 
accused had been charged with manslaughter. At the trial, a prosecu- 
tion witness had stated that the accused had attempted to bribe a co- 
prisoner to withdraw a statement which she had made implicating the 
accused. Defence witness sought to call a medical expert to show 
1) See R. S. O'Regan, "Impugninq The Credit of the Accused by 
Psychiatric Evidence", (1975) Crim. L. R. 563, and subsequent 
correspondence 
(1976) Crim. L. R. 84 
2) Walker and Walker - Law of Evidence in Scotland, § 350 
3) (1951) 35 Cr. App. Rep. 80 
- 751 - 
that the witness was suffering from a particular mental state, the 
effect of which would have been to discredit his evidence. The trial 
judge, however, refused to admit the medical evidence and the Court 
of Criminal Appeal held that it had been rightly excluded. Lord 
Goddard, C. J., wäs of the opinion' that a witness called to impeach 
the credit of another witness was entitled to state his opinion, in 
examination-in-chief, but not the reasons upon which that opinion was 
based. "In common fairness to the witness", said the Lord Chief 
Justice, 
2 "if that evidence were given, he might have wished evidence 
called to prove that he was not suffering from any disease of the 
mind, and the case against the prisoner ought not to be complicated 
by a simultaneous but subsidiary trial as to the sanity or insanity 
of a particular witness". 
R V. Gunewardene, however, was overruled by the House of Lords in 
the subsequent case of Toohey 'V. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 
3 
in which it is thought that it should be made clear that such evi- 
dence (i. e., psychiatric evidence of the witness) is admissible. In 
Toohey's case, which established its admissibility in English Law, 
Lord Pearce said: 
4 "Human evidence shares the frailties of those who 
give it. It is subject to many cross-currents such as partiality, 
prejudice, self-interest and, above all, imagination and inaccuracy. 
Those are matters with which the jury, helped by cross-examination 
and common sense, must do their best But when a witness through 
physical (in which I include mental) disease or abnormality is not 
1) Ibid at p. 90 
2) Ibid 
3) (1965) A. 595; (1965) 49 Cr. App. Rep. 148 
4) (1965) A. C. 595 at p. 608 
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capable of giving a true or reliable account to the jury, it must 
surely be allowable for medical science to reveal this vital hidden 
fact to them. If a witness purported to give evidence of something 
which he believed that he had seen at a distance of 50 yards, it must 
surely be possible to call the evidence of an oculist to the effect 
that the witness could not possibly see anything at a greater dis- 
tance than 20 yards, or the evidence of a surgeon who had removed a 
cataract from which the witness was suffering at the material time 
and which would have prevented him from seeing what he thought he 
saw. So, too, must it be allowable to call medical evidence of 
mental illness which makes a witness incapable of giving reliable 
evidence, whether through the existence of delusions or otherwise.... 
It is obviously in the interest of justice that such evidence should 
be available. The only argument that I can see against its admission 
is that there might be a conflict between the doctors and that there 
would then be a trial within a trial. Such cases would be rare, and, 
if they arose, they would not create any insuperable difficulty, 
since there are many cases in practice where a trial within a trial 
is achieved without difficulty. In such a case as this (unlike the 
issues relating to confessions) there would not be the inconvenience 
of having to exclude the jury since the dispute would be for their 
use and their instruction". It is worthwhile to examine the facts of 
the case itself. In that case, the accused had been charged with 
assault with intent to rob and a police doctor had examined the 
prosecutor, a seventeen (17) year old boy, soon after the alleged 
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incident and found him to be in a hysterical condition although the 
boy then gave evidence of the assault. The defence sought to obtain 
evidence from the doctor, who was called as a defence witness of his 
opinion as to what part of the boy's hysterical behaviour was attri- 
butable to alcohol and as to the boy's normal behaviour, based on his 
observations during the examination. At first instance, the Judge, 
whose decision was upheld by the Court of Criminal Appeal, refused to 
admit the evidence and refused to permit the doctor to give evidence 
of opinion beyond what could have been ascertained by looking at the 
prosecutor. The House of Lords held that the evidence was admis- 
sible. The real question to be determined, in the words of Lord 
Pearce, "... was whether, as the prosecution alleged, the episode 
created the hysteria, or whether, on the other hand, as the defence 
alleged, the hysteria created the episode. To that issue medical 
evidence as to hysterical and unstable nature of the alleged victim 
was highly relevant". Lord Pearce concluded by saying that, "Medical 
evidence is admissible to show that a witness suffers from some 
disease or defect or abnormality of mind that affects the reliabi- 
lity of his evidence. Such evidence is not confined to. a general 
opinion of the unreliability of the witness, but may give all the 
matters necessary to show not only the foundation of and reasons for 
the diagnosis, but also the extent to which the credibility of the 
witness is affected". In addition, Lord Pearce commented that the 
situation envisaged by Lord Goddard C. J., in P. V. Gunewardenel of a 
1) (1951) 35 Cr. App. Rep. 80 
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conflict between doctors leading to practical problems would rarely 
occur. 
1 
It is suggested that Toohey V. Metropolitan Police Commis- 
sioner, 
2 is a valuable and eminently sensible decision: it is clearly 
important that medical evidence of the kind which it was sought to 
adduce should be before the jury. 
Similarly in R V. Eades 
3 
Nield, J., held that the Crown might 
adduce evidence from a psychiatrist that the accused's account of how 
he had recovered his memory in the interval between giving two 
statements was not consistent with current medical knowledge. 
Recent decisions in England and the commonwealth have raised ques- 
tions as to the extent to whih psychiatric evidence may be admitted 
in relation to the character or credibility of the accused. Al- 
though, as has been observed in Gunewardene and Toohey, the psycholo- 
gical condition of a witness may sometimes be important, matters of 
this kind will more usually refer to the accused himself. In R V. 
chard, the accused had been convicted of murder and had been senten- 
ced to life imprisonment. Counsel for the defence sought to call a 
prison doctor who had prepared a report on the mental state of the 
accused where it was said: "What does seem clear to me in the light 
of this man's personality was that there was no intent or mans rea on 
his part to commit murder at any time that evening". However, the 
report also included the comment: "Mental illness, substantially 
diminished responsibility, the M'Naughten Rules, subnormality and 
psychopathic disorder do not appear to me to be relevant to the 
issue". The Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) held that the evide- 
1) See also Tapper "The case of the Hysterical Victim". 28 M. L. R. 
359,361 (1965) 
2) (1965) 49 Cr. App. Rep. 148 
3) (1972) Crim. L. R. 99 
4) (1972) 56 Cr. App. Rep. 268 
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nce was inadmissible as, in the words of Roskill L. J., 
1 
where the 
jury is dealing with "..... someone who by concession was on the 
medical evidence entirely normal, it seems to this Court abundantly 
plain, on first principles of the admissibility of expert evidence, 
that it is not permissible to call a witness, whatever his personal 
experience, merely to tell the jury how he thinks an accused man's 
mind - assumedly a normal mind - operated at the time of the alleged 
crime with reference to the crucial question of what that man's 
intention was". In addition, Roskill, L. J., refuted2 Counsel's sug- 
gestion that, if the medical witness's evidence were of no value, it 
could have been demolished by opposing counsel or by the Judge sum- 
ming up. Finally, whilst accepting the witness's expertise in mat- 
ters relating to mental illness, Roskill, L. J., commented3 that, 
"... neither he nor anyone else can claim to be an expert on the 
question of the intent of the ordinary man". 
However,. a somewhat different view was 'taken by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in Lowery V. R. In that case, the 
two accused,. Lowery and King, had been convicted of the murder of a 
fifteen (15) year old girl. Each held that the other had committed 
the crime; and one of the witnesses called by King was a psychologist 
who had interviewed both the accused and had submitted them to 
various personality tests. He gave evidence to the effect that King 
was an immature youth who was likely to. be led and dominated by more 
aggresive and dominant men and that he might also behave aggresively 
1) Ibid at 270 
2) Ibid at p. 271 
3) (1972) 56 Cr. App. Rep. 268 at. 271 
4) (1973) 3 All E. R. 662 _ 
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to comply with the demands of such a person. The psychologist also 
testified that the tests showed that Lowery was strongly aggressive 
and lacked control over those impulses. Lowery appealed on the 
grounds that the psychologist's evidence had been wrongly admitted as 
it merely tended to show disposition. The Judicial Committee decided 
that the evidence had been rightly admitted because, in the words of 
Lord Morris, ' the psychologist's evidence, ".... was not related to 
crime or criminal tendencies: it was scientific evidence as to the 
respective personalities of the two accused as, and to the extent, 
revealed by . certain well known tests", and was of particular 
relevance in- view of the defences raised by the accused. It is 
suggested that Lowery V. R is particularly important and valuable, 
because of Lord Morris's recognition of scientific inquiry in the 
field of behavioural science. 
In the subsequent case of R V. Turner, 
2 
the Court of Appeal were of 
the view that Lowery V. R was decided on its particular facts and, 
were unwilling to treat it as authority for the proposition that 
expert evidence may always be called on the issue of the accused's 
veracity. In Turner's case, a man charged with murder, who was not 
suffering-from mental illness, pleaded provocation and sought to call 
a psychiatrist to give evidence of his personality and mental state 
in order to show the jury that his account of the incident was likely 
to be true and that he would have been provoked by what his victim 
had told him. The trial Judge refused to admit the evidence on the 
ground that psychiatrist's report contained hearsay evidence and was 
1) Ibid at 671 
2) (1975) 1 All E. R. 70 
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irrelevant and inadmissible. The accused was accordingly convicted 
of murder and he consequently appealed. The Court of Appeal dismis- 
sed his appeal even though they did not regard the psychiatrist's 
evidence as irrelevant since, as Lawton L. J., described it: 
1 "A 
man's personality and mental make up do have a bearing on his conduct 
... Opinions from knowledgeable persons about a man's personality and 
mental make-up play a part in many human judgements". Lawton, L. J., 
went on to say2 that, even though the report contained hearsay, it 
would not have automatically been excluded, merely modified. How- 
ever, Lowton, L. J., refused to admit the psychiatrist's evidence 
because, in the circumstances of the case, the jury were able to form 
their own conclusions. "If" he said, 
3 "on the proven facts a Judge 
or jury can form their own conclusions without help then the opinion 
of an expert is unnecessary. In such a case if it is dressed up in 
scientific jargon it may make judgement more difficult. The fact 
that an expert witness has impressive scientific qualifications does 
not by that fact alone make his opinion on matters of human nature 
and behaviour within the limits of normality any more helpful than 
that of the jurors themselves; but there is a danger that they may 
think it does". Lawton, L. J., concluded4 his judgement by saying 
that he was firmly of the the opinion that, ".... psychiatry has not 
yet become a satisfactory substitute for the commonsense of juries or 
magistrates on matters within their experience of life". It is 
however significant to point out that Lawton, L. J., remarked5 that he 
I 
1) (1975)-l All E. R. 70 at p. 74 
2) Ibid 
3) Ibid 
4) (1975) 1 All E. R. 70 at p. 75 
5) Ibid 
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had not overlooked the comments of Lord Parker, C. J., in D. P. P. V. A 
& BC Chewing Gum Ltd. 
1 
to the effect that science was making further 
inroads into the common law principle relating to opinion evidence; 
One must say that it is arguable that Lawton, L. J., was contradicting 
himself by expressing that sentiment about Lord Parker's statement as 
he has just expressed his reservation about a similar kind of evi- 
dence. It should be pointed out that it is thought that a Scottish 
Court would have excluded the evidence considered in Turner2 and may 
I say rightly so too. It is equally pertinent to point out that, 
apart from the use of psychiatric evidence of character to affect the 
reliability of or credit of a witness's evidence, the cases also deal 
with the ability of the accused, either, to adduce psychiatric evide- 
nce for the purpose of showing dispostional incapacity (i. e., negati- 
ving any basic assumption of dispositional capacity), or of showing 
relatively greater dispostional capacity on the part of another, and 
the ability of the Crown to adduce psychiatric evidence in rebuttal. 
They are not, however, concerned with the ability of. The Crown to 
adduce, at first instance psychiatric evidence to estabish the requi- 
site dispositional capacity of the accused. 
The question of psychiatric evidence relating to character has been 
raised in an acute form in recent Canadian cases. First in R V. 
Lupien; the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that in a 
trial for gross indecency expert psychiatric evidence was admissible 
for the defence to the effect that he had a strong aversion, to 
homosexual practices and would not, therefore, knowingly engage in 
1) (1968) 1 Q. B. 159 at 164 
2) Sheriff Macphai 1 Research Paper`- § 16: 21 
3) (1970) 9 D. L. R. (3d) 1; (1970) SCR 263 
- 759 - 
homosexual acts. Ritchie, J., said' that the principle laid down in 
R V. Rowton was " ...... singularly inappropriate to the introduction 
of evidence from psychiatrists as to the accused's disposition". The 
value of Lupien may, however, be lessened by the fact that both 
Ritchie, J., 2 and Hall, j., 
3 
were at pains to emphasise the nature of 
the charges against the accused. Ritchie, J., in particular, stated 
that he thought that4 crimes involving homosexual behaviour fell into 
a special class, a view which, in the view of the later decisions in 
D. P. P. V. Kilbourne'5 and Boardman V. D. P. P., 
6 
is now of very doubtful 
validity. In addition, Ritchie, J., emphasised that he was not 
formulating a general rule regarding psychiatric evidence of disin- 
clination to commit a particular crime, a point which was strongly 
taken up by Martland, J., who said that, 
7 
"If such evidence is held 
to be admissible in a case of this kind, then there would seem to be 
no reason why, on a charge of murder, psychiatric evidence could not 
be led to the innate abhorrence of the accused in respect of physical 
violence, or on a charge of theft, of the innate respect of the 
accused for private property rights". It is suggested that Ritchie, 
J. 's rejection of the application of Rowton was entirely correct for 
psychiatric evidece can, by its very nature have nothing to do with 
general reputation. It is arguable that with regards to psychiatric 
evidence of character, sexual cases including those of indecent 
assault might need to be put into a special category. Actually in 
some states in America this seems to be the position as the case of 
1) (1970) 9 D. L. R. (3d) 1 at p. 10 
2) Ibid at p. 12 
3) Ibid at p. 13 
4) Ibid at p. 12; See also R V. Thompson (1917) 13 Cr. App. Rep. 61 
5) (1973) A. C. 729, at 751 per Lord Reid 
6) (1974) 3 All E. R. 887 at p. 897 per Lord Wilberforce 
7) (1970) 9 D. L. R. (3d) 1 at p. 5 
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People V. Jones 1 shows. In that case, Jones was convicted upon two 
counts of an information charging the commission of lewd and lasci- 
vious acts upon the person of his nine year old niece. At the time 
of the alleged offence, Carol, the niece, was living with Jones and 
his wife. She testified to the conduct of Jones upon two occasions 
specified in the information, "and it clearly was a violation of the 
statue". In addition she testified that Jones indulged in similar 
acts "lots of days", and that on one occasion Jones "showed her four 
books containing pornographic pictures and writing" prior to his lewd 
and lascivious conduct. "Briefly stated", said the court, "what 
Jones did, as related by Carol, amounted to sexual relations without 
penetration". Jones denied having committed any of the acts or 
having shown Carol any poronographic books, although he admitted 
"having had eight or nine pictures of nude women in his bedroom". 
Jones and his wife testified that their sexual relationship was 
mutally satisfactory but his mother-in-law "told of complaint's by 
him that his wife did not satisfy him sexually". There was evidence 
that Jones had a good reputation for morality in his community. Mrs. 
Jones testified that Carol's reputation for truth and veracity was 
bad. 
On appeal, while conceding the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the conviction, -Jones claimed error because of the rejection 
of the following offer of proof: "At this time, rather than bringing 
, 
the psychiatrist into court and having an adverse ruling on what he 
would testify about, I would like at this time to make an offer of 
1) 42 Cal. 2d 219,266 P. 2d 38 (1954) 
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proof that we will produce Dr. James Solomon, a duly licensed 
physician and surgeon under the laws of California, specialising in 
psychiatry ... If produced as a witness, Dr Solomon will testity that 
at my request he examined Mr. Rayburn Jones on two occassions, one 
without the use of drugs and on the second occasion with the aid of a 
drug known as sodium pentothal; that as a result of those 
examinations he reached the conclusion that Mr. Jones is not a sexual 
deviate ..... ". 
The Supreme Court of California unanimously sustained this conten- 
tion. Evidence of good character is relevant "(i)n the determination 
of the probabilities of guilt"; "the purpose of the evidence as to 
the character of the accused is. to show his disposition, and to base 
thereon a probable presumption that he would not be likely to commit, 
and, therefore he did not commit, the crime with which he is char- 
ged"; while "character is proved by evidence of the accused' s general 
reputation in the community for the traits which are in issue", the 
Californian Statute providing for the control of "sexual psychopaths" 
states "a legislative determination that such a person is more likely 
to violate (the criminal statute in question) than one who has no 
such propensity; to some extent there is a cause and effect relation- 
ship"; from "evidence which tends to prove that a person is not a 
sexual phychopath, an inference reasonably may be drawn that he did 
not commit the offence denounced" by the statute; "the competency of 
expert opinion in this field of evidence is established by the statu- 
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tory procedure for the determination of sexual psychopathy. Accor- 
dingly, the evidence here excluded was relevant to the general issue 
before the jury and should have been admitted". Also, because "the 
only direct evidence is the charges made by Carol and the denials of 
Jones ... the exclusion of the psychiatrist's testimony was prejudi- 
cially erroneous". 
1 
In the People's "Supplemental Memorandum" in support of the peti- 
tion for rehearing, it said in part: "We do not believe that this 
court has come to the conclusion that evidence of character has 
passed from the crucible of the community to the couch of the psy- 
chiatrist". But the petition was denied. The statment of the peti- 
tion is however plainly a very significant one as it strikes directly 
at the heart of the controversy. 
"Psychiatric evidence", says Hartt, 
2 "should be considered in the 
light of the problems it poses for the trial of the issues rather 
than on the basis of its conformance with an anomalous rule". The 
3 
earlier cited'case of R V. Lupien, was followed by the Ontario Court 
of Appeal in R V. Dietrich4 where the accused had been charged with 
non-capital murder, the defence-proposed to call psychiatric evidence 
in support of its contention that the accused was a psychopathic 
personality who confessed to acts which he had not really done and 
who had a propensity to lie. The purpose of the contention was to 
explain certain confessional statements made by the accused. At 
first instance, Haines, J., after a lengthy "voir dire", admitted the 
opinions of the psychiatrists but refused to admit the bases for 
I 
1) 42 Cal. 2d 219,216 P. 2d 38 at 42-43 (1954) 
2) "Character Evidence" in Studies in Canadian Criminal Evidence (Ed. 
Salhany and Carter) (1972) 259 at p. 269 
3) (1970) 9 D. L. R. (3d). l 
4) (1971) 1 C. C. C. (2d) 49 
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those opinions unless they were placed in issue by Crown Counsel. On 
appeal, it was held that the psychiatrists ought to have been allowed 
to explain the basis for. their opinions fully as such evidence had a 
direct bearing on a vital issue to be decided by the jury. 1 The 
matter, however came once more before the Ontario Court of Appeal in 
the case of R V. Rosik, 
2. 
a case which Silverman has described3 as at 
least maintaining the status quo in respect of attempts to develop a 
more enlightened attitutde towards mental illness and possibly even 
turning back the hands of the clock. There, the accused had been 
accused of capital murder and, not testifying himself, put his def- 
ence to the jury through a psychiatrist, who was permitted to relate 
the whole of a conversation he had had with the accused. The psyc- 
hiatrist gave his opinion that the accused was suffering from organic 
amnesia caused by the consumption of alcohol and drugs, and thus, 
lacked the capacity to form the requisite intent and, further stated 
that if he had thought that the accused was malingering he would not 
have given evidence. In reply, the Crown called another. psychiatrist 
who had also examined the accused and who gave an opinion which 
reflected prejedicially on the truth of the accused's assertions. 
During his summing up, the Judge at first instance stated to the jury 
that if the accused had not told the defence psychiatrist the truth 
regarding the amount of alcohol and drugs taken, then the foundation 
for that psychiatrist's evidence was gone. The accused' was convicted 
and appealed unsuccessfully to the Ontario Court of Appeal. There 
1) (1971) 1 C. C. C. (2d) 49 at p. 67 per Gale C. J. 
2) (i971) 2 C. C. C. 351 
3) "Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Law- (1971-2) 14 Crim. L. Q. 
145 at p. 145 
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are some features in Rosik's case which are however unsatisfactory. 
For example, relying on Toohey V. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, 
' 
Schroeder J. A., stated2 that medical evidence could be given to show 
that a witness has a -disease, defect or abnormality of mind likely to 
affect his credibility. Unfortunately, there is no evidence anywhere 
in the report to the effect that the crown psychiatrist considered 
that the accused was suffering from any abnormality of mind, although 
Schroeder J. A., seemed to be of the opinion that the accused was 
suffering from such a condition. Whatever the curiosity value of R 
V. Rosik, it is clear from the cases that no coherent judicial policy 
has been devised to deal with the question of psychiatric evidence 
relating to character. At the outset of any consideration of such 
policy, it must be admitted that it is by no means easy to construct 
one which is likely to be both realistic and acceptable. 
1) (1965) 49 Cr. App. Rep. 148 
2) (1971) 2 C. C. c. 351 at p. 381 
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CHAPTER 4 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED 
(1) GENERAL 
The significance of the discussion of cross-examination of accused 
persons and evidence of character lies in the provisions of Section 1 
of the criminal Evidence Act of 1898. It is a subject of overwhel- 
ming importance to the practitioner planning the defence of persons 
accused of criminal offences, and has been previously adumberated on 
more than one occasion in the polemical literature. In 1898 in 
England the legislature launched into life the Criminal Evidence Act 
of that year; that statute abolished the Common Law rule that an 
accused person was not competent to give evidence on his own behalf. 
The accused was not under an obligation to go into the witness box 
and give evidence but if he decided to do so justice required that 
Ii 
limitations should be placed upon the power of the prosecution to 
cross-examine him as to credit. Parliament accordingly placed the 
accused in a special position. 
Section 1 (f) of the Criminal Evidence Act, - 1898, defines the extent 
to which the accused may be cross-examined on the subject of his 
disposition and character. Initially, this Act, was of general 
application throughout the United Kingdom, but today in Scotland, 
cross-examination of the accused on the subject of his disposition 
and character is now guided by Sections 141 (e) and (f) and 346 (e) 
and (f) of the 1975 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act. The sections 
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apply to solemn and summary trials respectively. And in each state 
of Australia, there is an equivalent) to the provisions contained in 
the English Criminal Evidence Act 1898. As there is a proliferation 
of the same Act in Australia, I intend to base references to the 
position in Australia henceforth on the relevant portion of the 
Victorian Statute, namely Sec. 399 of the Crimes Act 1958. Section 
68 (3) of the Nigeria Evidence Act provides that an accused person 
may be asked questions to show that he is of bad character in the 
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (d) of the proviso to section 
159. The provisions of that paragraph (ie. S. 159(d)) are taken 
almost word for word from Section 1 (f) of the 1898 Criminal Evidence 
Act of England. The only difference originally appears to be in 
Section 159 (d) (ii) where the description "Legal practitioner" is 
used. The English statute uses "advocate". In Nigeria, practice in 
the courts is not restricted to barristers alone but is extended to 
solicitors as well. There is another difference in the wordings now 
brought about by the English Criminal Evidence Act 1979, which sub- 
stituted the words "in the same proceedings" for "with the same 
offence", in sub-section (iii). In Scotland the words "counsel or 
solicitor" are used instead of "advocate"; in The Republic of Ire- 
land however, the provisions of S. 1 (f) of the 1898 Act are contained 
word for word in S. 1 (f) of the Criminal Justice (Evidence) Act 
1924. 
There are countries where the position is different from the 
1) NSW: Crimes Act 1900 SS. 413A and 413B; Vic: - Crimes Act 1958 S. 399; 
Qid: Evidence Act 1977, S. 15; S. A.: Evidence Act 1929-1976, S. 18; W. A.: 
Evidence Act 1906-1976 S. 8; Tas: -Evidence Act 1910 S. 85; see too 
Northern Territory Evid. -Ordinance 1939-1966 S. 9(7) & Papua and New 
Guniea Evid. and Discovery Ord. 1913-1967 S. 58(1) 
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general position that seems common to the countries cited above. In 
New Zealand for instance, proviso (d) to section 5 (2) of the 
Evidence Act 1908, provides that cross-examination of the accused 
relating to any previous conviction or to his credit, may be limited 
by the court as it thinks proper. As it was observed in R V. 
Clarke': "In England the basis of the protection from cross-examina- 
tion upon previous convictions is largely a matter of law, whereas in 
New Zealand it is a matter of discretion in the trial Judge". 
And there is also an important difference between Canada and En- 
gland with regard to the right of the prosecution in Canada to cross- 
examine a defendant, who elects to give evidence as to his previous 
convictions, which only exist in England in a limited class of cases. 
Section 12 of the Canada Evidence Act permits examination and adduce- 
ment of evidence as to previous convictions for the purpose of 
attacking credibility. And it has been said that: -"The Canadian rule 
allowing cross-examination of the defendant on his previous convic- 
tions is strictly logical, since the Defendant is not bound to give 
evidence at all, and if he chooses to be a witness his liability to 
cross-examination on his previous convictions is only the same as 
that of any other witness. If it is a jury trial, the Judge will 
explain to the Jury that the previous convictions are relevant only 
in so far as they throw light on the, credibility of the defendant as 
a witness, and not as proving his guilt on the charge on which he is' 
presently being tried, though whether all juries always pay the 
necessary attention to this distinction may be open to doubt"2. As a 
1) (1953) N. Z. L. R. 823,830 
2) An accused with a Previous Conviction - R. B. Whitehead: - (1968) 
Chitty's Law Journal at 152 see also Colpitts V. R. (1966) D. L. 
R. 416 
great deal will turn on the construction of the statutory provisions, 
as most of the statutes contain similar wordings as the English 
Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, the 1898 Act will then be used as the 
basis for the discussion, with reference being made to the relevant 
provisions of the other statutes. 
(2). STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF THE CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT 1898 
Because of the risk of prejudice peculiarly associted with charac- 
ter in criminall cases, Parliament decided to afford the accused a 
substantial , albeit not unlimited protection in the no doubt justi- 
fied belief that the right to give evidence might otherwise be 
rarely exercised. The protection was achieved by building into the 
Act a complete code regulating the cross-examination of a defendant 
who chooses to give evidence as permitted by the Statute. The Code, 
as enacted by Section 1 provisoes (e) and (f), stands in full force 
today, subject only to one amendment to Section 1 (f) (iii) by the 
Criminal Evidence Act 1979. Section 1 (e) and (f) of the Criminal 
Evidence Act, 1898, has identical counterparts in the Commonwealth 
countires. In some of this jurisdictions there are certain signifi- 
cant additions and subtractions on the wordings of the provisions 
which I shall endeavour to point out as the discussion progresses. 
But first it is worth reading the provisions of the English Criminal 
Evidence Act, Section 1 provisoes (e) and (f), before considering it- 
in more detail. 
Section 1 (e) reads as follows: "A person charged and being a 
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witness in pursuance of this Act may be asked any question in cross- 
examination not withstanding that it would tend to criminate him as 
to the offence charged. " 
And in Section 1 (f) it is provided as follows: - "A person charged 
---ý. 
and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall not be asked, 
and if asked shall not be requested to answer, any question tending 
to show that he has committed or been convicted of or been charged 
with any offence other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is 
of bad character, unless - (i) if the proof that he has committed or 
been convicted of such other offence is admissible evidence to show 
that he is guilty of the offence wherewith he is then charged; or 
(ii) he has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the 
witness for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good 
character, or has given evidence of _his 
own good character, or the 
nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations on 
the character of the prosecutor or the witness for the prosecution; 
or (iii) he has given evidence against any other person charged in 
the same proceedings. " 
Before going further with the provisions above, I would like to 
draw attention as earlier mentioned to some of-differences that exist 
with similar provisions in other jurisdictions. The first noticeable 
difference between the provisions in England and Scotland is with 
respect to Section 1 (e) as enacted in Sections 141 (e) and 346 (e) 
of 1975 Criminal Evidence Scotland Act. The provision in Scotland 
I- 
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reads: "The accused who gives evidence on his own behalf in pursuance 
of this section may be asked any questions in cross-examination not 
withstanding that it would tend to incriminate him as to the offence 
charged. " The opening words have been significantly altered and the 
alteration is not unimportant as Sherrif Macphaill pointed out, 
because in England section 1 (e) is not expressly confined to cases 
in which the accused is giving evidence "on his own behalf", and the 
court would not read these words into it: it has been held that it 
applies when one accused confines his evidence to statement exculpa- 
ting his co-accused2. In Scotland, however, by virtue of the 1975 
Act, an accused who so confined his evidence would apparently be able 
to claim the Common law privilege against self-incrimination. It is 
thought that he should not be allowed to do so. Sherrif Macphail 
concluded that "in addition, if the law of Scotland is altered to the 
effect of making an accused person a competent, but not a compellable 
witness for co-accused3, and if it is accepted that such an accused 
should not be entitled to claim the privilege, it will be necessary 
to remodel paragraph (e). "4 
Generally there is no other significant difference between_the 
provisions of S. 1 (f) of the 1898 Act and Sections 141 (f) and 346 
(f) of the 1975 Act of Scotland, since the amendment to Section 1 
(f) (iii) by the Criminal Evidence Act 1979 is of general application 
in the U. K- -. it substitutes "the same proceedings" for "the same 
offence". However most of the Commonwealth countries in which there 
are similar provisions retain the use of the original wordings "the 
1) Scottish Law Commission - Research Papers - §5: 41 
2) See Rv Rowland (1910) 1 K. B. 458 3) See § 5: 36 of Sheriff 
Macphail Research Papers 4) Scottish Law Commisssion Research 
Papers § 5: 41 
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same offence". The significance of the changes will be discussed in 
later considerations. There are however other discrepancies in the 
words of the provisions in Scotland vis a vis the 1898 Act of 
England, but generally the tenor remains the same in the sense that 
there is no serious implication of change of principle. The Scotland 
Act being more recent, the drafting is more straightforward especial- 
ly £n the choice of words. For instance instead of the use of the 
word "wherewith" as in S. 1 (f) (i), the Scottish equivalent uses the 
words "with which"; and while in the prohibition clause of S. 1 (f) 
the following words are used, "A person charged and called as a 
witness ... " the Scottish provision puts it as "The accused who 
gives evidence on his own behalf"; and in S. 1 (f) (ii) while the 
English provision uses the word "advocate", the Scottish uses the 
words "counsel or solicitor". (This anyhow is a result of the rules 
regulating legal practice under two different judicial systems. ) And 
in Nigeria, Section 159 (d) of the Nigeria Evidence Act, reenacts 
almost word for word S. 1 (f) of the 1898 Criminal Evidence Act of 
England. There are only two differences between the two Acts. Whe- 
reas the English statute uses the word "advocate" in Nigeria the 
description "legal practioners" is used. In Nigeria, a qualified 
lawyer performs the functions of both a solicitor and a barrister. 
Advocate in England means a counsel or a solicitor. The other diffe- 
rence is brought about by the English Criminal Evidence Act 1979, 
which substituted the words "in the same proceedings" for "with the 
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same offence" in sub-section (iii). 
As earlier indicated in Australia, the relevant portion of the 
Victorian statute, namely S. 399 (e) of the Crimes Act 1958, is to be 
used as the basis of discussion. The provisions of S. 399 (e) is 
identical to S. 1 (f) of the 1898 Act save for the concluding portion 
of sub-section (ii) which I' must point out is peculiar to the 
Victorian Act, as it does not feature in other states of Australia. 
The provision was inserted in 1967 
1 
at the same time as spouses were 
made competent witnesses against each other in all criminal 
proceedings. It was designed to enable a husband, for example, to 
impugn the motives of a perhaps vindictive wife who agreed to give 
evidence against" him. The section provides - S. 399 (e) (ii) "... he 
has personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses 
for the prosecution with a view to establish his own good character, 
or has given evidence of his good character, or the nature or conduct 
of the accused of the defence is such as to involve imputations on 
the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution 
other than his wife or her husband as the case may be: Provided that 
the permission of the judge (to be applied in the absence'of the jury 
must first be obtained; ... ". It should be pointed out that the 
other part of the addition which is the express provision that the 
leave of the judge must first be obtained is peculiar to Victoria and 
Queensland. The only other difference between the Victorian statute 
and the 1898 Act is that effected by the English Criminal Evidence 
Act, 1979 in respect of sub-paragraph (iii), which I have repeatedly 
1) Act No 7546. Section 8 
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pointed out. 
As we shall see, in England and in other jurisidictions where 
provisions on similar lines have been adopted, paragraphs (e) and (f) 
have given rise to numerous judicial decisions so far as its 
construction is concerned. In Scotland, on the other hand, the only 
part of these provisions which has been the subject of reported 
decision is the second limb of paragraph (f) (ii) and the authorita- 
tive construction placed upon it since O'Hara v. H. M. Advocate, has 
never been called into question. Sherrif Macphail stated that "the 
reason for the absence of other Scottish authority may be that in 
Scotland the Crown are not astute to take advantage of every opportu- 
nity which may be technically open to them under the provisions. "2 
In O'Hara v. H. M. Advocate, Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson observed: - 
"One can only presume that the absence of any cases on this topic in 
Scotland is due to the fact that the prosecutor rarely attempts to 
insist on the on the magnitude of his rights. "3 And the Thomson 
Committee say that "normally, if the prosecution has any doubt, he 
will refrain from attacking the accused's character"4. So it does 
appear that there is a concensus on the reason for a dearth of 
authorities on this aspect of law in Scotland. 
(3). THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1 (e) 
Section 1 (e) of the 1898 Act provides: -"A person charged and being 
a witness in pursuance of this Act may be asked any question in 
cross-examination notwithstanding that it would tend to criminate him 
1) (1948) J, C. 90; applied in Fielding vHM Advocate (1959) J. C. 101; 
HM Advocate v Deighan (1961) S. L. I. (Sh. Ct) and HM Advocate v Grudins 
(1976) S. L. T. (Notes) 10.2) Scottish Law Commission - Research Papeer 
on the Law of Evidence of Scotland - §5: 40.3) (1948) J. C. 90 at 95. 
4) Thomson. §50: 24 
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as to the offence charged. " 
The sub-section seems to have been inserted in order that the 
legislature might ensure that the power of cross-examination was not 
too drastically restricted. Wigmore states that the purpose of the 
section was to avoid any doubt as to the propriety , of asking the 
accused himself about intent, motive and plan. 
' This section is an 
enabling provision -a provision designed to facilitate the asking of 
questions relevant and apertaining to or dealing with the offence 
charged. This conclusion may seem axiomatic upon a consideration of 
the overall purpose of the Act, but it is as well to have it stated 
expressly. 
In Scotland, Sections 141 (e) and 346 (e) of the 1975 Act are in 
identical terms to S. 1 (e) of the 1898 Act, except that they begin 
as follows: "The accused who gives evidence in his own behalf in 
pursuance of this section may be asked ... "; " the significance of this 
alteration has already been discussed. 
One aspect of the terminology of S. -1 (e) that should not go 
unconsidered is: "Tend to incriminate him as to the offence charged. " 
In Jones v. Director of Public Prosecutions2. Lord Reid considered 
"the question what is the proper construction of the words in proviso 
(e) 'tend-to criminate him, as to the offence charged". He said: 
"Those words could mean 'tend to convince or persuade the jury that 
he is guilty' or they could have the narrower meaning - 'tend to 
connect him with the commission of the offence charged'. If they 
I)- Wigraore On Evidence - 3rd ed. Vol. 1. §194A. 2). (1962) A. C. 635 
at pp. 662-663; see also Murdoch v Taylor (1965) A. C. 574, Lord Reid 
p. 583. 
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have the former meaning there is at once an unsoluble conflict 
between provisoes (e) and (f). No line of questioning could be 
relevant unless it (or the answer to it) might tend to persuade the 
jury of the guilt of the accused. It is only permissible to bring in 
previous convictions or bad character if they are so relevant, so 
unless proviso (f) is to be deprived of all content, it must prohibit 
some questions which would tend to criminate the accused of the 
offence charged if those words are used in the wider sense. But if 
they have the narrower meaning, there is no such conflict. So the 
structure of the Act shows that they must have the narrower meaning. " 
The Criminal Law Revision Committee' considered the question in 
this way: "Section 1 (e) clearly prevents the accused from claiming 
privileges in relation to a question directly incriminating him of 
the offence charged. But whether he may refuse to answer other 
incriminating questions is obscure. The question might arise in 
relation to (i) other offences which are directly or indirectly 
relevant as tending to show that the accused committed the offence 
charged or (ii) other offences which are relevant to his credibility 
as a witness. An example of (i) would be where the accused is 
charged with shoplifting in shop A, swears that he was not in the 
shop at the material time, is asked in cross-examination where he was 
and wishes to object to answer because the answers would show that he 
was in another shop commiting a similar offence. An example of (ii) 
would be where the accused is charged with theft, has made 
imputations against a witness for the prosecution and then gives 
1) CLRC §170,, 171 
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evidence, is asked in cross-examination whether he has not made a 
number of false tax returns and wishes to object because the answer 
would tend to incriminate him as to the tax returns. There is no 
direct authority on whether the objection would be upheld in either 
of these cases. This may be surprising, although the question would 
ordinarily not arise because the accused's claim of privilege would 
be likely to have very much the same effect as an admission. " 
The committee favoured a solution "by which the accused should have 
no privilege against self-incrimination in the case of questions 
about the offence charged or about any other offence which is admis- 
sible as tending directly or indirectly to show that he committed the 
offence charged but should have the privilege in respect of other 
offences which are relevant to his credibility as a witness. There- 
fore in the two examples suggested in paragraph 170 the accused could 
not refuse to say where he was at the time of the shoplifting, but 
could refuse to answer about the tax returns. To allow the privilege 
in the former case, even in theory, might make the law seem artifi- 
cial, but it' would seem reasonable to allow it in the latter case. 
But no privilege should, in our view, be allowed if the accused has 
claimed t6 be of good disposition or reputation, as mentioned in 
clause 7, for this would be inconsistent with the principle of that 
clause that the accuse' must not be allowed to mislead the court or 
jury by claiming a merit which he does not possess. " 
The Committee's view was accepted by the Bar Council' and Sherrif 
1) BC. §23 
- 777 - 
Macphail has suggested "that it should be adopted in Scotland, 
subject to the retention of the word 'character' instead of 
'disposition or reputation"'. 
' 
(4). THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1 (f) 
The provisions of Section 1 (f) and its equivalent counterpart have 
already been stated. The section under consideration has a 
prohibitory section which is absolute in its nature. It is 
superseded by a permission. The cross-examination must not only be 
brought within the terms of the permissive sub-sections, but must 
also be brought within the ambit of the general rules of evidence; 
in other words the question asked should be relevant at common law. 
The whole law as to relevancy is the very back-bone of the law of 
evidence. The Act gave full recognition to the fundamental precept 
that the accused should not be prejudiced by evidence of bad charac- 
ter and previous convictions. On the other hand cross-examination as 
to these matters by the prosecuting counsel was permitted when the 
accused put his character in issue. The legislature has effected a 
reconciliation in permitting cross-examination as to character only 
in particular instances where it is thought fit. and appropriate that 
it should. do so. The right to denegrate a man's character must be 
controlled by what justice requires. Wigmore says: "The Act made a 
broad exception in spirit to the traditional rule about character"2. 
The whole rationale - the very criterion of the reform achieved by 
the enactment at present under consideration is tersely stated by 
1) Scottish Law Commission - Research Paper on the Law of Evidence 
(1979) §5s42 2) Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd ed. Vol. 1,194A 
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Lord Reading - The Chief Justice of England - in R v. Wood1, as fol- 
lows: "If the defence choose to give evidence that he is a man of 
good character, whereas he is a man of bad character then they are 
asking the jury to try the case on a false ground and the prosecution 
are not only entitled but bound to show that he cannot be put on the 
high pedestal". 
The pattern of the provisions of S. 1 (f) is that although of 
course the cross-examination of the defendant may freely seek to 
convict him of the offence charged, he is invested with what is 
usually referred to as a "shield" in respect of other offences and of 
his bad character. The section begins with a prohibition on four 
types of question, viz - those tending to show previous charges; 
those tending to show previous offences; those tending to show 
previous convictions and those tending to show bad character2. 
Reference is then made to the situations in which such questions are 
permitted, which is in any of the circumstances envisaged by S. 1 (f) 
(i), (ii) or (iii). When any of the provisoes to S. 1 (f) comes into 
operation, the shield is said to be "lost" , and the consequences of 
that is that the defendant becomes liable to be cross-examined about 
the matters otherwise prohibited, and then stands in effect in the 
same position as witnesses generally. It will be observed that no 
action on the part of the accused is necessary to render questions 
admissible under S. 1 (f) (i), but the ommission from this. part of 
the proviso of any reference to the fact that the accused has been 
charged with another offence or is of bad character renders it 
1) (1920) 14 Cr. App. R. 149 at 150 2) Cross on Evidence, 5th ed 
at P. 4181 
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difficult to reconcile some of the decisions with the strict words of 
the statute. So far as S. 1 (f) (ii) and (iii) are concerned, the 
situations must be brought into existence by the accused himself; he 
must either put his character in issue or cast imputations on the 
witnesses for the prosecution or give evidence against someone char- 
ged in the same proceedings. It is important to note that the Act is 
only dealing with cross-examination, which is obviously available 
only where the defendant chooses to give evidence. A vivid reminder 
of this fact is providedd by R v. Butterwasserl. The appellant had 
been convicted of unlawful wounding by razor slashing. He did not 
give evidence on his own behalf and he neither called witnesses to 
his character nor cross-examined the witnesses for the prosecution on 
this subject. They (the witnesses) were however minutely questioned 
concerning their own criminal records and evidence was thereafter 
given of the accused's previous convictions. The appeal was allowed 
because the last mentioned evidence was improperly received. Lord 
Goddard said2: "By attacking the witnesses for the prosecution and 
suggesting they are unreliable, he is not putting his character in 
issue; he is putting their character in issue. " 
In the circumstances of this case, no other evidence of the 
accused's character would have been admissible. The position would be 
different where the accused by whatever means asserts his good 
character, in which case the prosecution are entitled at common law 
to rebut, in addition to cross-examining under S. 1( f) (ii). It is 
1) (1948) 1 K. B. 4; (1942) 2 All E. R. 415 2) (1948) 1- -K. B. 4 at p. 
7; 
(1947) 2 All E. R. 415 at 416 
important to remember that S. 1 (f) must in England be read subject 
to S. 16 (2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963. By the 
provision of that Act, someone aged 21 or more cannot be asked about 
convictions before he was 14. The proviso must also be read subject 
to the practice direction of 30th June 1975, made in consequence of 
the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act, 1974. The practice direction 
made by the Lord Chief Justice on 30th June 1975 provides that, 
whenever it can reasonably be avoided reference should never be made 
to a "spent conviction" in such proceedings, and never without the 
authority of the judge which may, not be given unless the interest of 
justice so require. 
Before discussing the situations in which, cross-examination of the 
accused person is permitted, it will be convenient to begin by 
considering the construction. of the prohibition. 
(i) THE PROHIBITION 
"A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act 
shall not be asked and if asked shall not be required to answer, any 
question tending to show that he has committed or been convicted of 
or been charged with any offence other than that wherewith he is then 
charged, or is of bad character ... " 
Little difficulty is to be found in identifiying the first three 
kinds of prohibited subject matter, previous, offences, previous' 
convictions or previous charges. Questions tending to show bad 
character may be more difficult. -In R v. Yates1 it was said that bad 
1) (1970) S. A. S. R., 302 at 305 
character means more than lack of refinement or sensibility in the 
context of an accused's demeanour towards the victim of his alleged 
rape. We shall see that in this section "character" means both 
disposition as well as repute, so that unless one or other of the 
provisoes operate to remove the shield, the accused is protected 
from cross-examination as to credit except in the sense that matters 
raised in his defence may be challenged'. Problems have been raised 
woith regard to the meaning of the words "tend, to show", the meaning 
of the word "charged" and the relation of the prohibition to the 
permissions conferred by the rest of S. 1 (f). Problems have also 
been raised with regard. to the relation between the prohibition and 
the statutory provision in S. 1 (e), that the accused may be asked 
any question in cross examination notwithstanding that it would tend 
to incriminate him as to the offence charged. These problems were 
considerd by the House of Lords in the leading cases of Jones v. 
Director of Public Prosecutions Z Stirland V. Director of Public 
Prosecutions3; and Maxwell V. Director of Public Prosecutions4. 
"If asked shall not be required to answer": - 
It has been suggested that it should be made clear that in Scotland, 
as well as in England (and in other jurisdictions with equivalent 
provision) the prohibition in proviso (f), although absolute, does 
not prevent questions concerning his record being put to the accused 
by his own advocate in examination-in-chief or re-examination on the 
comparitvely rare occasions when he wishes to testify on that 
1) Malindi vR (1967) 1 A. C. 439; R-v Donninni (1972) 128 C. L. R. 114 
2) 1962) A. C. 635; (1962) 1 All E. R. 569 3) (1944) 2 All E. R. 13 
4) 
ý1935) 
A. C. 309 
subject. Such words as "shall not be asked" and "shall not be re- 
quired to answer" are considered to be inapplicable to evidence which 
is tendered voluntarily in chief. In Jones v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Lord Reid said : ".... I turn to consider proviso (f) . 
It is an- absolute prohibition of certain questions unless one of the 
other three conditions is satisfied. It says that the accused 'shall 
not be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answw', certain 
questions. It was suggested that this applies to examination-in- 
chief as well as to cross-examination. I do not think so. The words 
'shall not be required to answer' are quite inappropriate for exami- 
nation-in-chief. The proviso is obviously intended to. protect the 
accused. It does not prevent him from volunteering evidence, and 
does not in my view prevent his counsel from asking questions leading 
to disclosure of a previous conviction or bad character if such 
-disclosure is thought' to assist in his defence". 
But questions by the judge or counsel for a co-defendant would be 
caught by the Act 
2. R v. Ratcliffe3 is a case which raises a ques- 
tion whether a series of interogatories put by the learned Recorder 
to the appellant in the witness box infringed S. 1 (f) of the Crimi- 
nal Evidence Act 1898. The appellant, and three other men. werechar- 
ged with shop-breaking, larceny and receiving. The alleged offences 
took place during riots in Liverpool when there was looting of shops.. 
The-police evidence. was that the. appellant was one of two men caught 
red-handed in the shop, and that the police took the men from the 
shop out into the street and to the police station. The case for the 
1) (1962) A. C. 635 at 663; (1962) 1 All E. R. 569 at 575 2) Ry Roberts 
(1936) 1 All. E. R. 23 3) (1919) Cr. App. R. 95 
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appellant was that he was standing outside the shop and had nothing 
to do with stealing or looting: he was merely standing by and was 
pushed into a corner and arrested by the police. The issue for the 
jury was whether they were satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the 
appellant was one of the two men who had been arrested in the shop. 
The appellant stated in the witness box that he had been to sea as a 
fireman and he concluded his statement by saying that he had a good 
character for the ship. The learned Recorder then put to him a 
series of questions about his having been in the army and in the 
Merchant Service. The Lord Chief Justice said in his judgement: "The 
appellant in this case had not put his character in issue, nor made 
any imputation on the character of the prosecutor or witness for the 
prosecution. Therefore he was within the protection of S. 1 (f),. 
The learned Recorder proceeded to put a series of questions to the 
appellant. There are some 18 questions which, in our opinion, are 
questions tending to-show that this man had been convicted of other 
offences. It is impossible to read the questions without coming to 
the conclusion that those who heard them must have thought that the 
Recorder had some information which was adverse to the appellant, and 
which reflected on the appellant to his discredit. We have come to 
the conclusion that that series of questions was an infringement on 
S. 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act. .... [Tlhe conclusion at which we 
are compelled to arrive is that these questions were tending to show 
that the appellant had committed another offence. "'. 
1) (1919) 14 Cr. App. R. P. 95 at P. 99 
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"Any questions tending to show": - 
The meaning of the phrase "tending to show" came up directly for a 
decision in Jones V. Director of Public Prosecutions1. In March 
1961, the appellant was convicted of rape of a young Girl Guide. In 
June 1961, he was tried for the non-capital murder of another young 
Girl Guide who had been indecently assualted and strangled, one month 
after the previous crime. There were significant similarities 
between the two cases. On the second trial the cross-examination of 
a police officer by the appellant's counsel and also the appellant's 
own evidence-in-chief made the jury aware that he had earlier had 
"trouble with the police". The appellant (who had previously set up 
an alibi now admitted to be false) gave evidence that he spent that 
night in question with a prostitute, and he gave an account of his 
wife's stormy reaction to his late return home, and her subsequent 
conversation with him. His explanation of his previous false alibi 
was that he was worried because earlier he had been "in trouble". It 
was known to the prosecution that the account which he had given of 
his movements, and of the conversation with his wife were almost 
precisely similar to the story which he had told when charged with 
the rape. The judge gave leave to the prosecution to cross-examine 
the appellant regarding the two explanations,, with a view to showing 
the similarities between them, and so as to suggest that his evidence 
should not be believed. Although the terms of the cross-examination 
did not actually show that he had committed another offence, it was 
1) (1962) A. C. 635; (1962) 1 All E. R. 569 
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common ground among the members of the House of Lords who heard the 
appeal that the questions suggested that he was a person of bad 
character who had previously been suspected of, if not charged with, 
a serious crime. Jones was convicted, and the propriety of the 
cross-examination was challenged in the Court of Appeal. That court 
held that proviso (f) had not been infringed because the words 
"tending to show" mean "make known to the jury", and the jury had 
already been made aware of the fact that the accussed had previously 
been in trouble by means of his evidence-in-chief . Jones appealed 
to the House of Lords, on the ground that the cross-examination 
permitted bythe judge was inadmissible because the questions were 
excluded by the section of the 1898 Act as "tending to show" that he 
had committed or been convicted or been charged with an offence other 
than that with which he was then charged, or was of bad character. 
However the House was unanimously in favour of dismissing the appeal. 
Lords Simonds, Reid and Morris did so for the reason given by the 
Court of Criminal Appeal, but Lords Denning and Devlin expressly 
disagreed with it. They were in favour of dismissing the appeal on 
the broader ground that the cross-examination was relevant to the 
issue of the prisoner's liability because it tended to disprove his 
alibi; a considerable strain was put on the credulity of the jury 
when they were asked to believe that identical alibis were true, and 
that identical conversations took place between Jones and his wife. 
Lords Simonds, Reid and Morris were 'of course also of opinion that 
the cross-examination was relevant for this reason, but, in their 
1) Rv Jones (1962) A. C. 635; (1961)3 All E. R. 668 
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view, that did not of itself suffice to render the questions 
admissible under the statute'. Had Jones not alluded in-chief to his 
previous trouble, the majority would have allowed the appeal; unless 
they would have been prepared to apply what is now the proviso to S. 
2 (i) of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, and dismiss the appeal on the 
ground that there had been no miscarriage of justice. 
The Criminal Law Revision Committee did comment on the decision in 
Jones v. Director of Public Prosecutions2 in the following words: "The 
majority, ... held that the words 'tending to show' in paragraph (f) 
meant tending to show for the first time, so that the prohibition in 
the paragraph would not be infringed if evidence of the conduct had 
already been given, whether by the accused himself (as happened in 
the case in question) or (when this was admissible at Common Law) by 
the prosecution. The minority disagreed with this view and 
considered that 'tending to show' meant tending to show when regarded 
in isolation. The result was that all five members of the House of 
Lords held that the disputed question was admissible, but for 
The Committe then went on to say in conclusion different reasons" 
3. 
that: "On the question of 'tending to show' in paragraph (f), we 
adopt the majority view, so that cross-examination of the accused 
about his misconduct will not be forbidden if the misconduct has 
already been mentioned at the trial. This result is secured by the 
combination of sub-section (1) and (2) of clause 6. Sub-section (1) 
contains the general prohibition of cross-examination 'tending to 
1) Rv Cong ressi (1974) 9 S. A. S. R. 257 at 263 2) (1962) A. C. 635 
3) CLCR 116 
-787 - 
reveal to the court or jury' the fact that the accused has committed 
other misconduct; subsection (2) removes the prohibition in relation 
to misconduct which is admissible in evidence as mentioned. "1 [Subse- 
ction 3 contains a provision analogous to Subsection (2), to 
remove the prohibition in relation to misconduct of one acc sed which 
is admissible on behalf of a co-accused for the purpose of showing 
that the latter is not guilty of an offence with which he is 
charged. ] 
It is clear that the majority view in Jones's case must be taken to 
represent the present English law. The minority view is difficult to 
reconcile with the wording of the 1898 Act, but as Lord Denning 
pointed out, the majority view may operate harshly because : "It is 
one thing to confess to having been in trouble before. It is quite 
another thing to have it emphasised against you with devastating 
detail. "2. The harshness is all the greater when the revalation is 
made in the course of the prosecution case. It is pertinent to 
consider the case of R v. King3 in this regard, because the question 
put in that case may perhaps have been justified by the fact that the 
accused had impliedly admitted to homosexual practices in his state- 
ment to the police. The appellant i1ad been convicted of various acts 
of indecency with two young boys. He admitted in evidence that he 
had met the boys at a public lavatory and invited them to sleep at 
his flat. But he denied that any indecent acts had taken place. In 
the course of cross-examination he was asked: "Are you a homosexual? " 
and gave the answer "Yes". One of his grounds of appeal was that 
1) CLRC 117 2) Jones vDPP (1962) A. C. 635 at 667; (1962) 1 All E. 
R. 569, at 577 3) (1967) 2 Q. B. 338; (1967) 1 All E. R. 379; (1967) 2 
WLR 612 
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this question should not have been allowed. A startling feature of 
the case is that the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on this 
point without making any reference to Section 1 (f) of the Criminal 
Evidence Act, 1898. It is inconceivable that the Court of Appeal 
could have overlooked this familiar statute, particularly since coun- 
sel cited Malindi v R1, a Privy Council case which turned upon an 
identical provision in the law of Rhodesia. It is thought that the 
only explanation for the omission is that the court thought that the 
question fell so clearly outside Section 1 (f) that point was not 
worth mentioning. Hoffmann is of the view "that the question probab- 
ly did fall outside Section 1 (f) but it was not so obviousas all 
that"2. 
Lord Parker C. J., who delivered the judgement of the court , said 
that in his opinion evidence of the appellant's homosexuality was 
admissible under what is commonly called the "similar fact" rule, or 
the rule in Makin's case, after its well-known formulation by Lord 
Herschell in Makin v. Attorney General for New South Walesa. 
Lord Parker this time did not cite Lord Herschell's words but ref er- 
red to an almost equally famous statement of the rule by Lord Sumner 
in Thomson v. R4: "No one doubts that it does not tend to prove a man 
guilty of a* particular crime to show that he is the kind of man who 
would commit a crime, or that he is generally disposed to crime and 
even to a particular crime but, sometimes for one reason änd some- 
times for another, evidence is admissable, not-withstanding that its 
1) (1966) 3 WLR 913 2) Cross-Examination of the Accused - 83 L. Q. R. 
186 at 187 3) (1894) A. C. 57 4) (1918) A. C. 221 at 232 
0 
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general character is to show that the accused had in. him the making 
of a criminal, for example, in proving guilty knowledge, or intent, 
or system, or in rebutting an appearance of innocence, which, unex- 
plained, the facts might wear". 
As Hoffman rightly stated: "The difficulty is that even if it is 
accepted that the evidence was admissible under the Makin rule, this 
is not the end of the case. There is still the problem of S. 1 (f). 
Until the decision of the House of Lords in Jones V. Director of 
public Prosecutions1, it was commonly thought that if the prosecution 
were entitled to adduce evidence under the Makin rule, they could 
also ask questions about the same matters in cross-examination2. 
Lord Parker's reasoning in King looks at first sight like a reversion 
to this view. The section is now to be given a literal construction 
and if a question falls within the prohibited classes it may not be 
asked, not withstanding that the prosecution could have adduced 
evidence-in-chief to the same effect. The question must therefore 
pass. two tests. First, it must be relevant and admissible (eg. under 
the Makin rule) at Common Law. Second, it must not infringe the 
prohibitions of Section 1 M. This double requirement has recently 
been affirmed by the privy council in Malindi V. R3. The only point 
made by Lord Parker beyond saying that the question was admissible 
under the Makin rule was that the appellant's admission to being a 
homosexual did not necessarily mean that he had actually committed 
any offences. This is a rather mysterious remark because it does not 
seem relevant either to whether the question was admissible at common 
1) (1962) (1962) A. C. 635 2) See Lord Denning Ibid at 671; and Lord 
Devlin Ibid at 704 3) (1966) 3 WLR 913 
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law or whether it was excluded by Section 1 (f)"1. 
As we know from earlier discussion, at common law, evidence may be 
admissible under the Makin rule notwithstanding that it shows the 
commission of other offences2, or it may be inadmissible even though 
it does not3. Section 1 (f) also excludes not only questions showing 
other offences but also questions which tend to show that the accused 
is "of bad character". The judgement in R V. King does not consider 
whether the disputed question could tend to show that the appellant 
was of bad character but prima facie one would have thought that it 
could. In Malindi V, R5, the Privy Council took the view that a 
question tended to show bad character when its relevance if any, was 
to show that the accused was the sort of person who would have a 
disposition to, commit the offence charged. By this test the question 
put to King must surely, have come within the prohibition. 
This leaves only one ground upon which the Court of Appeal might 
have thought that the question fell outside Section 1 M. And in 
this regard, Hoffman said: "In Jones v. D. P. P. a majority of the 
House of Lords decided that in Section 1 (f) the words 'tends to 
show' means 'tends to reveal'. A question cannot tend to show bad 
character and so forth if it elicits facts which the jury already 
know. This may have been the position in King. It seems that in the 
course of the prosecution case the police gave evidence of the appel- 
lant's answers to questions about what he was doing at the public 
lavatory. The accuracy of the answers does not appear to have been 
1) Cross-Examination of the Accused, 83 L. Q. R. 186 at 188 2)_a v 
Straffen (1952) 2 Q. B. 911 3) Rv Cole (1941) Cr. App. R. 42 
) (1967) 2 W. L. R. 612 5) (1966) 3 W. L. R. 913 
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contested and their nature, was such that the jury could reasonably 
have inferred that the accused was a homosexual. It is therefore 
arguable that when the question was specifically put to the appel- 
lant, his answers told the jury no more than they already knew. By 
the above process of elimination one is driven to conclude that this 
construction of 'tends to show' must have been the reason why the 
Court of Appeal thought it unnecessary to refer to Section 1 (f). 
But it is respectfully submitted that it would have been helpful if 
they had expressly said so"1. 
One other criticism of the majority view in Jones's case was made 
by Lord Devlin2 in his judgement with the help of examples, to the 
effect that, there may be cases in which it would be difficult if not 
impossible, to expose a false alibi by reference to the fact that the 
accused was in prison or with his mistress at the material time 
because the alibi was raised for the first time after the case for 
the prosecution had been closed. 
And one final important point to note is that it is the effect of 
the questions put that must be considered; another words, if a 
question infact has the effect of revealing prohibited matter, if 
truthfully answered, it is improper: - for example, a question which, 
if answered truthfully, would oblige the defendant to say that he 
had been in prison at a certain time. A case in point is R V. 
Haslam3. In this case the appellant was charged on an indictment 
containing two counts, the first of which charged him with obtaining 
by false pretences food and money from one Margaret Edmunson, and the 
1) L. if. Hoffman, "Cross-Examination of the Accused" 83 L. Q. R. at p. 
189 2) (1962) A. C. "635 at 695; (1962) 1 All E. R. 569 at 596 3) (1916) 
12 Cr. App. R. 10 
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second of which charged him with obtaining by false pretences money 
from one John James Almond. On the charges, A. T. Lawrence J. said: 
"Without founding our decision upon the fact that the pretences 
alleged were proved (so far as they were proved) by answers procured 
by leading questions, we are of opinion that this conviction must be 
quashed. We have come to that conclusion because we are satisfied 
that when at his trial the appellant offered himself as a witness, 
questions were put to him in cross-examination which were in flat 
contradiction to the terms of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, S. 1 
(f). The effect of that enactment is to forbid a prisoner who is 
called as a witness on his own behalf being asked, or if asked being 
required to answer, any question tending to show that he has commit- 
ted or convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that 
which he is then charged. None of the exceptions to that provision 
are relevant here, but nevertheless the appellant was subjected to a 
long cross-examination which put him in the dilema that he must 
either commit perjury or admit that he was in prison at the time 
referred to by counsel. That was a method of cross-examination which 
is in direct opposition to the provisions of the Act of 1898. Moreo- 
ver, in his summing up, the Deputy-Recorder directed the jury that in 
deciding whether or not the appellant was guilty or not, they were 
entitled to take into consideration the fact that he had not been 
able to give *satisfactory answers to the questions put to him in 
cross-examination*" 
1 
1) Ibid at 10-11 
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often the effect of a line of cross-examination must be looked at; 
the whole line may contravene the prohibition, even though individual 
questions may be perfectly proper in themselves. The prohibition is 
not limited to questions taken individually. 
"Committed or been convicted of or been charged with": - 
Here, the prohibition is not limited to actual convictions and even 
questions tending to show the commission of an offence not charged 
must be disallowed, for example, questions tending to show acts of 
dishonesty concurrent with, but other than those charged. 
1 The 
meaning of the word 'charged' was properly raised and discussed in 
Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecutions2. In the case, the House 
of Lords overruled the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal3. 
The appellant, who was charged with forgery and kindred offences, put 
his character in issue and specifically stated in his examination-in- 
chief that he had never before in his life been charged with any 
offence. The prosecutor asked various questions in cross-examination 
about his previous employment at a bank and the reasons for the 
termination of that employment. He was asked whether he had been 
questioned about 'a suggested forgery and whether he left after an 
interrogation about a particular signature. The Court of Criminal 
Appeal held that the cross-examination was relevant and admissable as 
going to the credibility of the appellant. The House of Lords upset 
this decision. It was held that the appellant must have intended to 
use the word "charge" in his evidence-in-chief in the sense which it 
bore in S. 1 (f) of the Act, ie., accused before a court. The cross- 
1) Rv Wilson (1915) 11 Cr. App. R. 251 2) (1944) A. C. 315 3) See 
(1943) 29 Cr. App. Rep. 154 and (1944) 30 Cr. App. R. 40 
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examination was not relevant either as a challenge to the veracity of 
the appellant's evidence or, as going to disprove good character. It 
is no disproof of good character that a man has been suspected or 
accused of a previous crime. Questions along these lines are irrele- 
vant to the issue of character and can only be asked if the accused 
has given direct testimony to the contrary. 
The judgement of the court in this case was delivered by Lord Simon 
L. C. In concluding his speech in the case, on the rules as to the 
cross-examination as to credit of an accused person in the witness 
box, Lord Simon L. C. made six propositions. The first one merely 
states the effect of S. 1 M. The second one says that an accused 
person "may, however, be, cross-examined as to any of the evidence he 
has given in chief, including statements concerning his good record, 
with a view to testing his veracity or accuracy or to showing that 
he is not to be believed on his oath. " As one can decipher from the 
facts above, the accused had been questioned before leaving his pre- 
vious employment and was presumably well aware of the suspicions. 
Accordingly, he could presumably have been cross-examined on the 
subject if he had said in-chief that he had never previously been 
suspected of an 
offence. According to Lord Simons's fifth proposi- 
tion "it is no disproof of good character that a man has been suspec- 
ted or accused of a previous crime. " . Such questions as 
"Were you 
suspected? " or "Were you accused? "_ are inadmissable because they are 
irrelavnt to the issue of character, and-can only be asked if the 
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accused has sworn expressly to the contrary. When he does this, he 
may be said to have adopted a particular method of putting his chara- 
cter in issue. And according to the sixth proposition, the fact that 
a question put to the accused is irrelevant is no reason for quashing 
his conviction, though it should have been disallowed by the judge. 
If the question is not only irrelevant but is unfair to the accused 
as being likely to distant the jury from considering the real issues 
and so lead to a miscarriage of justice, it should be disallowed, and 
if not disallowed, is a ground on which an appeal against conviction 
may be based. For example in Burrows V. R1, the accused was charged 
with the wilful murder of her husband. In cross-examination of the 
accused, who gave evidence on her own behalf, counsel for the prose- 
cution, in relation to an occasion three years previously, when a 
gun had exploded, put questions to her with a view to suggest that 
she had fired it with intent to murder. Questions were also put 
concerning her relation with her previous husband, particularly con- 
cerning complaints by him as to her extravagance and as to his divor- 
cing her; however I must say that apart from portraying the accused 
in a bad light these questions were irrelevant. The accused was 
convicted. on appeal, the conviction was quashed and a new trial 
ordered on the ground that the cross-examination in relation to the 
discharge of the gun contravened Section 8 (i) (e) of the Evidence 
Act 1906-1930 of Western Australia -. which is an equivalent counter- 
part of S. 1 (f) of the English Criminal Evidence Act 18981. 
Thus as it is clear that the convictions may be quashed as a result 
1) (1937) 58 C. L. R. 249i 
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of the admission of such irrelevant questions) as in the above case, 
it has become the practice of doubtfull cases for counsel for the 
production to obtain the leave of the judge before putting his 
questions as to credit to the accused persons 
2. 
It has been suggested3 that the wording - "committed or been 
convicted of or been charged with" - would be wide enough to include 
previous offences with which the accused had been charged, but of 
which he had been acquitted, though questions of relevance often 
arise in relation to previous acquittals. A case which appears to 
come close to supporting that principle is R v. Constantine 
Nicoloudis4. The appellant was convicted of obtaining money by means 
of a forged cheque. The cheque bore the signature of D. W. G., a 
friend. of the appellant, but D. W. G. denied having signed it. The 
appellant's defences were (i) that D. W. G., had signed the cheque; 
(ii) that he (the appellant) was not the person who had presented the 
cheque at the bank or obtained the money. He did not put forward the 
defence that, if the cheque was forged, he had no knowledge of the 
forgery. In his evidence the appellant stated that he had never 
been convicted of any offence, and was cross-examined by prosecuting 
counsel on having been charged with forging a cheque on a previous 
occasion where the charge had subsequently been withdrawn. It was 
held that such cross-examination might well have been admissable if 
the issue in the case had been whether the appellant knew the cheque 
named in the indicement to be forged; but no such issue having been 
1) See Rv Maclean (1926) 19 Cr. App. R 104 2) See Rv Ogala Nweze 
e Ors (1957) 2 F. S. C. 27 (Nigeria) 3) A practical Approach to Evidence. 
- By peter Murphy at p. 
95 4) (1954) 38 Cr. App. R. 118 
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raised, cross-examination which had not resulted in conviction was 
inadmissable and the conviction was accordingly quashed. 
However the case of R V. Wadey1 seems to me to decide contrary to 
both the principle stated above and the case of Nicoloudis. In 
Wadey's case, the appellant was charged with indecent assualt on 
three young girls, and put his character in issue. In cross-examina- 
tion he was asked a number of questions with regard to previous 
complaints by other young girls of similar conduct on his part. 
Those complaints had led to charges which in every case had been 
either dismissed or not proceeded with. Similar questions were put 
in cross examination to a witness called by the appellant to charac- 
ter. It was held that the cross-examination was inadmissable and the 
conviction was quashed. I am in favour of the decision in RV Wadey 
because I do not think that the wording in question include cases 
where the accused had been acquitted of the offence charged, and to 
my mind neither the case of Striland v. D. P. P. 
2, 
nor any literal 
explanation could be said to suggest that. And if we intimate oursel- 
ves with Maxwell V. D. P. P. 
3 
we will see that the House of Lords 
had laid down that even if an accused put his character in issue one 
could not ask him whether he had been previously charged with an 
offence of which he had been acquitted or where the case had not been 
carried to conviction. Viscount Sankey L. C., had said in that case 
that: "The mere fact that a man has been charged with an offence is 
no proof that he had committed the offence. Such a fact is, there- 
fore, irrelevant; it neither goes to show that the prisoner did the 
1) (1935) 25 Cr. App. Rep. 104.2) (1944) A. C. 315; (1944) 2 All E. R. 13. 
3) (1935) A. C. 309 
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acts for wich he is actually being tried nor does it go to his 
credibility as a witness"; 1 but it should be added that it may show 
knowledge. 
On the other hand, it is actually open to question whether R v. 
Nicoloudis3 could be used to support the suggestion that the wording 
"committed or been convicted or or been charged with" - would be wide 
enough to include previous offences with which the accused had been 
charged, but of which he had been acquitted. A more plausible ground 
on which the decision in that case could be rationalised is that what 
the court was saying is that, had the issue been whether the accused 
knew that the cheque was forged, it might have been possible to show 
that he was dealing with other cheques, but in the present case his 
defence was that he was not the person who went to the bank and 
therefore the questions were 'irrelevant and highly prejudicial. If 
this explanation of the decision is correct then there is nothing 
wrong with it after all and R v. Wadey cannot be said to contradict 
it in the circumstances, just as it cannot be said that the decision 
in any way supports the above proposition. 
Also a case of pertinence is R v. 'Sugarman4. The appellant, who was 
charged' with receciving part of the proceeds of' several cases of 
shopbreaking and housebreaking, put his character in issue at the 
trial, and was asked in cross-examination a series of questions 
suggesting that he had feloniously received other portions of the 
stolen property (of which there was no evidence) and that a sum of 
1) Maxwell v. D. P. P. (1935) A. C. 309 at 320 2) See Rv Waldman (1934) 
24 Cr. App. R. 204 3) (1954) 38 Cr. App. Rep. 118 4) (1935) 25 Cr. 
App. Rep. 109 
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money found on him on arrest represented the proceeds of the sale by 
him of those portions of the property. The court held that the cross- 
examination was inadmissible as offending the principle laid down by 
the House of Lords in Maxwell V. Director of Public Prosecutions, and 
the conviction was accordingly quashed. And in R V. Savory, where 
the accused was cross-examined as to a complaint that on a previous 
occasion he had committed a similar offence for which no prosecution 
had begun, his eventual conviction was quashed. 
"Any offence": - 
It is thought that the absence of limitation shows that the 
prohibition extends to offences committed after, as well as those 
committed before, the offence charged2. Where the shield is thrown 
away, it is therefore proper (subject to the judge's discretion) to 
cross-examine about such offences, and it has been held to be within 
the judge's discretion, in such a case to allow cross-examination of 
an accused, otherwise of good character, about offences committed 
some ten months after the offence charged. in R v. Coltress3, the 
accused was charged with the theft of a bottle of whisky from a 
store. At his trial his defence involved imputations on the charac- 
ter of witnesses for the prosecution. At the time of his arrest, the 
accused had been a man of good character, but ten months later before 
his trial, he had been convicted of the theft of a credit card and of 
. obtaining credit 
by the use of that card. The judge, in his discre- 
tion, permitted the prosecution to cross-examine the accused as to 
those convictions. The accused was convicted and appealed. Orr, L. 
1) (1942) 29 Cr. App. R. 1 2) Rv Wood (1920) 2 K. B. 179 3) (1978) 
68 Cr. App. R. 193 
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J., giving the judgement of the court, said: "The next ground of 
appeal was that the judge wrongly exercised his discretion in allo- 
wing cross-examination of the defendant as to the convictions in 
question, which took place ten months after his arrest for the offen- 
ce on which he was being tried, and it was argued that at the time of 
the offence the accused was a man of good character and would have 
remained so had the trial taken place before the subsequent convic- 
tions of which evidence was admitted. For this reason it was said, 
it was a wrong exercise of discretion to admit the convictions in 
evidence". His Lordship concluded by saying that the court was in no 
doubt that the trial judge had in mind the fact that these were 
subsequent convictions in coming to the conclusion whether they 
should be admitted in evidence, and as such they could find no sub- 
stance in this ground of appeal and it was dismissed accordingly. 
"Or is of bad character": - 
The meaning of character will be auspiciously considered when 
discussing the interpretation of Section 1 (f) (ii) 
(ii) THE RELATION OF THE PROHIBITION TO THE PERMISSION CONFERRED BY 
THE REST OF S. 1 (f)1 - Maxwell V. Director of Public Prosecutions2 
Where the accused "throws away the shield" provided by the first 
part of S. 1 (f), it would be wrong to suppose that he can always be 
asked questions tending to show that he has committed, been convicted 
of or charged with other offences or is of bad character, because 
such questions must be relevant either to his liability or else to 
1) SS. 141 (f) and 346 (f) of the 1975 Scotland Act; S. 399(e) of the 
1958 Crimes Act (Victoria); S. 159(d) of the Nigerian Evidence Act 
2) (1953) A. C. 309 
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his credit. The decision of the House of Lords in Maxwell v. 
Director of Public Prosecutions made that clear. In that case, the 
accused, a medical doctor charged with manslaughter gave evidence of 
his general good character, by asserting that he was of "good clean, 
moral character". The allegation against the accused being that he 
had performed an illegal abortion, which had resulted in death, he 
was then cross-examined to show that on a previous occasion, he had 
been charged with, but acquitted of, the same offence in similar 
circumstances. The questioning was held to be improper. Although he 
had given evidence of his good character, and although the fact that 
he had previously been charged was within the terms of the section, 
the evidence of the previous acquittal was simply not relevant, 
because it did not have the effect of contradicting the evidence of 
the defendant in chief. Stripped of that quality of relevance, it 
lacked any evidential value and was purely prejudicial. Viscount 
Sankey, L. C., in his judgement in this case, made some vital 
observations, about proviso (f), he said: "The substantive part of 
the proviso is negative in form and as such is universal and is 
absolute unless the exceptions come into play. Then come the three 
exceptions: but it does not follow. that when the absolute prohibition 
is superseded by a permission, that the permission, is as absolute as 
the prohibition. When it is sought to justify a question it must not 
only be brought within the terms of the permission, but also must be 
capable of justification according to the general rules of evidence 
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and in particular must satisfy the test of relevance. Exception (i) 
deals with the former of the two main classes of evidence referred to 
above, that is, evidence falling within the rule that where issues of 
intention' or design are involved in the charge or defence, the 
prisoner may be asked questions relevant to these matters, even 
though he has himself raised no question of his good character. 
Exceptions (ii) and (iii) come into play where the prisoner by 
himself or his witness has put his character in issue, or has 
attacked the character of others. Dealing with exceptions (i) and 
(ii), it is clear that the test of relevance is wider its (ii) than in 
(i); in the latter, proof that the prisoner has committed or been 
convicted of some other offence, can only be admitted if it goes to 
show that he was guilty of the offence charged. In the former 
(Exception (ii)), the question permissible must be relevant to the 
issue of his own good character. and if not so relevant cannot be 
admissible. But it seems clear that the mere fact of a charge cannot 
in general be evidence of bad character or be regarded otherwise than 
as a misfortune. It seeemed to be contended on behalf of the 
respondent that a chargewas per se such evidence that the man 
charged, even though acquitted, must thereafter remain under a cloud, 
however innocent. I find it impossible to accept any such view. The 
mere fact that a man has been charged with an offence is no proof 
that he committed the offence. Such a fact is, therefore, 
irrelevant; it neither goes to show that the prisoner did the acts 
for which he is actually being tried nor does it go to his credibili- 
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ty. as a witness. Such questions must, therefore, be excluded on the 
principle which is fundamental in the law of evidence as conceived in 
this country, especially in criminal cases, because, if allowed, they 
are likely to lead the minds of the jury astray into false. issues; 
not merely do they tend to introduce suspicion as if it were eviden- 
ce, but they tend to distract the jury from the true issue - namely, 
whether the prisoner in fact committed the offence on which he is 
actually standing his trial. It is of the utmost importance for a 
fair trial that the evidence should be prime facie limited to matters 
relating to the transaction which forms the subject of the indictment 
and that any departure from these matters should be stricly con- 
fined. " 
It is important to point out that it does not result from the 
conclusion that the word "charged" in proviso (f) is otiose: it is 
clearly not so as regards the prohibition. Lord Sankey, L. C., 
recognised the possibility of circumstances in which the fact of a 
charge resulting in an acquittal might be elicited. 
_Among 
the 
instances he mentioned was that of a man charged with an offence 
against the person who might be asked whetherr he had uttered threats 
against his victim because he was angry with him for having brought 
an unfounded charge. A further instance is supported by the later 
case of R V. Waldman 
i, in which the Court of Criminal Appeal upheld a 
conviction for receiving stolen goods although the accused, who had 
put his character in issue, _had 
been asked about a previous acquittal 
1) (1934) 24 Cr. App. Rep. 204 
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on an earlier charge of receiving. The court appears to have consi- 
dered that Maxwell's case could be distinguished because was the 
question was addressed to a character witness as well as to Waldman, 
and because -the question was linked with one concerning a previous 
conviction for receiving. The court also recognised the possibility 
that a previous acquittal of receiving might be relevant to the 
accused's guilty knowledge on a subsequent occasion because the 
previous investigation ought to have stimulated the most careful 
inquiries in the later transactions, and thus militate against the 
credibility of statements to the effect that the accused acquired 
goods, cheaply without asking questions concerning their origin. 
It has been suggested that the effect of the decision in Maxwell v. 
Director of Public Prosecutions' should be incorporated in any 
restatement of the law especially as the terminology of proviso (f) 
appears to suggest that when the accused throws his shield away, any 
questions about charges in court are permissible, whatever the result 
of the charge may have been. However it should be emphasised that 
both Maxwell v. Director of Public Prosecutions and RV Waldman were 
concerned with situations in which the shield had been thrown away. 
Anyhow it is extremely doubtful when this is not the case, whether 
the accused could be asked about a previous charge resulting in an 
acquittal owing to the restricted phraseology of S. 1 (f) (i)2. 
Quite apart from the rule as to relevance, which applies alike to S. 
1 (e) and S. 1 (f) in each of its exceptions it must be noted that 
1) (1935) A. C. 309 2) SS. 141 (f) (1) of the 1975 Scotland Act; S. 399 
(e) (i) of the 1958 Crimes Act (Victoria) S. 159 (d) (i) of the 
Nigeria Evidence Act 
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the wording of S. 1 (f) (i) expressly excludes any reference to the 
accused having previously been charged-with an offence; only the fact 
of his having committed or been convicted of such offence is said to 
be admissible, and indeed, it is obvious that a previous charge, 
standing alone with an acquittal, cannot have any relevance to a 
guilt as charged, although it may be relevant to credit. Hence, 
under S. 1 (f) (i), previous acquittals are not within the proper 
scope of cross-examination. InR v. Cokarl, Cokar was convicted at 
quarter sessions of entering a dwelling-house by night with intent to 
steal. He had entered the house through a window sometime after 
midnight and was found by the householder shortly afterwards sitting 
in a chair in front of the fire. He had apparently made no attempt 
to steal anything. Cokar was cross-examined to the effect that he 
knew it was no offence if he was merely found in the premises slee- 
ping; and leave was sought to cross-examine Cokar as to a previous 
occasion on which he had been found on private premises and had been 
charged and acquitted. The questions were allowed and Cokar convic- 
ted. On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, his conviction was 
quashed on the ground that the question concerning the previous 
charge had been wrongly admitted. It was the court's view that the 
purpose of the cross-examination had been to show that on the occa- 
sion of the previous charge Cokar must have learnt that no offence 
was committed in law by a person who was on premises for an innocent 
purpose such as sleeping. Whether or not the questions were allowab- 
1) (1960) 2 Q. B. 207; see also Rv Wadey (1935) 25, Cr. App. Rep 104; 
Rv Sugarrian. (1935) 25 Cr. App. 109; Rv Savory (1942) 29 Cr. App. 
R. 1` 
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le depended on the true interpretation of S. 1 of the Criminal Evide- 
nce Act, 1898, and in particular, of paragraph (f), where there was a 
complete prohibition on suggestion that a man had been previously 
charged, whatever the result of the charge. There were three excep- 
tions to this prohibition. Section 1 (f) (ii) and (iii) did not 
apply to the case because Cokar had neither put his character in 
issue, nor cast imputation nor given evidence against a co-accused. 
The question in this case was whether the cross-examination was 
admissible under the first exception, namely: "Unless the proof that 
he has committed or been convicted of such other offence is admissib- 
le evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence wherewith he has 
been charged. " The exception only dealt with the commission or 
conviction of other offences and there was no reference to "charge". 
Accordingly, it was impossible to question a man in regard to a 
charge of which he had been acquitted under this exception. Thus the 
cross-examination had been wrongly allowed and, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal rightly quashed the conviction. 
In Maxwell v. Director of Public Prosecutions', it was decided that 
it is not sufficient that a particular question relating to one of 
the matters referred to comes within the terms of an exception unless 
it is also capable of justification according to the general rules of 
evidence and, in particular satisfies the test of relevance. In that 
case the question came within the terms. of exception (ii) to S. 1 (f) 
of the 1898 Act, for the prisoner had set up his good character, but 
failed to satisfy the common law test of relevance, since "the mere 
1) (1935) A. C. 309 
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fact of a charge cannot in general be evidence of bad character or be 
regarded otherwise than as a misfortune". It seems the position in R 
V Cokarl is the reverse. The question would appear to satisfy the 
test of relevance but not come within the terms of the statutory 
permission which, in this case, was exception (i). RV Cokar appears 
" to be the first decision on whether cross-examination under exception 
(i) is confined to the commission or conviction of other offences, 
and it is respectfully submitted that the Court in RV Cokar adopted 
the correct construction of the statute. The contrast between the 
prohibiting words, "committed or been convicted of or been charged 
with any offence" and the permitting words of exception (i), 
"committed or been convicted of", seems to indicate a clear intention 
that there should be no cross-examination as to a mere charge under 
exception M. 
(5) THE RELATION OF PROVISO (e) TO PROVISO (f) - . '1898 Act]_ 
There is at first sight, a conflict between proviso (e) and M. 
Proviso (e) provides that the accused may be asked "any question in 
cross-examination notwithstanding that it would tend to criminate him 
as to the offence charged". This provision though restricted by the 
principle of privilege against self-incrimination helps to preserve 
the rule that any evidence relevant to guilt as charged is, 
prima facie, admissableto prove guilt as charged. Proviso (f) 
provides that he shall not be asked, inter alia, any question tending 
to show that he has committed or been convicted of any other 
1) (1960) 2 Q. B. 207; (1960) 2 All E. R. 175 
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offence. Now it is apperent that a question which shows that the 
accused has committed or been convicted of some other offence may 
also tend to criminate him as to the offence charged. Proviso (e) 
apperently allows such a question, proviso (f) apperently forbids it. 
One or the other must give way. 
Somehow, surprisingly, the relation of proviso (e) to proviso (f) 
for a long time was not discussed until the case of Jones v. Director 
of Public Prosecutions 
1. In that case, a majority of the House of 
Lords sanctioned a construction of S. 1, (f) which does much to reduce 
the practical effect of the difference between the two views 
concerning the relationship of provisos (e) and (f). This point will 
be further discussed later. It is however significant to mention 
that the two main views on the subject expressed in Jones's case were 
discernible in the earlier authorities. They may be described as the 
"literal" and "broad" views respectively. According to the literal 
view proviso (e) permits questions tending to criminate the accused 
as to the offence charged, while proviso (f) prohibits, subject to 
exceptions which must be construed literally, questions tending to 
incriminate the accused indirectly as well as those which simply go 
to his credit as a witness. This view is supported by: (i)the 
wording of the statute which excludes previous charges and bad 
character from the first exception, (2) the tenor of Lord Sankey's 
speech in Maxwell v. Director of Public Prosecutions and (3) the 
decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in RV Cokar2 where cross- 
1) (1962) A. C. 635; 2) (1960) 2 Q. B. 207 
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examination about a previous charge was held to have infringed the 
statute although it related to an issue raised by the accused. 
According to the broad view, proviso (e) permits questions which 
tend to criminate the accused as to the offence charged directly or 
indirectly, and, in cases to which none of the exceptions apply, the 
prohobition in proviso (f) relates solely to cross-examination to 
credit. This view is supported by R v. Chitson', R V. J. Kennaway2, R 
V. Kurasch3, and the second of the six propositions with which Lord 
Simon concluded his speech in Stirland V. Director of Public Prosecu- 
tions. In R V. Chitson, the accused was charged with unlawful inter- 
4 
course with a girl of 14. In the course of her evidence in chief, 
the prosecutrix stated that he had told her that he had done the same 
thing to another girl. There was no evidence whether this other girl 
was beneath or above the age of 16 at the material time, but it was 
held by the Court of Criminal Appeal that the prisoner had been 
properly examined with regard to his relations with her because, 
, although 
the questions did no doubt tend to show that he was of bad 
character, they also tended to incriminate him as the offence char- 
ged; if he had had intercourse with the other girl, that fact would 
confirm the prosecutix's statement with regard to what he told her. 
If the other girl had been under 16 at the material time, the case 
would have come within S. 1 (f) (i) because evidence that Chitson had 
committed another offence would have been admissable in-chief but, if 
the other girl was over 16 at the material time, no offence would 
have been committed against her; nevertheless despite the ommission 
1) (1909) 2 K. B. 945 2) (1917) 1KB 25 3) (1915) 2 K. B. 749 
4) (1944) A. C. 315; (1944) 2 All E. R. 13 
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of the words "bad character" from S. 1 (f) (i) the cross-examination 
was held to be permissible because it was relevant to an issue in the 
case. The test therefore, was one of relevance to guilt as charged, 
and that criterion being satisfied, it was no answer to the cross- 
examination that evidence also exposed some aspect of the accused's 
character. In R V.. Kennawayl, on the trial of a prisoner for forgery 
of a will two accomplices were called for the prosecution, who de- 
posed that the will was forged by the prisoner in pursuance of a 
scheme by which they were to endeavour fraudulently to obtain an 
advance from third persons to a legatee under the will on the faith 
of his legacy. One of the accomplices was to figure as the legatee 
and the other as the executor. They said that the accused told them 
that he objected to appearing as executor himself because he had 
forged a will under a similar scheme in the past, that on that 
occasion he had played the part of the executor, and that if he did 
it again suspicion might be directed at him. The prisoner gave 
evidence to his defence, and denied amongst other things, the accom- 
plices' statement that he had admitted the earlier forgery. In 
cross-examination counsel for the prosecution went into details of 
that earlier forgery and asked questions tending to show that the 
prisoner had infact committed it. It was held by the court that the 
cross-examination was rightly admitted. If the prisoner had in fact 
been guilty of a similar forgery in connection with the earlier will, 
the probability was that the accomplices' story that he told them so 
1) (1917) 1 K. B. 25 
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and gave that as his reason for not being executor under the later 
will was true, and therefore the answers to the questions might 
afford corroboration of their evidence. The cross-examination was 
consequently relevant to the issue at the trial, and was not open to 
objection under the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898. 
And in R V. Kurasch, the appellant and four other men were tried 
and convicted of conspiring by means of false pretences to defraud 
the prosecutor, the false pretences alleged being the holding of a 
mock auction. The defendants denied the false pretences and also 
alleged that they were all merely the servants of a woman who was the 
proprietress of the auction business. Evidence was given for the 
prosecution that the appellant had said at the time of his arrest 
that one of the other defendants was employed by him. The appellant 
gave evidence and was asked in cross-examination whether it was not 
the fact that he and the proprietress of the business were at the 
date of the offence living together as man and wife. The appellant 
answered the question in the affirmative. The appellant appealed 
against his conviction on the ground that this question was a contra- 
vention of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, S. 1 (f), in that it 
tended to show that he was a person of bad character. it was held, 
that, the defence having raised the issue that the defendants were 
only the servants of the proprietress of -the business, it was mate- 
rial to show what were the real relations existing between her and 
the appellant, and that the question was therefore admissible. It is 
no doubt clear that the accused had done nothing to throw his shield 
1) (1915) 2 K. B. 749 
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away under S. 1 (f) (ii) or (iii), and, as the question merely tended 
to show immorality as opposed to the commission or conviction of 
another offence, the case fell outside the literal words of S. 1(f) 
(i). 
As earlier mentioned, Lord Simon's second proposition in Stirland 
v. Director of Public Prosecutions, favours the braod view as the 
basis for the admissibility of questions in cross-examinations notwi- 
thstanding their apparent infringement of the prohibition contained 
in proviso (f), for the proposition asserts that the accused may be 
examined: "as to any of the evidence he has given in-chief including 
statements as to his good record with a view to testing his veracity 
or accuracy or to showing that he ought not to be believed on his 
oath". 
After a total difference of judicial opinion on the fundamental 
question of the relation between paragraph (e) and (f) of the 1898 
Act, it was eventually discussed in Jones v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions 
2. The majority of the House of Lords (Viscount Simonds, 
Lord Reid and Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest) held that paragraph (e) 
allows only questions tending directly to criminate the accused as to 
the offence charged, and not questions tending to do so indirectly 
such as questions about other misconduct of which evidence was admis- 
sible at common law. That is to say, the question must relate direc- 
tly to the offence charged, and it is not enough that the other 
misconduct would have been admissible during the case for the prose- 
1) (1944) A. C. 315; (1944) 2 All E. R. 
_13 
2) (1962) A. C. 635; (1962) 
1 All E. R. 569 
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cution. On this view paragraph (f) allows questions which tend 
indirectly to criminate the accused as to the offence charged, and 
questions directed to his credibility as a witness, only if the case 
falls within one of the three exceptions in paragraph (f). The 
minority (Lord Denning and Lord Devlin) considered that paragraph (e) 
allowed questions tending, whether directly or indirectly, to crimi- 
nate the accused as to the offence charged and that paragraph (f) 
related only to questions directed to the credibility of the accused 
as a witness. 
The Criminal Law Revision Committee said that "on the question of 
the relation between paragraphs (e) and (f) we have no doubt that the 
minority view gives the right result. We therefore propose that the 
accused, if he gives evidence, should be open to cross-examination 
about any misconduct of which evidence would have been admissible (in 
particular, under clause 3- of the Committee's Draft Bill, which 
makes provision as to the admissibility of other conduct of the 
accused tending to show disposition -) during the case for the prose- 
cution"'. The committee's proposal as to the relation between the 
two provisos is supported by the Bar Council2. 
it is equally significant to point out that the majority's view in 
Jones's case that "tending to show" means "make known" or "reveal" to 
the jury has gone a long way towards reducing the practical effect of 
the difference between the literal and broad views concerning the 
relation between provisos (e) and (f) of the Criminal Evidence Act 
1898, if it applies to cases in which the evidence tending to show 
1) CLLR at S 117 2) BC S 128; cf C Tapper (1973) 36 M. L. R. 167 at 
pp. 168-169 
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bad character has been given by the prosecution. in Jones v. 
Director of Public Prosecutions, the speeches of the majority disap- 
prove, obiter, of the rationes decidendi of R V. Chitsoni, R V. 
Kennaway2, and may be by implication R V. Kurasch3. Lord Reid in. his 
judgement observed as follows: "It is said that the views which I 
have expressed involve overruling two decisions of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal, RV Chitson and RV Kennaway. I do not think so. I 
think the decisions were right but the reasons given for them were 
not. In the former case, the accused was charged with having had 
carnal knowledge of a girl of 14. Giving evidence, she said that the 
accused told her he had previously done the same thing to another 
girl, who, she said was under 16. No objection was taken to this 
evidence, I assume rightly. So before the accused gave evidence the 
jury already knew that he was alleged to have committed another 
offence. If the views which I have already expressed are right, 
cross-examining the accused about this matter disclosed nothing new 
to them and therefore did not offend against the prohibition in 
proviso (f). But the judgement of the Court was not based on that 
ground: it was said that although the question tended to prove that 
the accused was of bad character they also tended to show that he 
was guilty of the offences with which he was charged. For the rea- 
sons I have given I do not think that that is sufficient to avoid the 
prohibition in proviso (f). R V. Kennaway was a prosecution for 
forgery. Accomplices giving evidence for the prosecution described 
1) (1909) 2 K. B. 945 2) (1917) 1 K. B. 25 3) (1915) 2 K. B. 749 
- 815 - 
the fraudulent scheme of which the forgery was a part and related a 
conversation with the accused in which he stated to them that some 
years earlier he had forged another will in pursuance of a similar 
scheme. Then in cross-examination the accused was asked a number of 
questions about this other forgery. Those questions. were held to 
have been properly put to him. Here again, these questions disclosed 
nothing new to the jury and I can see no valid objection to them. 
But again that was be the ground of the court's decision. 
Their ground of decision was similar to that in Chitson's case, and I 
need not repeat what I have said about that case"1. However it is 
thought that Lords Devlin and Denning would have decided Chitson's 
case as it was "decided for the reason given by the Court of Criminal 
Appeal, namely, that the cross-examination was relevant to an issue 
in the case and did not merely go to credit2. There are, however, 
many situations in which cross-examination must be rejected according 
to the majority opinion in Jones V. Director of Public Prosecutions 
although it would be admissible according to the broad view. For 
example, the questions concerning the accused's relations with the 
proprietress of the auction room upheld by the Court of Criminal 
Appeal in R v. Kurasch3 would be condemned on the reasoning of the 
majority of the House of Lords in Jones's case because there had been 
no previous suggestion to the jury that the proprietress was the 
accused's mistress. On this view the question would have been prohi 
bited by S. 1 (f) and not permitted by S. 1 (e), but the question was 
perfectly proper according to the opinions of Lord Denning and Lord 
1) (1962) A. C., 635 at 665 of-per Lord Morris another member of the 
majority at p. 685 Ibid 2) See too. R v Donnini (1972) 128 C. L. R. 114 
at 130 where Menzies J. disposed of the appeal in a similar manner. 
3) (1915) 2 K. B. 749 
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Devlin. 
And as earlier mentioned, Lord Denning viewed with concern the 
suggestion that Chitson and Kennaway were wrong for they have 
governed the practice in the criminal courts for years with, in his 
view, wholly beneficial results. Lord'Devlin also favoured upholding 
these cases even if they were incompatible with a strict construction 
of the- section: "If mistakes have been made, if the correct thing has 
not always been done, but if the result produced is a sensible one 
that has established itself in the practice of the law, let it be 
left alone". The status of the principle applied in these three 
decisions is not therefore easy to state categorically. The disap- 
proval of the majority, being obiter, is not strictly binding on 
lower courts and is weakened by the dissent of Lords Denning and 
Devlin. However, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rv. 
Cokarl seems to be inconsistent with the principle on which the three 
earlier cases were decided. In the result, then, 'it would seem that 
they must be regarded as of very doubtful authority. The effect of 
this is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the cross-examination in 
those cases would now be allowed under the principle which was the 
ratio decidendi of the majority in Jones V. Director of Public Prose- 
cutions2. But in a case where the-evidence had not been led by the 
prosecution nor given by the accused in his cross-examination-in- 
chief, such cross-examination 'would now be ruled out. 
1) (1960) 2 Q. B. 207 2) (1962) A. C. 635; (1962) 1 All E. R. 569 
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(6) THE INTERPRETATION OF S. 1 (f) (i)1 
"A person charged .... shall not be asked ... unless: - 
(i) the proof that he has. committed or been convicted of such other 
offence is admissible evidence to show that he is guilty of the 
offence wherewith he is then charged; ". 
It is worthy of note, that unlike exceptions (ii) and (iii) S. 1 (f) 
(i) operates as a matter of law, because of the relevance and 
admissibility of the evidence, and-requires no step to be taken by 
the defence to bring it into play. The section allows the accused to 
be questioned concerning other offences when proof that he has 
committed or been convicted of them is admissible to show that he is 
guilty of the offence charged. Although there is a dearth of 
authority on the point, there can be little doubt that S. 1 (f) (i) 
permits cross-examination about previous convictions when they have 
been proved in-chief on. the rare occasions on which such a course is 
permissible. There can also be little doubt that, when similar fact 
evidence has been given in-chief because it does more than show bad 
disposition, the accused may be cross-examined about the other 
offences mentioned in such evidence2. The principle of Makin v. 
Attorney General for New South Wales3, earlier discussed, under which 
evidence of misconduct on another occasions is inadmissible if its 
only relevance is to support an argument that the accused is the kind 
of man who would commit the crime charged, applies just as much to 
4 
evidence elicited in cross-examination as to evidence- in- chief. 
1) SS. 141(f)(i) and 346(f)(i) of the 1975 Scotland Act; S. 399(e)(i) 
of the 1958 Crimes Act (Victoria); S. 159(d)(i)N. E. A. 2) R. V Chit son 
(1909) 
2 K. B. 945; Rv Kennäway (1917) M. B. 25 (These cases must now be read 
subject to the majority views in Jones's case); see also Rv Cokar (1960) 
2 Q. B. 593 3) (1894) A. C. 57 4) See per Lord Devlin in Jones v 
-*Director 
of Public Prosecutions (1962) A. C. 635 at 701; (1962) 1AE. R. at p. 593 
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Therefore questions suggesting that the accused has been convicted of 
or has committed other offences which have not been proved in-chief 
would normally be inadmissible, but, if they are relevant for some 
further reason than their tendency to show bad disposition, they may 
be permissible under S. 1(f)(i) although they do not relate to matters 
proved in chief. In general they will, however, be inadmissable, 
because a proper foundation should have been laid for the cross- 
examination by means of the evidence-in-chief. It was said in Jones 
V. Director of Public Prosecutions' that when the accused has commit- 
ted or been convicted of another offence is justified in proviso (f) 
(i), it is in general undesirable that it should be first adduced in 
cross-examination. Lord Denning observed as follows: "Before any 
cross-examination is permissible under exception (i), the prosecution 
must lay a proper foundation for it by. showing some 'other offence 
which is admissible evidence to show that he is guilty'. The prose- 
cution should normally do it by giving evidence in the course of 
their case; though there may be cases in which they might, with the 
leave of the judge, do it for the first time in cross-examination"2. 
And in a similar vein Lord Morris of Both-y-Gest said: "If the 
prosecution consider that proof of the commission or the conviction 
of some other offence would be 'admissible evidence' to show guilt in 
regard to the offence charged (eg. within the principle laid down in 
the case of Makin v. Attorney General for New South Wales) then such 
proof from the points of view of effectiveness and convenience would 
be given, if allowed as admissible, as part of the case for the 
1) (1962) A. C. 635, (C. C. A. ) at 646) 2) (1962) A. C. 635 at 668 
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prosecution. I agree with the Court of Criminal Appeal that in 
general it would be undesirable if the matter was first raised in 
cross-examination"'. It is pertinent to draw attention to the Aus- 
tralian case of R V. May2, where the accused in evidence-in-chief 
stated that he had falsely admitted to the police that he was to 
blame for an alleged offence and took the blame for another because 
as he said: "I have never had much trouble". The Crown secured leave 
to put a number of previous convictions to the accused under S. 399 
(e) (i) jof the 1958 Act (Victoria) - which is the equivalent of S, 1 
(f) (i) - on the ground that these were relevant on the question of 
the truth or falsity of the accused explanation. 
In R v. Cokar3, the Court of Criminal Appeal was clearly of opinion 
that no question concerning a previous charge other than one which 
was merely a preliminary to an admissible question concerning a 
conviction could be put under S. 1 (f) (i) and, in Jones V. Director 
of Public Prosecutions4, the majority would clearly not have allowed 
a question tending to show bad character if the bad character, had not 
previously been revealed to the jury. It may therefore be taken to 
be settled English law that S. 1 (f) (i) must be construed literally, 
and no words justifying questions about charges or bad character can 
be read into it. 
The Australian courts have consistently favoured a broad 
interpretation of the prohibition and S. 399 (e) (i) - [which is an 
equivalent to S. 1( f) (i) I. The basis of most of their decisions 
1) Ibid at 685 2) (1959) V. R. 683 3) (1960) 2 Q. B. 207; (1960) 2 All 
E. R. 175 4) (1962) A. C. 635; (1962) 1 All E. R. 569 
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seems to be that the draftsman inadvertently omitted to mention 
questions showing bad character in S. 399 (e) (i). In Attwood V. R1, 
the court held that the words of the prohibition in S. 399 (e) do not 
exclude questions on matters relevant to the proof of the charge, 
because those questions also possess a tendency to show the accused 
to be of bad character. To quote the judgement of the High Court on 
the point, they said: "One argument is to be found in sub-paragraph 
(i) of paragraph (e) of S. 399 [of Victoria Crimes Act, 19581. Why, 
it is naturally asked should the express provision be made in favour 
of allowing questions as to the commission of offences and convic- 
tions of offences where relevant if without any provision expressly 
permitting it the accused as a witness may be asked questions simply 
because they are relevant to proof of the ingredients of the crime, 
notwithstanding that the do affect his character? The reason is, 
one may reasonably suppose, that the draftsman saw the two things in 
different lights. When he expressly prohibited proof of thee commis- 
sion of an offence or of a conviction of an offence the draftsman 
said that he was expressly prohibiting proof of a fact he definitely 
identified independently of its operation or of the ground of intro- 
ducing it in evidence. On the otherhand, in the case of 'questions 
tending to show that he (the accused) is of bad character' the draf- 
tsman was dealing with, a description of cross-examination going to 
credit which he thought of as, ex hypothesis, outside the field of 
relevancy altogether. In other words, in the case of strictly rele-' 
vant facts he was regarding them as open to proof as part of the 
1) (1960) 102 C. L. R. 353 at 361; (1960) A. L. R. 321 at 325 
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Crown case and as necessarily, or at least as naturally, the subject 
of evidence by the accused if he were called as a witness on his 
trial and he regarded them as not matter going to the bad character 
of the accused but as a matter going to proof of his guilt. The 
words describe questions as to that kind of evidence excluded at 
Common Law upon the trial of criminal issues as a matter of policy 
but allowable in the cross-examination to credit of an ordinary 
witness. It follows that in so far as the questions excepted to in 
the present applicant were relevant to the issues they were not 
excluded by the operation of S. 399 (e)". It was also observed by 
the court that: "The exclusionary words in S. 399 (e) do not natural- 
ly relate to a fact, matter or circumstance which is, in itself 
relevant to the prrof of the issues although its occurence or existe- 
nce incidentally tells against the possession by the accused of a 
good character or may be the ground attributing to him a bad charac- 
ter. This view was expressed by Angus Parsons J. in the Supreme 
Court of South Australia speaking for the full Court, His Honour said 
of the cross-examination there objected to: "Such questions are not 
directed as to the accused bad character, but to prove his guilty 
knowledge, which was one of the issues in the case, and, that being 
the position, they were not rendered inadmissible by reason of the 
fact that they might also tend to show that he was of bad charac- 
ter". In R V. Lambert2, Piper A. J. speaking for the Full Court 
adopted this statement and also said, 'notwithstanding that it ap- 
1) Rv Baxter (1927) S. A. S. R. 321 at 327 2) (1957) S. A. S. R. 341 
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pears that the provisoes' (to the provision) 'were enacted in order 
to protect accused persons from such prejudicial effect as might 
arise from the consequences of enacting that accused person may give 
evidence in their own defence, questions which tend to show that he 
is of bad character may be asked of an accused person if they are 
relevant to the question whether he did or did not commit the offence 
charged". His Honour added: 'or to test the veracity of evidence 
in-chief'2, but it is safer to omit this alternative as capable of a 
construction or application which would carry it beyond relevance 
into cross-examination to credit. Otherwise the passage expresses 
the interpretation of the provision which seems best to accord with 
the probable legislative intention. "3 
It is pertinent to point out that the view that S. 1 (f) and its 
equivalent does not prohibit questions tending to show bad character 
and (presumably) questions. tending to show charges, can be reached in 
three ways; (a) that of Lord Denning and Jones's case, according to 
which there may always be cross-examination on matters relevant to 
the issue, (b) that of Lord Devlin in Jones's case according to which 
'character' in S. 1 (f) means 'reputation' so that questions about 
specific acts falling short of an offence are outside the prohibi- 
tion, and (c) the way adopted by the High Court in Attwood's case 
according to which the questions are casus omissus and words may be 
read into S. 1(f) (i) and its equivalents. 
1) Ibid at 345-6 2) Ibid at 346 3) (1960) 102 C. L. F. 353 at 361; 
see also Rv May (1959) V. R. 683 
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(7) THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1 (F) (ii) 1 
An accused person shall not be asked ... unless - (ii) "he has 
personally or by his advocate asked questions of the witnesses for 
the prosecution with a view to establish his own good character, or 
has given evidence of his good character, or the nature or conduct of 
the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the 
prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution. " 
In order to have an analytical examination of the above section, 
and also for a proper understanding of the provisions, it will be 
better to divide the discussion of Section 1 (f) (ii) into two main 
parts - viz - cases in which the accused puts his character in issue, 
and those in which the nature or conduct of the defence involves 
imputations on the character of the prosecutor or one of his witnes, 
ses. 
(i) Character in Issue 
To bring the first limb of the second exception to the prohibiton 
into play, the court must be satisfied that the accused: "has 
personally or by his advocate asked questions of the, witnesses for 
the prosecution with a view to establish his, own good character, or 
has given evidence of his good character". Thus it is envisaged that 
the defendant may attempt to establish his good charcater by either 
of the two methods described in the section, or both together; in any 
such case, the shield is lost, the accused having effectively put his 
1) SS. 141(f)(i) and 346(f)(ii) of the 1975 Scotland Act; S. 399(e)(ii) 
of the 1958 Crimes Act (Victoria); S. 159(d)(ii) Nigerian Evidence Act 
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character in issue. 
In Scotland, the first part of paragraph (f) (ii) as its English 
counterpart permits cross-examination of "the accused or his councel 
or solicitor has asked questions of the witnesses for the prosecution 
with a view to establish the accused's good character, or the accused 
has given evidence of his own good character. "' Except for the 
alteration of a few words the provisions in Scotland and England are 
substantially the same. However, Sherrif Macphail2 is of the view 
that the phraseology of the first limb as set above, does not in 
terms cover the case where the accused has led evidence of witnesses 
to his good character but does not cross-examine on the subject or 
allude to it in his own evidence in chief: such witnesses may be 
cross-examined as to his character, but he himself may not. Sherrif 
Macphail then suggests that the phraseology should be recast in order 
to cover such a case, and that it should be made possible for the 
accused to be recalled for the cross-examination as to character, by 
a co-accused as well as the prosecutor, after such witnesses have 
given evidence. It is significant and interesting to note that in 
England, the same provision is understood to cover such a case as 
Cross stated: "The latter phrase is apt to cover a case in which the 
prisoner calls a witness to character but does not cross-examine on 
the subject or allude to it in his own evidence in chief3. May I 
just say that I find the view expressed by Cross more appealing and 
the suggestion by Sherrif Macphail for the provision to be remodelled 
might be unnecessary after all. My reason for following Cross' view 
1) SS. 141 (f)ai) and 346(f)(ii) 1975*'Scotland Act 2) Sheriff Macphail - 
Research Paper on the Law of Evidence in Scotland - §5: 52 3) Cross on 
Evidence, 5th ed. at p" 425 
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is simply because to my mind it is a quite reasonable interpretation 
of the provision and moreover it is not everytime as Sherrif Macphail 
might prefer to see as a result of his suggestion that the intentions 
or all the intentions of a statutory provision are made crystal clear 
by the legal draughtsman. However the other suggestion made by 
sherrif Macphail to the effect that it should be made possible for 
the accused to be recalled for cross-examination as to character, by 
a co-accused as well as the prosecutor, after such witnesses have 
given evidence, is an important point to take notice of. And in 
Australia the same provision of the first limb to Section 1 (f) (ii) 
seems to extend further than that claimed in England as it is 
probably thought to cover the rare case where an accused gives sworn 
evidence after putting forward his own good character during his 
unsworn statement', though not apparently during his address to the 
jury from the dockt. 
The first limb of the second exeption to the prohibition is not 
brought into play when a defence witness volunteers a statement 
concerning the haracter of the accused which he had not been asked 
to make as R v.. Redd3 demonstrates. In that case, an appellant, who 
was tried for housebreaking and robbery, called a witness for the 
purpose of producing certain letters. This witness, without any 
question being put to him by the appellant, voluntarily made a 
statement as to the appellant's good character. The counsel for the 
prosecution then claimed that as evidence of the appellant's good 
1) Rv Gibson (1929) 30 SR (NSW) 282 - This decision is the subject of 
considerable criticism in MacDonald vR (1935) 52 CLR 739 2)Carroll v. 
R (1964) Tas SR 76; Rv Lockard Tas SiR 195 3) (1923) 
104 
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character had been given he was entitled to cross-examine the witness 
as to the appellant's real character, and he thereupon proceeded to 
ask the witness as to the number of times the appellant had been 
convicted. The court held that the appellant was not under the 
circumstances endeavouring to establish a good character by calling 
witnesses who voluntarily made a statement as to the appellant's good 
character, and that therefore the questions as to the appellant's 
previous convictions were not admissible. 
similarly, the exception is not brought into play by the accused's 
reference to- one of his many previous convictions as a ground for 
fearing the police because it would be wrong to infer that he meant 
that the occasion of the conviction was the only occasion on which he 
had previously been in trouble. And the case directly in point is 
that of R V. Thom pson1. Thompson was convicted on two counts of 
office-breaking and larceny and one of taking and driving away a 
motor vehicle. Some time after the commission of the offences he 
struck at a policeman who tried to arrest him and ran away: he said 
he did so because he thought he was being arrested for non-payment of 
a fine imposed-on a conviction for assualt. The judge said that the 
whole of his character must be laid before the jury and the prosecut- 
ion may cross-examine him as to his other convictions. It was then 
elicited from Thompson that he had convictions for violence, taking 
away motor vehicles and one for dishonesty. It was held, allowing 
the appeal , that Thompson had not put his character in issue but 
merely explained his conduct. He had not in any way misled the 
1) (1966) 1 All E. R. 505 
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court, or sought to assert his charcater as such, and it was wrong of 
the trial judge to compel him to say for what offence he had been 
fined, and to allow cross-examination concerning his previous 
convictions. The dictum of Oliver, J., in R V. Wattami, was clearly 
applied in the above case. In Wattam's case, the appellant who had 
told a number of lies to the police when questioned about his 
movements on the day of a murder, on his trial for murder, gave 
in evidence as his explanation of those lies that he had been in 
Borstal and had been stealing property in London. The Court held 
that the appellant had in no sense given evidence of good character, 
so as to entitle the prosecution to cross-examine him, under Section 
1 (f) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, with a view to suggesting 
bad character. In his judgement, Oliver, J., said: "All he (the 
accused) had said was: 'I have been in Borstal. I am a thief and I 
have been stealing things in London. That is why I made certain 
answers to the police. ' That is not, in our view, giving evidence of 
good character, nor do we agree in the argument ... that the position 
is to be compared with that of the man who says in the witness-box: 
'I have once been convicted of crime', when in fact he has been 
convicted half a dozen times. A prisoner who says that is, of cour- 
se, liable to be asked in cross-examination: 'It is not true that you 
have only been convicted once. Have you not been convicted six 
times? ' because he is giving evidence of a form of good character 
and is saying untruly: 'My character is better than it truly is'. iI. e 
1) (1952) 36 Cr. App. Rep. 72 at 78 
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lays himself open under the Act to cross-examination about anything 
which tends to show that he is a man of bad character. In this case 
we do not think that .... as he had not put his character in issue, 
the appellant was not liable to be asked those questions. "1 
It is however submitted that where any creditable attributes are of 
direct relevance to the defence, apart from any assertation of good 
character, the defendant would not be within the scope of the excep- 
tion. Thus, if a prisoner charged with going equipped for a burglary 
or theft, sought to explain his possession of certain implements by 
reference to his trade as a builder, it is submitted that he would 
not thereby "give evidence of his good character" for this purpose, 
though if he went on to say that he earned his living honestly by 
building and had no inclination to steal, he would have exceeded his 
necessary assertion of his defence and put his character in issue. 
Similarly, it has been held that a general examination by the accused 
in the course of his evidence into the circumstances surrounding the 
alleged crime with a view to establishing innocence does not expose 
him to cross-examination under Section 1 (f) (ii)". Sub-clause (ii) 
of clause (f), Section 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, is 
intended to apply to cases where witnesses to character are called, 
or where evidence of the good character of the prisoner is sought to 
be elicited from the witnesses for the prosecution. It is to this 
class of evidence that the statute refers, not to mere assertations 
of innocence or repudiation of guilt on the part of the prisoner, nor 
to reasons given by him for such assertions or repudiations. In R V. 
1) (1952) 36 Cr. App. Rep. 72 at 78 
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Ellis1, the appellant was convicted upon an indictment for obtaining 
from D. cheques by false pretences. The indictment alleged that he 
sold various artciles of virtu 
to D. under an agreement that he was 
to charge D. the cost price plus 10 per cent profit; that the appel- 
lant represented to D. that the cost was much in excess of the real 
cost; and that by this means he had obtained from D. much larger sums 
than he was entitled to. The appellant gave evidence on his own 
behalf, and in cross-examination, questions were put to him sugges- 
ting that in other transactions he had obtained money from D. by 
alleging that certain china figures were genuine pieces of Old Dres- 
den China, whereas he knew they were not. The court held that the 
alleged false pretences in representing the articles to be genuine 
old Dresden China when they were not so were entirely distinct from 
those with which the prisoner was charged, and that, as upon that 
ground evidence of the false representations with regard to the 
articles being genuine Old Dresden China was not admissible to show 
that he was guilty of the false pretences with which he was charged, 
the questions put were improperly allowed in as much as they tended 
to show that the appellant had committed an offence other-than that 
with which he was charged, and . the conviction must 
be quashed, as 
the jury must have been influenced by the questions and answers. In 
a case like this, no doubt the accused must have in answering the 
questions about his conduct towards the alleged victim, with a view 
of negativing any intent to defraud, given explanations with a tende- 
1) (1910) 2 K. B. 746 
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ncy to establishing good character, but an assertion of innocence 
might equally well be said to be tantamount to giving evidence of 
character. In R v. Lee2 part of the defence was that two men, who 
were not witnesses at the trial, had had the opportunity to commit 
the offence in question. Two prosecution witnesses were cross- 
examined about the men having access to the house, and their previous 
convictions for dishonesty. The Court of Appeal held that the ac- 
cused was wrongly cross-examined on his own convictions: "It is not 
implicit in an accusation of dishonesty that the accused himself is 
an honest man". It seems that there is a temptation to argue in the 
present case that the attack on the character of the third parties 
was an implicit assertion of the accused's own good character. To my 
mind however, the accused was merely suggesting that, because of 
their bad character, they were persons likely to have committed the 
offence. If he had said explicitly, "they are more likely to have 
committed the offence than I because they have bad characters", this 
would indeed seem to amount to an assertion that his own character 
was good. However it does not appear that he went so far. The 
accused may clearly submit with an impunity that third persons, not 
witnesses, had the opportunity to commit the offence. This is in 
itself a suggestion that they may have done so - otherwise there is 
no point in it. To show that they had not only the opportunity but 
also the propensity to commit the offence seems to differ only in 
degree and not in principle. In Butterwasser's case3 Lord Goddard, 
C. J., said " ... by attacking the witnesses for the prosecution and 
1) See av Crawford (1965) VR 580; Rv Mathews (1973) WAR 110; Rv 
Langford (1974) Qd R. 67 2) (1976)-l A711 E. R. 570; (1976) 1 W. L. R. 71 
3) (1948) 1 K. B. 4 
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suggesting they are unreliable [the accused], is not putting his 
character in issue; he is putting their character in issue. " The 
same must apply when the accused attacks the character of third 
parties who are not witnesses which is why I support the decision in 
R v. Lee. 
And in Donnini v. Rl two judges of the majority of the High Court 
in Australia held that if a question is asked of the prosecution 
witness with a view to establishing accused's character,, that is 
enough: it seems immaterial that the witness answers in barely rele- 
vant terms that accused is "quite shy" and "always very pleasant". 
However, what amounts to an assertion of good character may not 
always be easy to determine. At any rate we do not know generally 
speaking that the accused's own evidence of- his character takes the 
form of allusions to his innocent or praise worthy past. Therefore 
it may be assumed that the rule will cover any evidence adduced by 
the defence which is not otherwise relevant to the issue of guilt and 
which in fact has the effect of inviting the jury to infer that the 
defendant is a man less likely, from whatever consideration of 
character, to have committed the offence charged than would otherwise 
have appeared to them to be in the case. The most obvious case is 
where the defendant asserts that he has no previous convictions, or 
that he is a man above suspicion or of good moral character, in 
"1 
whatever terms, or that the offence charged is contrary to his dispo- 
sition. But the assertion may be less direct; for example a man's 
1) (1972) 128 C. L. R. 114; See also Rv May(1959) V. R. of Lowery v. R 
(1974) A. C. ¬5,102 (PC) - Evidence from a physchiatrist as to the 
intelligence and personality of an accused is not evidence about his 
character 
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allegations concerning his regular attendances at Mass or that he is 
a religious person 
i, his assertion that he has been earning an honest 
living for a considerable time2, and his affirmative answer to the 
question whether he is a married man with a family in regular work3, 
have been treated as instances in which the shield provided by Sec- 
tion 1 (f)4 would be thrown away. Other similar instances would 
include claim by a person that he is a membber of a generally respec- 
ted profession, institution, society or club. Presumably this may be 
impliedly asserted by appearance or dress, for example a school tie. 
It is a moot and interesting question how far a defendant may safely 
appear respectably or tidily dressed in court, without risking making 
an implied assertion of good character. Occassionally, the appellate 
courts have had to intervene to prevent absurd results, as in R V. 
Hamilton5, where the trial judge wrongly ordered the defendant to 
remove his regimental blazer before giving evidence. Hamilton was 
convicted of indecent assault. He appealed on the ground that the 
number and nature of the interventions by the judge were such that 
the conviction should be quashed. He also complained that the judge, 
in the absence of the jury, obliged him to remove a regimental blazer 
he was wearing on the ground that it might be considered evidence of 
good character. The court held, dismissing the appeal, that it is 
wrong for a judge to descend into the arena and give the impression 
of acting as advocate and often does more harm than good. However 
whether interventions can give ground for quashing a conviction is 
not only a matter of degree but also depends on what the interven- 
1) Rv Ferguson (1909) 2 Cr. App. Rep. 250 2) Rv Baker (1912) 7 Cr. 
Ate. Rep. 252 3) Rv Coulman (1927) '20 Cr. App. Rep. 106 per Swift J., 
in the course of the argument 4) See SS 141(f) 1975 Scotland Act; S. 
399 (e) 1958 Crimes Act (Victoria); S. 159(d) Nigerian Evidence Act; 
5) (1969) Cr. L. R. 486 
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tions are directed to and what their effect may be. Interventions to 
clear up. ambiguities and to enable the judge to make an accurate note 
are perfectly justified. Interventions which may lead to the quas- 
hing of a conviction are (1) those which invite the jury to disbe- 
lieve the defence evidence in such terms that it cannot be cured by 
telling the jury that the facts are for them; (2) those which make it 
impossible for counsel to present the defence properly; (3) those 
which have the effect of preventing the defendant from doing himself 
justice and telling his story in his own way. 
In the present case though the judge descended into the arena he 
did not do so to an excessive degree, counsel was not prevented from 
presenting the defence and Hamilton did himself full justice. The 
judge was not justified in forcing Hamilton to remove his blazer but 
this could have had no effect on the result of the trial. There are 
some important things to be said by way of comment about this case. 
First, it should be clearly reiterated that whether or not the ac- 
cused goes into the witness-box, he is allowed to adduce evidence of 
his own good character. There seems to be no good reason why an 
accused should not impliedly assert his good character by wearing 
clothes which suggest this. The prosecution could no doubt, in an 
appropriate case, adduce evidence to rebut the implied assertion of 
good character, though it is likely that the judge would exercise his 
discretion against admitting such rebutting evidence in most cases, 
since the wearing of certain types of clothing may not amount to a 
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very powerful assertion of good character, and it might be oppressive 
to allow the prosecution to adduce strong rebutting evidence. It is 
not clear whether if the accused were to give sworn evidence he 
could be cross-examined on his record on the basis that he had, by 
wearing a uniform, thrown away his "shield" under Section 1 (f) of 
the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898. It seems doubtful whether it could 
be said that he had "given evidence of his own good character" within 
the meaning of Section 1 (f) (ii). However even if it were possible 
to cross-examine on this basis, the judge would still have an overri- 
ding discretion. 
By and large claims by an accused person that he has attributes 
which people would be likely to think creditable come within the 
meaning of Section 1 (f) (ii) and the decisions certainly do not 
indicate any great reluctance on the part of the courts to hold that 
he has put his character in issue by such a reference. 
In a Victorian Health Act prosecution the statement by the defen- 
dant "I always take every precaution" was held to amount to evidence 
of good charcater as applied to the trade in question'. But there 
seems to be some doubt whether a reference to honourable discharge 
from the army would have this effect. In R V. Parker2 it was held 
that a mere reference to a meritorious discharge from the army by an 
undefended prisoner in a statement handed to the court of trial does 
not necessarily expose him to cross-examination on his character 
generally (though it may do so on his career in the army). The ratio 
of this case appears to be that if the accused does not plead an 
1) Gunner v Payne" (1910) VLR 45 
2) 1924 18 Cr. App. Rep. 14 
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aspect of his life as his general character,. he cannot be so cross- 
examined, but if he does then he may be cross-examined as to his 
general character. -I think attention should be payed to the phrase 
used in the decision - ... does not necessarily expose him ... ". 
Similar uncertainty prevails with regard to the statement by a man 
-charged with traffic offences that he disapproved of speedingi. And 
in R V. Samuel2, Samuel was convicted of larceny by finding. The 
facts, shortly, were that a camera, which had been lost some five 
weeks earlier by a little girl in the grounds of a museum, had been 
found in Samuel's possession. Samuel said at the trial that he had 
intended returning the camera, and gave evidence that on two previous 
occasions he had found property belonging to someone else and had 
handed it back. The chairman ruled that, in these circumstances, the 
accused had pat his character in issue, and accordingly, Samuel was 
cross-examined as to his previous convictions. " Samuel appealed to 
the court of Criminal Appeal against his conviction on the main 
ground that cross-examination as to previous convictions was imprope- 
rly allowed. It was contended that the evidence given by Samuel 
about handing back other property was not evidence of "good charac- 
ter" within the meaning of Section 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act, 
1898, and that"character" in that context meant general good charac- 
ter and reputation. The court held, dismissing the appeal, that the 
only effect of. the evidence by Samuel could have been to induce the 
jury to say that when Samuel found property he gave it up, or, in 
1) Rv Beecham (1921) 3 K. B. 464 
2) 71956 40 Cr. App. Rep. 8 
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other words, that he was an honest man. That entitled the prosecu- 
tion to show that there were other occasions when Samuel had not 
dealt honestly with property. The simple issue was: Did the appel- 
lant put his character in issue? In the opinion of the Court, he 
clearly had. 
So much has been said and discussed about the issues and problems 
especially from the corner of the defence that a few final points on 
issues from the corner of the prosecution will be appropriate. In 
the first place it is helpful to note that whether a question put to 
a person charged with a crime and called as a witness tends to show, 
within the meaning of Section 1 clause (f) of the Criminal Evidence 
Act, 1898, that he has committed or been convicted of or charged with 
any offence other than that with which he -is then charged cannot be 
decided by looking merely at the single question. Each question 
must be judged by the light of others asked before and after. Secon- 
dly, the object of the enactment is that it should not, except in 
specified circumstances, be suggested to the minds of the jury by 
means of any question put to the prisoner that he has committed 
another offence. Any question or series of questions which would 
reasonably lead a jury to believe that he had committed another 
offence would tend to show that the prisoner had committed that other 
offence. If a question does so tend, it is quite immaterial whether 
it would be admissible on other grounds. It is the duty of the judge 
not to wait for any objection to the question from the prisoner's 
counsel, but to stop the question himself, and to direct the jury to 
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disregard it and not allow it to influence their minds. 
It is now necessary to consider some vital issues like the meaning 
of "character" as used in Section 1 (f) in general and the first part 
of Section 1 (f) (ii) in particular, the purpose of cross-examination 
under the exception and the question of the divisibility of the 
accused'$ character. 
(ii) THE MEANING OF CHARACTER 
We have already discussed the definition of the term 'character' 
which in ordinary language may mean either the reputation or the 
disposition of the person about whom the inquiry is being made, and 
that, at common law a character witness might only be asked about the 
reputation of the accused. It is easily noticed that the word 
"character" is used no less than four times in proviso (f) of section 
1 of the Criminal Evidence Act, 18981. And there has been much 
speculation about the meaning Parliament intended to give the word 
when enacting the 1898 Act. It is variously argued that Parliament 
intended either to maintain the narrow definition, insisted upon in R 
v. Rowton2, of general reputation only, or, by the reference to 
previous specific incidents, to open up the subject of character to 
a more comprehensive definition. Whatever Parliament actually 
intended, it is now settled that the word has acquired a wide 
connotation, for the purposes of the Act and that the disposition of 
an accused is included in his "character" for this purpose. In R V. 
Duý3, the appellant was convicted stealing and receiving certain 
1) 5.159(d) Nigerian Evid. Act; S. 399(e) 1958 Crimes Act (Victoria); 
SS. 141(f) & 346(f) 1975 Scotland Act; 2) (1865) Le & Ca. 520 3) (1927) 
1 K. B. 323 
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property. A witness for the prosecution gave evidnce that the 
appellant brought the articles to her and asked her to dispose of 
them. In cross-examination it was suggested to the witness that her 
story was a pure invention fabricated out of a feeling of revenge 
against the appellant. The trial judge allowed the prosecution to 
cross-examine the appellant as to his previous convictions on the 
ground that he had cast imputations upon the character of a witness 
for the prosecution within Section 1 (f) (ii) of the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1898. Lord Hewart C. J., delivering the judgement of 
the Court, referred to Section 1 (f) of the Criminal Evidence Act and 
continued: - "It is apparent that within the space of a very few lines 
the word 'character' is used in this part of the section no fewer 
than four times. It is also apparent that the imputations which are 
spoken of in the closing words of the passage I have read are 
described, not as imputations on the *prosecutor or the witnesses for 
the prosecution, but as imputations on the character of the 
prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution. In those 
circumstances it is not difficult to suppose that a formidable 
argument might have been raised on the phrasing of this . 
statute, that 
the character which is spoken of is the character which is so well 
known in the vocabulary of the criminal law - namely, the general 
reputation of the person referred to; in other words, that 
'character' in that context and in every part of it, in the last part 
no less than in the first, in the third part no less than in the 
second, bears the meaning which the term 'character' was held to 
=_839 - 
bear, for example, in the case of R v. Rowton', where the question 
was considered by the Court of Crown Cases Reserved .... 
Nevertheless, when one looks at the long line of cases beginning very 
shortly after the passing of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, it does 
not appear that that argument has ever been so much as formulated. 
-It was formulated yesterday. One can only say that it is now much too 
late in the day even to consider that argument, because that argument 
could not now prevail without the revision, and indeed to a great 
extent the overthrow of a very long series of decisions. "2 
And when speaking of the first part of Section 1 (f) (ii) in 
Stirland V. Director of Public Prosecutions3, Lord Simon, L. C., 
said: - "There is perhaps some vagueness in the use of the term "good 
character" in this connection. Does it refer to the good reputation 
which a man may bear in his own circle, or does it refer to the man's 
real disposition as distinct from what his friends and neighbours may 
think of him. " His Lordship was inclined to think that both 
conceptions were combined in S. 1 (f). This view has since been 
adopted in the Privy Council 
4, 
and the House of Lordss, and is 
implicit in the Australian High Court judgement in Attwood v. R'6 
where- it was said that. "the expression 'bad character' in relation 
to a witness has no technical or legal meaning. " 
However in Jones V. Director of Public Prosecutions? Lord Devlin 
discussed a radical 'change in the construction of the Act, which 
would in some ways obviate some of the difficulties usually faced but 
1) (1865) Le & Ca. 520; 2) (1927) I K. B. 323 at 329 3) (1944) A. C. 
315 at 324; (1924) 2 Al]. E. R. 13 at 17 4) Malindi vR (1967) A. C. _ 
439 at 451 5) Selvey v D. PP. (1970) A. C. 304.6) (1960) 102 CLR 252 
at 359 7) (1962) A. C. 635 8) Ibid at 699; (1962) 1 All E. R. 569 at 
604 
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in some other ways accentuate the difficulties. He proposed that the 
term "character" in proviso (f) should be construed to mean 
"reputation" only and that it should not include "diposition" as the 
Court of Criminal Appeal decided in R V. Dunkleyl' and Lord Simon said 
in Strirland's case2. One effect of this would be to exclude from 
, 
the terms of the prohibition evidence of particular acts, not amoun- 
ting to offences; so that the admissibility of such acts would depend 
purely on rules of common law and would not need to be brought within 
the exceptions of proviso (f). And in view of the difficulties to 
which the construction of the Act gives rise, there seems to be much 
to be said for an approach which will confine it to the narrowest 
possible limits and leave as wide an area as possible to be dealt 
with under common law rules. But Lord Denning3 with an uncharacteri- 
stically strict regard (with respect) for the doctrine of precedent, 
thought it "far too late" to uphold this argument. Lord Reid, on the 
other hand, clearly thought it open to the House to reconsider the 
matter if it should be directly raised. Lord Devlin also thought 
that the point was still open at the level of the House of Lords. 
The point that "character" in Section 1 (f) means solely "general 
reputation" as Lord Devlin sugggested was later raised again, and it 
is submitted, finally rejected in Selvey v. Director of Public Prose- 
cutions4. it is interesting to note that the point never appears to 
have received judicial support in Australia. As earlier pointed out 
above, the effect of the construction suggested by Lord Devlin would 
be revolutionary but in some ways may be difficult to apply. This is 
1) (1927) 1 K. B. 323 at 329 2) (1944) A. C. 315 at 324; (1944) 2 All 
E. R. 13 at 17 3) (1962) A. C.. 635 at' 671; (1962) 1 All E. R. 569 at 
580 4) (1970) A. C. 304; 
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certainly so when the accused himself is testifying to his good 
character: one can hardly testify to one's own reputation with any 
confidence, for a man's reputation is what people say about him when 
he is not there. As Lord Dennning stated in Plato Films v Speideli. 
"The plaitiff cannot speak as to his own character and reputation 
because he does not know what other people think of him, or at any 
rate he cannot give evidence as to what they think of him. " And it 
would certainly upset past decisions if it were to be held that a man 
who swore that he had led a good clean life and gone to Mass every 
Sunday had not given evidence of his own good character". This 
development does something to temper a rather irrational rule. Fur- 
thermore it is difficult to see how there can be an "imputation" on a 
general reputation; it may be that the section is intended to mean: 
"If the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve an 
assertion that the prosecutor is or the witnesses for the prosecution 
are of bad general reputation", but this would be a question of fact 
(whether or not the subject had a certain reputation) whereas the 
actual line of defence envisaged by the section is that the subject 
is not entitled to his apparent reputation. It would only be in rare 
cases, and for few purposes, that the Act would come into effect, if 
read in such a way (which the wording will not support). 
Moreover if throughout the entirety of Section 1 (f) "character" 
were to mean "reputation", it would be difficult to construe part of 
Section 1 (f) (ii) under which the accused loses his shield if the 
1) (1961) A. C. 1090 at 1143 
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nature or conduct of his defence involves imputations on the 
"character" of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution. 
It would then become possible to argue that someone who swore that a 
policeman had extracted a confession from him by violence was not 
casting imputations on the character of a witness for the prosecu- 
tioni. It was just such an argument that was rejected by the House 
of Lords in Selvey v. Director of Public Prosecutions2. In that case 
various members of the House of Lords made passing reference to the 
problem of the meaning of "character". The defence in that case, 
that the complainant was a male prostitute, involved imputations on 
the complainant's character, whichever meaning was adopted. The 
accused alleged that the complainant had offered to go on the bed 
with him for a pound, told him that he had already gone to bed for 
that sum with another man, and because his offer was rejected, dumped 
indecent photographs in the accused's room out of pique. Viscount 
Dilhorne, Lord Hodson and Lord Pearce were all inclined to reject 
Lord Devlin's construction and adopted the approach favoured by Lord 
Simon in Stirland's case . Lord Pearce said: "The words 'involve' 
and 'imputations' are wide. It would be playing with words to say 
that the allegation of really discreditable matters does not involve 
imputations on his general reputation, if only as showing how erro- 
neous that reputation must be3. It may therefore now be taken to be 
settled law that "character" when used in the Act of 1898 (and its 
equivalents in other jurisdictions) means both disposition and repu- 
tation. It is submitted that this is sensible and satisfactory for 
1) Cross on Evidence (5th ed. ) at P. 247; Lord Devlin considers that 
the word 'character' means "reputation" throughout the law of 
evidence - see Dingle v Associated Newspapers (1961) 2 Q. B. 162 at pp. 
195 and 198; see also Fridman, The Solicitor's Quarterly Vol. 1, P. 211 
(1962) 2) (1970) A. C. 304; (1968) 2 All E. R. 497 3) (1968) 2 All E. R. 
497 at 522 
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the practical working of the Act, and deserves more enthusiastic 
support than the grudging status of "too late to argue the contrary" 
which has sometimes been accorded to it. Indeed, the facts of R V, 
DunkleyI in which Lord He wart C. *J., employed exactly that epithet, 
--ý 
seem to show that much of the 'code' in particular the operation of 
the part of Section 1 (f) (ii) dealing with "imputations on the 
charcater of the prosecutor or the witnesses of the prosecutor", 
would be meaningless on a Rowton view. And if one may observe from 
all that has been said, the root of the trouble appears to lie in the 
assumption that the distinction between disposition and reputation, 
necessarily means that the word "character" is being used in one or 
other or both senses. The judgements on R V. Rowton2 make it 
abundantly plain that what the court is seeking in every case, is 
evidence, of the accused's disposition - is he the kind of man who 
would do the kind of act charged or, is he the kind of man who should 
be believed on oath? The difference is not so much over the meaning 
of "character", as over the means by which disposition may be 
proved. It may be taken to be settled that a prisoner is liable to 
be cross-examined under the proviso, if he calls a witness to speak 
to his good reputation or cross-examines the Crown witness with a 
view to establishing it, if he adopts either of these courses with 
regard to his conduct as showing good disposition, or if he, gives 
evidence on- the subject himself. We have seen that it is possible 
that the-character witness- could be cross-examined about rumours and 
1) (1927) 1 K. B. 323 at 329 2) (1865) Le. & 'Ca. 520 
844 
suspicions affecting the accused, although the latter cannot be asked 
whether he was suspected of crime unless his method of giving eviden- 
ce of his character takes the form of a specific denial of this fact. 
The Criminal Law Revision Committee have recommended that the word 
"character", the construction of which has caused difficulty in 
. 
England, as shown in the discussion above, should be abandoned in 
favour of "disposition", "reputation" and, where appropriate 
"credibility". The Thomson Committee on the other hand, disagree 
with that recommendation2: "In our view, there is no justification 
for change. There may well be cases which will raise narrow issues 
as regards attempts to set up good character but in our view neither 
the attempts of the Criminal Law Revision Committee nor any other 
that we can think of would in practice obviate the difficulties 
raised in such cases. Accordingly we are not in favour of any 
amendment of the law as presently enacted. " 
(iii) THE PURPOSE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION UNDER THE EXCEPTION 
Lord Sankey stated as follows in Maxwell V. Director of Public 
Prosecutions3: "If the prisoner by himself his witnesses seeks to 
give evidence of his own good character, for the purpose of showing 
that it is unlikely that he committed the offence charged, he raises 
by way of defence an issue as to his good character so that he may 
fairly be cross-examined on that issue just as any witness called by 
him to prove his good character may be cross-examined to show the 
contrary". On the other hand however one should take note of the 
1) CLLR paras 118,133-136; 2) Thomson, para 50: 26 3) (1935) A. C. 
309 at 319 
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decision in the Australian case of R v. Micoluccol, where rebuttal 
evidence following a good character claim by the accused was held to 
be inadmissible on the grounds that it was no more than evidence of 
complaints about the accused. 
It is clear from previous discussions that evidence of the 
accused's bad character may be admissible for one or other or both of 
two purposes. First to show that he is not to be believed and second 
to show that he is guilty of the offence charged. In the present 
context of Section 1 (f) (ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, it 
seems obvious that the evidence is relevant to the former and not (or 
at least directly) to the latter. _ 
In R V. Wood2, a man, charged with indecent assualt upon a girl, 
put his character in issue and was held by the Court of Criminal 
appeal to have been properly cross-examined concerning a conviction 
for an indecent assualt on another girl, which assualt took place 
after that for which he was being tried. it was said that the 
chronological order of events did not render the conviction any less 
admissible as evidence tending to show that the accused'was not of 
good character "at the time of the second trial"3, and clearly this 
could only mean that the the conviction was regarded by the Court as 
relevannt to the credibility of the accused testimony. In R V. 
Donnini4, Barwick C. J., was clearly of this view: "when the sole 
purpose of the admission of a prior conviction is to deny a sugges- 
tion of good character and to impugn the credit of the accused the 
jury should be specifically instructed that they may only use the 
1) (1957) SR (NSW) 434 2) (1920) 2 K. B. 179 3) (1920) 2 K. B. 179 at 
182 4) (1972) 128 CLR 114 
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evidence for those purposes. "1 Nevertheless the judgements given in 
that case illustrate that differing views may be taken on this ques- 
tion of relevance"2. 
In R v. Coltress3, the appellant was charged with the theft of a 
bottle of whisky from a store. At his trial his defence involved 
"imputations on the character of witnesses for the prosecution. At 
the time of his arrest, the appellant had been a man of good 
character, but ten months later, befor his trial, he had been 
convicted of the theft of a credit card and of obtaining credit by 
the use of that card. Counsel for the prosecution applied to cross- 
examine the appellant as to two convictions under Section 1 (f) (ii) 
of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, and the appellant's counsel 
opposed the aplication contending that the prejudicial effect of 
admitting those previous convictions outweighed their evidential 
value. The judge, in his . discretion permitted the cross-examination, 
and directed the jury, inter alia, that where a defence involved the 
imputation on the character of prosecution witnesses, then the 
appellant's own character must be known to the jury as well. The 
jury convicted on a majority verdict. On appeal that the trial, judge 
exercised his discretion wrongly. Orr, L. J., giving the judgement 
of the court said: "The next ground of appeal was that the judge 
wrongly exercised his discretion in allowing cross-examination of the 
defendant as to the convictions in questions, which took place 10 
months after his arrest for the offence on which he was being tried, 
1) Ibid at 127 2) See judgements of McTiernan and Menzies JJ. 
3) (1978) 68 Cr. App. Rep. 193 
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and it was argued that at the time of the offence the accused was a 
man of good character and would have remained so had the trial taken 
place before the subsequent convictions of which evidence was admit- 
ted. For this reason it was said, it was a wrong exercise of discre- 
tion to admit about the convictions in evidence. We have no doubt 
, 
that the judge had in mind the fact that these were subsequent 
convictions in coming to the conclusion whether they should be admit- 
ted in evidence, and we find no substance in this ground of appeal. " 
A similar decision had been given in an earlier case in Australia - 
R V. Woolcott Forbes, where evidence of frauds perpetrated after the 
Woolcot offence charged was admitted to rebut evidence of good chara- 
cter from the accused. 
And in R v. Longman and Richardson2, Longman and Richardson were 
convicted of conspiring to pervert the course of public justice. 
They sought to discredit a prosecution witness C. by, inter alia, 
calling H. as to-her credibility. After H. had been asked if he were 
aware of her reputation for veracity and if he would believe her on 
oath and had replied: "I would say that in certain particularsshe 
could be believed on oath . But ... ". The judge refused to allow 
further questions to be put to him. As a result of the attack on C. 
the previous bad character of Longman was elicited and the judge 
directed that the jury could make use of this when deciding whether 
they could believe him. They appealed on the grounds, inter alias 
(1) that the judge was wrong in stopping the examination of H., (2) 
that the direction was wrong. It was submitted that evidence of a 
1) (1944) 44 SR (NSW) 333; 61 WN (NSW) 219 2) (1969) IQ. B. 299 
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defendant's bad character is admissable only in particular 
circumstances and can be used only in relation to the situation which 
rendered it admissible; thus the evidence of Longman's bad character 
could only be used to neutralise the attack on C. 
1 he Court of 
Appeal held, dismissing the appeals (1) that the defence were 
entitled to ask H whether from his personal knowledge of C. he would 
believe her on oath; but there was no authority whereby he could be 
asked for any qualification of, or reasons for, his answers. Despite 
the irregularity of stopping the questions being put to H., there had 
been no miscarriage of justice since it transpired that the defence 
sought to elicit H. 's reasons; (2) there is nothing in the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1898 to suggest that the use of evidence of bad 
character should be restricted in the way submitted.. Edmund Davis L. 
J. speaking for the Court of Appeal said3: "In our view, evidence of 
character, when properly admitted, goes to the credit of the witness 
concerned, whether the evidence disclosed good character or bad 
character, if the accused calls evidence of good character, and is 
shown by cross-examination to have a bad character, the jury may give 
this fact such weight as they think fit when assessing the general 
credibility of the accused. " These observations were made in the 
course of the refutation of the over-sophisticated argument that, 
evidence of convictions having been volunteered by, one of the accused 
in anticipation of the cross-examination he had invited by casting 
imputations on the character of Crown witnesses, the jury should have 
1) relying on R. v Row-ton (1864) 10 Cox 25; and R. v Cook (1959) 43 
Cr. App. R. 138 2) Gunewardene (1951) 35 Cr. App. R 80; Toohey v 
Cornnissioner of Metropolitan Police (1965) 49 Cr. App. R. 148. 
3) (1969) 1 Q. B. 299 at 311 
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been directed that the evidence merely showed the accused to be of 
bad character and did not go to his general credibility. They 
should not be taken to contradict what is implicit in Lord Sankey's 
statement quoted earlier that cross-examination of the accused on the 
issue of his good character raised by himself bears on the probabili- 
ty of his guilt. 
Attention should equally be drawn to the observations made by Lord 
Pearce in Toohey v. Commissioner of Metropolitan Police'; he said: 
"From olden times it has been the practice to allow evidence of bad 
reputation to discredit a witness's testimony. It is perhaps not 
very logical and not very useful to allow such evidence founded on 
hearsay. None of your Lordships and none of the counsel before you 
could remember being concerned in a case where such evidence was 
called. But the rule has been sanctified through the centuries in 
legal examinations and textbooks and in some rare cases, and it does 
not create injustice. " The witness may be asked whether he is aware 
of the other's reputation and whether, from such knowledge, he would 
believe him on oath2: or, simply, whether he would believe him on 
oath3. In R v. Gunewardine4 the Court of Criminal Appeal followed 
the rule as stated in Stephen's. Digest of the Law of. Evidence: "The 
credit of any witness may be. impeached by the opposite party, by the 
evidence of persons who swear that they, from their knowledge of the 
witness, believe him to be unworthy of credit upon his oath. Such 
persons may not, upon their examination-in-chief, give reasons for 
their belief, but they may be asked for their reasons in cross- 
1) (1965) 49 Cr. App. R. 148 at 159-160 2) Mawson v Hartsink (1802) 
4 Esp. 102 3) Watson (1817) 2 Stark 116 4) (1951) 35 Cr. App. R. 80 
- 850 - 
examination and their answers cannot be contradicted. " 
In R V. Bellis; Bellis was convicted of possessing explosives. he 
appealed on the ground inter alia, of misdirection as to the 
significance of his previous character in that the judge after 
saying that it was not a ticket to an acquittal continued: "but it is 
something which you must take into account in his favour really on 
the basis that a- person of good character is less likely to commit 
this type of offence than a man of bad character. " It was submitted 
that the proper direction would have been that possession of a good 
character makes a defendant's testimony more worthy of belief than 
that of a person of bad character. The Court of Criminal Appeal 
held, dismissing the appeal, that although there is no formal or 
standard direction on the matter the court took the view that the 
possession of a good character is primarily a matter which goes to 
credibility. The direction actually given was not less favourable 
than the direction which it was submitted should have been given. 
The proposition stated by the trial judge seems with respect to be 
entirely correct. Long before the accused was entitled to give 
evidence (and so before his credibility could be an issue before the 
jury) it was settled that he was entitled to introduce evidence of 
his good character. This could only be on the ground that the jury 
was entitled to take it into account as making it less likely that 
the accused committed the crime. "The object of laying the latter 
'[evidence of character] - before the jury is to induce them to believe, 
1) (1966) 1 W. L. R. 234, (1966) 1 All E'. R. 552n; 50 Cr. App. R. 88 
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from the improbability that a person of good character should have 
conducted himself as alleged, that there is some mistake or mis- 
representation in the evidence on the part of the prosecution" 
1. At 
the present day, evidence of the accused's good character would be no 
less admissible because he did not give evidence. In such a case his 
credibility would not be before the jury but he would have a right 
that they should know his good character and take this into account 
in deciding whether he committed the offence. Clearly good character 
is also relevant to the accused's credibility. Historically, this 
was not its primary purpose. It is respectfully submitted that 
whether good character is a matter going primarily to creditibility 
or to the accused's guilt must depend on the circumstances of the 
case and nature of the evidence of character tendered. 
(IV) THE DIVISIBILITY OF THE CHARACTER OF THE ACCUSED 
As Cross rightly pointed out: "When the prisoner urges that he 
ought to be believed, when he swears that he was innocent of a sexual 
crime because he has a good character for sexual morality, it 
certainly does tend to refute his contention to show that he was 
convicted of an indecent assualt; but it is -open to question whether 
a conviction for theft has the same effect"Z. This raises the issue 
of the propiety of a dictum in Rv Winfield3 on the assumption that 
the accused was cross-examined about his character. According to 
this dictum which was given by Humphreys J., while delivering the 
judgement of the Court of Criminal Appeal in that case: "There is no 
1) Rv Stannard (1837) 7 C& p 673 per Patterson J; and see Rv Shy inp- 
ton (1851) 5 Cox 387; Rv Rowton (1865) 10 Cox 25 2) Cross on Evidence 
3h ed) at p. 428 3) 719n) 2T'Cr. App. Rep. 139 
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such thing known to our procedure as putting half a prisoner's 
character in issue and leaving out the other half. " 
It will be recalled that this issue has earlier been discussed 
under the common law rule - the present purpose is to consider the 
divisibility of the character of the accused under the 1898 Criminal 
Evidence Act1. It will also be remembered from the first discussion 
of the case of R V. Winfield, that conflict between the two reports 
of the case was highlighted. While on the one hand a report 
indicates that it was the defence witness to character who was cross- 
examined as to Winfield's previous convictions for dishonesty2, 
another report on the other hand suggests that it was Winfield who 
was cross-examined as to his previous convictions for dishonesty. 
It is therefore necessary in the circumstances to take the case both 
ways, first as already done, as a decision on the position at common 
law where the prisoner produces a character witness, who is cross- 
examined as to previous convictions of the prisoner not relating to 
the specific trait that is relevant and then as it is presently 
intended, as a decision under the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 where 
the prisoner avails himself of the statutory opportunity of giving 
evidence on oath, and is cross-examined as to previous convictions. 
Though the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, made the accused a 
competant witness in every case, he is not treated in every respect 
like an ordinary witness. We do know that he. is given a shield 
against certain cross-examination by proviso (f) to Section 1 of the 
Act. It is further provided that in certain exceptional cases the 
1) See 1975 Scotland Act; 1958 Crimes Act (Victoria) 2) The headnote 
to 27 Cr. App. Rep. 139, " and so does the statement of facts. 3) 
(1939) 
4 All E. R. 164 
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prisoner cannot avail himself of this shield. On the other hand we do 
know that an ordinary witness can be cross-examined as to any 
previous conviction, and if he denies the conviction it can be proved 
against him under Section 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 18651. In 
Scotland however, the only way to discredit a witness is to question 
as to his honesty; you cannot cross-examine on anything else. A 
first reading of proviso (f) suggests that where the prisoner becomes 
a witness, and one of the exceptions applies, as it did in Winfield's 
case as he gave evidence of his good character, he can be cross- 
examined as to any previous conviction whatsoever. It will be 
recollected that Winfield was convicted of indecent assualt upon a 
woman and that he called a witness to speak of his good behaviour 
with ladies. He (Winfield) had previously been convicted of larceny, 
and it is not clear whether this conviction was put to his character 
witness, in which case the matter fell to be determined by the 
common-law principles that have already been discussed, or whether 
the cross-examination concerning the conviction was of Winfield him- 
self under Section 1 (f) (ii) of the Act of 1898 - (it is the latter 
that is under consideration). In either event, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal appears to have approved of the cross-examination, although 
their observations on the subject were obiter dicta because the 
conviction was quashed on account of the inadequacy of the direction 
to the jury on the subject of corroboration. 
There are apart from Winfield's case, two "sub silentio" 
1) See S. 12 of the Evidence Act 1908 (New Zealand); see to* Rv Morris 
(1959) 43 Cr. App. Rep. 206; Rv Gilday (1924) VLR 42 
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authorities that a previous conviction of the prisoner can be proved 
in a case falling under exception (ii) to proviso (f), even though it 
does not relate to the specific trait involved. In R V. Solomon , 
Solomon was indicted for attempted burglary. He gave evidence on 
oath that he was in respectable employment. On his arrest he had 
stated that he was a respectable man, earning his living, and had 
never robbed anyone of a penny. He was cross-examined, despite 
objections, as to previous convictions for assualt and keeping a 
gaming-house. Solomon was convicted. On appeal, the Court of Crimi- 
nal Appeal found it unnecessary to decide whether Solomon had in fact 
put his character in issue, as they held that there had been no 
substanial miscarriage of justice - (the appeal was therefore dismis- 
sed) 
2, even if the evidence ought not to have been admitted, as it 
was most unlikely, having regard to the nature of the previous convi- 
ctions, that their disclosure influenced the jury at all. It is 
submitted that this is an unfair decision. If the suggestion is 
correct that juries will disregard previous convictions that do not 
relate to the specific trait, even though the judge has given them no 
warning on the point, then the whole object of the present discussion 
is lost, but it is submitted that such evidence is highly prejudi- 
cial and likely to influence the jury. There is no doubt , however, 
that this case is' an authority, sub silentio as the point was never 
argued, that where the prisoner has given evidence on oath and thrown 
away their shield supplied by proviso (f) by giving evidence of his 
good character, he may be cross-examined as to previous convictions 
1) (1909) 2 Cr. App. R. 80 2) Criminal Appeal Act, 1909,7 Edw. 79 
C. 23, S. 4 (1) proviso 
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whether or not they relate to the specific trait. 
The other sub silentio authority, R V. Steinie Morrisonl, is of 
great importance to the subject under discussion. Morrison was, 
indicted for a brutal murder. One prosecution witness, Mrs D., was 
cross-examined by Morrison's counsel, as to whether she kept a 
-brothel. Morrison later gave evidence on oath, and it was held that 
the cross-examination of Mrs D. was an imputation on the character of 
a prosecution witness within exception (ii) to proviso (f), and that 
Morrison could therefore be cross-examined as to his previous 
convictions for larceny and burglary, though he had never been 
convicted of a crime of violence. Morrison's counsel argued that no 
imputation had been cast upon Mrs D., within the exception, but he 
did not take the point that the previous convictions should be 
excluded as not relating to the specific trial. Darling J., admitted 
the previous conviction, but there were two matters on which the 
evidence might be relevant and admissible, first the credibility of 
the prisoner as a witness, and secondly his guilt of the offence 
charged. In this summing-up, the judge cautioned the jury as to the 
danger of his evidence warping their judgement, and instructed them 
to confine their use of it to Morrison's credibility as a witness: 
" ... the only use to be made of these previous convictions is to 
show that when you have to rely upon his (the prisoner's) word as 
contradicting something stated by somebody else, or something which 
is not corroborated, you have not the word of a person who has done 
1) (1911) 6 Cr. App. Rep. 159 
- 856 - 
nothing wrong ... you have only the word of a man whose past career 
has been what you know it to have been"1. This summing-up apparently 
received the approval of the Court of Criminal Appeal, as Lord Alver- 
stone C. J., delivering the judgement of the court, remarked: "The 
cross-examination of Mrs D ... exposed the appellant to the risk of 
his past life being inquired into. It had become a question of 
credibility: who was to be believed when one contradicted the ot- 
her? "2. 
The importance of Morrison's case is that it decides that there are 
circumstances in which previous convictions are admissible in cross- 
examination, under exception (ii), to attack the credibility of the 
prisoner as a witness, but must not be used to prove his guilt. This 
question was examined by Julius Stone in two learned articles, and 
he came to the conclusion that in all the exceptions (i), (ii) and 
(iii), to proviso (f), the cross-examination can be used both to 
attack credibility and to show guilt, desirable as it is in the case 
of exception (ii) that it should be confined to credibility4. His 
main reason for so holding is that the legislature must have known 
that there was a great danger of the jury using such evidence to find 
guilt, yet it made no attempt to seperate the two uses, and that this 
is the most significant since explanation (i) expressly refers to 
admissibility to show guilt as distinct from credit. The position is 
of course clear under exception (i), which is a reference to the 
common law rule of cases such as Makin V. Attorney General of New 
South Wales 
S 
permitting the prosecution to put in evidence previous 
1) Notable British Trials at 277 2) 6 Cr. App. Rep. 159 at 169 
3) 51 LQR 443 & 58 LQR 369 4) 51 LQR 443 at 455-461 and 58 LQR 
369,384 5) (1935) A. C. 309 
- 857 - 
similar of fences committed by the prisoner to prove system, to rebut 
a suggestion on the part of the prisoner of accident or mistake etc. 
And, thus coming back to the case of Winfield, one could say that 
so far as the cross-examination of the prisoner was concerned, it 
ought not to have been used by the jury as a direct means of 
"establishing his guilt, because it was only relevant on the very 
doubtful footing that a thief is more likely to commit an indecent 
assualt than an honest man. Its relevant to the credibililty of the 
prisoner's testimony is not much greater either although, there is 
just a little more force in the argument that a convicted thief is 
more likely to lie than others. However on the authority of P. v. 
Morrison, it can' be viewed as a matterr affecting credibility; that 
is, Winfield's cross-examination can be justified on the footing that 
having put his character in issue, he fortified his right to be 
treated, as regards cross-examination, otherwise than as an ordinary 
witness, and an ordinary witness may be cross-examined about a 
conviction for any offence with a view to shaking his ceredibility. 
it is significant to mention that R v. Winfield2 has received some 
support from a dictum of Lord Simon in Stirland V. Director of Public 
Prosecutions3 , though it remains to be seen whether this will be 
held tantamount to House of Lord's approval of the course that was 
adopted in that case. Lord Simon's third proposition in Stirland's 
case was that: "An accused who 'puts his character in issue' must be 
regarded as putting the whole of his past record in issue. He cannot 
1) (1911) 6 Cr. App. R. 159 2) (1939) 27 Cr. App. Rep. 139 
3) (1944) A. C. 315 at 324; (1944) 2 All E. R. 13 at 18 
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assert his good conduct in certain respects without exposing himself 
to inquiry about the rest of his record so far as this tends to 
disprove a claim to good character. " The qualification added by his 
Lordsship "so far as this tends to disprove a claim for good 
character", seems to leave the question much as it was before. 
However, in Selvey v. Director of Public Prosecutions 
i, Selvey had 
convictions for dishonesty and homosexual convictions: only the 
latter were allowed to be put to him - the accused in the case was 
charged with buggery. 
In the New Zealand the case of R v. Johnston2, the appellant had 
been found guilty of an indecent assualt on a six year old girl and 
the Court of Appeal, without refering to R v. Winfield or Stirland's 
case, held that the trial judge had not exercised his discretion 
wrongly in allowing the prosecution to cross-examine the accused as 
to his previous convictions for dishonesty. 
In the light of Selvey's case, the New Zealand Court of Appeal is 
unlikely to decide in the same way in future3. Though by and large 
the position cannot be said to be exactly settled regarding this 
matter, I must say however that I will be more willing to abide by 
the decision in Selvey because it is a more just line of reasoning to 
my mind. And it is significant to point out that there hasn't been 
any other authority to the contrary since then, at least to the best 
of my knowledge and commentators don't seem critical of it either. 
1) (1968) 2 All E. R. 497; Cf Lord'Denning in the Court of Appeal, (1967) 
3 WLR 1637,1640 2) (1956) NZLR 516; Cf Rv Woods (1956) 56 SR(NSW) 
, 142 3) Cf Rv Fisher 
(1964) NZLR 1063 
(V) IMPUTATIONS ON THE CHARACTER OF THE PROSECUTOR OR THE WITNESSES 
FOR THE PROSECUTION 
The second limb of Section 1 (f) (ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 
18981, permits cross-examination of the accused tending to show that 
he has commited, been convicted of, or charged with other offences or 
is of bad character, if: "the nature or conduct of the defence is 
such as to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor or 
of the witnesses for the prosecution. " 
It seems that this is the only part of the provisions which has 
been the subject of reported decisions in the Scottish Courts2 and as 
we shall soon find out, they have interpreted it differently from the 
House of Lords3. 
It is proposed to preface the discussion of the main problems 
arising on the application to the statutory provision by dealing with 
some minor matters, mainly of definition. 
(a). DEFINITION 
"Nature or Conduct .. Imputations" - As will be seen, the word, 
"imputation" has generally been given its ordinary meaning. The main 
difficulty which has arisen is due to the words "the nature or 
conduct of the defence is such as to involve imputations". In O'Hara 
v. H. M. Advocate4, Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson faced up to the 
interpretational problems thrown up by the section and concluded: 
"the real difficulty ... lies in what is meant by the 'nature or 
conduct of the defence'. 'Conduct' by itself would not create 
difficulty as. this would mean the actual handling of the case by the 
1) See SS. 141 (f) (ii) and 346 (f) (ii) of the 1975 Scotland Act; 
S. 399 (e) (ii}, 1958 Crimes Act - Victoria; S1 (f) (ii) Criminal 
Justice (Evidence) Act 1924 - Ireland. 2) O'Hara vHM Advocate 
(1948) J. C. 90 applied in Fielding vHM Advocate (1959) J. C. 101 
HM Advocate v Deighan (1961) SLT (Sh. Ct) 38; and HM Advocate v 
Grudins (1976) SLT (Notes) 10.3) Selvey v D. P. P. (1970) A. C. 304 
4) (1948) J. C. 90 
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accused or his advocate so as to bring about a general attack on 
character. I find 'nature' much more difficult, as at first blush it 
seems to point to something inherent in the defence and therefore apt 
to cover for example provocation in a charge of assualt-... . But 
the more general considerations I have mentioned persuade me to the 
view that 'nature' is to be read, not as meaning something which is 
inherent in the defence, but as referable to the mechanism of the 
defence; nature being the strategy of the defence and conduct the 
tactics. "1 
"The Prosecutor" - The Act does not define "prosecutor". Any 
question as to the meaning of the word must be largely academic, for 
in the vast majority of cases the prosecutor, whoever he be, will be 
a witness for the prosecutions. 
A magistrate whoconducts the preliminary investigations which 
resullts in the committal for trail of the accused is not the 
prosecutor within the meaning of the section; nor is a police officer 
merely on the ground that he was involved in the inquiry or 
the collection of evidence. In R v. Westfa112 it was held that 
defence allegations that the magistrate had unfairly deprived accused. 
of opportunity of calling a witness, and that a detective, who was 
not a witness, had coached the victim in his evidence and struck 
accused when he protested, was not within the purview of Section 1 
(f) (ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. And in the Australian 
case of R V. Billings3, an attack upon counsel for the Crown appea- 
1) Ibid at 98. See also Attorney-General v Campbell (1928) 62 I. L. T. R. 
30 2) (1912) 7 Cr. App. Rep. 176 3 1961) VR 127 
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ring to prosecute have been held to fall outside the equivalent 
proviso, so that they did not warrant cross-examination under the 
section. 
In a case of homicide the deceased is not the prosecutor, for as 
was pointed out in R V. Biggin1, "(there--is) neither the will nor the 
intention on his part to prosecute. He (is) dead and can take no 
part in the proceedings"2. In that case the appellant was indicted 
for murder. The defence set up was that the act had been done in 
self-defence, the killed man having made improper overtures to the 
appellant, and on these being rejected had violently assualted him. 
Questions were addressed to the appellant in cross-examination which 
had no relevance to the charge of murder, but which tended to show 
that the appellant had previously committed an offence other than 
that for which he was being tried. No evidence had been given or 
questions asked to show that the appellant had a good character. The 
questions although objected to were admitted on the grounds that the 
dead man was the prosecutor and that the defence involved an 
imputation on his character and also because they tended to show that 
the appellant did not always speak the truth. The appellant was 
convicted of manslaughter and appealled. The court held that the 
questions were not admissible on the ground that the defence involved 
an imputation on the character of the dead in as much as he was not 
the prosecutor within the meaning of Section 1 (f) of the Criminal 
Evidence Act, 1898; and it was further held that the questions were 
not admissible to prove that the appellant did not always speak the 
1) (1920) I. K. B. 213; see also Rv Gillis (1957) Y. R. 91 2) (1920) 
1. K. B. 213 at 219; - [cases are conceivable in which the prosecutor 
would not be called as a witness and imputations on his character would 
none the less expose the accused to cross-examination under the 
legislation] 
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truth, and that therefore the conviction must be quashed. 
A similar ruling was given in the Scottish case of H. M. Advocate 
v. Grudinsl. The accused was charged on indictment that on 29th or 
30th March 1975, she assualted her husband, John Grudins, and did 
stab him on the body with a knife or similar sharp instrument and did 
murder him. In the course of the trial the panel gave evidence. In 
examination-in-chief the witness stated that while she and her 
husband were living apart between 1966 and 1973 he did not send her 
any money. In cross-examination the advocate-depute asked: -"Did you 
remain faithful to your husband while you were in England? " Counsel 
for the defence objected to the question and Lord Stewart heard 
argument from counsel in the absence of the jury. Counsel based his 
objection on the terms of Section 1 (f) of the Criminal Evidence Act 
1898 arguing that the question and the line of questioning fore- 
shadowed tended to show that the accused was of bad character. The 
advocate-depute countered that he was entitled to ask the question in 
order possibly to explain why the panel's deceased husband had failed 
to support her during their separation, a matter which had been 
raised in evidence-in-chief. Such a situation was covered by the 
terms of Section 1 (f) of the Act. Had he been alive the accused's 
husband would have been a witness for the prosecution, and it would 
be illogical to allow cross-examination if he were alive and to 
disallow it when he was dead. in sustaining the objection for the 
defence and disallowing the question Lord Stewart said: "In O'Hara v. 
1) (1976) SLT (Notes) 10; 
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H. M Advocate', it was assumed that the prosecutor would always ask 
for leave to cross-examine. I see much force in the argument of the 
advocate-depute that it is artificial to distinguish between 
witnesses for the prosecution and deceased persons, who, if the crime 
had been a lesser one, would have been alive to be prosecution 
, witnesses. 
Nevertheless, I do not consider that I would be 
justified in interpreting the words of the statute when they refer 
to 'witnesses forthe prosecution' as flexibleenough to include 
deceased persons who are not, and cannot be, such witnesses. However 
if I am wrong in this, and the situation does fall within the second 
exception to paragraph (f) of Section 1 of the 1898 Act, I have a 
discretion to refuse to allow this cross-examination. " 
"Witnesses for the Prosecution" - This phrase presents no difficulty, 
but it should be observed that an accomplice called as a witness is 
in the same position under the section as any other witness. Even if 
the prosecution has already impugned the character of the witness by 
stressing that he was an accomplice, cross-examination of witness 
which imputes to him the commission of some other crime will render 
the accused liable to cross-examination on his convictions or 
character as R v. Cohen2 shows. In that case it was held that it is 
an "imputation" within Section 1 (f) (ii) of the Criminal Evidence 
Act 1898, to suggest that a witness for the prosecution tended as an 
accomplice, and a person of bad character, has committed a crime 
other than that he has admitted. Similarly as R v, -Watson3 
illustrates, where the prosecution has already called into question 
1) (1948) J. C. 90 2) (1914) 10 Cr. App. Rep. 91 3) (1913) 8 Cr. 
App. Rep. 249 
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the character of the witness by stressing that he was an accomplice, 
cross-examination of the witness which otherwise involves imputations 
on his character beyond what has already been revealed to his 
discredit by the prosecution will in return open the accused to 
cross-examination on his convictions or character. In that case, an 
"unrepresented defendant was charged with receiving, and made various 
allegations against a prosecution witness who had been put forward by 
the prosecution as an accomplice. During the defendant's cross- 
examination he charged the witness with sending him blackmailing 
letters. Pickford, i., said that the allegations seemed to cast 
imputations on the character of the witness, because it suggested 
that he had told false stories about his relations for the purpose of 
his own advantage and had also sent the appellant threatening let- 
ters. The court concluded that the appellant was not satisfied with 
the statement that the witness was an accomplice "but wished to 
elicit more in order that the jury should not accept his evidence. " 
The court was therefore not able to say that the evidence as to the 
appellant's character was wrongly admitted, but significantly, Pic- 
kford, J., said it was not a question for the court whether it would 
have exercised its discretion in the same way - "it might have worked 
a considerable injustice" because the jury heard the full bad history 
of the appellant, but only a portion of the witness's bad character. 
And an Irish case goes slightly further than those cited above, by 
holding that there is an imputation within the section if the defence 
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alleges that a witness who, if the accused committed the crime 
charged, was admittedly an accomplice, himself committed the crime. 
In The People (Attorney General) v. Coleman', the accused was found 
guilty on two counts of criminal abortion. At his trial he was asked 
questions in cross-examination tending to show that he was of bad 
character. It was held that these questions were admisible in view 
of the fact that counsel for the defence had asked questions of the 
witnesses or the prosecution, the woman in respect of whom the charge 
was brought and her husband, tending to show that the husband had 
committed the offence himself; that husband and wife had conspired to 
charge the accused with the crime; that prior to her marriage the 
wife had used contraceptives, contrary to the teachings of her reli- 
gion; and that the witness had married with the object of defeating 
justice, these suggestions being imputations on the character of 
witnesses for the prosecution within the meaning of Section 1 (f) 
(ii) of the Irish Criminal Justice (Evidence) Act, 19242. 
similar principles regarding accomplice presumably apply to any 
witness tendered by the prosecution as a witness of bad character. 
The phrase "the witness" has not been read by the courts as 
requiring imputations on the character of more than one witness. 
Notkes, referring to the Interpretation Act 1898, which, by Section 
1 (f) (1) (b), provides that, in an Act of Parliament, unless the 
contrary intention appears, words in the plural shall include the 
singular, commented as follows "Proviso (f) (ii) is far from happily 
drafted. It is not clear that it was necessary to mention both the 
1) (1945) I. R. 237, Irish C. C. A. 2) Equivalent of S. 1 (f) (ii) 
of'the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 
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prosecutor and the witnesses for the prosecution, for the latter will 
normally include an actual prosecutor and the Crown as prosecutor is 
not likely to suffer imputations; o. r to refer to imputations and 
witnesses in the plural, since a single imputation on a single 
witness is sufficient, presumably by virtue of the Interpretation 
Act, 1898, Section 1 (i) (b), to bring the proviso into operation, 
and has done so in various cases ... without argument on plurality or 
singularly. "' 
(b) GENERAL PROBLEM OF INTERPRETATION 
We may now concern ourselves with the interpretation of the phrase 
"the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve 
imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for 
the prosecution. " -The difficulty about this phraseology is that 
unless it is given some restricted meaning a prisoner's bad 
charcater, ifhe had one, would emerge almost as a matter of course. 
Counsel for the defence could not submit that a-witness for the 
prosecution was untruthful without making an imputation upon his 
character; in many cases a plea of not guilty coupled with an asser- 
tion of innocence in-the witness box would render the accused liable 
to cross-examination on his criminal record, on account of the tacit 
suggestion that the prosecutor or one of his witnesses had been 
guilty of perjury. In R v. Cook2, Devlin, J., spoke about the nature 
of the basic problem arising on the interpretation of these words 
thus: "It is clear from the subsection (ie. Section 1 (f) of the 
1) Nokes - "Imputations on The Prosecution" - (1959) 22 MLR 511 
at 512 2) (1959) 2 Q. B. 340 at 344-345 
Criminal Evidence Act 1898) as a whole that it does not intend that 
the introduction of a prisoner's prevoious convictions should be 
other than exceptional. The difficulty about its phraseology is that 
unless it is given some restricted meaning, a prisoner's bad charca- 
ter, if he had one, would emerge almost' as a matter of course. 
-Counsel for the defence could not submit that a witness for the 
prosecution was untruthful without making an imputation upon his 
character; a prisoner charged with assualt could not assert that the 
prosecutor struck first without imputing to him a similar crime". 
The avoidance of such a conclusion has led to an uneasy conflict of 
authority, palliated by an extensive exercise of the court's discre- 
tion. The authorites as we shall see, 'show that the courts have 
endeavoured to surmount this difficulty in two ways. First, it has 
in a number of cases construed the words of the subsection as benevo- 
lently as possible in favour of the accused. Secondly, it has laid 
down that, in cases which fall within the subsection, the trial judge 
must not allow as a matter of course questions designed to show bad 
character; he must weigh the prejudicial effect of such questions 
against the damage done by the attack on the prosecution witnesses, 
and must generally exercise his discretion so as to secure a trial 
that is fair both to the prosecution and to the defence. 
Next, the authorities will be briefly reviewed before that ratio- 
nale of the later-part of Section 1 (f) (ii) and the purpose of the 
cross-examination which it permits are considered. 
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(C) IMPUTATIONS 
In R V. Rouse and Another', the view was expressed that, raising a 
defence, even in forcible language was not necessarily casting impu- 
tations on the prosecutor or his witnesses. In that case, upon the 
trial of an indictment for conspiring by false pretences to induce 
the prosecutor to sell a mare, the prosecutor gave evidence that one 
of the defendants had previously offered to buy the mare on credit. 
The defendant in question was callled as a witnesss for the defence, 
and was asked in cross-examination, "Did you ask the prosecutor to 
sell you the mare in April, or has he invented all that? " To which 
he replied, "No it is a lie, and he is a liar". Counsel for the 
prosecution was thereupon allowed to cross-examine the defendant's-as 
to previous convictions. The court held that the defendant's answer 
amounted only to an emphatic denial of the truth of the charge a- 
gainst him; that the nature or conduct of the defence was not such as 
to involve imputations on the character of the prosecutor within the 
meaning of Section 1-sub-section (f) (ii) of the Criminal Evidence 
Act 1898, and that therefore the defendant was not liable to be 
cross-examined as to his previous character. In his judgement Lord 
Alverstone said: " Either the answer amounted to no more than a plea 
of not guilty put in forcible language such as would not be unnatural 
in a person in the defendant's rank in life or it had nothing to do 
with the conduct of the defence. " 2 In the same case, Darling, J., 
had similarly decided that to deny a fact alleged by the prosecution 
1) (1904) 1 K. B. 184; see also Rv Stratton (1909) 3 Cr. App. Rep. 
255; Rv Parker (1924) 18 Cr. App. Rep. 14; Rv Manley (1962) 46 Cr. 
App. Rep. 235; 2) (1904) 1 k. B. 184 at 189 
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is not necessarily to make an attack on the character of the prosecu- 
tor or his witnesses; in his words: "such a denial is necessary and 
inevitable in every case ... , and is nothing more than a traverse of 
the truth of an allegation made against him; to add in cross-examina- 
tion that the prosecutor is a liar is merely an emphatic mode of 
denial, and does not affect its essential quality"1. In R v. Grout2, 
the court said that a declaration by the accused that the constable 
charging him was telling lies was only an emphatic way of stating the 
charge was not true, and was not an imputation upon the constable's 
character within the meaning of the exception contained in the parag- 
raph. The same view was adopted by the Supreme Court of South Aus- 
tralia in Hewitt V. Lentha, 13, and by the Supreme Court of Western 
Australia in R v. Martinelli4. Similarly Lord Goddard C. J., said in 
R v. Clarks "... I do not believe that any judge would allow a roving 
cross-examination into the prisoner's past merely because he said, 
'The police constable is a liar', or 'The police constable is not 
telling the truth'; for all he is doing is pleading-not guilty with 
emphasis ... " It may therefore be assumed that a judge would- only 
in exceptional circumstances allow the prosecution to cross-examine 
the accused on his past record in answer to an allegation that prose- 
cution witnesses are lying or that evidence is false. 
However it appears that the judgement in the above cases have to be 
confined to the special facts of the cases, because there are cases 
where the defence allegation of untruthfullness go beyond the 
1) Ibid at. 187 2) (1909) 3 Cr. App. Rep. 64 3), (1931) SASR 314 
4) (1980). 10 WALR 33 5) (1955) 2 Q. B. 469 at 478 
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witness's evidence and this may account for the comparative ease with 
which the Court of Criminal Appeal concluded in R V. Rappolt1 that an 
assertion by the accused that the prosecutor was such a horrible 
liar that his brother would not speak to him warranted cross- 
examination under Section 1 (f) (ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 
1898. 
Generally when the veracity of the prosecutor or his witness is not 
challenged, the statute has often been construed favourably to the 
accused. He has for example in R V. Eidenow2, been allowed to 
allege with impunity that a witness for the prosecution failed to 
hand over the proceeds of a cheque which he had been asked to cash. 
And in R V. Morgan3, the charge against the accused was of 
obtaining by false pretences and obtaining credit by fraud. His 
defence in part was a denial of indebtedness. The accused also made 
an allegation that the prosecutor did not deliver an itemised bill 
and that his charges as an innkeeper were excessive. In his 
judgement, Lord Alverstone C. J., said: "You cannot twin a defence 
involving a bona fide dispute which might justify a man in declining 
to pay into an attack on the witnesses for the prosecution. "4 A 
similar reasoning process could be deciphered from the decision in H. 
M. Advocate v. Deighans In that case, a ganef charged on indictment 
with house-breaking and assualt upon the occupier of the home lodged 
a special defence of self-defence. At the trial, his solicitor 
suggested to the complainer that he (the complainer) was of violent 
temprament and proved convictions for the breach of the peace and 
1) (1911) 6 Cr. App. R. 156 2) (1932) 23 Cr. App. Rep. 145 3) (1910) 
5 Cr. App. Rep. 157 4) Ibid at 161 5) (1961) S. L. T. (Sh. Ct. ) 38 
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assualt against him. It was also put to the complainer that he kept 
the house as a boarding house to which he knowingly allowed 
prostitutes to resort with their clients for immoral purposes. The 
prosecutor then moved the court to allow questions to be put to the 
panel regarding his previous character. The panel's solicitor 
contended his questions were-necessary to establish the plea of self- 
defence, and to set up his defence that he did not break into the 
house but was admitted to it by a prostitute who had received a key 
from the complainer. The court held that the motion should be 
refused. 
It must be said that the efforts of the courts to interprete the 
words of the section even handedly, have resulted in the existence of 
a number of irreconcilable decisions, though it is fair to say that 
it will be too much to expect complete consistency on an issue like 
this. For instance, someone who is charged with receiving throws 
away his shield if he casts aspersions on the morality of the 
complainant as it happened in Rv Jenkins'. The defendant was 
charged with stealing, or alternatively receiving, a coat which had 
been found in his possession and which the prosecutrix said was hers. 
The defence was that the coat was the property of another person, 
and it was suggested to the prosecutrix, who was married, that she 
had had sexual relations with the defendant. This was held to be an 
imputation on her character, but the court pointed out that where 
there had been such an imputation by reason of the nature or conduct 
1) (1945) 31 Cr. App. Rep. 1; see also Rv Jones (1909) 3 Cr. App. 
Rep. 67 
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of the defence the judge still had a discretion-whether to let in the 
defendant's character. And in R V. Morris, the appellant was char- 
ged with sexual intercourse with his stepdaughter, aged 11 (eleven). 
Questions were put in cross-examination to the girl on her having 
stolen from school, having had intercourse with a boy, in the habit 
of keeping bad company and coming home late at night, and to the 
girl's mother of having been found in the act of intercourse with a 
man not her husband. When the appellant gave evidence, counsel for 
the Crown obtained leave from the judge to cross-examine the appel- 
lant on a previous conviction for dishonesty, on the ground that the 
nature or conduct of the defence was such as to involve imputations 
on the character of the Crown witnesses within the meaning of Section 
1 (f) (ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. It was held that as 
the general line adopted by the defence was to make suggestions to 
discredit the girl and her mother, there had been imputations on the 
character of Crown witnesses within the meaning of the section and 
the judge had rightly exercised his discretion in permitting cross- 
examination of the appellant on the previous conviction. 
similarly an. alleged burglar who explains the presence of his 
fingerprints in the prosecutor's bedroom by an allegation of a 
homosexual relationship with him2; and an accused who raised 
suggestion of provocation by homosexual advances3 have been held to 
lose their shield since they have by implication cast aspersionson 
the morality of the prosecutrix. However one would have expected by 
the same token that an allegation that the prosecutor is a habitual 
1) (1959) 43 Cr. App. Rep. 206; see also Rv Gilday (1924) VLR 42 
2) Rv Bisho (1975) Q. B. 274; (1974) 2 All E. R. 1206 3) v -11 
Cunningham 1959) IQ. B. 288; (1958) 3 All E. R. 71 
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drunkard by someone charged with robbery would have the same effect 
since it is equally an aspersion on the morality of the prosecutrix. 
But curiously and for no obvious reason in R V. Westfall1, it was 
held inter alia that a suggestion in cross-examination that the 
prosecutor is a habitual drunkard, is not an imputaion on character 
within Section 1 (f) of the 1898 Criminal Evidence Act. It has, 
however been held in RV Brown 2that the statement that the prosecu- 
tor in a case of causing grevious bodily harm following a road acci- 
dent, was quite drunk, was driving disgracefully, shouting abuse at 
other drivers and deliberately stopped in the middle of the road to 
prevent other drivers from passing, amounted to an imputation on the 
character of the prosecutor. 
And in the Australian case of R V. Billings3 it has been held that 
the final address of counsel for the accused is part of the conduct' 
of the defence, and that a trial judge was entitled to apply the 
statute to permit the recall of' the accused where in such addresses 
imputations had been cast of the kind mentioned in the section. 
In R v. Preston4, the suggestion that an identification parade had 
been unfairly conducted was held not to deprive the accused of his 
shield, because the defence was not conducted on the footing that the 
police inspector was a witness of such a character that he ought not 
to be believed. It might be worthwhile stating the full facts of the 
case. There, the appellant had been placed in an identity parade 
after a housebreaking. He was second from the end of a row and he 
1) (1912) 7 Cr. App. Rep. 176 2) (1960) Cr. App. Rep. 181 
3) (1961) VR 127 4) (1909) 1 k. B. 568 
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heard a police inspector say something about "second" to a constable 
whom he sent to bring in a man who was to identify the appellant. 
When this man came in he immediately picked out a man standing second 
from the other end of the row. In his evidence at the trial the 
appellant referred to what had happened and he accused the inspector 
of deliberately assisting the witness in his identification. The 
appellant was thereupon cross-examined as to previous convictions on 
the ground that his evidence "involved imputations" upon the prose- 
cution. He was convicted and in the Court of Criminal Appeal, Chan- 
nell, J., recited the words of Section 1 (f) of the 1898 Act and 
said: "It appears to us to mean this: that if the defence is so 
conducted, or the nature of the defence is such, as to involve the 
proposition that the jury ought not to believe the prosecutor or one 
of the witnesses for the prosecution upon the ground that his conduct 
- not his evidence in the case, but his conduct outside the evidence 
given by him - makes him an unreliable witness, then the jury ought. 
also to know the character of the prisoner who either gives that 
evidence or makes that charge, and it becomes admissible to cross- 
examine the prisoner as to his antecedents and character with the 
view of showing that he has such a bad character that the jury ought 
not to rely upon his evidence". No doubt, he added, the prisoner has 
said something about the inspector which involved a suggestion of 
improper conduct, namely that he had conducted the arrangements for 
identification in an unfair way - "a serious imputation upon the 
conduct of a man holding the position of inspector of police". But 
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he concluded that the allegation was made with reference to a matter 
which could not be said to be irrelevant. The conviction was quas- 
hed. It is however settled in R v. Wright' that a suggestion by a 
prisoner that admissions made by him when in custody were obtained by 
bribes or threats of a policeman was an "imputation" letting in 
character. It was alleged, inter alia, that a police inspector had 
bribed the appellant with tobacco. Darling, J., said: " The imputa 
tion in the case now before us was that the police inspector was not 
a fit person to remain in the force: had he done what was imputed to 
him there is no doubt that he could have been dismissed from the 
force; it is the gravest possible imputation, and cannot be excused 
by the contention that it was the only way open to the appellant of 
meeting the case against him". In Selvey V. Director of Public 
Prosecutions!, Lord Dilhorne considered this decision to be irrecon- 
cilable with R V. Westfall3, where there was also a suggestion that a 
confession had been obtained by violence. It is also impossible to 
reconcile the decision of Wright 
4 
with that in Preston, and indeed 
the words of Darling, J., quoted above are all the more remarkable - 
and the decision all the more unfair - if it is borne in mind that 
the identification sought to be fabricated by the inspector in R V. 
Preston was abortive and so formed no part of the case against the 
appellant. And it can scarecly be argued even for controversial 
purposes that a charge of conducting _a 
false identity parade is less 
serious than one of securing admissions by bribery. It is true that 
1) (1910) Cr. App. R. 131; of Attorney General v O'Shea (1931) I. R. 
713 2) (1970) A. C. 304 at 305 3) (1912) Cr. App. Rep. 176 
4) (1910) 5 Cr. App. Rep. 131 5) (1909) 1 k. B. 568 
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in R v. Preston, Channell, J., said that the, case was very near the 
line, but if in that case the prisoner was within the limits of 
immunity - though barely so - it is difficult in logic or sense to 
see why R V. Wright should have been outside the limits - he was, 
after all, developing his defence in the face of alleged admissions 
which formed a substantial part of the prosecution case, whereas 
Preston, unincriminated by the fabricated parade did not need to make 
the imputation that the policeman "was guilty of misconduct indepen- 
dently of the defence or of the necessity for developing the defence" 
as Lord Alverstone, C. J., put it in the next case to be considered, 
that of R v. Bridgwater. 
Lord Alverstone's words were spoken in the Court for Crown Cases 
Reserved in the case of R V. Bridgwater, where the point was whether 
the defendant might be cross-examined as to character because he 
alleged that he had acted under the directions of a detective called 
Moss, a prosecution witness. The defendant had been arrested while 
in possession of stolen property and he said in answer to the charge 
that he had acted under Moss's instructions. - At the trial Moss was 
cross-examined as to whether he had not employed the defendant as an 
informer. - Lord Alverstone said that the defendant was doing no more 
than developing his defence and seeking to substantiate it by means 
of admissions from Moss. It is submitted that this passage from the 
judgement nicely expresses a distinction which the Appeal Court has 
not invariably appreciated: "If the questions put to Moss had 
involved the imputation that he was guilty of misconduct independent- 
1) (1905) 1 k. B. 131 
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ly of the defence, or of the necessity for developing the defence, 
different considerations might arise, for the questions might then 
perhaps be construed as an attack on the prosecutor's general char- 
acter. " indeed, if the attack had been in the sense of the 
concluding words, or, so to speak, gratuitous, character would have 
been let in - subject to the court's basic discretion which stands 
apart from the Criminal Evidence Act. This was the situation in R v. 
Steinie Morrison', where several matters were raised on appeal, but 
the sole one relevant here arises out of an attack on a prosecution 
witness suggesting that she kept a disorderly house. The Court of 
Criminal Appeal held that this cross-examination fell within the 
express terms of the Act and exposed the defendant to the risk of his 
past life being inquired into. The judgement, delivered by Lord 
Alverstone, makes plain what is permissible under the Act and what is 
not: "It had become a question of credibility: who was to be be- 
lieved when one contradicted the other? It was clear her evidence 
was very important, as it was true, it destroyed the prisoner's 
alibi, and she might have been effectively cross-examined as to her 
memory, her opportunity of seeing the appellant, and so forth. But 
Mr Abinger was not content to do this, he made a violent attack on 
her character so as to discredit her evidence altogether, and he did 
it with his eyes open, and after consultation with his client. " 
Abinger's memoirs2 deal with the case and criticise the law. He 
put the case of a prosecution witness who has been convicted of 
1) (1911) 6 Cr. App. R. 159 2) Forty Years at the Bar, p. 48 
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perjury and asks: "Is counsel defending the man in the dock to allow 
such a witness to leave the dock uncross-examined as to his 
convictions for perjury, and thus-delude the jury into belie eing he 
is a reliable witness? " There is undoubted substance in his plaint, 
but as the law stood, and stands, the decision of the Appeal Court 
was correct, because the attack on the witness was extraneous to the 
defence. 
Understandably in the Australian case of Matthews v. R1, where an 
accused charged with larceny as a servant alleged that his receipt of 
the money in question was made with the concurrence of the managing 
partner of the employer and as part of a "tax dodge", it was held 
that the effect of cross-examination of the managing partner to this 
effect was to throw away the statutory protection. 
It is settled that a suggestion that successive remands were 
obtained by the police to enable them to fabricate evidence2; and 
that a confession was dictated by one police officer to another3; or 
the assertion of a complete "frame up" by the police4, does mean 
that the conduct of the defence involves imputations on the character 
of the prosecutor or his witnesses. And in R V. Roberts (otherwise 
Spalding)5. The appellant had been charged with larceny and with 
failing to report and had been sentenced to two terms of six months 
with hard labour consecutively. At his trial he gave evidence that 
a woman with whom he had been living had during a quarrel threatened 
that she would have revenged on him by having him arrested. Posing 
the question whether this came within the statutory provision, Dar- 
-1) 
(1973) WAR 110; 2) Rv Jones (1923) 17 Cr. App. Rep. 117 
3) Rv Clark (1955) 2 Q. B. 469; 1955) 3 All E. R. 29; 4) Rv Phillips 
(1963) NZLR, 855 at 857, see-generally. R v Dawson (1961) 106 C. L. R. 1, 
at 11 per Dixon C. J., 5) (1920) 15 Cr. App. Rep. 65; see also Rv 
McLean (1926) 19 Cr. App. Rep. 104; Rv Dunkley (1927) 1 k. B.; Rv 
Fisher (1964) NZLR 1063; The People (Att. Ge-en v Havelin (1952) 86 
I. L. T. R. 168 
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ling, J., said: "In the present case the imputation on the character 
of the woman was the whole substance of the defence, and all the 
cases seemed to show that it came within what the statute regarded as 
sufficient to enable the prisoner to be cross-examined as to his own 
character. " 
It is almost startling to find out that one of the authorities used 
to support the conclusion was R V. Preston. As Darling J., 
observed, the allegation made by the appellant in R V. Roberts2 was 
that the woman had determined to make a charge against the appellant 
which she knew to be false. By what possible exercise in logic could 
this misconduct be differentiated from that of the police inspector 
accused of trying to fabricate incriminating evidence -Rv. 
Preston?. In R V. Roberts, the charge against the woman was "the 
whole substance of 'the defence", and on any view it was a much 
stronger case for- preserving the prisoners immunity from revelation 
of his character than was in R v. Preston, where the prisoner was 
held entitled to be protected because the charge he made against the 
police inspector was, in the words of Channell, J., made "with refe- 
rence to a matter which could not be said to be irrelevant. " 
Lord Hewart C. J., once said -Rv. Jones3 - that 
'a clear line is 
drawn between words which are an emphatic denial of the Crown's 
1) (1909) I K. B. 568 2) (1920) 15 Cr. App. Rep. 65; (1920) 37 
T. L. R. 69 3) (1923) 17 Cr. App. Rep. 117, at 120; see also Rv 
Lev (1966) 50 Cr. App. Rep. 238; Rv Tanner (1977) 66 Cr. App. 
Rep. 56 
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evidence and words which attack the character or conduct of the 
witness, but the imprecise nature of this distinction was immediately 
emphasised when he added: "It was one thing for appellant to deny 
that he had made the confession, but it was another thing to say that 
the-whole thing was a deliberate and elaborate concoction on the part 
of the inspector; that seems to be an attack on the character of the 
witness. " 
it is respectfully submitted that the same judge approached more 
nearly to the truth when he said: "It is not possible to lay down, 
even if it were desirable, as the authorities stand, a series of 
formulas or regulations on this matter. "' "These cases", said 
Chanel, J., in R v. Preston2, "are-very often somewhat difficult to 
deal with", and I quite agree. 
(VI) READING WORDS INTO SECTION 1 (f) (ii)3 
In R V. Dunkley4 Lord Hewart C. J., said that "It is not possible 
to lay down, even if it were desirable, as the authorities stand, a 
series of formulas or regulations on this matter". Though these 
words were spoken many years ago, they are still true today -a fact 
which is amply demonstrated by a consideration of the authorities on 
the subject of adding gloss to the last part of Section 1 (f) (ii). 
One important question that needs to be considered now is whether it 
can be said that the accused is only exposed to cross-examination 
concerning his record when the nature or conduct of the defence is 
such as to involve "unnecessary" or "unjustifiable" imputations upon 
1) Rv Dunkle (1927) I K. B. 323 at 330 2) (1909) I K. B. 568 
3) See Ss 141 (f) (ii) and 346 (f) (ii) of the 1975 Scotland Act; 
S. 399 (e) (ii) 1958 Crimes Act - Victoria; S. 159 (d) (ii) Nigerian 
Evidence Act 4) (1927) 1 K. B. 323 at 330 
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the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution. 
If the answer is negative the prisoner who alleges that it was not 
he, but a crown witness, who committed the crime charged, that the 
prosecutrix who asserts his guilt of rape was a consenting party of 
acts of immorality or that the man he assualted was the aggresor will 
be unable to develop his defence without throwing his shield away. 
' 
Initially this question was answeed in the affirmative; it will be 
recalled for example that in R V. Bridgewater2, it was held that a 
suggestion that someone found in possession of stolen property 
acquired it under instructions from the police did not amount to 
imputation on the character of the prosecutor or his witness. And 
in R v. Preston3, the suggestion that an identification parade had 
been unfairly conducted was held not to amount to an imputation 
within the provision. 
An emphatic negative was however the reply given to the question by 
a full Court of Criminal Appeal in R V. Hudson4, -a prosecution for 
larceny to which the defence was that the crime had been perpetrated 
by a Crown witness. Lord Alverstone, C. J., disposes of the matter 
in the following passage from the judgement of the Court: - "We think 
that the words of the section, 'unless the nature or conduct of the 
defence is such as to involve imputations, ... ' must receive their 
ordinary natural interpretation, and that it is not legitimate to 
qualify them by adding or inserting the words 'unnecessarily' or 
'unjustifiably' or 'for the purposes other than that of developing 
the defence', or other similar words. " 
'1) See Cross On Evidence, 5th ed. - at p. 431 2) (1905) I K. B. 131 
3) (1909) I K. B. 568 4) (1912) 2 K. B. 464; Decisions to the same 
effect are Rv Cohen (1914) 10 Cr. App. R. 91; Rv Bishop (1975) Q. B. 
274; (1974) 2 All E. R. 206; Rv Jenkins (1945) 31 r. App. Rep. 1; R 
v Pollinger (1930) 22 Cr. App. Rep. 75. See also The People (Att. Gen. ) 
v Coleman (1945) I. R. 237; The People (Att. Gen. ) v Denis Bond (1966) 
I. R. 214 
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Another decision to the same effect is R v., Sargron1. In that 
case, S. and D. were indicted with assualting G. with intent to rob 
him. Their defence was that they saw G. and V. steal an article and 
chased and stopped them with the object of making them return the 
article to its'owner, whereupon G. offered them money to avoid 
'apprehension. G. and V. denied this allegation. The judge 
permitted the prosecution to cross-examine S. and D. as to their 
previous convictions for dishonesty, saying: "I must ask myself this 
question: if I were to admit (this evidence) would the prejudice 
thereby created be disproportionate, to its evidential value ... I 
cannot conceive that this trial can be a fair one from the point of 
view both of the defence and the prosecution if the jury are kept in 
ignorance of the character of the accused ... " On appeal it was held 
that it was not for the court to substitute its discretion for that 
of the judge unless satisfied that he was wrong in principle. It 
seemed to the court that it was necessary if the trial was to be fair 
to the prosecution as well as the defence that the jury should know 
that S. and D., who were suggesting that they were honest persons 
anxious to prevent crime and that G. and V. were thieves whom they 
had caught red-handed, had recently been guilty of dishonesty. The 
Court of Appeal also pointed out that the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 
Section 1 (f) (ii) provides for the admission of such evidence and R 
V. Flynn2 does not lay down anything more than a general rule. The 
general rule laid down in R V. Flynn is that where "the very 
1) (1967) 51 Cr. App. R. 394 2) (1963) I Q. B. 729; (1961) 3 All 
E. R. 58 
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nature of the defence necessarily involves an imputation against a" 
prosecution witness or witnesses the discretion should be, as a 
general rule, exercised in favour of the accused, that is to say, the 
evidence as to his character or criminal record should be excluded. " 
The facts of that case were not dissimilar from that of R V. Sargvon. 
The accused, charged with robbery, alleged that the prosecutor had 
committed an offence of indecency against him and handed the money to 
him voluntarily as "hush money". The imputation against the 
prosecutor's character was no more and no less necessary in that case 
than in the case of R V. Sargron. One could rightly and properly 
querry why then was the general rule not applicable in the case of R 
v. Sargron? The answer would appear to be that. the appellants set 
themselves up as "honest persons anxious to prevent crime". Had they 
not then given evidence of good character within the meaning of the 
proviso so-as to let in evidence of. their bad character under a 
different head? I think they had. 
And in R V. Kassem', Kassem was alleged to have stolen a purse 
from a young girl. When approached by the police he attacked the 
girl's character and repeated the attack at his trial. The judge 
gave leave for Kassem to be cross-examined about his previous 
convictions. Relying on R v. Flynn2, he appealled on the ground that 
the judge was wrong to give leave. The Court of Appeal held that the 
attack was not necessary to the defence and R v. Flynn did not apply. 
It was held that the judge exercised his discretion properly and the 
appeal was accordingly dismissed. 
1) (1968) Cria. L. R. 331 2) (1963) 1 Q. B. 729; (1961) 3 All E. R. 
58 
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The leading Australian decision has been that of the High Court in 
Curwood v. R1. Both in that case and in the later Australian 
2 
, the approach has been to grapple with the difficulties of decisions 
construction of the section, rather than fall back on the exercise 
of discretion to meet the problem raised by the operation of the 
3 
"counterpart of Section 1 (f) (ii) . In Curwood v. R, a case on the 
earlier counterpart of Section 399 (e) (ii) of the Crimes Act 1958, 
it was held that a confession was extorted by threats and physical 
violence on the part of the police officers who gave evidence 
rendered the accused liable to be cross-examinaed as to his previous 
character. It was pointed out by Dixon, J., however that: "There is 
much authority to show that a denial by the prisoner of incriminating 
facts, notwithstanding the clear implication must be that the 
witnesses for, the Crown are lying does not 'involve' an imputation. ' 
Further, it makes no difference that the denial is vigorous and even 
disparaging in its expression or that the imputation of deliberate 
untruthfullness is explicit. "4 
In the same judgement, Dixon, J., drew a distinction between on the 
one hand, the denial of the facts evidentiary or ultimate, and on the 
other hand, the setting up of a defence the basis of which is 
5 
misconduct imputed to witnesses. 
In the later case of Dawson v. R6, the same judge held that the 
trial had erred, both in ruling that Section 399 (e) '(ii) applied, ' 
and in his exercise of discretion. He denied any knowledge of the 
1) (1944) 69 C. L. R. 561 2) Rv Brown (1960) VR 382;, E v Clark (1962) 
VR 657; Rv Crawford (1965) V 7R 586; Rv Heydon (1966) I NSWR 708 
3) See S. 399 (e) (ii) of the Crimes Act 1958 - Victoria 4) 
(1944) 69 
C. L. R. 561 at 587 5) Ibid at 588 6) (1961) 106 C. L. R. 1; (1962) 
ALR 365 
- 885 - 
crime, denied admissions alleged by the police officers and claimed 
that a record of interview produced contained much more than the few 
questions he had in fact been asked. Dixon, J., re-affirmed his view 
of the phrase in the proviso as follows: - " ... when you stop to 
consider the significance of the hypothesis demanded by the words 
. 'when the nature or conduct of the 
defence is such as to involve 
imputations on the character of the witnesses for the prosecution' it 
becomes plain at once that what is referred to is not a denial of the 
case for the Cröwn, not a denial of evidence by which it is suppor- 
ted, but the use of matter which will have a particular or specific 
tendency to destroy, impair or reflect upon the character of the 
prosecution or witnesses called for the prosecution, quite independe- 
ntly of the possibility that such matter, were it true, would in 
itself provide a defence. The phrase assumes that denial of the case 
for the prosecution, although the evidence of the prosecution is 
necessarily contradicted, does not carry with it an imputation of 
the kind to. which the provison refers. Further the word 'involves' 
refers to what is a part of the defence or at all events, an element 
or ingredient in the defence or what arises from the manner in which 
the defence is conducted. It is not meant to cover inferences, 
logical implications or consequential deductions which may spell 
imputations against the character of witnesses"'. 
It is quite settled that when, on a charge of rape, the defence 
allege that the prosecutrix consented to the intercourse, cross- 
examination of the accused on his previous convictions or bad 
1) (1961) 106 C. L. R. at 9 
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character is not justified by the statute 
I. This rule can be, and 
has been explained in two ways: first, one of the essential 
ingredients of the crime of rape, to be proved by the prosecution, is 
the absence of consent on the part of the prosecutrix. On this 
ground it may be said that, although to suggest that the -prosecutrix 
-consented is in the ordinary sense an imputation on her character, it 
is not such an imputation as is intended by Section 1 (f) (ii). 
Alternatively the rule can be explained on the ground that, though 
the defence of consent involves an imputation, it has now been 
settled how the judicial discretion existing under the section shall 
be exercised2. 
In R V. Turner 
3 the question which fell to be decided was whether 
an accused charged with rape lets in cross-examination as to his 
character if his defence is that the complainant was a consenting 
party. This very question had been left open in R v. Preston, and a 
court of five judges was convened to consider the case of R v. 
Turner. At his trial the accused had said that the complainant had 
consented and that she had taken hold of his penis. The Court of 
- Criminal Appeal 
held that this cross-examination fell within the 
express terms of the Act and exposed the defendant to the risk of his 
past life being inquired into. The judgement delivered by Ludge's 
view, it is hardly surprising that he permitted cross-examination of 
the accused as to a previous conviction for assualt with intent to 
ravish. It is right to say that the trial judge had to rule a 
1) Rv Turner (1944) K. B. 463, C. C. A; Rv Clark (1955) 2 Q. B. 469 at 
475; Rv Cook (1959) 2 Q. B. 340 at 347 2)R -v Cook (1959) 2 Q. B. 340 
3) (1944) K. B. 463; see also Rv Webster - (New Zdaland Court of Appeal, 
unreported 6 June 1973). 4) (1909) I K. B. 568 5) (1944) K. B. 463; 
(1944) 1 All E. R. 599 
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question to which previous judicial answers had been in conflict. 
Thus in R v. Fished, Day, J., had decided that where the accused 
alleged that the complainant had consented he could be cross-examined 
2 
as to character, but in R v. Sheean' Jeff, J., had refused to follow 
this decision and had held that where oc resent is raised as a defence 
character is not thereby let in. In R V. Turner Humphreys, J., 
delivering the judgement of the Court of Criminal Appeal, pointed out 
that on a charge of rape there had to be proved (a)intercourse and 
(b) non-consent of the woman, and he then said: "What is commonly 
referred to as the defence of consent in rape is in truth nothing 
more than a denial by the accused that the prosecution has establis- 
hed one of the two essential ingredients of the charge. It is and 
must be the prosecution which introduces the question of consent or 
non-consent. Can the legislature have intended to penalise the 
accused who avails himself of the right to give evidence conferred by 
statute by enacting that he may be cross-examined as to previous 
convictions if he denies one, though not if he only denies the other 
of the two ingredients o' the crime? "! He added that the accused's 
allegation that the complainant had handled his penis - described by 
the trial judge as an allegation that she had "committed an act of 
gross indecency upon him, indecently assualted him" - did no more 
than state details of the complainant's conduct showing that the act 
of connection was not against her will. Humphreys, J., concluded by 
expressing the opinion that the case was one in which "the court is 
justified in holding some that some limitation must be placed on the 
1) (1899) 43 L. J. (News) 100, Day J; The Times; January 31,1899 
2) (1908) 21 Cox C. C. 561 Jeff J; (1908) 72 J. P. 232 3) (1944): 
I All E. R. 599 at 601 
words of the section since to decide otherwise would be to do grave 
injustice never intended by Parliament. " 
It is possible to argue, by analogy with the defence of consent to 
a charge of rape, that certain other defences to other charges should 
be capable of being raised without exposing the accused to cross- 
examination as to previous convictions, although such defences 
necessarily imply something to the discredit of a prosecution 
witness. A defence capabale of such analogous treatment would be one 
which amounts to a denial of some aspect or ingredient of the offence 
charged as to which the prosecution has the burden of proof. _ 
A 
decision that the raising of the defence does not justify cross- 
examination under the statute could be explained by methods similar 
to the explanations mentioned earlier for the case of rape. Two 
defences which might be so treated are, first, consent as a defence 
to indecent assualt (other than on a girl under sixteen or on a woman 
whom the accused knows or has reason to suspect to be a defective- 
in which cases consent is no defence) 
1. The burden lies on the 
prosecution to prove the absence of consent. Second, is self-defence 
as a defence to assualt, wounding etc. Where this defence is raised, 
the jury must acquit if on the whole of the evidence they are left in 
doubt whether the accused may have acted in self-defence2. 
In Scotland, it is clear that in relation to the special defences 
of alibi, self defence and incrimination, the persuasive burden of 
proof remains on the Crown and the only duty on the defence is to 
1) Sexual Offences Act, 1956, S. 14 (2) (3) 2) Rv Lobell (1957) 
I Q. B. 547 C. C. A. 
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discharge the evidential burden of raising the issue in such a way 
that it has to be left to the jury. It is for the judge to consider 
whether the evidential burden has been satisfied, ie., whether there 
is evidence before the jury which could leave them in reasonable 
doubt on the matters in question. If he decides that that burden has 
been satisfied, then the only burden remaining in issue is the burden 
of proof lying on the prosecution, which includes the burden of 
proving to the jury beyond reasonable doubt that the plea of alibi, 
self-defence or incrimination is unfounded. It is thought that the 
effect of the decision in Lambie v. H. M. Advocate2, is of pertinen- 
ce, though this case is as to the special defence of insanity. The 
court said in that case that " ... the passage in Walkers' Law of 
Evidence, Section 83 (b), to the effect that 'when a special defence 
is stated by the accused, the onus of proving it is upon him' can 
now be regarded as an accurate statement of the law only in the case 
of the plea of insanity at the time. "3 It is now hoped that the 
statement in Walker and Walker shall be confined as stated in Lam- 
bie's case to cases of insanity only; that way, the Scottish rule 
will be brought in line with its English counterpart. If the state- 
ment in Walker and Walker were still to be applicable, it is clear 
that the jury would not acquit if they were in doubt as to whether 
the accused acted for example in self defence, since the onus of 
proving the special defence would have been on him. 
It is true that the prosecution need not anticipate this line of 
defence by adducing evidence to negative self defence in the first 
1) Cf Rv Abraham, (1974) Crim. L. R. 246 2) (1973) J. C. 53 
3) Ibid at p. 58 
- 890 - 
instance, and consequently, that if the defence leads no evidence 
directed to the issue of self defence, a conviction may be proper 
although the prosecution evidence did not deal with that issue. But, 
the issue once raised, the burden lies on the prosecution, and to 
that extent the analogy with the defence of consent on a charge of 
-rape holds good. Moreover, the accused is asserting that what he did 
constituted, in the circumstances, no offence, thereby, as in the 
case of rape, denying the prosecution case. It seems clear that in 
cases where the defence is able to elicit from the Crown witnesses 
sufficient evidence to raise the issue, the accused need not go into 
the witness-box. It is thought that the courts would not now adhere 
to what has been said to be the "principle"1 that a defence of self- 
defence can succeed only where the accused himself gives evidence. 
In cases of homicide the allegation that the killing was provoked 
by the deceased or was in self-defence does not raise any problem 
under Section 1 (f) (ii), for the deceased is not the prosecutor2 or 
witness. A case could, however arise in which the lethal act of the 
accused, directed at and provoked by A, accidentally killed B. If A 
gave evidence, the arguments above could be advanced to protect the 
accused from cross-examination under the section3. 
In R v. Biggin4, the defence, on a charge of murder, was that the 
deceased had made indecent overtures to the accused and had violently 
attacked him, and that the killing was in self-defence. The Court of 
Criminal Appeal, quashed a conviction of manslaughter on the ground 
1) Blair vHM Advocate (1968) 32 JCL 48, per L. J. C. Grant 
2) Rv Bein (1920) I K. B. 213 3) Supported in a case of provo- 
cation, by Woolmington v D. P. P. (1935) A. C. 462; Chankau vR (1955) 
A. C. 206; Bullard vR (1957) A. C. 635; See also Cross, 75 L. Q. R. at. 179 
4) (1920) 1 K. B. 213 
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that, the deceased not being the prosecutor, cross-examination of the 
accused under Section 1 (f) should not have been permitted. In R v. 
Clarke', however, Lord Goddard C. J., giving the judgment of the 
Court of Criminal Appeal, found another explanation of R V. Biggin. 
Having justified the rape cases on the ground that the defence of 
consent is but a denial of the essential ingredient of the offence 
charged, he said: "That also, I think, may be the explanation of R v. 
Biggin ... the prisoner was relying on provocation or self-defence, 
and the facts had to come out. Somebody had to explain why the 
attack took place, and until that was explained and why people should 
have been in the same room, and why there was a fight, it was 
impossible for any defence to be developed at all. "2 The alternative 
explanation is in fact offered though not clearly, in R V. Biggins 
itself 3. 
On the other hand, in R v. Cunningham4, provocation was the defence 
to charge of malicious wounding. The substance of the provocation 
alleged was an invitation to homosexual conduct. The accused was 
convicted after cross-examination as to his previous convictions. 
The Court of Criminal Appeal dismissed an appeal, holding that 
provocation is not a defence to a charge of wounding. Lord Parker, 
C. J., thought though it was unnecessary to determine the question, 
that: "even if provocation was a proper defence, a question such as 
was put in this case must of necessity bring in the character of the 
prisoner. " 
R v. Turner 
5 
was mentioned with approval by Lord Simon in Stirland 
1) (1955) 2 Q. B. 469 - 2) Ibid at 475; see also Devlin J., in Rv 
Cook (1959) 2 Q. B. 340 at 344-345; R"v Brown (1960) 44 Cr. App. 
R. 181 
3)(1920) I K. B. 213 at 221 4) (1959) 1 O. B. 288 at 290 5) (1944) 
K. B. 463 
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V. Director of Public Prosecutions' and the fourth of the 
propositions with which he concluded his speech was that: "An accused 
is not to be regarded as depriving himself of the protection of the 
section because the proper conduct of his defence necessitates the 
making of injurious reflections on the prosecutor or his witnesses. "2 
But how on earth can this be made to fit with the decision in R V. 
Hudson? 
3. 
What could be more contradictory than Lord Simon's use of 
the verb 'necessitates' and the express declaration in R V, Hudson 
that the adverb 'unnecessarily' must not be tacked on to the 
statutory provision? 
All the English cases were thoroughly reviewed by the House of 
Lords in Selvey V. Director of Public Prosecutions4. The House of 
Lords rejected an argument that R V. Hudson and the cases that fol- 
lowed it were wrong in their strict construction of Section 1 (f) 
(ii). The case is important both because of the attempts made in it 
to provide a cogent rationale from the difficult and sometimes con- 
flicting decisions on the topic, and because it affirmed the existen- 
ce and nature of the discretion accompanying the operation of the 
section. It is submitted that the speeches of the other Lords are 
entirely consistent with the four propositions which Viscount 
Dilhorne set out in his speech. He regarded these proposition: as 
finally established by the cases: "(1) The words of the statute must 
be given their ordinary natural meaning ... (2) The section permits 
cross-examination of the accused as to character both when imputa- 
1) (1944) A. C. 315; (1944) 2 All E. R. 13 2) (1944) A. C. 315; for 
interpretation of Lord Simon's Fourth proposition see Per Dixon J in 
Cur wood vR (1944) 69 C. L. R. at 588 3) (1912) 2 K. B. 464 4) 
(1970) A. C. 304; see also Rv Jessop (1974) Tas. SR. 64; Cushing vR 
(1977) WAR 7 
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tion on the character of the prosecutor and his witnesses are cast to 
show their unreliability as witnesses independently of the evidence 
given by them and also when the casting of such imputations is neces- 
sary to enable the accused to establish his defence ... (3) In rape 
cases the accused can allege consent without placing himself in peril 
-of cross-examination. This may be because such cases are sui gene- 
ris 
1, 
or on the ground that the issue is one raised by the prosecu- 
tion ... (4) If what is said amounts in reality to no more than 
'a 
denial of the charge, expressed, it may be, in emphatic language, it 
should not be regarded as coming within the section ... "ý 
The decision firmly established the existence of the discretion in 
the trial judge to modify the operation-of Section 1 (f) (ii), which 
does not contain an express grant of discretion as in most'of its 
Australian counterparts. 
However the formulation by Viscount Dilhorne3 leaves it uncertain 
whether rape is altogether exceptional, or whether the same reasoning 
extends to other offences in which the absence of consent is a 
necessary ingredient. Proposition 4 leaves the court considerable 
room for manoeuvre when drawing the line between an emphatic denial 
and an imputation. Even so, Viscount Dilhorne's statement of the law 
might be thought capable of being very oppresive to accused persons 
for whom a successful defence necessarily involves making imputa- 
tions, were it not for the existence of a general discretion to 
disallow cross-examination despite its permissibility under Section 1 
M. 
1) RV Cook (1959) 2 Q. B. 340 at 347 (1959) 2 All E. R. 97 
2) Z1970) A. C. 304 at 339 3) Selvey v D. P. P. (1970) A. C. 304 at 
339 
R v. Nelsonlis a pertinent case in the application of propositions 
2 and 4 as set out by Viscount Dilhorne. In that case, the appellant 
who had a very bad criminal record, was charged with arson. The 
prosecution case rested largely on evidence of a police constable of 
an interview in which the appellant had, 'according to the constable 
made a full confession of guilt. Counsel for the appellant put it to 
the constable that that conversation had never taken place and, by 
implication, his notebook was unreliable. The Crown then applied to 
cross-examine the defendant on his previous convictions under section 
1 (f) (ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. This was allowed and 
the appellant was convicted, after a retrial, on a majority verdict. 
On appeal the question was whether in the language of the section, 
the cross-examination of the constable, taken with the appellant's 
denial in his evidence in chief of the interview created the 
situation which involved imputations on the character of the 
prosecution witness. The court held that - (1) (a) proviso (ii) of 
section 1 (f) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 permits cross- 
examination of an accused as to character both when the imputations 
on the character of the prosecutor and his witnesses are cast to show 
their unreliability as witnesses independently of the evidence given 
by them and also when the casting of such imputations is necessary to 
enable the accused to establish his defence; (b) but if what is said 
amounts in reality to no more than a denial of the charge, expressed, 
it may be, in emphatic language, it should not be regarded as coming 
1) (1978) 68 Cr. App. Rep. 12 
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within Section 1 (f) - the above two propositions (a and b) should be 
regarded as complimentary and mutually exclusive; (2) in the present 
case there was no attempt to demonstrate the constable's 
unreliability as to the disputed interview based on any matter inde- 
pendent of his evidence and the cross-examination of the constable 
was only directed at supporting the appellant's denials of the con- 
tent of the disputed interview: it was not directed at casting impu- 
tations to establish a defence, the constable's notebook being merely 
used to refresh his memory and was not evidence in the case; accor- 
dingly, the judge had been wrong in law in allowing the appellant's 
criminal record to be puz to him, which amounted to a material 
irregularity in the course of the trial; further, in view of the fact 
it was a retrial, a majority verdict and the fact that the alleged 
interview between the constable and the appellant was the only direct 
evidence of his involvement in the offence charged, the case was not 
one for the application of the proviso to Section 2 (i) of the 
Criminal Appeal Act 1968, and the appeal would be allowed and the 
conviction quashed. 
But the Scottish approach to the statute in any case differs from 
the English as the case of O'Hara V. H. " M. Advocate' shows. In that 
case a distinction was drawn between imputations which are necessary 
to enable the accused fairly to establish his defence, and 
imputations on the general character of the witnesses: the first do 
not deprive the accused of the protection of the prohibition, but the 
second may, in the judge's discretion, do so. In the case, the 
(1948) S. C. (J) 90; (1948) S. L. T. 372 
defence of an accused tried on a charge of assualting two constables 
was that he had acted in self-defence and under provocation and a 
cross-examination of the constable was directed to show that one of 
them had been under the influence of drink and had been the aggresor. 
It was held that, since the cross-examination was necessary to 
enable. the accused to establish his defence and was not an attack on 
the general character of the constable, the accused had not exposed 
himself to cross-examination, as to previouss convictions and the 
conviction following upon such a cross-examination, quashed. It was 
further observed that it is always within the discretion of the judge 
to refuse to allow such cross-examination the fundamental considera- 
tion being that the trial judge should be a fair one. It is perti- 
nent to refer to the observation made by the Lord Justice-Clerk 
Thomson, he said: "Accordingly in my judgement, the statute warrants 
a distinction being drawn between two sets of cases, however diffi- 
cult it may be to say on which side of the line any particular case 
falls, and perhaps for that reason it is undesirable to attempt too 
rigid line of demarcation. Broadly, the two classes are (1) where the 
the cross-examination is necessary to enable the accused fairly to 
establish his defence to the indictment albeit it involves an invita- 
tion'to the jury to disbelieve the witnessess so cross-examined in so 
far as they testify in support of the indictment, and (2)' where the 
cross-examination attacks the general character of the witness. I 
should perhaps add as a corrollary that in the second class of case 
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difficulty will arise only where the imputation on the character of 
the witness is directed to credit. Subject to risks involved in 
adopting that course, questions directed to some matter like general 
quarelsomeness or looseness of morals, the matter will usually be 
decided by the presiding Judge on the issue of whether or not the 
evidence is relevant to the indictment. I should add further that, 
even within the comparatively limited class of cases where the 
nature or conduct of the defence involves imputations on character, 
it is still a question for the presiding Judge to decide whether 
cross-examination of the accused should be allowed. The fundamental 
consideration is a fair trial and there may be cases-where the price 
which the accused may be called upon to pay if cross-examination will 
be out of all proportion to the extent and nature of the imputations 
cast on the witnesses who testify against him"1. 
It is interesting to note that in the House of Lords decision in 
Selvey v. Director of Public Prosecutions2, all the opinions 
delivered, except that of Lord Guest, contained adverse criticism of 
the judgement of Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson in O'Hara's case. It 
should however be pointed out that Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson's 
judgement had previously found some favour with some English 
commentators3. The majority in the House of ' Lords in Selvey's case I 
attacked Lord Thomson's conclusion on two grounds. First, it was argued 
by Viscount Dilhorne4 that "if the statement of Lord Alverstone in R 
v. Hudson5 that it is -not legitimate to qualify the words of the 
statute by adding or inserting the words 'for any purpose other than 
1) (1948) J. C. 90 at 98-99; see also Lord Jamieson at p. 101 
2) (1968) 2 All E. R. 497; (1970). A. C. 304 3) See J. D. Newton in 
(1956) Crim. L. R. 241 4) (1968) 2 All E. R. 497 at 507 5) (1912) 
2 K. B. 464 
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that of developing the defence' be accepted it does not seem ... that 
the Lord Justice-Clerk's classification can be right. " Against this 
it can be said that Lord Thomson did not add or insert anything, 
except in so far as every decision which involves the construction of 
a statute involves an explanation of its meaning. Secondly, Lord 
Pearce 
1 feared that Lord Thomson's view would be to provide an over- 
liberal shield for an accused and might be unfair to the prosecution, 
since there "would be no limit to the amount of mud which could be 
thrown against an unshielded prosecutor while the accused could 
still crouch behind his own shield", provided that the abuse was 
linked up to the defence put forward. It is however simply not true 
to say that the defence has or ever has had complete freedom in this 
respect. 
Furthermore, the metaphor of the shield is misleading in so far as 
it conveys the impression that the trial is a battle in which the 
accused is provided with a shield which protects him from the most 
dangerous kinds of attack on his credibility, which has, however 
already been undermined by the fact that a charge has been brought 
against him by a public prosecutor who is independent of the police . 
In view of the accused's already impared credibility, and in the 
context of an accusational procedure in which the accused's record 
and character are not normally disclosed until a finding of guilt 
has been made, -Lord Thomson's judgement provides, it is submitted, at 
least in the context of Scottish criminal procedure, the most 
1) (1968) 2 All E. R. 497 at 522 2) See John Grahame, Nov., 3,1712, 
quoted in Hume II. 10; see also Lord Kilbrandon, Other people's Lat 
at p. 62 
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convenient solution to the problem set by Section 1 (f) (ii) of the 
1898 Act. 
The decision in O'Hara vHM Advocate1 was followed in Feilding v. 
HM Advocate 
2. 
In that case, during the trial of an accused on 
charges of exorting money by threats, the victim of the extortion 
gave evidence for the prosecution that in the course of a telephone 
conversation he was threatened that, if he did not hand over the sum 
of money demanded he would be assualted and robbed in the same 
manner as had happened on a previous occasion. There was evidence 
linking the accused with the telephone conversation, but there was no 
evidence linking him with the previous assualts. In cross-examining 
the victim of the crime, the agent for the accused, ostensibly for 
the purpose of attacking the credibility of the witness on that 
previous assualt, sought to elicit from him that on the occasion 
concerned he had engaged in some unlawful activity. This he denied 
and no evidence was led to support the allegation. The prosecutor 
having cross-examined the accused as to his previous convictions, the 
court held that the questions put to the prosecution witness in 
cross-examination were not necessary in order to enable the accused 
to establish his defence and that, in view of the nature of the 
cross-examination, the prosecution was entitled to put the accused's 
own charcater in issue. 
Having seen the position in England as contained in the 
propositions in Selvey v. Director of Public Prosecutions 
3, 
and the 
position in Scotland as it forward by Lord Justice-Clerk Thomson in 
1) (1948) J. C. 90 2) (1959) J. C. 101 3) (1970) A. C. 304 
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O'Hara v. HM Advocate, it is significant to note that the Criminal 
Law Revision Committee recommended that Selvey's case should be 
overruled, and that the accused would lose his shield only if the 
main purpose of casting the imputations was to discredit the prosecu- 
tor or his witnesses and not directly to further the defence of the 
accused2. In other words, where the injurious reflections are not 
more than consequential upon or incidental to the due presentation of 
the accused's denial of the incriminating facts, the case will fall 
under Lord Simon's fourth proposition formulated in Stirland's case3, 
read as it should be with reference to the case he mentions -Rv. 
Turner4. The Thomson Committee endorsed the principle enunciated in 
,, O'Hara v. HM Advocate and observed that the effect of the recommen- 
dations of the Criminal Law Revision Committee seems to be to bring 
. the 
law in England into, line with the position in Scotland. 
5 That 
appears to be true; but as Sherrif Macphail rightly pointed out: 
"it does not follow that the.. wording of the-second limb of proviso 
(f) (ii) should not be altered'. Sheriff Macphail. continued by. 
observing that: "It may be said that the - 
distinction in O'Hara does 
not. follow from the ordinary and natural interpretation of the words 
of the section, and that in order to arrive at the distinction it is 
necessary to qualify these words by adding or inserting the words 
'unnecessary' or 'unjustifiably' or 'For the purpose other than that 
of developing the defence' or other similar words.? It is thought, 
accordingly, that in any restatement of the law a provision equiva- 
lent to the second limb of proviso (f) (ii) should be phrased in such 
a way as to incorporate the principles in O'Hara. 
8 
1) (1948) J. C. 90 2) C. L. R. C. paras. 119-130 3) (1944) A. C. at 
p. 327 4) (1944) K. B. 463 5) Thompson, paras 50: 21 - 50: 25 
6) See Sheriff Macphail Research Reimorts - §5: 56 7) Cf R. v Hudson 
(1912) 2 K. B. 464, Lord Alverstone C. J. at pp 470-471; 8) Sheriff 
Macphail Research Papers - §5: 56 
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Sherrif Macphail then went on to enumerate some of the inherent 
problems of the suggestion, he said: "It must be recognised, however, 
that even a provision in such terms would represent, as did Section 1 
(f) of the 1898 Act, a somewhat unsatisfactory compromise between the 
treatment of the accused in every respect as an ordinary witness and 
the complete prohibition of any cross-examination of the accused 
about misconduct otherwise admissible in evidence. Lord Justice- 
Clerk Thomson said that the principle seems to be that it is unfair 
that an accused with a bad record should stand safe in the box while 
blackguarding the witness who testify against him1. It would 
certainly be unsatisfactory if, respectable witnesses were to be 
subjected to unfounded accusations by an accused whose record could 
not be disclosed: such people might be unwilling to act as witnesses, 
or might feel a deep sense of injustice if they did so act, only to 
be unjustly impugned in the witness-box. -On the other 
hand, the 
present law permits an accused to make unfounded attacks on witnesses 
with impunity, so long as he does not go into the witness-box 
himself. The law also permits the defence to attack the character of 
murder victims2 and other dead victims of crime, and to ask questions 
with a view to establish the bad character of persons who have not 
been called as witnesses3. Another difficulty is that the present 
law has the effect of deterring an accused with a record from 
attacking prosecution. witnesses who themselves have had records and 
whose credibility may be suspect; and there is no equivalent rule 
1) O'Hara v H. M. A., (1948) J. C. 90 at 98 2) H. M. A. v Grudins (1975) 
SLT Notes) 10,3) See Rv Lee (1976) 1 W. L. R. 71 
- 902 - 
deterring the prosecution from attacking defence witnesses. It may 
be supposed, however, in the light of the experience of the two 
Committees, that it is not easy to formulate any less unsatisfactory 
rule. "' In conclusion, may I say that though no wholly satisfactory 
solution of the problems thrown up by Section 1 (f) (ii) of the 1898 
Act has yet been found, there is no reason to abandon the search. To 
leave everything to the court's unfettered discretion, as the House 
of Lords advocate in Selvey, creates too much uncertainty2. Some 
guidance is necessary for the courts and the legal profession, and 
Lord Thomson in O'Hara has to my mind provided the nearest approach 
to such guidance. 
(VII) CO-ACCUSED'S RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE: - 
Section 1 (f) (ii) is clearly intended to allow cross-examination 
by the prosecution, but it is not obvious that cross-examination by a 
co-accused should be allowed simply because the accused in the 
witness-box has attacked the character of the prosecutor or the 
prosecution witnesses. The court's tentative view seems to be, that 
the judge may in his discretion allow an accused to cross-examine 
another under Section 1 (f) (ii) where the former has been prejudiced 
by the latter's evidence. In other words when one or two or more 
co-accused casts imputations on the prosecutor or his witnesses, the 
court should have the discretion to allow his co-accused to cross- 
examine him under proviso (f) (ii). That was held to be the 
law in R 
v. Lovett3. In that case Lovett was convicted of burglary and 
1) Sheriff Macphail Research Papers, § 5: 57 2) B. Livesey, 
"Judicial discretion to exclude prejudicial evidence in Criminal 
Cases" 
(1968) CLJ 291 at pp. 301-309 3) (1973) 1 WLR 241 
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stealing a television set. He was tried with G. who was acquitted 
of handling the set. Lovett was interviewed by a police officer, E, 
and made a statement saying that he had stolen the set and that G had 
put him up to it. In evidence Lovett said that G. had claimed that 
the set belonged to him and asked him to recover it from the house 
where it was. Lovett also said that E had obtained the statement by 
threats of violence. G's counsel, assuming he was entitled to do so 
under Section 1 (f) (iii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, and 
without giving any notice to the judge, cross-examined Lovett as to 
his previous convictions. Lovett submitted that the section did not 
apply because he and G. were not charged with the same offence1. 
Crown counsel submitted that there had been no injustice because it 
had been his intention, following the attack on E, to apply for leave 
to cross-examine Lovett as to his convictions, but he had been fores- 
talled by G's counsel, and because G. was entitled as of right to 
cross-examine Lovett under Section 1 (f) (ii) of the Act. The Court 
of Criminal Appeal, dismissed an appeal holding that the proper 
practice was for counsel to tell the judge, in the absence of the 
jury, that he proposed to cross-examine an accused as to his conic-. 
2 
tions so that the judge could rule on the matter. The court was 
aware of only one case3, where the prosecution had been permitted to 
cross-examine under proviso (f) (iii), and knew of no case where a 
co-accused had based cross-examinantion on proviso (ii). Althougha 
decision on 'the point was not called for, - the'Court inclined to the 
view that the judge having allowed G to cross-examine Lovett under 
1) Relying on Rv Roberts (1936) 25 Cr. App. R. 158 and Rv Russell 
(1971) 55 Cr. App. R. 23 2) See Murdoch v Taylor (1965) 49 Cr. App. 
R. 119 3) Rv Seighley (1911) 6 Cr. App. R. 106 
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proviso '(ii) as a matter of discretion; but G was not entitled to 
cross-examine as of right because it would follow that a co-accused 
who had not been prejudiced would have the same right. The trial 
judge not having been called upon to rule on the matter or exercise 
his discretion, the Court it was held would exercise its own discre- 
tion1. Whereas the view might be taken that Lovett's imputations 
against E did G no harm and it would not be fair to allow him to 
cross-examine Lovett, there could be no doubt it would have been 
proper to allow the prosecution to cross-examine him. It was held 
that in the circumstances the court would apply the proviso. 
It should be noted that while the court may refuse leave to a co- 
acccused to cross-examine under proviso (f) (ii), it cannot refuse it 
to a co-accused under provios (f) (iii) as we shall soon find out in 
subsequent discussions. 
(VIII) IMPUTATIONS AGAINST WITNESS FOR CO-ACCUSED: - 
Sherrif Macphail2 has suggested that the rule in O'Hara v. HM 
Advocate3 should be extended to cover the case where the imputation 
is made against a witness for a co-accused. The Criminal Law 
Revision Committee formulated a clause the effect of which is that, 
whether the imputation is made by the accused (A) against a witness 
for the prosecution or against a witness for the co-accused (B), both 
the prosecution and B will be able to cross-examine the accused A who 
makes the imputation. This seems to the committee to be clearly 
right. In particular, they say, the fact that the prosecution may 
1) applying Rv Cook (1959) 43 Cr. App. R. 138- 2) 'Sherrif Macphail 
Research Papers § 5: 59 3) (1948) J. C. 90 
905 
have refrained from cross-examining A should not prevent B from 
cross-examining him, especially if the witness against whom the 
imputation is made is more favourable to B than to A. 1 
(IX) THE DISCRETION AND THE DUTY TO WARN 
" When the nature or conduct of the defence is such as to involve 
imputations on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for 
the prosecution, the trial judge has a discretion to disallow cross- 
examination of the accused on his previous convictions or bad 
character. This discretion, though its existence had been observed 
earlier2, was first stated and examined in a case on the second limb 
of Section 1 (f) (ii) in R V. Jenkins3, and has since been re-aserted 
as an essential factor in the application of the section4. Even now, 
in cases in which the judge does not apply his mind to the question 
of discretion, the Court of Appeal may exercise to its own discretion 
as happened in R v. Cooks. In that case the appellant, had been 
charged with obtaining a motor car by false pretences and with recei- 
ving cheques. One of the prosecution witnesses was a detective 
constable who said that the appellant when charged, admitted that he 
had obtained the cash by means of a forged cheque. He had also made 
a written statement saying that he had found the cheque forms in a 
road. The appellant conducted his own defence and suggested to the 
detective constable that his statement had been obtained by means of 
a threat that if he did not speak his wife would be charged. In 
cross-examination he repeated this allegation, and counsel for the 
1) CLLR § 131 2) Rv Watson (1913) 8 Cr. App. R. 249; Maxwell v 
D. P. P. (1935) A. C. 309 3) (1945) 31 Cr". 'App.. ßr, 1 4) Bv Clarke 
(1955. ) 2 Q. B. 469-; Rv Cook (1959)'2 Q. B.. 340; (1959) 2. All E. R. 97; 
Ry 
_F1 
(1961) 3 All E. R. 58 5) (1959) 2 Q. B. 340; see also Rv 
Vannini 1972) 128 C. L. R. 114 
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prosecution indicated to the judge that he wished to put "certain 
further questions" to the appellant. The judge said that while 
counsel was, strictly entitled to do so he would have thought it 
would not be necessary. Counsel then put his criminal record to the 
appellant, and he was convicted. Cook appealed, and although in the 
event the appeal was dismissed under the proviso to Section 4 (i) of 
the Criminal Appeal Act 1907, the judgement delivered by Devlin J., 
came to grips with the problem involved in an impressive fashion. 
It held that the defence had been so conducted as to involve an 
imputation on the character of the police witness, that the trial 
judge had a discretion whether an accused's character should be let 
in but that in the present case he had not exercised that discretion. 
After reviewing the authorities Devlin, J., said: "We have come to 
the conclusion that the questions ought not to have been put. " 
Devlin, i., having briefly mentioned the point about the 
discretion, recalled that it had been made again in Stirland v. 
s 
Director of Public Prosecutions1, and he said that it was just 
elaborated in R v. Jenkins2. Since R V. Cook3 it is easier to see 
how the discretion should be exercised and the court's judgement is 
in accord with the words of Singleton, J., inR V. Jenkins: "The 
essential thing is a fair trial. " Devlin, J., in R V. Cook said that 
the cases, particularly R v. Preston4, R v. Jones5 and R V. Clark6, 
indicate the factors to be borne in mind, and he went on: "Is a 
deliberate attack being made on the conduct of the police officer 
1) (1944) A. C. 315; (1944) 2 All E. R. 13 2) (1945) 31 Cr. App. -R. 1 
3) (1959) 2 Q. B. 340 4) (1909) I K. B. 568 5) (1923) 17 Cr. App. R. 
117 6) (1955) 2 Q. B. 469 
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calculated to discredit him wholly as witness? If there is, a judge 
might well feel that he must withdraw the protection which he would 
desire to extend as far as possible to an accused who was 
endeavouring only. to develop a line of defence. " 
The soundness of this seems to be confirmed by R v. Flynn1. The 
facts of the case were that the appellant had been convicted of 
robbing a major X of money. His defence at the trial was that the 
major had made indecent suggestions to him and had indecently 
assaulted him, and that the money had been given to him as "hush 
money". The trial judge allowed questioning of the appellant as to 
his record. In the Appeal Court, Slade, J., had no hesitation in 
finding this to be wrong. The judgement contains these important 
words: "The exercise of a discretion must depend entirely on the 
facts of the particular case in which it falls to be exercised, but 
where, as in the present case, the very nature of the defence 
necessarily involves an imputation against a prosecution witness or 
witnesses the discretion should in the opinion of this court be as a 
general rule exercised in favour of the accused ... . If it were 
otherwise, it comes to this, that the Act of 1898, the very Act which 
gave the charter, so to speak, to an accused person to give evidence 
on oath in the witness-box would be a mere trap because he would be 
unable to put forward any defence, no matter how true, which involved 
an imputation on the character of the prosecutor, or any of his 
witnesses, without running the risk, if he had the misfortune of 
having a record, of his previous convictions being brought up in 
1) (1961) 3 All E. R. 58 
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court while being tried on a totally different matter. "". - (The 
Court refused to apply the proviso to Section 4 (1) of the Criminal 
Appeal Act and the conviction was quashed. ) The above lucid exposi- 
tion means that the discretion must be exercised in the accused's 
favour if he is doing no more than alleging misconduct connected with 
"the necessity for developing his defence". 
It is true to say that the cases discussed suggest that the words 
of the statute must be construed literally, even in cases in which 
imputations are a necessary part of the accused's case, but that the 
judge should generally exercise his discretion to exclude cross- 
examination which is legally proper when imputations are an essential 
part of the offence Although the principles have been intelligibly 
laid down in R v. Cook2 and R V. Flynn 3 their application in some of 
the later cases may not appear entirely happy. In R V. Davies 
4, the 
charge was one of living on the earnings of prostitution. Three 
police officers gave evidence of observations, and defending counsel, 
after warnings from the judge, put it to them that they were lying, 
using such expressions as "completely and utterly untrue", "all 
lies", "not merely mistaken but positively untrue" and "fiction". 
The judge permitted cross-examination of the accused and he was 
convicted. At the appeal his counsel relied on Flynn's case. The 
court upheld the conviction and said the judge had properly exercised 
his discretion. It declared that the suggestion was not merely that 
the officers were lying but that they had put their heads together 
1) Ibid at 63 2) (1959) 2 Q. B. 340 3) (1961) 3 All E. R. 58 
4) (1963) Crim. L. R. 192; 107 S. J. 78 
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and concocted a story which they knew was untrue. The decision seems 
open to the objection that had only one prosecution witness been 
accused of lying that accusation, even if in strong terms or "forcib- 
le language", would not have let in character, whereas an attack on 
more than one raises an inference of "concoction" and removes the 
defendant's protection. Would the defence retain immunity if it said 
in terms that no allegation of "concoction" was being made, although 
the imputation of lying to several prosecution witnesses where there 
was no question of mistake inevitably raised the inference of "conco- 
ction"? It is arguable that in R V. Davies, the welcome assertion of 
principle in Flynn was whittled down in a manner that does not as a 
matter of logic carry conviction. 
Another decision which is open to criticism is R V. Weldon. The 
appellant had been convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a 
girl of fifteen. She had given birth to a child whose father, she 
alleged, was the appellant. She was cross-exaimined with a view to 
showing that she had had intercourse with other men, and it was also 
put to her that she had said to a number of persons that she had a 
hold over her brother because she had had intercourse with him. The 
defence was a denial and the judge permitted questions to the accused 
about a previous conviction, for indecent assault. The Court of 
Criminal Appeal supported this. It was inclined to the view that 
the nature of the defence necessarily involved putting it to the girl 
that she had had intercourse with other people, not to show that she 
was of loose character but that somebody else might be the father of 
1) (1963) Cr. L. R. 439 
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the child. But, continued the judgement, the questions regarding the 
brother suggested that she was a thoroughly immoral and also a 
criminal person and went further than was necessary from the nature 
of the defence. Now if it was proper to seek to show that someone 
other than the appellant was the child's father, "the evidence that 
she had had intercourse wit- her brother would have had the same 
effect; and it is not clear why this should have been treated 
differently because of the fact that it happened to be an allegation 
of incest. "" As to the assertion of the Appeal Court that the 
questions-about the brother suggested she was a "criminal Person", it 
is relevant to observe that the Sexual Offences Act 1956, Section 11, 
provides that the offence of incest by a woman is committed only if 
she is aged sixteen years or more - the girl in this case was fifteen 
years of age. 
However the dicta of R v. Cook2 and R v. Flynn3 were correctly 
applied in R v. Manley 
4 In that case Manley was convicted of 
housebreaking and larceny and burglary and larceny and sentenced to 
seven years' preventive detention. He appealed against conviction 
and sentence. His first ground of appeal against conviction was that 
the Assistant Recorder wrongly allowed the prosecution to cross- 
examine him as to his record which involved thirty-eight convictions. 
The chief prosecution witness, H., said that Manley woke him up in 
the night and handed him the stolen property. Manley admitted the 
visit but denied bringing any property. Counsel for Manley cross- 
1) Professor C. J. Smith in (1963) Crim. L. R. 440 2) (1959) 2 Q. B. 
340 3) (1961) 3 All E. R. 58 4) (1962) 46 Cr. App. R. 235 
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examined H. on the basis that he was lying and suggested that he was 
lying because he wanted Manley out of the way of his (H: s) wife and 
family, and also on the basis that he was an accomplice. The 
Assistant Recorder ruled that the putting of both these imputations 
entitled the prosecution to cross-examine as to character and when 
prosecuting counsel indicated that he proposed to do so said: "I do 
not see how I can possibly stop you having ruled that you are 
entitled to do so. " It was argued that the Assistant Recorder did 
not deal with the matter as one of discretion but as one of 
admissibility, and erred in principle in exercising his discretion. 
It was held that although the Assistant Recorder did not say in terms 
that he was exercising his discretion it was clear that he was 
purporting to do so because during the submissions he refered to an 
authority directly in point. It was also held that so far as the 
exercise of the discretion was concerned, the questions put to H. 
suggesting he was lying had to be put since they were inherent in 
Manley's defence. And further, that the mere suggestion of a reason 
for the lie did not change the position at all unless the reason 
itself imputed some bad character or previous conviction. Here, 
however disagreeable it may have been to H. to have his private life 
refered. to in public, it is no way suggested that he had been guilty 
of any disgraceful or criminal conduct. Accordingly if the matter 
remained there, there-would be no ground for exercising the discre- 
tion in favour of allowing Manley to be cross-examined as to charac- 
ter. However the further questions to H. were clearly designed to 
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show that he was an accomplice because if that could be shown then, 
there being no corroboration, there was a very good chance of persua- 
ding the jury it would be unsafe to convict on H. 's evidence. That 
was going very much further than was necessary for the defence which 
Manley was putting up. It was the reverse of the pQsition that arose 
in regard to the first imputation, because here the reason given for 
his lie was that he was an accomplice and guilty of a criminal 
offence. In these circumstances there was nothing wrong in principle 
with the manner in which the discretion was exercised. 
The appeal against conviction was dismissed but the court varied 
the sentence to five years' imprisonment on the ground that despite 
his shocking record it was proper to do so pursuant to the Practice 
Discretion on Corrective Training and Preventive Detention' since he 
was only thirty-five and his longest sentence was. three years' impri- 
sonment. It is my view that the decision in this case involves 
further principles governing the exercise of the discretion than both 
Cook and Flynn. As we know by now, discretion should be exercised in 
favour of the accused where, simply by denying the truth of the 
prosecution's evidence he is alleging that the prosecution witness is 
a liar; whereas as in the present case if he alleges such a witness 
is an accomplice, for- the purpose of requiring that his evidennce be 
corroborated, the discretion may be exercised against him. Though in 
the present case it was emphasised that the latter allegation is an 
allegation of criminal offence it is clear that not every allegation 
1) (1962) Crim. L. R. 308 
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of a criminal offence entitles the judge to exercise his discretion 
against the accused, for such an allegation may be essential to the 
very nature of the defence. 
The position in England once again appears unsettled following the 
House of Lords decision in Selvey V. Director of Public 
Prosecutions. In that case, though the House confirmed after full 
arguement, the existence of judicial discretion to prohibit cross- 
examination it denied the existence of a general rule that the 
discretion should be exercised in favour of the accused when the 
proper development of his defence necessitates the casting of 
imputations on the prosecutor or his witnesses. Selvey's conviction 
was accordingly affirmed. This to my mind negates the joint effect 
of R V. Cook2 and R V. Flynn3 which were generally thought to have 
put paid on the matter. While Cook's case makes it clear that it is 
not enough for the judge to rule that the questions which it is 
proposed to put to the accused are admissible in law, but that he 
must make it clear that he has considered whether 'he should not 
exclude them, notwithstanding their technical admissibility, and in 
the exercise of his discretion, has decided to admit them; it will be 
recalled that R'v. Flynn established that the exercise of the judge's 
discretion is governed by principles; and that a failure to observe 
these principles in the'exercise of the discretion will result in the 
conviction being quashed. In that case, the principle which was 
isolated was that, as a general rule, where the very nature of the 
defence necessarily involves an imputation against the prosecutor or 
1) (1970) A. C. 304 2) (1959) 2 Q. B. 340 3) (1961) 3 All E. R. 58 
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his witness, the discretion should be exercised in favour of the 
accused. 
It is clear that in Selvey's case, their Lordships refused to 
fetter the discretion of the trial judge by any rules as to its 
exercise. The sole criterion to guide his decision is fairness to 
the accused. it is however significant to point out that Lord Guest, 
in the same case of Selvey, observed that one of the matters 
affecting the exercise of discretion would doubtless be the relevance 
of the imputation to the accused's case and the extent to which the 
accused pursued the allegation in the circumstanced . 
The position in Scotland is contained in O'Hara V. HM Advocate , 
in which it was held that it was a question for the presiding judge 
I 
to decide whether cross-examination of the accused under proviso (f) 
(ii) should be allowed, and it was assumed that the prosecutor would 
always ask for leave to cross-examine. 
In sustaining an objection for the defence and disallowing a 
question Lord Stewart in HM Advocate v. Grudins3, voiced an 
unmistakable support for O'Hara's case. He said: "In O'Hara v. HM 
Advocate4, it was assumed that the prosecutor would always ask for 
leave to cross-examine ... . As was said by Lord Justice-Clerk 
Thomson in O'Hara' 'even within the comparitively limited class of 
cases where the nature or conduct of the defence involves imputations 
on character, it is still a question for the presiding judge to 
decide whether cross-examination of the accused should be allowed. 
1) _ (1970) A. C. 304 at 352 2) (1948) S. C. (J) 90 3) (1976) S. L. T. 
(notes) 10 4) (1948) S. C. (J) 90 
- 915 - 
The fundamental consideration is a fair trial and there may be cases 
where the price which the accused may be called upon to pay if cross- 
examined will be out of all proportion to the extent and nature of 
the imputations cast on the witnesses who testify against him. ' I 
would have no hesitation here in using my discretion in favour of 
. 
disallowing the line of cross-examination. The prejudice which might 
be suffered by the accused would be out of proportion to the 
relevancy ... " 
Sheriff Macphail has expressed the thought that it may be useful to 
include in any new provision a rule to the effect that all cross- 
examination under this provision may be undertaken only with leave of 
the Court, and it is always within the discretion of the judge to 
permit or refuse it. 
1 
We can next turn to the position in Autralia. The Australian cases 
prior to Selvey's case contain a number of formulations of the 
principles upon which the discretion of the court should be 
exercised. The most comprehensive of these was the following made by 
Smith, J., in R V. Brown2: "(a) That the legislation is not intended 
to make the introduction of a prisoner's previous convictions other 
than exceptional. (b) That the prejudicial effect on the defence of 
questions relating to the accused's long criminal record needed to be 
weighed against such damage as his Honour might think had been done 
to the Crown case by the imputations. (c) That on the issue of 
credibility it might be unfair to the Crown to leave the Crown witne- 
sses under an imputation while preventing the Crwon from bringing out 
1) Sheriff Mäcphail Research Papers, §5: 60 2) (1960) V. R. 382 at 
398 See Rv Jessop (1974) Tas SR 64; Rv Clarke (1962) VR 657 at-664 
and Dixon C. J., in Rv Dawson (1961)-106 CLR1 at 17 
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the accused's record. (d) That the actual prejudicial effect of the 
cross-examination, if allowed, might far exceed its legitimate 
evidentiary effect upon credit. (e) That great efforts had been made 
by the defence to make it clear that memory only and not honesty was 
the subject of the attack. (f) That counsel for the defence has not 
-been warned but had been refused advice when he sought it from his 
Honour. " Smith, J., concluded his judgement with the sentence: "I 
may observe that as R v. Cook shows, it is essential if accused 
persons are not to be unfairly restricted in putting off their defen- 
ces that the courts should"be most cautious and sparing in the exer- 
cise of the discretion to grant leave. " 
And 'in the recent case of Matthews v. Rl , Burt, J., made the 
interesting observation that in Victoria and Queensland the wording 
of Section 399 (e) (ii) is such that the discretion is to admit the 
cross-examination. In the other jurisdictions the discretion is to 
exclude the evidence. In most cases this difference would not be 
important. 
There are some minor points worth mentioning. For instance the 
fact that the Court of Appeal may uphold the judges decision to 
allow cross-examination on a different ground from that upon which 
he relied 
2 is worth a mention. And the general principle is that the 
Court of Appeal interferes only if the trial judge's discretion was 
exercised upon a wrong principle; ' this is demonstrated by the case of 
3 
R v. Gunner and Lye . In that case Lye approached S in a public 
1) (1973) WAR 110 at 117 2) Rv Clark (1955) 2 Q. B. 469 at 473 
3) (1977) Criri. L. R. 217 
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house while S was making a telephone call and asked him to go outside 
and have a word. Having finished his telephone call, S went outside. 
Lye made an unprovoked attack on him knocking him to the ground. 
Thereafter both Gunner and Lye kicked him. The defence case was that 
S had made an unprovoked attack-on Lye, who acted in self-defence and 
Gunner had gone to his assistance. It was suggested that S's motive 
was revenge, he suspecting that Lye had stolen L15 from him some 
weeks earlier. It was put to s that he had been waiting for an 
opportunity to obtain his revenge for what he considered to be the 
theft of his money. It was put to another prosecution witness that 
he and S were lying and had conspired to commit perjury to achieve 
that revenge. The Crown successfully applied for leave to cross- 
examine Gunner and Lye as to previous convictions for violence. They 
appealed on the ground that the previous convictions were wrongly 
admitted. It was held dismissing the appeal that, the Recorder had 
approached the matter in entirely the correct way applying the deci- 
sion in Selvey's case. He gave the jury a very proper direction on 
the caution they should apply in relation to the convictions and to 
their relevance. The cross-examination of Selvey clearly indicate 
imputations on his character in the ordinary, natural meaning of the 
words and the cross-examination of Gunnner and Lye as to their pre- 
vious conviction was thus admissible in law. The Judge exercised his 
discretion when applied to for leave, and the Court of Appeal would 
interfere with that exercise only if it were based on some error in 
principle. 
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In R V. Cook , the Court of Criminal Appeal stressed the importance 
of giving some sort of warning to the defence that it was going too 
far. It was said that it has always been the practice for 
prosecuting counsel to indicate in advance that he is going to claim 
to rights, or for the judge to give the defence a caution. This is 
especially needful when the prisoner is unrepresented2. The warning 
should not be in open court. 
3 
Finally, it is necessary to point out that the fact that the 
existence of the discretion was not recognised in the early days of 
the Criminal Evidence Act is a matter to be borne in mind when the 
early decisions are under consideration. It is possible that some of 
them should now be treated as cases in which there was an imputation 
although the judge would have been justified in prohibiting cross- 
examination in the exercise ` of his discretion, had he known that he 
possessed such a thing. And not withstanding the decision in 
Selvey's case 
4I 
would like to think that if the accused has to make 
imputations against prosecution witnesses in the course of the proper 
conduct of his case there should be no question of permitting cross- 
examination as to his character. Only where the attack on the 
prosecution is gratuitous in the sense of not flowing naturally from 
the defence should the protection be lost. 
(X) THE RATIONALE OF THE SECOND HALF OF SECTION 1 (f) (ii) 
The rationale of the second limb of Section 1 (f) (ii) can be 
broadly classified or identified under two headings. The first is by 
1) (1959) 2 Q. B. 340 2) Rv Carroll (1964) Tas. S. R. 76, discussing 
Rv Coman (1955) VLR 289 (no rule of law or practice) 3) For the 
'appropriate procedure at a summary trial see Rv Weston-Super-Mare JJ; 
ex Parte Townsend (1968) 3 All E. R. 225n. 4) (1970) A. C. 304 
- 919 - 
reason of the adversorial system of justice. As we know, generally 
in the adversorial system, the prosecution always starts rather 
handicapped and it appears the rule is out to minimise or decrease 
this handicap or imbalance, by endeavouring to put both parties on 
equal footing. This is done for the sake of the system, as Lord 
Justice-Clerk Thomson observed in Thomson v. Glasgow Corporationl 
He said: "It is an essential feature of the judge's function to see 
that the litigation is carried on fairly between the parties. Judges 
sometimes flatter themselves by thinking that their function is the 
ascertainment of truth. This is so only in a very limited sense. 
Our system of administrating justice in civil affairs proceeds on 
the footing that each side, working at arm's length, selects its own 
evidence. Each side's selection of its own evidence may, for various 
reasons, be partial in every sense of the term. Much may depend on 
the diligence of the original investigators, or on the luck of fin- 
ding witnesses or on the skill and judgement of those preparing the 
case. At the proof itself whom to call, what to ask, when to stop 
and so forth are matters of judgement. A witness of great value on 
one point may have to be left out because he is dangerous on another. 
Even during the progress of the proof values change, treasured mate- 
rial is scrapped and fresh avenues feverishly explored. It is on 
basis of the two carefully selected versions that the judge is final- 
ly called upon to adjudicate. He cannot make investigations on his 
behalf he cannot call witnesses; his undoubted right to question 
1) (1962) SC (HL) 36, at pp 51-52 
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witnesses who are put in the box has to be exercised with caution. 
He is at the mercy of contending sides whose whole object is not to 
discover truth but to get his judgement. That judgement must be 
based only on what he is allowed to hear. He may suspect that 
witnesses who know the 'truth' have never left the witness-room for 
the witness-box because neither side dares risk them, but the most 
that he can do is to comment on their absence .... A litigation is 
in essence a trial of skill between opposing parties conduct under 
recognised rules, and the prize is the judges decision. We have 
rejected inquisitorial methods and prefer to regard our judges as 
entirely independent. Like referees at boxing contests, they see 
that the rules are kept and count the points. "' It is no surprise 
following this statement that this is sometimes described as the 
sporting view. 
The other rationale of the second limb of Section 1 (f) (ii) can be 
described as "truth" oriented. Here too, the idea as in the first 
rationale is to put both parties on equal pedestal, though this is 
not the main objective of the rule, that being just a direct by- 
product of the main objective which is to consider the credibility of 
the accused - i. e., his reliability after he might have cast asper- 
sions on the character of the prosecution. As Channell, J, stated 
in R v. Prston2 : "If defence is so conducted, or the nature of the 
defence is such, as to involve the proposition that the jury ought 
not to believe the prosecutor or one of the witnesses for the prose- 
cution upon the ground that his conduct - not his evidence in that 
1) For a commentary on these observations see (1963) SLT (News) 21 
2) (1909) I K. B. 568 at 575; see RV Westfall (1912) 7 Cr. App. R. 
176 at 179 per Hamilton J. 
case ... makes him an unreliable witness, then -the 
jury ought also to 
know the character of the prisoner who either gives that evidence or 
makes that charge, and it then becomes admissible to cross-examine 
the prisoner about his antecedents and character with the view of 
showing that he has such a bad character that the jury ought not to 
rely upon his evidence. " 
Similarly in R V. Jenkins Singleton, J., stated that: "The subse- 
ction was intended to be a protection to an accused person. A case 
ought to be tried on its own facts and it has always been recognised 
that, it is better that the jury should know nothing about an accused 
past history if that is to his discredit just as it was recognised 
that this was fair and proper, so it was recognised that if the 
nature or conduct of the defence was such as to involve imputations 
on the character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecu- 
tion it was equally fair and proper that'the prosecution should have 
the right to ask questions tending to show that the accused has 
committed or been convicted of an offence other than that which is 
under investigation. " In the same case Jenkins, J., 
2 
observed as 
follows: "(I)n the ordinary and normal case (the judge) may feel that 
if the credit of the prosecutor or his witnesses has been attacked, 
it is only fair the jury should have before them material on which 
they can form their judgement whether the accused person is more 
worthy to be believed than those he has attacked. It is obviously 
unfair that the jury should be left in the dark about an accused 
1) (1945) 31 Cr. App. R. 1 at pp. 14-15 2) Ibid at p. 15 
- 922 - 
person's character if the conduct of his defence has attacked the 
character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution 
within the meaning of the section. " A view seemingly reinforced by 
Devlin J in R v. Cookl , when he said: "If there is a real issue about 
the conduct of an important witness which the jury will inevitably 
have to settle in order to arrive at their verdict, then ... the jury 
is entitled to know the credit of the man on whose word the witness's 
character is being impugned. " In other words, it is a matter of tit 
for tat as all the dicta unanimously indicates. 
It is pertinent to point out that the question is not the intent 
with which the accused raised the matter but the likely effect on the 
mind of the jury 2' 
(XI) PURPOSE OF THE CROSS-EXAMINATION ALLOWED BY SECTION 1 (f) (ii) 
It will be pertinent to recall the rationale of the provision in 
Section 1 (f) (ii) that allows an accused to be cross-examined as to 
his character when he has made imputations on the character of a 
prosecution witness is, as Channell, J., observed in R v" Preston3, 
that " ... the jury ought also to know the character of the prisoner 
who either gives that evidence or makes that charge, and it then 
becömes admissible to cross-examine the prisoner about his 
antecedents and character with. the view to showing that he has such a 
bad character that the jury ought not to rely on his evidence. " 
It follows from this that the purpose of the cross-examination 
permitted by Section 1 (f) (ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, is 
. 
1) (1959) 2 Q. B. 340 2) See Rv Donnini (1972) 128 C. L. R. 114 
3) (1909) I K. B. 568 at 575; see a s3 v Jenkins (1945) 31 Cr. 
App. R. 1 at 15 
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to discredit the accused, and the judge must use his best endeavours 
to make this plain to the jury. A good case in point is R v. 
Vickersl In that case, the appellant Vickers was convicted of 
unlawfully and maliciously wounding A., a prison officer, at a 
remand home at which Vickers was at the material time on remand. He 
alleged in defence of the charge that he had been attacked by A and 
other prison officers and that any injury caused to A by the 
appellant was done in self-defence. The Deputy Chairman gave leave 
to the prosecutor to cross-examine Vickers as to his previous 
convictions under Section 1 (f) (ii). He was cross-examined in such 
a way to as to suggest that his convictions were evidence of a 
violent disposition. In summing up to the jury the Deputy Chairman 
said that the appellant's convictions for violence did not mean he 
must be guilty, his convictions were simply part of the evidence and 
the jury were to give them what weight they saw fit. The court held, 
quashing the conviction, that, this was not a satisfactory direction. 
The object of cross-examination under Section 1 (f) (ii) it was held, 
is really to affect the credit of the accused. it was observed that 
the direction of the Deputy Chairman set against the background of 
the appellant's cross-examination would appear to be a direction that 
the jury could consider his convictions as a disposition to violence. 
The decision in this case is clearly in accordance with the above 
statement of Channell, J., in R v. Preston. The decision however has 
a further significance; it raises doubts whether the cross- 
examination as to convictions for violence ought to have been 
1) (1972) Crim. L. R. _ 101 
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admitted at all. It is not clear what bearing convictions for 
violence have upon untruthfulness. A man may have a very violent 
disposition generally and yet be very honest. Are persons with 
violent dispositions generally less truthful than other people? 
Unless they are, the evidence surely has no relevance at all for, the 
-purpose for which it may be admitted. 
On the other hand, convictions for violence have, or may have, `a 
high degree of relevance on a charge of an offence of violence. 
Whatever direction is given to the jury, it is difficult to suppose 
that they can infact ignore the conviction for the purpose for which 
it has high relevance, while taking it into account for the purpose 
for which it has little or no relevance. This is surely a case in 
which the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighs its probative 
value, so that, even if it is admissible in law, it ought to be 
excluded in the exercise of the judge's discretion'. - 
Another case in point ' is R v. Index. In' that` case the appellant 
was charged with one offence of buggery and with seven of indecent 
assault relating to six boys living in the same place where he lodged 
and three of them in the same house. He had a very bad record for 
similar offences and during the evidence-of one boy, the appellant 
alleged that the evidence against him had been faked 'and that the 
boy had been blackmailing him. The trial judge ruled that the 
appellant had made an imputation of bad character against the boy 
and, therefore, under the proviso'to Section 1 (f) of "the Criminal 
1) (1977) 67 Cr. App. R. -143 
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Evidence Act, 1898, he allowed the appellant's bad record to be let 
in. During the summing up the judge did not exercise full caution to 
ensure that the jury were warned from time to time that the 
information about the appellant's bad character should be used for 
purposes of credit only. The crown case was that the evidence of 
similar fact satisfied the test laid down in Boardman V. Director of 
Public Prosecutions', in that the offences were strikingly similar, 
all committed during a period when the appellant was living in the 
same house as two of the boys and shared the same bed, and further, 
that the similarities represented the stock in trade of the seducer 
of small boys. The jury convicted on the one count of buggery and on 
four of the indecent assualt counts. On appeal on the question 
whether the trial judge had erred in allowing the appellant's past 
record of similar offences to be admitted in evidence and how far the 
evidence of each boy could be treated as corroborating the evidence 
of others, it was held that, first, the trial judge had not erred in 
admitting evidence of the appellant's past criminal record, despite 
its highly prejudicial nature; nevertheless, insufficient guidance 
had been given to the jury to treat that evidence as going to credit 
only and not as similar fact evidence, in respect of which it was 
clearly admissible. Secondly, it was held that evidence as to other 
similar offences was admissible as similar evidence if, but only if, 
it went beyond showing a tendency to commit crimes of that kind and 
was positively probative with regard to the offence charged, whereas 
the common factor of the instant offences were similarities which 
1) (1974) 60 Cr. App. R. 165; (1975) A. C. 421 
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represented the stock in trade of the seducer of small boys and were 
not unique. It was further pointed out that the judge should have 
directed the jury. that the similarities were not sufficient to 
satisfy the test of similar fact evidence, and they should not have 
regarded the evidence of one boy as evidence against another; 
-accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed. 
It is pertinent to take a look at the suggestion of Sir Rupert 
Cross on the issue of direction to the jury. He pointed out that the 
judge is obliged to direct the jury in something like the following 
terms: "You must not infer from the fact that the accused has 
numerous convictions that he is guilty because he is the kind of man 
who would commit this crime but when considering the weight to be 
attached to his testimony to the effect that he did not commit this 
crime, you must remember that it is tendered less trustworthy than 
would otherwise be the case by the fact that he has numerous 
convictions. "' Similar directions have been made in a number of 
cases. In R v. Morrison2, the accused was charged with murder by 
violence, and his counsel cross-examined one of the witnesses for the 
prosecution on the question whether she kept a brothel. Morrison was 
accordingly cross-examined in his turn with regard to his previous 
convictions for larceny and burglary. Darling, J., told the jury 
that: "The only use to be made of these previous convictions is to 
show that when you have to rely on his (the prisoner's) word as- 
contradicting something stated by somebody else, or something which 
1) An attempt to Update The Law of, Evidence, pp 21-22 2) Cited from 
Notable British Trials in 11 C. L. J. at 388. The direction appears to 
have been approved by the Court of Criminal Appeal -Rv Morrison 
(1911) 6 Cr. App. R. 159 at 169. Similar directions were given by 
trial judges, see report of the case of Rv Falconer - Atlee (1973) 
58 Cr. App. Rep. 349 
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is not corroborated, you have not the word of a person who has done 
nothing wrong .... You have only the word of a man whose past career 
has been what you know it to have been. " 
And in R V. Cookl, where imputations were cast upon the method by 
which a confession was obtained, the judge told the jury he was sure 
that they would not be prejudiced by the fact that the accused 
admitted to having been convicted of criminal offences. Later he 
said this: "When allegations are made against police officers, or 
indeed any other witness for the prosecution, you should consider 
who is the person who is making them, and for that purpose you are 
entitled to take into consideration that he admits that he is a 
convicted criminal. If you understand what I mean by that, it does 
not make it any more likely that he committed this crime, but it may 
mean that it is more unlikely that the allegations made against the 
police officers are true than if they were made by a person of good 
character. " In the Court of Criminal Appeal this was said to have 
been a proper direction on the limited effect of the appellant's bad 
character. 
Clearly a direction of this nature is given more frequently than is 
sometimes supposed. In R V. Brown2, where self-defence was pleaded, 
the judge said to the jury: "You will not allow your knowledge of his 
past to weigh your judgement of the evidence given in this case. It 
is relevant only in your consideration of the suggestion that it was 
Wright who was the aggressor on his occaasion. " As Cross3 pointed 
out, this being the only live issue in the case, it is difficult to 
1) (1959) 2 Q. B. 340 2) (1960) 44. Cr. App. R. 181 3) See Cross 
on Evidence, 5th ed. at p. 434 
describe the judge's admonition, though required by law, as anything 
other than specious. And he rightly went on to observe that: "The 
distinction sought to be drawn in R v. Cookl is only one degree less 
specious. How can the fact that it is more unlikely that allegations 
that a confession was improperly obtained were true than would be the 
case if they were made by a person of good character fail to render 
it more likely that the accused was guilty of that to which he 
confessed. When made before the jury the whole purpose of such 
allegations is to support the contention that the confession was 
"'2 untrue. 
In R v. Maya, it was decided that it was a matter of discretion, 
not duty, for the trial judge to warn the jury not to use his 
convictions to show the accused was a person with a propensity to 
commit crimes. In another and more recent Australian case - Donnini 
V. R4, Barwick, C. J., quite elaborately discussed the matter as 
follows: "(T)he question of public importance which, in my opinion, 
is raised ... is the existence and extent of the duty of a trial 
judge to assist a jury as to the use they may make of evidence of 
prior convictions having no other relevance in the case than the 
character and credibility of the accused. It is the settled policy 
of the law that, in general, evidence of a prospensity to commit a 
crime or of a prospensity to commit a particular type of crime is not 
admitted for the consideration of a jury. But evidence of bad chara- 
cter, particularly where it serves no other purpose in a cause than 
1) (1959) 2 Q. B. 340 2) Cross On Evidence, -5th ed. at p. 434 
3) (1959) V. K. 6 83 4) (1972) 128 C. L. R. 114 at p. 123 
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the exposure of that character where the accused's credit is invol- 
ved, is susceptible of use by a jury as indicating a propensity for 
criminal behaviour. Where the ground for granting the permission 
under Section 399 (e) (ii)i is an attempt by the accused to establish 
his own good character as a matter to be considered on the question 
of his guilt or innocence, the purpose of the section is to deny the 
accused the benefit of a false claim to good character. It does not 
intend to place bad character before the jury as a fact upon which 
they may conclude the guilt or innocence of the accused. It seems to 
me, however, that there is a high degree of possibility that a jury- 
man will be prone to reason towards guilt by the use of the fact of 
prior conviction as indicative of a disposition to crime on the part 
of the accused. To so use the fact of prior conviction is to cut 
across a deeply entreched policy of the law. Therefore the not 
unnatural tendency of the juryman and the importance of that policy 
seem to me to require that the trial judge, when evidence of prior, 
conviction is properly before the jury for the sole purpose of comba- 
ting a suggestion of good character or to weaken or destroy an 
accused's credibility, must assist the jury by expressly and with 
emphasis telling them that they may not use the fact of prior convic- 
tion as tending to the guilt*of the accused. In my opinion, in such 
a case, he should tell them quite clearly that the fact of prior 
conviction can only be used as a means of discrediting the accused in 
respect of any matter as to which he is in conflict in his evidence 
with witnesses for the Crown, or as to exculpatory facts or claims 
1) See S. 1(f) (ii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898; Ss. 141 (f) 
(ii) and 346 (f) (ii) of, the 1975 (Scotland) Act; S. 159 (d) (ii) 
of the Nigerian Evidence Act 
which he makes. Where the evidence of prior convictions or of bad 
character or tendencies is properly admitted for other purposes, it, 
may be that a clear statement of the use to be made of the evidence 
for those purposes may suffice. " 
It is however, very doubtful whether the distinction between cross- 
-examination to credit and to the issue makes sense in this context, 
especially since it is unlikely that words can be found which will 
prevent the revelations elicited from the accused in cross- 
examination from being treated as something which enhances. the 
probability of his guilt. We know that, as Barwick, C. J., pointed 
out above in Donnini's case, regardless of the direction that is 
given to the jury, it seems likely that they will take the accused's 
record into account when deciding whether or not he committed the 
crime. The most that can be hoped for is'that the jury may be 
restrained from jumping to the conclusion that someone'is guilty 
because "he is the kind of person who would do that kind of thing". 
Moreover, whatever remaining confidence as one might have in the 
distinction between cross-examination to credit and to the issue in 
the context is in no way increased by the court's tendency to pay 
particular attention to convictions for offences of the same category 
as that charged to-the exclusions of others which, viewed in ab- 
stract, go more directly to credibility. A good example is the 
exclusion of the convictions for dishonesty and the inclusion of 
those for indecency in Selvey v. Director of Public Prosecutions. 
1) (1970) A. C. 304 
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It is essential to point out that the second limb of Section 1 (f) 
(ii) is liable to place counsel for the defence in a somewhat embar- 
rasing position. Assuming that the prosecution has, as it shouldl, 
informed him of his client's record, and of the known records of 
witnesses for the prosecution2, he cannot cross-examine the witnesses 
without exposing the accused to retaliation in kind. On the other 
hand, failure to attack the witnesses' credibility may lead the jury 
to treat unreliable evidence as though it were trustworthy. This 
difficulty could be countered by a practice under which counsel for 
the Crown informs the Court of such matters as the previous convic- 
tions of his witnesses but there does not appear to be any general 
rule to that effect. In R V. Carey and Williams 3, Carey and Williams 
were convicted of shopbreaking and larceny. One of the main prosecu- 
tion witnesses had previous convictions; this was known to counsel 
for Carey and Williams but he decided not to cross-examine the wit- 
ness about them. Carey and Williams applied for leave to appeal on 
the gorund, inter alia, that the judge, or prosecuting counsel should 
have told the jury of the witness's bad character. it was held, 
refusing the application, that, a judge has no materials on which to 
question a prosecution witness as to character and in any event is 
not a matter for him. Nor has the prosecution any duty to disclose 
to the jury the character of the witnesses. There are some cases in 
which it is done but it is a matter of discretion. In the present 
case it was held that to have put before the jury the character of 
the witness in this way would have given them an unbalanced picture, 
1) Practice Direction, (1976) 2 A11'E. R. 928 2) Cf Rv Collister 
and Rv Warhurst (1955) 39 Cr. App. R. 100 and Rv Mat-hews-(1975) 60 
Cr. App. R. 292 3) (1968) 52 Cr. App. Rep. 305 
- 932 - 
because they would have known his bad character but not that of Carey 
and Williams. 
This case thus illustrates the unsatisfactory state of affairs 
arising from the provisions of the Criminal Evidence Act, 18981. The 
accused with a bad character who wishes to give evidence dare not 
reveal the known bad character of the prosecutor or his witness 
because this will expose him to cross-examination as to his own 
misdeeds. Because the accused is keeping from the jury evidence 
which is certainly logically relevant as tending to show that he is 
an unreliable witness, other logically relevant evidence which is 
favourable to the accused is also withheld from them. This looks 
like rough justice: it'is thought'better to let the jury think that 
all the witnesses are of impeccable character, when they are not, 
than let them know that 'the prosecution witnesses are of bad 
character while concealing from them the truth about the accused. If 
the accused has witnesses other than himself - whoare of bad 
character, the rule is capable of working grave injustice; for them 
there'is nothing to prevent the prosecution from revealing the bad 
character-of the defence witnesses, other than the accused, while he 
will still be inhibited by his own bad character' from cross-examining 
the prosecution asýto credit. There are possible ways' of surmounting 
the difficulties which have been mentioned. The first that readily 
comes to mind is the total repeal of the second half of paragraph (f) 
(ii) 2. but the question is to what extent or rather on what terms 
1) S. 1 (f); S. 399 (e) Crimes Act, 1958 - Victoria; Ss. 141 and 346 
of the 1975 (Scotland) Act; S. 159 (d) Nigerian Evidence Act 
2)Glanville Williams - The Proof of Guilt (3rd ed. ) at 222 
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should the repeal be. For a start one may suggest that the subsec- 
tion be amended in such a way as to make it plain that it has no 
application to cases in which the making of the imputations is neces- 
sary for the purpose of developing the accused's defence. Another 
course which would seem more desirable is to provide with full force 
. 
general guidelines or criteria for the exercise of discretion in 
matters under the second part of Section 1 (f) (ii). This course is 
marred by the inevitable difficulties that accompany the dispensation 
of judicial discretion. 
(8). THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1 (f) (iii): - 
It is now clear that when an accused gives evidence, he is liable 
to be cross-examined by any co-accused about any matter other than 
his character, even though his evidence has not been in any way 
adverse to that co-accused. In R V. Hilton1, the appellant was 
jointly charged with ten others with the offence of aiding and 
abetting an affray. He pleaded not guilty. One of the defendants 
gave evidence in his own defence which did not incriminate any of the 
co-defendant. On application by the appellant and other co- 
defendants to cross-examine that defendant, the commissioner ruled. 
that, in the absence of any evidence by the defendant tending to 
incriminate the appellant or any of the other co-defendants, they had 
no right of cross-examination. The appellant was convicted, on 
appeal it was held - allowing the appeal - that the ruling of the 
commissioner had been wrong, for the right to cross-examine a co- 
1) (1972) 1 Q. B. 421 
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defendant was well established and necessary in order that justice be 
done- that accordingly, the conviction would be quashed. 
One of the cases referred to in the judgement in Hilton was Gemmell 
and McFadyen v. MacNiven1, where the Court of Justiciary held that in 
Scotland the general right to cross-examine only arose when evidence 
had been given against the co-accused by the accused within the 
meaning of Section 1 (f) (iii). Gemmel's case bears to follow 
Hackston v. Millar2, but that decision is not an authority for the 
word "only" in the rule. The rule is also qualified by Lee V. HM 
Advocate3 which held that the co-accused has a duty to cross-examine 
the accused in the witness-box if he intends to give evidence 
incriminating that accused. In Scotland it is now thought that it 
would be more satisfactory to give the co-accused a right to cross- 
examine which is not so restricted; this brings it in line with the 
position in En-gland4 as indicated above. That was proposed in the 
Draft Code, by article 6 (3) (c), with hardly any adverse comment. 
Article 6 (3) (c) of `the Draft Code is in the following terms: "An 
accused person may, with the consent of another accused call that 
other accused as a witness on his behalf, or he may cross-examine 
that other accused if that other accused gives evidence, but he 
cannot do both. " 
The Thomson Committee made the following observations on the rules: 
"Rule (c) will involve an alteration to the existing law. As regards 
the first part of (c) we favour the suggestion that an accused may, 
with the consent of another accused, call that other accused as a 
1) (1928)-S. C. (J) 5 2) (1906) 8F (J) 52; 5 Adam 37; considered 
in Townsend v Strathern (1923) J. C. 66; and RN Gooderson, "The 
Evidence of Co-Prisoners", (1952) 11 CLJ 209, at'223_'3) '(1968) SLT 
155 4) See Rv Hilton (1972) 1 Q. B. 421 5) Thomson, para. 38: 22 
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witness on his behalf. The second part of (c) would allow an accused 
person to cross-examine a co-accused whether or not the evidence of 
that co-accused incriminates him&. This change accords generally 
with the views of the majority of our witness. The present rules 
whereby co-accused A may only be cross-examined on behalf of another 
accused if his evidence incriminates them, is unduly restrictive in 
that the other co-accused are unable to obtain from A evidence in 
their favour. We therefore approve of the content of rule (c) and 
recommend accordingly. Indeed, we would go further and recommend 
that the evidence of every witness, whether an accused or not, should 
be evidence in causa and subject to general cross-examination. " The 
law -today by virtue of Section 141 (2) (b) of the Criminal Procedure 
(Scotland) Act, 1975, is that the accused may ask a co-accused any 
question in cross-examination if the co-accused gives evidence. - 
However, the accused can only be cross-examined about his character 
and, in particular, about any previous convictions when, in the words 
of Section 1 (f) (iii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, as amended 
by the criminal Evidence Act 1979 "he has given evidence against any 
other person charged in the same proceedings. " The Act of 1898 
originally referred to cases in which evidence was given against any 
other person "charged with the offence". The original version 
remains the provision in some Commonwealth countries like Australia2 
and Nigeria; in which case the relevant provisions of the statute in 
these countries permit cross-examination on the prohibited matters if 
1) Cf Youn vHM Advocate (1932) J. C. 63 2) See S. 399 (e) Crimes 
Act, 1958, Victoria 3) S. 159 (d) (iii) of the Nigeria Evidence 
Act 
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"the accused has given evidence against any other person charged with 
the same offence. " In other words, two conditions must be satisfied 
before the co-accused can cross-examine the accused about any pre- 
vious convictions. First, the accused must have "given evidence 
against" the co-accused. Secondly, the co-accused must have been 
"charged in the same proceedings" or "charged with the same offence" 
- as the case may be - as the accused. Both conditions as we shall 
see, present considerable difficulties of interpretation. And there 
are still other problems. For instance, it has been observed that it 
is not clear whether this exception applies where the accused witness 
has given evidence against a person other than the person seeking to 
bring out his character: nor is it clear whether it applies where the 
evidence relied on by the cross-examiner has been given in other 
proceedingsl. It is thought that both difficulties may be resolved 
if the rationale underlying the exception is that the accused witness 
"is in the same position as a witness for' the prosecution`so far as 
the co-accused is concerned, and nothing'must be done to impair the 
right of a person charged to discredit the accusers"z it has recen- 
tly been said that the purpose of Section 1 (f) (iii) and its equiva- 
lents in other jurisdictions, was to allow an accused against whom a 
co-accused had given evidence, to cross-examine that co-accused "to 
show'thit credence ought not to be attached to the evidence which had 
3 
been given against him". The same reason was indeed given in the 
much earlier case of R v. Hadwen4. And in the reported cases cross- 
1) Renton and Brown, para 18: 16 2) Cross on Evidence, 5th ed. at 
p. 435 3) Per Lord Morris in Murdoch v Taylor (1965) 2 W. L. R. 425, at 
428 4) (1902) 1 K. B. 882 
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examination under section 1 (f) (iii) has almost invariably been by 
counsel for the co-accused. The one exception is R V. Seigley 
1 
where 
it would appear that the prosecution conducted the cross-examination. 
It is desirable for a thorough analysis of Section 1 (f) (iii) that 
one's discussion should be focussed on the construction and scope of 
---ý. 
the provision; one may then start by considering the significance and 
aptness of the expressions. 
(I) CONSTRUCTION 
" ... given evidence against ... " - It is a generally accepted view 
that it is not necessary that there should have been any hostile 
intent in order that a person should be held to have "given evidence 
against" his co-accused. The important point is, not the state of 
mind of the witness, but the likely effect of his testimony. One 
question which the House of Lords in Murdoch v. Taylor2 had to 
decide was whether Murdoch had in fact "given evidence against" L 
within the meaning of Section 1 (f) (iii). In that case two accused 
L and M., were charged jointly with receiving stolen cameras. The 
prosecution alleged that L had tried to sell the cameras, which were 
in a box, to a shopkeeper for L100 but that being unsuccessful he had 
enlisted the help of M., who was waiting in a car outside, and that M 
had than suggested that the shopkeeper could have them for L60. The 
defence of L opened first and L in substance agreed with the 
prosecution's story. M in his defence, however, said 
inchief that 
until L invited him into the shop and said that the shopkeeper had 
I) (1911) 6 Cr. App. R. 106 2) (1965) A. C. 574 
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offered 160 he did not know that the box contained cameras and that 
he had become suspicious and had left. M was cross-examined by 
counsel for L and was asked whether he was saying that he had had 
nothing to do with the cameras but that it was entirely L's 
responsibility. M replied that he was. In view of M's answers 
'counsel for L claimed the right to cross-examine M under Section 1 
(f) (iii), and the court held that he could do so. 
it is of course pertinent to mention the fact that prior to 
Murdoch v. Taylor', there were other cases2 where the term "given 
evidence against" was discussed but no where was a definition 
attempted. The only case in which a court had previously attempted 
to define the term "against" was R V. Stannard3. in that case 
counsel for one accused had contended that though his client had 
given evidence which conflicted with the evidence of a co-accused he 
had not intended to attack him. Stannard together with C and B was 
convicted of conspiring to receive stolen property. Stannard in the 
course of developing his own defence, gave evidence which tended to 
incriminate C and B. The trial judge ruled that he had "given 
evidence against" C and B and that they were entitled to cross- 
examine him as to his previous convictions - Section 1 (f) (iii), 
Criminal Evidence Act 1898. Stannard appealed on the grounds, inter 
alia, that he had not "given evidence against" C and B. The Court of 
Appeal held, - dismissing the appeal - that the object of paragraph 
(iii) is to protect a defendant against whom a co-defendant has given 
evidence by enabling him to undermine the credibility of the co- 
1) (9165) A. C. 574 2) See Rv Seighley (1911) Cr. App. R. 106 
and Rv Zango u11as (1962) Crim. L. R. 3) (1964) 2 WLR 461 
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defendant by cross-examining him as to his criminal record. This 
right to cross-examine it was held, when it arises is absolute', and 
so it follows that the test of whether evidence has been given a- 
gainst a co-defendant is objective, that is, has the evidence or any 
part of it been adverse in a material respect to the case of the co- 
defendant (has it undermined his defence or tended to support the 
prosecution case) and not subjective i. e., has the evidence been 
given with the object of saying something so adverse. Otherwise 
there would have to be a trial of the motives of the witness. It 
also follows that a defendant cannot claim immunity from cross- 
examination on the ground that he was only asserting what was neces- 
sary for his own defence. However, a mere conflict of fact will not 
necessarily amount to "giving evidence against"2. And it was further 
held that it would be rarely that an answer given by a defendant, to, a 
question from the judge would be sufficient, to render him liable to 
cross-examination under Section 1 (f) (iii). Accordingly,, it was 
decided in the present case that the cross-examination was properly 
allowed. 
The House of Lords in Murdoch V. Taylor3 in substance agreed with 
the text as suggested in R V. Stannard4. Lord Donovan observed as 
follows: "The text prescribed by the court of Criminal Appeal in 
Stannard was whether the evidence in question tended to support the 
prosecution's case in a material respect or to undermine the defence. 
I have no substantial quarrel with this definition. "S Nevertheless, 
1) See Rv Ellis (1961) I WLR 1064 2) Rv Zangoullas (1962) Crim. 
L. R. 544 3) (1965) A. C. 574 4) (1964) 2 W. L. R. 461 5) (1965) A. C. 
574 at 592 
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Lord Donovan considered that the expression "tended to" was better 
omitted. He said "I would, however, observe that some danger may 
lurk in the the use of the expression 'tended to'. There will proba- 
bly be occasions when it could be said that evidence given by one 
accused 'tended to' support the prosecution's case simply because it 
differed from the evidence of his co-accused, and the addition of 
the words, 'in a material respect' might not wholly remove the dan- 
ger. The difficulty is not really one of the conception but of 
expression. I myself would omit the words 'tended to' and simply 
say that 'evidence against' means evidence which supports the prose- 
cution's case in a material respect or which undermines the defence 
of the co-accused"1. 
And Lord Morris of Both-y-Gest opined as follows: "The Act does 
not call for any investigation as to the motives or wishes which may 
have prompted the giving of evidence against another person charged 
with the same offence. It is the nature of the evidence that must be 
considered. Its character does not change according as to whether it 
is the product of pained reluctance or of malevolent eagerness. If, 
while ignoring anything trivial or casual, the positive-evidence 
given by the witness would rationally have to be included in any 
survey or summary of the evidence in the case which, if accepted, 
would warrant the conviction of the 'other person charged with the 
same offence' then the witness would have given evidence against such 
other person. Such other person would then have the additional 
testimony against him. From this point of view that testimony would 
1) See Ibid 
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be just as damaging whether given with regret or whether given with 
relish"'. 
The only real note of dissent was struck by Lord Reid2 who contras- 
ted "evidence against" with "would tend to criminate" in section 1 
(e) of the 1898 Act. He expressed his doubt whether the word "a- 
gainst" would have been used if the intention had it been that Sec- 
tion 1 (f) (iii) should apply to all, evidence which would tend to 
criminate the co-accused. He said: "If this provision has this wide 
meaning, an accused person with previous convictions, whose story 
contradicts in any material respect the story of a co-accused who has 
not yet been convicted, will find it almost impossible to defend 
himself. "3 Nevertheless, Lord Reid was unable to find any solution 
to the problem set by section 1 (f) (iii) and did not therefore 
dissent. 
In McCourtney v. HM Advocate , the court observed that the test 
favoured by the majority in Murdoch v. Taylor was "a stiff one" and 
expressed no opinion as to the correctness of its formulation. In 
that case, the appellant was tried on indictment with four others. 
Charge 1 was a charge that in his house and workshop, and a house 
occupied by his co-accused, the appellant and another produced a 
controlled drug, namely amphetamine sulphate, contrary to Section 4 
(2) (a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971. He was convicted and 
sentenced to eight years' imprisonment. He applied for leave to 
appeal against conviction At the trial, a co-accused, R, gave 
1) Ibid at 584 2) Ibid at 583 3) (1965) A. C. 574 at 583 
4) (1978) S. L. T. 10 at 13 
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evidence on his own behalf and at a later stage, the appellant gave 
evidence. In the course of the cross-examination of the appellant 
by counsel for R, the appellant was asked a number of questions 
intended to elicit, and which did elicit, that he had a number of 
previous convictions for dishonesty. The trial judge took the 'view 
after debate that the appellant had given evidence against his co- 
accused R within the meaning of Section 141 (f) (ii) and (iii) of the 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975. For the appellant it was 
argued (i) that before evidence given by one accused relating to 
another accused can be evidence against the other accused for the 
purposes of Section 141 (f) (iii), the evidence in question must 
support-the the Crown case against the co-accused in a material way 
and undermine his defence; and (2) the trial judge misdirected him- 
self in allowing the previous convictions of the appellant to be put 
to him in cross-examination by counsel for Robertson, for he did so 
upon the view that he had no discretion on the matter. The Court 
held that in the context of the evidence as a whole the appellant's 
evidence materially supported the Crown case and undermined the 
defence of R., and the trial judge accordingly made the correct 
decision. The conviction was consequently upheld. 
It is pertinent to draw attention to the following passages in the 
judgement, the Court said: "For the appellant the first submission 
was that before evidence given by one accused relating to another 
accused can be evidence against the other accused for the 'purpose of 
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Section 141 (f) (iii) of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975, 
the evidence in question must support the Crown case against the co- 
accused in a material respect or undermine his. defence. This was 
the test favoured by Lord Donovan in Murdoch V. Taylor' and it is a 
stiff one. Applying that test in this case to the evidence given by 
-the appellant in-the passages which we have quoted the trial judge 
was wrong in holding that this evidence fell to be regarded as 
evidence against R. We have no hesitation in rejecting this 
submission. 2 
The meaning of the words "given evidence against" has been 
considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal in some recent' cases. In 
R V. Davis3, Davis was tried with 0 on a count for theft. They went 
to a house and bought some antiques. After thay had left the 
householder discovered that a soup tureen and a gold cross on a chain 
were missing. As to the tureen each said that they thought the other 
had bought it. As to the cross 0 said, in cross-examination, that 
after leaving the house Davis produced it from his pocket. Davis's 
counsel obtained leave to cross-examine o on his previous convic- 
tions Davis said that O's account was a pack of lies, and in cross- 
examination, "I am not suggesting he took the cross and chain. As I 
never, and it is missing, he must have done it but I am not saying 
he did. If it is not in the house, who did steal it I do not know. 
I am not going to imply that he stole it because I never saw him 
steal it. I have got no idea. " O's counsel obtained leave to cross- 
examine Davis on his previous convictions Both were convicted of 
1) (1965) A. C. 574 at 592 2) (1978) S. L. T. 10 at 13 3) (1975) 
I W. L. R. 745 
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stealing the tureen and 0 alone of stealing the cross. Davis ap- 
pealed on the ground inter alia, that the judge was wrong in ruling 
that he had given evidence against 0. The Court of Criminal Appeal 
held that "evidence against" meant evidence which supported the 
prosecution case, or undermined the defence of the co-accused; that 
it was not necessary to show that the witness had a hostile intent 
against his co-accused. As only Davis or 0 or both of them could 
have stolen the cross, Davis's denial that he had done so necessarily 
meant that 0 had. The court attached no importance to Davis's use 
of phrases such as "a pack of lies" but his answers in cross-examina- 
tion would have undermined 0's defence. It had been submitted that 
mere denials did not come within Section 1 (f) (iii), relying on R V. 
Stannardl. Much would depend however upon the relevance of the 
conflict to the issues. In the present case the court of Criminal 
Appeal observed that the conflict went to the root of the matter. 
If the jury accepted Davis's denial 0 had little chance of acquittal. 
Davis had to make it if he was to have a chance of acquittal although 
he thereby exposed himself to cross-examination and damaged his 
chances. The court however rightly observed further that some might 
not find the result attractive but no injustice had been done. In 
any event, the appeal was dismissed. I think it is fair to say 
that in this case, the interpretation of the majority judgement in 
Murdoch v, Taylor2 was applied logically but with an odd result. It 
appears that where a crime must have been committed by one or other 
1) (1964) 2 WZR 461; see also R v4Cöngressi (1974) 9 SASR 257"where 
a simple denial of the evidence of a co-accused was held not to attract 
the operation of an equivalent of the section. 2) (1965) A. C. 
574 
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of two accused, A and B, either of them necessarily exposes his 
character to cross-examination merely be denying that he is the 
criminal. In this situation, moreover, the judge does not have his 
usual discretion to exclude the cross-examination. 
In R v. HattonL, R, H and one other youth were caught red handed 
taking scrap metal from a building site. There was no dispute that 
all three were taking the metal and had no permission to do so. The 
only issue was whether their appropriation of the property was 
dishonest. It was the prosecution's case (which was supported by the 
evidence of R and H) that the three went together to the site. The 
first youth gave evidence that he was not in any way involved with 
the others before they got to the site. H. next gave evidence and 
said all three had been sent to the site to collect the scrap by the 
first youth's step-brother,, which the first youth had denied in 
cross-examination. The first youth's counsel successfully applied 
for leave to cross-examine H as to his previous convictions. H 
appealed on the ground that although he had given evidence which 
damaged his co-accused's evidence by contradicting it, it was not 
evidence which made his acquittal less likely. It was held, 
dismissing H's appeal, that his evidence, if believed, not merely 
undermined the first youth's credit but on balance did more to 
undermine his defence than to undermine the prosecution's case. 
Adopting the language of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Murdoch v. 
Taylor 
; 
the positive-evidence of H (and R) associating the first 
youth with them in their mission to the site "would rationally have 
1) (1976) 64 Cr. App. R. 88 2) (1965) A. C. 574 at 584 
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to be included in any survey or summary of the evidence in the case 
which, if accepted, would warrant the conviction of" the first youth. 
Accordingly the trial judge had been right to admit the cross- 
examination. 
In R v. Brucel, the words "given evidence against" has produced 
some curious if strictly logical results. In that case, Bruce was 
tried with McGuiness and other youths on a charge of robbery. 
McGuinness, in his evidence, supported the prosecution case that 
there was a plan to rob. Bruce, on the other hand, denied that there 
was a plan to rob. McGuiness's counsel then cross-examined Bruce 
about his previous convictions on the basis that he had given eviden- 
ce against McGuiness. In one sense Brüce's evidence was in favour 
of McGuiness since it contradicted the prosecution's case, but in 
another sense it was evidence against him since it also contradicted 
his evidence. The Court of Appeal held that on balance Bruce's 
evidence exculpated McGuiness of robbery and did not incriminate him. 
They thought it right to give the words of proviso (f) (iii) their 
ordinary meaning, if they could, without adding any gloss to them, 
but Murdoch v. Taylor 
2 
and other cases "at first sight show that a 
gloss had been put upon these words which this count is bound to put 
upon them. " Stephenson L. J., giving the judgement of the court, 
said: "In our judgement, evidence cannot be said to be given against 
a person charged with the same offence as the witness who gives it if 
its effect, if believed, is to result not in his conviction but in 
1) (1975) 1 W. L. R. 1252 2) (1965) A. C. 574 
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his acquittal of that offence. The fact that Bruce's evidence under- 
mined McGuiness's defence by supplying him another does not make it 
evidence given against him. If and only if such evidence undermines 
a co-accused's defence so as to make his acquittal less likely is it 
given against him. If that puts a gloss upon a gloss, the addition 
is needed to preserve the natural meaning of the sub-paragraph. 
Bruce's evidence did not so undermine McGuiness's defence. He should 
not have been asked questions about his previous convictions. "1 
Thus the necessity for adhering to the natural meaning of "against" 
appears to be emphasised by R V. Bruce where the construction laid 
down in Murdoch V. Taylor appeared to cause some difficulty. - And it 
is thought with respect that the approach taken in R v. Bruce is the 
correct result and it is submitted that it should be made possible 
for the court to arrive at such a result without difficulty by making 
it clear that an accused does not give evidence against a co-accused 
where his evidence, if believed, would result in the acquittal of the 
co-accused. 
Clearly problems of degree can arise when evidence given by one of 
two accused contradicts part of that given by a co-accused but is in 
other respects favourable to his case. 
On a literal construction it is questionable whether evidence 
elicited in cross-examination has been "given" by the cross-examiner 
against "any other person charged with the same proceedings" or "with 
the same offence". If it has not, an accused who, as in R V. 
Miller2, asks a Crown witness whether he was aware that the illegal 
1) (1975) 1 W. L. R. 1252 at 1259 2). (1952) 2 All E. R. 667 
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importations with which the court was concerned stopped while one of 
his co-accused was in prison, could not, for that reason alone, be 
cross-examined on his record by his co-accused. Section 1 (f) (iii) 
would of course be applicable if he referred to the matter of his 
evidence-in-chief or called a witness to testify to the same effect. 
It should be said that the case -Rv. Miller - was not concerned 
with Section 1 M. 
"Any other person charged with the same offence"- 
It is essential to discuss the importance and significance of 
these words even though it has been substituted in England and Scot- 
land by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1979, because the words are still 
operative in other countries like Australia) and Nigeria2. Essentia- 
lly as such, our discussion will largely rest on the salient English 
cases up to the time of the amendment. Effectively, the present 
discussion may be taken to be the discussion of the original Sectiön 
1 (f) (iii) of the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898. 
Since the words "any other person charged with the same offence" 
have sometimes been described as being "plain and unequivocal"3, it 
might be thought, therefore, that those words would have been 
interpreted by different courts in a consistent manner. But no such 
consistency is to be found. This lack of consistency is hardly 
surprising. The words "the same offence" are ambiguous as our 
discussion and a number of cases will reveal. I would like to 
4 
follow Peter Mirfield's' submission "that four interpretations of 
1) S. 399 (e) Crimes Act, 1958 - Victoria 2) S. 159 (d) (iii) of 
the Nigerian Evidence Act 3) Per Lord Diplock in Commissioner 
of 
Police for the Metropolis v Hills (1978) 3 WLR 423 at 426A 
4) See The Meaning of "the same offence" under S. 1 (f) (iii), (1978) 
Crim. L. R. 725 
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'the same offence' may be put forward. They are: - (1) The accused 
and the co-accused are charged with the same offence whenever they 
are charged in the same proceedings. Thus, if D1 is charged with 
stealing certain property and D2 with handling that property knowing 
or believing it to be stolen, they will probably be charged on 
different counts of the same indictment since there will be 
sufficient connection between their offences. 
1 
This interpretation 
will be referred to as the 'same proceedings' interpretation. 
(2) The accused and the co-accused are charged with the same 
offence whenever they are charged in the same proceedings with 
offences carrying the same legal title. So, for example, if D1 and 
D2 are both charged in the same indictment with offences of theft 
they are charged with the same offences no matter what differences 
there are between the facts of the offences, and even though they are 
charged in different counts. Any theft is the same offence as any 
other theft. This interpretation will be "referred to as the 'same 
title' interpretation. 
(3) The accused and the co-accused are charged with the same 
offence whenever they are charged in the same proceedings with 
offences carrying the same legal title and the offences in question 
exhibit sufficient similarity with regard to actus reus. So, for 
example, if D1 and D2 are both charged with offences of causing death 
by dangerous driving2, it being alleged that their acts combined' to 
cause the same death, that similarly in actus reus might be held to 
render their offences the same even though they could not be charged 
1) The principles governing the joinder of accused persons in the 
same indictment where no joint offence is alleged to be found 
in Rv 
Assim (1966) 2 Q. B. 249 2) These facts are taken from Commissiöner 
of Police for the Metropolis v Hills (1978) 3 WLR 423 - The offence of 
causing death by dangerous driving was abolished by S. 50(i) of the 
Criminal Law Act 1977 as from December 1,1977. 
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with a. joint offence of causing death by dangerous driving. This 
interpretation will be referred to as the 'sufficient similarity' 
interpretation. 
(4) The accused and the co-accused are charged with the same 
offence whenever they are charged with what amounts in law to a joint 
offence. For these purposes, it would not matter whether they were 
charged in the same indictment or in different counts of an indic- 
tment 
1 
An example of such a joint offence would be the example of 
the joint burglary by D1 and D2 given above. This interpretation 
will be referred to as the 'joint offence' interpretation. " 
With four suggested interpretations having been set out, one may 
now consider how those interpretations were regarded by the courts 
prior to the Criminal Evidence Act 1979 (U. K. ) which substituted 
0 
"charged in the same proceedings " for "charged with the same offen- 
ce". 
At a fairly early stage, the courts rejected the "same proceedings" 
interpretation as the case of R v. Roberts2 demonstrated. In that 
case, the appellant was charged with fraudulently converting property 
entrusted to him. His co-accused was charged with two offences of 
causing, by 'false pretences, money to be paid to the appellant. The 
appellant having given evidence against the co-accused the latter 
was allowed by the trial judge to cross-examine the appellant as to 
his previous convictions. It was held by the Court of Criminal 
appeal that the cross-examination should not be allowed since it was 
1) In the case of a joint offence, the prosecution may charge both 
accused in the same count. However, they have no obligation to do so. 
2) (1936) 1 All E. R. 23 
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impossible to say that the appellant and the co-accused had been 
"charged with the same offence". 
A similar view was taken in R V. Lovett 
i. In the case, the accused 
- Lovett - was charged with entering a house as a trespasser and 
stealing therein a television set. His co-accused, Gregory, was 
charged with handling that television set. The Court of Criminal 
Appeal held that Gregory should not have been allowed to cross- 
examine Lovett as to his previous convictions because, in the words 
of Edmund Davis L. J., delivering the judgement of the court: " .. o 
in the present case the offence of theft and handling charged against 
the defendant and Gregory respectively were not the 'same offence' 
even though the same 'Sobell' television set was the subject matter 
of both charges. "2 Thus, there is a clear and convincing authority 
against the "same proceedings" interpretation. 
And the case of R v. Russell3 could be said to be an example of the 
rejection of the "joint offence interpretation". There, R was 
convicted of possessing (Count 4; and also uttering - Count 2) 
forged bank notes. H was convicted of possessing the same notes 
(Count 3). The prosecution case, based on admissions alleged to 
have been made by R and H to the police, was that R first had 
possession of the notes and he uttered them to H. Both attacked the 
prosecution witness (R more violently than H) and each denied 
possession, saying that the other had offered him the notes and 
he 
had refused to take them. The prosecution obtained leave to cross- 
examine R as to his character but made no application in respect of 
1) (1973) 1 W. L. R. 241; (1973) 1 All E. R. 744 2) (1973) I W. L. R. 
241 at 243 3) (1971) 1 Q. B. 151 
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H. Accordingly R sought to cross-examine H under proviso (ii) and 
(iii) of Section 1 (f) of Criminal Evidence Act 1898. The judge 
ruled proviso (ii) only applied to cross-examination by the 
prosecution and as to proviso (iii) that R and H were not charged 
with the same offence since their possession of the notes was not 
-co-incident or joint but consecutive. The Court held that dealing 
with proviso (iii), there was no direct authority on the point. 
Reference to Webster's Dictionary showed that "same" was not used to 
describe two things which were identical but merely two things which 
possessed the same relevant characteristics. Looking-at the circum- 
stances of the case, and accepting that R and H would have been 
charged with the same offence if it had been alleged that they had 
been jointly in possession of the notes, the court found it impossib- 
le to say that the offences charged against them ceased to be the 
same because the possession alleged was successive rather than coin- 
cident. The possession was successive in an immediate sense: one 
surrendered possession at the instant when the other received it; the 
subject matter, the nature of the offence and the circumstances to be 
proved were the same and the offences took place, if not technically 
at the' same instant, at moments which were immediately successive. 
It would be unsatisfactory and unjust if R were denied the right to 
cross-examine H merely because their possessions were not at the 
same time but were successive. It was held that the judge's ruling 
was wrong, and since it was not a case for the application of the 
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proviso to the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, the convictions would be 
quashed. 
Until R v. Lauchlan' was decided, there was no authority against 
the "same title" interpretation. However in R v. Russell2, if the 
Court of Criminal Appeal had accepted that interpretation as the 
correct one, it would have given the court a very simple ground for 
allowing the appeal. It is clear that the court did not accept that 
interpretation. The judgement of the Court was delivered by- Widgery 
L. J., assuming that some further similarity was required. H and R 
had been charged with the "same offence" because: "The subject-matter 
was the same, the nature of_ the charge was the same, the 
circumstances to be proved were the same, and the offences took 
place, if not technically at the same instant, at moments which were 
immediately successive one with the other"3. The clear assumption of 
the Court of Appeal here was that the "sufficient similarity" inter- 
pretation rather than the "same title" interpretation was the correct 
one. And this rejection of the "same title" interpretation is confi- 
rmed by R V. Lauchlan. 
In Lauchlan's case, the appellant was charged, on one count of an 
indictment, with assaulting a man called E, occassioning him actual 
bodily harm. On another count of the same indictment, E was charged 
with assaulting the appellant causing him actual bodily harm. The 
two counts, both charging offences contrary to Section 47 of the 
Offences Against The Person Act 1861, arose out of an alleged fight 
between the appellant and E. Giving his evidence-in-chief, E stated 
1) (1978) R. T. R. 326 (note) 2) (1971) 1 Q. B. 151 3) Ibid at 155 
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that the appellant had been the aggressor. Counsel for the appellant 
sought leave to cross-examine E as to his previous convictions for 
violence. The trial judge ruled against the appellant because he 
did not regard the two accused as being "charged with the same 
offence". This ruling was upheld by the Court of Appeal. The court 
'referred to the facts needing to be proved by the prosecution in 
respect of each offence. Delivering the judgement of the court, Shaw 
L. J., said: " ... the subject matter is not the same in two counts 
in the indictment. One of the counts alleged that the appellant 
assaulted Mr E, the other that Mr E assaulted the appellant. The 
circumstances as to be proved were not the same ..., but different. 
To procure a conviction of Mr E or on the other hand to justify a 
conviction of the appellant, required proof of differing facts. "1 
Thus, R v. Lauchlan2 provides support for the view that identity of 
legal title of the offences will not suffice for the purpose of 
Section 1 (f) (iii). More positively, it seems to require some 
degree of similarity between the offences with regard to actus reus. 
It appears that after Lauchlan, there was only one interpretation of 
"the same offence" which was consistent with all the authorities, 
namely the "sufficient similarity" interpretation. Unfortunately 
however, while clearly supporting the "sufficient similarity" inter- 
pretation the case provides us with no test as to what kind or degree 
of similarity is required. 
And as Peter Mirfield observed3: "The decision on the facts of 
1) (1978) R. T. R. 326 at 327 2) (1978) R. T. R. 326 3) The 
Meaning of "the same offence" under S. 1 (f) (iii), (1978) Crim. L. R. 
725 at 729 
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Lauchlan is rather surprising in policy terms. Where the two 
accused are charged with offences against or affecting some third 
party they may well have an interest in presenting a united front 
against the prosecution. They may both tell a similar story, their 
defences standing or falling together. If so, the one is unlikely to 
give 'evidence against' the other. Where, however, as in Lauchlan, 
the two accussed are alleged to have assaulted each other, there is 
unlikely to be any interest in presenting a united front against the 
prosecution. Typically, each will say he was defending himself 
against the attack of the other. Inevitably, in that situation, each 
will give 'evidence against' the other. Thus, Lauchlan decides that 
Section 1 (f) (iii) is unavailable to the accused in the very situa- 
tion where he is likely to need it most often. One needs only to 
consider the possibility that the accused has no previous convictions 
for violence while the co-accused has a large number of such convic- 
tions in order to see the degree of hardship which may be inflicted 
upon the accused. " 
On the other hand, one difficulty with the "same title" 
interpretation needs to be mentioned. The core of the issue here is 
in answering the question: - With what degree of particularity does 
one define an offence? For example, is burglary contrary to Section 
9 (1) (a) of the Theft Act 1968 the same offence, as a matter of 
legal title, as burglary contrary to Section 9 (1) (b) of the same 
Act? One may say that in each case the offence is burglary. It may 
equally be said to be entering a building as a trespasser with inte- 
rest to steal in the one case and, having entered a building as a 
trespasser, stealing therein in the other. It should be noted that, 
in an indictment, the "Statement of Offence" will refer to "Burglary 
contrary to Section 9 (1) (a) of the Theft Act 1968" or to "Burglary 
contrary to Section 9 (1) (b) of the Theft Act 1968"1 It will not 
'refer to "Burglary contrary to Section 9 (1) of the Theft Act 1968. " 
This difficulty, arising from the "same title" interpretation will 
probably be obviated if the "sufficient similarity" interpretation be 
accepted. Although it is not a necessary condition of the latter 
interpretation that the offences carry the same legal title, some 
sufficient similarity with regard to actus reus is required. In 
that respect, there would seem to be an obvious and relevant diffe- 
rence between any Section 9 (1) (a) offence and any Section 9 (1) (b) 
offence. In the former the act of entering as a trespasser with the 
requisite intent is all that is required. In the latter, two acts 
are required, the act of entering as a trespasser and the act of 
theft or of infliction of grievious bodily harm or whatever. Thus, 
no Section 9 (1) (a) offence would be "sufficiently similar" to any 
Section. 9 (1) (b) Offence. 
2 
In R V. Rockman, Rockuran refused'D entry to his shop. D upset, 
swung a punch at Rockman, who hit him in the face, causing him to 
fall to the ground. Police officers came ' on the scene but there 
was a dispute as to whether what they saw was D lying on the pavement 
being kicked by Rockman or Rockman struggling to free his foot which 
1) See e. g. Archibald, Criminal, Pleadings Evidence and Practice 
(39th ed, 1976) at para. 1489 2) The Times, November 30,1977; 
(1978) Cr. L. R. 162; Court of-Appeal. -transcript reference number 
287/A2/77. 
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was being held by D. When Rockman eventually stood back D got up and 
stabbed him in the chest with a knife. D was charged with 
maliciously wounding Rockman contrary to Section 20 of the offences 
against a Person Act 1861 and Rockman with assualting D thereby 
occasioning him actual bodily harm, contrary to Section 47 of the 
same Act. The Crown accepted that R's original blow was struck in 
self-defence and relied on the disputed evidence of the police 
officers. Counsel for Rockman unsuccessfully sought to crorss- 
examine D under Section 1 (f) (iii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 
1898 as to his previous convictions. Rockman appealed against 
conviction on, the ground inter alia, that the cross-examination had 
been wrongly excluded. 
The simple answer to this ground of Rockman's appeal was that the 
offences charged against D and Rockman were legally distinct. And 
indeed Ormrod L. J., 
1 delivering the judgement of the court, referred 
to this point with apparent approval: "Prima facie, one would think 
that there could be no question of that exception applying in this 
case because the two offences in question were, as I have already 
indicated, respectively an offence of malicious wounding by Davies 
on Rockman on the one hand and an offence of actual bodily harm 
caused to Davies by Rockman on the other. It. would be, perhaps, 
rather difficult to think of the two offences more clearly separate 
although, of course, they arise out of the same incident. " 
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal chose to reject this ground of 
Rockman's appeal on an entirely different basis. Ormrod L. J., 
1) Transcript 287/A2/77 at p. 3; (1978) 67 Cr. App. Rep: 171 at 172 
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referred to an arquement of counsel for the Crown. That argument and 
the court's reaction to it merit quotation in full: "Mr Binning, who 
appears in this Court for the Crown, has answered (counsel for 
Rockman's submission) quite shortly by saying that the essential 
feature of this proviso is that the two defendants should, in some 
way or other, be accused of pursuing the same enterprise, although 
perhaps with differently specified offences, the purpose of the 
proviso being, he submits, to discourage them, from each blaming the 
other with impunity so far as their past records were concerned. Mr 
Binning submits that the proviso cannot apply where the essence of 
the case is that each defendant is charged with committing an offence 
against the other. Prima facie, there seems to be strong grounds for 
thinking that Mr Binning's submission is right. This Court has come 
to the conclusion that it is right, and that the learned Recorder was 
correct in his ruling that the proviso did not apply in this case 
where each' of these two men was charged with doing something to the 
other. "' 
The interesting feature of this passage is that it may provide a 
test for determining whether the offence of an accused and that of 
his co-accused are sufficiently similar with regard to actus reus. 
It has been pointed out that Lauchlan2 provides us with-no such test; 
the same can be said of Russe113. In each of those cases, the judge 
refered to particular similarities or differences between the offen- 
ces without attempting to extract some general principle. The notion 
1) Transcript 287/A2/77 at p. 4 2) (1978) R. T. R. 326 (note) 
3) (1971) 1 Q. B. 151 
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that accused and co-accused must have been "pursuing the same enter- 
prise although perhaps with differently specified offences" is a 
general one. However, it is not clear how much of Mr Binning's 
submission the Court of Appeal concluded to be correct. Was it 
agreeing with the "same enterprise" submission or only with the more 
limited submission that these offences could not be the same because 
each of the men was charged with doing something to the other? That 
more limited submission would deal only with the situation where the 
parties are alleged to have been fighting. It would be of no use in 
any other situation. 
In Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis v. Hills', Hills was 
driving his employer's car along Western Avenue in North London when 
another car, driven by L turned right through an intersection in 
front of him. Hill's vehicle collided with L's and bounced off it 
on to the kerb,, killing a woman standing there., Hills and L were 
charged in successive counts of the same indictment with causing the 
death of the woman by dangerous driving, contrary to section 1 of the 
Road Traffic Act 1972. The offences charged against Hills and L were 
particularised in exactly the same way. Hills having given evidence 
against L, application was made on behalf of L to cross-examine Hills 
as to his previous convictions.. -The judge, having-ruled 
in favour of 
the application, H sought leave from the, Court of Appeal to-appeal 
against his conviction. L had been acquitted. The Court of Appeal 
granted Hills leave to appeal but then dismissed. his appeal. Orr, 
L. J., delivering the judgement of the Court, distinguished Lauchlan2 
1) (1978) 3 WLR 423 2) (1978) R. T. R. 326 (note) 
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and Rockmanl and followed Russell2, holding that L and H had been 
charged with "the same offence". The court accepted that the words 
"the same offence" were not confined to cases involving a joint 
offence, Russell being the authority on this point. The decisive 
positive factor, as far as the court was concerned, was that, though 
. there were obvious 
differences in actus reus between, the offences of 
H and L there was a vital factor uniting the two offences, namely 
that the same death had been caused. 
H was granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords: their 
Lordships unanimously decided to allow the appeal3. In doing so, 
they. unanimously agreed to overrule Russell. It will be convenient 
to consider first Lord. Russell's reasons for allowing the appeal. It 
is submitted that the essence of his reasoning is to be found in the 
following passage4: "Suppose there had been no question of-death 
resulting. from the, collision, and each had been charged on>the same 
indictment with the relevant dangerous driving. I do not consider 
that they could. have. been, charged together in one count: the offence 
of. dangerous, driving alleged against one was-factually quite diffe- 
rent from the-offence of. dangerous driving alleged against the other: 
they were not 'the same offence' in that they were not identical. 
The fact that in"the instant case a death--resulted, and that casuing 
it 
. 
is included in the charges, cannot alter-that; because the first 
essential step is for the prosecution to prove the dangerous driving,. 
and only when those dangerous drivings were proved, to show that 
1) (1978) Crim. L. R. 162; Court of Appeal Transcript reference number 
2871A2/77 '2) (1971)'Q. B. 151 3) (1978) R. T. R. 320 at 324 L. 
4) (1978) 3 W. L. R. 423 at 430 B-C , 
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death was thereby caused. " 
It seems clear that the key words are: "I do not consider that 
they could have been charged together in one count". Accused and co- 
accused may be charged together in one count only if they are alleged 
to have committed a jö nt offence; otherwise the count will be bad 
for duplicity since it. will charge more than one offence. Where they 
are charged in different counts they are "charged with the same 
offence" only if they could have been charged in the same count. 
Thus, Lord Russell is saying that, in order for Section 1 (f) (iii) 
to be potentially applicable, accused and co-accused must be alleged 
to have committed a joint offence. The words "they were not 'the 
same offence' in that they were not identical" would seem to refer 
to the absence of identity as between actus reus of the offence 
alleged against H and the actual reus of that alleged against L. 
Only where a joint offence has been committed with the actus reus of 
the accused and that of his co-accused be identical. In other 
circumstances, the differences may sometimes be merely trivial, yet 
they will still be differences. Lord Russell described Russel as "an 
erroneous decision" caused by the Court of Appeal's anxiety "to 
escape from too strait a jacket"' 
Viscount Dilhorne's judgement at the outset dealt with the position 
where accused and co-accused are charged together in one count of an 
indictment. He said2: "If two or more persons are jointly charged in 
a court, that count will be bad for duplicity if it charges more than 
one offence. When it is not bad for duplicity, each accused 
is 
1) (1978) 3 W. L. R. 423 at 430 E. 2) Ibid p. 427 E. 
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one offence. When at is not bad for duplicity, each accused is 
charged with the same offence and if one accused has given evidence 
against another accused in that count, it cannot be doubted that 
proviso (iii) to Section 1 (f) applies. " This passage provides no 
support for the "joint offence" interpretation as against the 
"sufficient similarity" interpretation. 
The passage immediately following this it is submitted, indicates 
that Viscount Dilhorne favoured the "joint offence" interpretation. 
He stated: "Where it is alleged by the prosecution that two or more 
persons have committed the same offence, it would indeed be unusual 
to find them indicted together but only charged in separate counts. 
If, though indicted together, they are charged only in separate 
counts, that may be taken as an indication that the prosecution at 
least did not regard them as charged with the same offence. "1 
That inference may be drawn 'from one further passage where Viscount 
Dilhorne said: "As I have said where persons are jointly charged with 
one offence and the charge is not bad for duplicity, they are charged 
with the same offence within the meaning of the Act. If charged 
separately with offence, a test of whether they are charged with the 
same offences is'whether they could have been'charged'jointly. " 
2 
The test of whether persons are "charged with the same offence" 
proposed here is, in effect, whether they are charged with what 
amounts in law to a joint offence. For, as has been pointed out, 
only where their offence is a joint one can they lawfully be charged 
1) (1978) 3 W. L. R. 423 at p. 427F 2) Ibid at 428H - 429A 
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in the same count. Yet, even this inference is a doubtful one. 
Viscount Dilhorne does not say that the test is "whether they could 
have been charged jointly" but only that this is a test. It cannot 
be said that he unequivocally rejected the possibility of any other 
test being applied as an alternative in the case of persons charged 
in. separate counts. And his treatment of R v. Russell' led him to 
put forward another test. In a passage he said: "In my view for the 
offences charged to be regarded as the same for the purpose of the 
proviso, they must be the same in all material respects including the 
time at which the offence is alleged to have been committed, and a 
distinct and separate offence similar in all material respect to an 
offence committed later, no matter how short the interval between the 
two, cannot properly be regarded as 'the same offence'. "2 
This would in effect be taken to mean that the. two accused in R V. 
Russell were not "charged with the same offence" because there was a 
minute time interval between their respective possessions of, the 
forged banknotes, this interval preventing their offences being "the 
same in all respects". If the only test of whether two persons 
charged in separate courts are "charged with the same offence" is 
"whether they could have been charged jointly" the decision in R V. 
Russell is wrong simply because the accused in that case could not 
have been so charged. Reference to the offences of the two accused 
not being "the same in all material respects" would then be 
superfluous. It may, therefore, be argued that viscount Dilhorne was 
in favour of overruling Russell not because the Court of Appeal in 
1) (1971) 1 Q. B. 151 2) (1978) 3 W. L. R. 423 at 428 G-14 
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that case failed to apply the "joint offence" interpretation but 
because that court applied an incorrect version of the "sufficient 
similarity" interpretation, the correct version being that the 
offences must be "the same in all respects". 
On the other hand, it might be argued that, in requiring that the 
offences be "the same in all material respects" Viscount Dilhorne 
was simply expressing the "joint offence" interpretation in a 
different way. Offences will only be the same in all material 
respects where they are joint ones. But, while it is difficult to 
think of cases where there would be no joint offence yet where the 
offences might be said to be "the same in all material respects", it 
is not impossible. For example, if D1 drove his car along a road at 
high speed and without keeping a proper look-out and D2 did the same 
things along the same road in the opposite direction, resulting in a 
head-on collision between the two, both D1 and D2 might be charged in 
separate counts of the same indictment with the offence of reckless 
I 
driving. There would be no joint offence in these circumstances 
since they would not have aided each other in doing physical acts 
2 
or 
have acted in concert3. Yet, the example will not be on all fours 
with Hills' case since there, as Viscount Dilhorne pointed out4, the 
ways in which H and L drove dangerously were different. L had turned 
into the path of an on-coming car when it was unsafe to do so while H 
had driven too fast and not'kept a proper look-out. Here, on the 
other hand, not only would the road be the same, the time be the same 
1) See S. 2 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 as amended by S. 50 (t) 
of the Criminal Law Act 1977.2) As suggested by Lord Diplock in 
D. P. P. v Merriman (1973) A. C. 584. at 606.3) See D. P. P. v Merriman 
(1973) A. C. 584 and R" v Rowlands (1972). 1 QB... 424 4) (1 WLR. 
423, at pp. 427H. - 428A. 
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and the result be the same with regard to each offence, but the way 
in which D1 and D2 drove recklessly would also be the same. Since 
the facts that the cars were different and that they were travelling 
in different directions could hardly be regarded as material, it can 
convincingly be argued that the offences of D1 and D2 were "the same 
in all material respects. " 
" ... any other person charged in the same proceedings"- As already 
mentioned earlier, the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 originally referred 
to cases in which evidence was given against any other person "char- 
ged with the same offence". Without doubt these words were unduly 
restrictive because there are many joint trials in which the accused 
cannot by any strength of imagination be said to be charged with the 
same offence. An obvious ambiguity surrounds the words "the same 
offence". The offences of any accused and co-accused can never be 
identical, even though a joint offence be alleged against them. So, 
for example, if D1 and D2 break into a house together and one of them 
ransacks the rooms upstairs, the other the rooms downstairs, they 
will probably be charged with a joint offence of burglary, involving 
the theft of all the property taken by the two of them. In this 
situation, there are two obvious differences between the offence of 
D1 and that of D2. First, the mens rea of each of them is entirely 
separate and the wens rea of one of them may differ from the mens 
rea of the other. Secondly, the physical acts of D1 and D2 are 
different, one having taken property from upstairs, the other from 
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downstairs. It is only a matter of law that the physical acts of D1 
are, in effect, deemed also to be those of D2 and vice versa. The 
position was succinctly stated by Lord Diplock in D. P. P. V. Merri- 
man1, as follows: "But when two men are aiding one another in doing 
physical acts with criminal intent, though the mens rea of the sepa- 
rate offence of each is personal to the individual charged, the 
physical act of ether one of them is in law an actus reus of the 
separate offence of each. A 'joint offence' of two defendants means 
no more than that there is this connection between the separate 
offences of each, so that as against each defendant not only his own 
physical acts but also those of the other defendant may be relied 
upon by the prosecution as an actus reus of the offence with which he 
is charged. " 
In the discussed case of Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis 
v Hills 
; the House of Lords criticised the phraseology - "charged 
with the same offence". Viscount Dilhorne expressed the hope that 
the Criminal Law Revision Committee would be asked to give attention 
to the reform of Section 1 (f) (iii) without delay-3 He agreed with 
the following words of Edmund Davies in R V. Lovett "It has been 
suggested (and not without good reason) that the law on this matter 
is unsatisfactory, and that the mischief aimed at in proviso (iii) 
would be more satisfactorily dealt with if it appiled whenever two 
accused are jointly tried, even though they are not charged with the 
same offence ... " The Criminal Law Revision Committee, in its Ele- 
venth Report, came to a similar conclusion by recommending that 
in 
1) (1973) A. C. 584 at 606 2) (1978) 3 WLR 423 3) Ibid at 
429E 4) (1973) 1 W. L. R. 241 at 243 5) "Evidence (General)" 
June 1972 
Section 1 (f) of the 1898 Act the words "jointly charged with the 
same offence" should be altered to "jointly charged with him in the 
same proceedings. "1 And consequently in the U. K. the Criminal Evade- 
nce Act 1979 substituted the words "charged in the same proceedings" 
for "charged with the same offence". It is hoped that an amendment 
on similar lines would be made in other countries with similar provi- 
sions - Australia and Nigeria amongst others. It is thought that the 
new wordings restores the intention of the Act and is wide enough to 
cover any case where the defendants are being tried before the same 
court on the same occassion, and not only where they are jointly 
charged, in the sense that a joint enterprise in respect of one 
offence is alleged against them, and there is no obvious reason why 
it should cause difficulty. 
(ii) SCOPE 
Discretion - (a) Cross-examination by Co-accused: - 
A further question for the House of Lords in Murdoch V. Taylor 
2 
was 
whether, if an accused has given evidence against a co-accused, the 
judge has a discretion to exclude cross-examination under Section 1 
(f) (iai). Under Section 1 (f) (i) and (i. ) it has been held that 
the judge does have a discretion where the result of such cross- 
examination would be to "make a fair trial of the accused almost 
impossible 
3, 
" and there is nothing in the wording of Section 1 (f) 
(iii) to suggest that there the position is different. Nevertheless, 
1) CLCR, para. 132 2) (1965) A. C. 574; (1965) 2 W. L. R. 425 
3) Per Singleton J, Rv Jenkins (1945) 114 L. J. K. B. 425; see also 
Rv Cook (1959) 2 K. B. 340; Rv Fl n (1963) 1 Q. B. 729 
whereas the exercise of the discretion to exclude under Sect. on 1 (f) 
(i) and (ii) will normally be at the expense of the prosecution, 
under Section 1 (f) (iii) it will normally be at the expense of the 
co-accused. 
It has been held that the court has no discretion to refuse leave 
to a co-accused to cross-examine under Section 1 (f) (iii) if it 
considers that the subsection applies to the case, although it would 
have a discretion to refuse such leave if the application under the 
subsection were made by the prosecution. That is so upon the view 
that A, by giving evidence against B, becomes, from B's point of view 
like a witness for the prosecution, and is therefore open to cross- 
examination on his misconduct in order to show that he should not be 
believed. 
As Lord Donovan said in Murdoch V. Taylor' "when it is the co- 
accused who seeks to exercise the right conferred by proviso (f) 
(iii) different considerations come into play. He seeks to defend 
himself, to say to the jury that the man who is giving evidence 
against him is unworthy of belief; and to support that assertion by 
proof of bad character. The right to do this cannot, in my opinion, 
be fettered in any way. " The earliest reported case where the Court 
of Criminal Appeal held that they had no discretion to prevent a co- 
2 
accused cross-examining under section 1 (f) (iii) was R v. Rothery, 
but this has since been followed by a series of cases3 and now by 
Murdoch v. Taylor. It will be pertinent to discuss some of these 
cases. In R V. Ellis4 ,E was convicted of breaking and entering and 
1) (1965) A. C. 574 at 593 2) (1958) Crim. L. R. 618 
3) See Rv Stannard (1964) 2 W. L. R. 461; Rv Riebold (1964) Crim. 
L. R. 530 4) (1961) 1 W. L. R. 1064 
stealing, and receiving. One G was also tried on the same indic- 
tment. The evidence for the prosecution included evidence that E and 
G were seen together removing articles from a warehouse and loading 
them on a van. E giving on his own behalf said that G had told him 
that he had bought some bankcrupt stock and had asked him (E) to help 
move it. G's counsel then applied for permission to cross-examine E 
on his criminal record on the basis that E had given evidence against 
a co-accused charged with the same offence, in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 1 (f) (iii) of the 1898 Act. The trial judge 
ruled that such cross-examination was permissible. Later G changed 
his plea to one of guilty on the receiving charge but as the prose- 
cution were unwilling to drop the other charge, the trial proceeded. 
When G gave evidence, he admitted that he might have told E that he 
acquired some bankcrupt stock. On appeal to the court of criminal 
Appeal it was held, dismissing the appeal, that at the time when E 
was cross-examined as to character, G's defence was that he was not 
present for more than a moment and that he had been asked to hire the 
van for E. In those circumstances the evidence given by E was prope- 
rly held by the judge to be evidence against a person charged with 
the same offence within the meaning of Section 1 (f) (iii) of the 
1898 Act. Where the fact brought the matter within the relevant 
statutory exception, cross-examination as to character was a matter 
of right not of discretion. 
Similarly, in R v. McGuirkl, M was convicted of conspiracy to 
(1963) 48 Cr. App. R. 75 
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defraud. There were conflictes between his evidence and that of G 
who was convicted with him. In particular, M said that he had 
signed a certain false document given to him by G because G 
persuaded him to do so, and without appreciating its significance. G 
said that he had neither given the document to M nor had he invited 
M to sign it. The trial judge refused an application on behalf of M 
to cross-examine G as to previous convictions, under Section 1 (f) 
(iii) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. The Court held as follows: 
G "Had given evidence against" M1: the judge had no discretion to 
disallow the cross-examination2: G's previous convictions were so 
material to M's defence that he was the dupe of a fraudulent person 
that the proviso to Section 4 of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, could 
not be applied and the conviction would be quashed. 
It is important to point out that in Murdoch v. Taylor3, Lord 
Morris, while agreeing -that the court had no discretion to exclude 
cross-examination by a co-accused did, however, stress the need for 
the judge to have regard to the relevance of the proposed questions 
- Lord Morris quoted with approval the words of Lord Sankey in 
Maxwell v. D. P. P. 
4. 
This indeed would seem correct and the judge 
ought normally to exclude cross-examination as to, for example, a 
previous acquittal 
5 Nevertheless, a power to exclude on the ground 
of relevancy can sometimes appear to be indistinguishable from 
a general discretion to exclude, and if Lord Morris was trying to 
give the judge a discretion, though through the back door rather than 
the front, he would appear to be in disagreement with the majority of 
1) Rv Stannard (1964) 2 WLR 461; 2) Rv Ellis (1961) I WLR 1064 
3) (1965) 2 WLR 425; (1965) A. C. '574 4) (1935) A. C. 309 at 319 
5) In Maxwell v D. P. P. itself, cross-examination as to previous 
acquittal was disallowed under s. 1 (f) (ii) on the ground that it 
was not relevant. See also Stirlnd v D. P. P. (1944) A. C. 315 
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the court'. 
Lord Pearce, however, did dissent on the question of discretion. 
He quoted with approval the Tasmanian case of Hill v. The Queen 
a 
which held that there was a discretion under a similarly worded 
Tasmanian statute. Though Lord Pearce considered that the exercise 
of the discretion should be within fairly narrow limits he did give 
two examples where the discretion should be exercised. First where 
counsel for one accused has deliberately led another accused into a 
trap by putting to him questions which compel him to contradict the 
story of his co-accused; secondly "where the clash between the two 
stories is both inevitable and trivial. " 
I must say that the proposition made by Lord Pearce looks appealing 
at first glance, but as a matter of fact it is arguable that the 
issues raised by him have been appropriately answered by Lord Morris. 
On the fist point, Lord Morris observation that "a judge would be 
alert to protect a witness from being cajoled into saying more than 
it was ever his plan or wish to say" is pertinent and clearly judges 
ought now to be so alert. On the second point, Lord Morris pointed 
out as shown above that under the rule in Maxwell v. D. P. P3 
evidence must have relevance as well as falling within the terms of 
the statute and-that it is for the judge to rule whether the evidence 
is sufficiently relevant. 
In McCourtney V. H. M. Advocate, it was held by the High Court of 
Justiciary that once an accused has given evidence against a co- 
1) It is perhaps of note that Lord Sankey in Maxwell was speaking of 
a discretionary power. 2) (1953) Tas. S. R. 54 3) (1935) A. C. 309 
at 319 4) (1978) SLT 10 at 13 
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accused there is no discretion in the trial judge to refuse the 
accused the right to cross-examine him as to his criminal record. 
The Court observed that it could never be conducive to a fair trial 
to deny to an accused person, against whom a co-accused has given 
evidence, the right to cross-examine him as to credit and character. 
It is a fair comment to say that arguments in favour of giving a 
discretion to the trial judge do not appear to be strong. As Sherrif 
McPhail pointed out "It may be argued that there might be a case for 
giving a discretion to the court in order to enable it to do some 
justice, as far as possible, in a case where A has only one relevant 
conviction and B has many, and B proposes to question A about his 
single conviction and to call witnesses to say that A committed the 
offence, -but not to give evidence himself. In Scotland, however, the 
trial judge could not have the material on which to, -exercise 
a 
discretion in that situation, because he, remains ignorant of the 
criminal records of A and B unless, and until they-are-convicted, and 
he is also unaware of the nature of the evidence, to be called on 
behalf of B. "' "It may-be further argued that cases can arise, in 
which the connection between the charge against one accused and those 
against his co-accused are tenuous, and that in such a case, where 
two accused are not. charged with the- same offence or, at least are 
not charged with offences which are so inter-connected as to stand or 
fall together, gross injustice might result if one accused, as a 
matter of. right, was allowed to cross-examine another as to his 
antecedents and character2. But cases where the charges are des- 
1) Sherrif McPhail Research Paper § 5: 67 2) Cf I. R. Scott, 
"Cross-examination by Co-defendant's (1973) 36 MLR 663 
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cribed where it would be in the interests of the accused to give 
evidence against another, and where it could be unfair to permit the 
other to elicit his record or bad character, may be thought to be 
rare. na. 
The Criminal Law Revision Committee in England reached the view 
by a majority that it is unacceptable that it should be possible to 
prevent an accused person from bringing out the misconduct of another 
accused who has given evidence against him. In particular, they 
thought it unsound to make the matter one of discretion because that 
might lead to too much difference in the way in which the discretion 
was exercised. 
2 
Discretion - (b)Cross-examination by Prosecutor: - 
It should be made clear that the prosecutor may cross-examine 
under proviso (f) (iii), subject to the discretion of"the Court. 
That appears to be the law in England. As Lord Donovan said in 
Murdoch v. Taylor3, if the prosecution sought to cross-examine under 
Section 1 (f) (iii) the Court would have a discretion. He observed 
as follows: "if, in any given case (which I think would be rare) the 
prosecution sought to avail itself itself of thq provisions of provi- 
so (f) (iii) then here, again, the court should keep control of the 
matter in the like way. Otherwise, if two accused gave evidence one 
against the other, but neither wished to cross-examine as to charac- 
ter, the prosecution could step in as of right and reveal the crimi- 
nal records of both, if both possessed them. I cannot think that 
1) Sheriff McPhail Research Papers at § 5: 67 2) C. L. C. R. § 132 
3) (1965) A. C. 574 at 593 
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Parliament in the Acz of 1898 ever intended such as unfair procedure. 
So far as concerns the prosecution, therefore, the matter should be 
one for the exercise of the judges discretion, as it is in the case 
of proviso (f) (ii). 
Also in Rv Lovettl, Lovett was charged with stealing a television 
set and G., his co-accused was charged with handling it. Lovett cast 
serous imputations on a witness for the prosecution and gave 
evidence against G. G's counsel immediately cross-examined him on 
his previous convictions; he was convicted and G acquitted. On 
Lovett's appeal the Court of Appeal held that cross-examination 
under Section 1 (f) (iii) as to it then was worded was improper 
because two accused were not charged with the same offence but, as 
counsel for the prosecution had intended to seek to cross-examine 
under Section 1 (f) (ii), the court of Appeal exercised the discre- 
tion which the judge would have had and dismissed the"'appeal. 
The Court, on the authority of R v. Seighleyz, expressed the view 
thatthe prosecution may, subject to the discretion of the'judge to 
prohibit such a course, cross-examine under Section 1 (f) (iii). As 
the law then stood the prosecution could not have been allowed to 
cross-examine under that proviso in R V. Lovett. It may be supposed 
that it is in only very exceptional circumstances that an application 
by the prosecutor for leave to cross-examine under that proviso would 
be granted. Sir Rupert Cross3 suggests as a possible instance a case 
in which two persons charged in the same proceedings each gave evide- 
1) (1973) 1 All E. R. 744; (1973) I WL. R. 241 2) (1911) 6 Cr. 
App. R. 106 3) Cross on Evidence, 5th ed. at p. 437 
nce against the other, but, because they both had criminal records, 
neither cross-examined the other under Section 1 (f) (iii). 
There is, however something to be said for the conclusion of the 
High Court of Australia that the Crown has no power to cross-examine 
under an identically worded proviso - that was the decision in 
Matusevich v. R 1- the decision turned in part on the absence of a 
statutory requirement of an application for leave to cross-examine 
such as is required in the equivalent to Section 1 (f) (ii) in 
Section 399 of the Crimes Act of Victoria. 
(9)SECTION 1 (f) AND SECTION 5 (2) (d) OF THE NEW-ZEALAND ACT 1908 
I do not find it necessary to recapitulate the provisions of 
Section 1 (f) of the English Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, since they 
have just been extensively discussed. 
Proviso (d) to Section 5 (2) of the New Zealand Act, 1908, states: 
"A person charged and called as a witness in pursuance a 
of this subse- 
ction in pursuance of this subsection is liable to be cross-examined 
like any other witness on any matter, though not arising out of his 
examination-in-chief: but so far as the cross-examination relates to 
any previous conviction of the person so charged, or to his credit, 
the court may limit the cross-examination as it thinks proper, al- 
though the proposed cross-examination may be permissible in the case 
of any other witness. " 
The contrast between this proviso, which has remained unchanged in 
substance since 1893 and which places the matter entirely within the 
2 
1) (1977) 51 A. L. J. R. 657; (1977) 15 ALR 117 2) See the Criminal 
Code Act 1893, S. 398 (3) and (4), repealing S. 2 (3) of the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1889, which was an attenuated version of S. 1 (f) of 
the English 1898 Act, enacted 9 years later. 
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trial judges discretion, and Section 1 (f), which lays down detailed 
rules as to when a prisoner's past, misconduct can be put to him in 
cross-examination, is obvious. The first and perhaps the most impor- 
tant difference, is that while Section 1 (f) expressly prescribes the 
conditions necessary to be fulfilled before an accused may be cross- 
examined, in New Zealand the matter is left to the trial Judge as one 
of discretion. Then in England as in some other Commonwealth coun- 
tries, the text forbids any question tending to show that the accused 
has "committed or been convicted of or been charged with any offence 
other than that wherewith he is then charged, or is of bad charac- 
ter. " In New Zealand, the questions excluded are those relating to 
any previous conviction of the accused, or to his credit. ' Perhaps 
however, there is little difference, in the actual application of the 
statutes, in the area covered by the two sections, it is in the 
discretion given by the New Zealand Act that the important difference 
lies. It should, however, be noted that a trial judge in England 
has, as we have seen, a considerable discretion exercisable by him 
within the frame-work of Section 1 (f), and in both jurisdictions 
there is an over-riding discretion to refuse to allow evidence which, 
though technically admissible, would have a prejudicial effect upon 
the accused out of all proportion to its probative value. Even so, 
the contrast remains, and it might have been expected that the New 
Zealand courts would treat each case coming before them as one of the 
first . mpression and decline to treat the English cases interpreting 
Section 1 (f) of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 as persuasive autho- 
- 977 - 
rities. 
It is clear from the wording of the New Zealand statute that it 
confers a much wider discretion on a New Zealand judge than that 
permitted to English judges by Section 1 (f). The desire for a 
degree of precision in stating the law and for some uniformity of 
approach by trial judges have, however, proved too strong and 
somewhat surprising result has been stated as follows: "We think 
that, although the matter is, in New Zealand, one of discretion, the 
limits prescribed by the English statutory . position so evolved as a 
compromise should, in general, be observed in the exercise of the 
discretion"'. This statement is contained in the judgement of the 
Court of Appeal in Rv. Clark2, where it was observed that there may 
still be cases outside the limits set by the English Act in which the 
discretion should be exercised in favour of allowing the cross- 
examination. 
Thus it remains now for us to deal with cases in New Zealand 
outside the limits of Section 1 (f) in which the court ought to 
exercise its discretion in favour of allowing a proposed cross- 
examination of an accused person. In R v. Clark, the accused had not 
sought to establish his own good character, nor had he attacked the 
veracity of witnesses for the Crown. All he had done was to present 
a version of the transaction, alleged to constitute either theft or 
receiving, which did not contradict the statements of witnesses for 
the Crown except upon minor relatively unimportant points. The Court 
1) The reference was to Viscount Sankey LC's observation in Maxwell v 
D. P. P. (1935) P. C. 309; 317 , 
2) (1953)-N. Z. L. R. 823. Cf The position 
-in New South Wales; Curwood vR (1944) B9C. L. R. 561; and Rv Woods 
(1956) 56 S. R. (NSW) 142ý 
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of Appeal accordingly held that the accused had not put his 
credibility in issue "to a degree that made it necessary or desirable 
to have his criminal record disclosed to the jury. " 
It must be said that the difficulty with the provision of the New 
Zealand statute - Section 5 (2) (d) of the Evidence Act, 1908, and 
Section 1 (f) of the Criminal Evidence Act (U. K. ) - which has most 
exercised the minds of the judges has been the extent to which the 
. 
defendant who has entered the witness-box can attack the evidence of 
the prosecution without losing h. s shield. In the terms of the 
English statute he will lose his shield if the nature or conduct of 
the defence is such as to involve imputations on the character of the 
prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution. it is perhaps the 
meaning of "imputation" which has caused the greatest difficulty. In 
England, both the Court of Criminal Appeal and the House of Lords 
have experienced fundamental changes of mind on the type of 
imputation which would be sufficient to deprive the defendant of his 
shield. In New Zealand, it appears there is some conflict between the 
courts about the correct meaning of "imputation" and moreover there 
is the further difficulty of reconciling the principles contained in 
some of the leading New Zealand cases with those expressed in the 
most recent House of Lords decision - Selvey v. D. P. P. 
1. 
In R v. Johnston2, the defendant was charged with indecent assualt 
on a six-year-old girl. He denied part of the girl's evidence and 
the trial judge allowed the prosecution to cross-examinae him on his 
record. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal against conviction. 
1) (1970) A. C. 304 2) (1956) N. Z. L. R. 516 
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On the cross-examination point the Court said: "The appellant in 
evidence denied the material point of the girl's story so that his 
credibility as a witness was in issue, and his previous convictions 
for dishonesty were relevant thereto"1. No authority was relied on 
---ý. 
in support of this principle except that the Court stated that R v. 
Clark 
2 had been cited to it. It is not apparent from the judgement 
for what principle the Clark case was cited, but it will be recalled 
that R V. Clark was inter alia Court of Appeal authority for the 
proposition that, in general, the New Zealand courts should follow 
English law and practice. If this principle had been drawn to the 
Court of Appeal's attention in R v. Johnston, one might have expected 
to find at least some reference to the English statute, a 
consideration of Court of Criminal Appeal authorities directly in 
point for a corresponding situation in English law and, if the New 
Zealand court was still determined to reach a result contrary to that 
obtained in England, some guidance on the reasons for the departure. 
It is important to point out that there is one material distinction 
between he facts of the Clark case and those in R V. Johnston. In 
the former, the defendant did not challenge the evidence of the 
prosecution witnesses but merely put forward an explanation which, 
though consistent with their testimony, would, if believed, have- 
established his innocence. No question, then, arose of his having 
cast imputations on the character of the prosecution witnesses. It 
is equally important to find out what part of the judgement in R v. 
1) Ibid at 518 2) (1953) N. Z. L. R. 823 
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Clark may have contributed to the result in the Johnston case. A 
test which the Court 'of Appeal appears in the earlier case to have 
thought appropriate for deciding whether the defendant should be 
cross-examined on his record was whether the accused had put his 
credibility in issue to a degree that made it necessary or desirable 
to have his criminal record disclosed to the jury. The test of 
placing credibility in issue was applied in the Johnston case. It is 
submitted that this test is somewhat unhelpful and misleading. In 
any case, where there is an issue of fact between the prosecution 
and a defendant who gives evidence in the witness box, the 
defendant's credibility is in issue. It is not a question of degree. 
His credibility is no more nor less in issue, whether he accepts 
the prosecution witness's story and gives an explanation consistent 
with innocence, or denies the prosecution's story. His credibility 
can hardly be said to be more in issue because he shows that a 
prosecution witness is thoroughly unreliable and untruthful. The 
weight of the evidence against the defendant may make it easier or 
more difficult to believe his story but this does not mean that his 
credibility is any more or less in issue. While the prosecution 
maintains that the defendant has committed the deeds which make up 
the crime and while the defendant denies this, his credibility is in 
issue. To talk in terms of the degree to which a defendant puts his 
credibility in issue is to add little to the statutory formulation in 
Section 5 (2) (d) and to remove the element of a reasonable certainty 
which the Court of Appeal has achieved by incorporating English law 
1) Rv Clark (1953) N. Z. L. R. 823 at 831 
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in the application of its discretion. 
Johnston's case and the test of putting credibility in issue were 
relied on by the Crown in R V. Leadbitter1. In that case the accused 
denied in cross-examination a conversation he was alleged to have had 
with police constables when apprehended, and the Crown Prosecutor 
thereupon obtained leave to cross-examine as to previous convictions. 
The accused had not, however set up his own good character in cross- 
examination in-chief, nor had he at that stage impugned the veracity 
of the Crown witnesses. The Court of Appeal criticised counsel's 
cross-examination which had produced the denial, since it could have 
been intended only either to confirm a position which the appellant 
had not until then denied, or to promote a conflict between the 
appellant's evidence and that of witness for the Crown2 which would 
allow his previous convictions to be put to the appellant. in all 
the circumstances the trial judge had exercised his discretion wron- 
gly, and the court ordered a new trial3. In reaching this conclu- 
sion, the Court of Appeal did not find it necessary to refer to 
Johnston's case, nor appropriate to invoke the test of putting credi- 
bilit in issue. It is significant also that the view expressed in R 
that New Zealand courts should follow English law and v. Clark 
4 
practice was approved in R V. Leadbitter. 
The decision in R V. Leadbitter5 was followed in R V. MacLeod 
6. 
In 
that case, an attack was made on the complainant's character, and the 
accused suggested that she was actuated by spite and was endeavouring 
1) (1958) N. Z. L. R. 336 at 339 2) Cf Rv Eldinow (1932) 23 Cr. 
App. R. 145 3) -(1958) N. Z. L. R. 336 at 343 4 (1953) N. Z. L. R. 
823 5) (1958) N. Z. L. R. 336 at 339 6) (19643 N. Z. L. R. 545 
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to implicate him. The Court of Criminal Appeal doubted whether the 
mere fact that there was a strong conflict of evidence between the 
defendant and a number of prosecution witnesses would have been a 
sufficient reason for allowing cross-examination on the accused's 
record. R V. Johnston' was regarded as decided on a very special set 
of facts. 
R V. Fisher2 was decided on the line of reasoning in Leadbitter and 
Macleod. In the case, the Court of Appeal referred to R V. Flynn3 
and stressed the paramount consideration of having a fair trial. The 
appellant appealed against his conviction in the Supreme Court at 
Hamilton on two counts of breaking and entering business premises in 
the town of Huntly and his sentence to preventive detention. In the 
notice of appeal several grounds were raised in support of the appel- 
lant's contention that he had been wrongly convicted, but the only 
one which was proceeded with was that the Judge had wrongly exercised 
his discretion in allowing the prosecution to cross-examine the 
appellant about his previous convictions. The question arose in 
these circumstances: An important Crown witness on the appellant's 
second trial was a Miss Stevens. In the earlier trial she had given 
evidence for the defence and now, on the second trial, she was hel- 
ping the Crown to secure a conviction. In these circumstances coun- 
sel for the appellant felt obliged to attack her character. This he 
did, first by cross-examining a police officer with a view to showing 
that the young woman was a prostitute and had, moreover, acted as a 
police agent. Then when Miss Stevens herself came to be cross- 
1) (1956) N. Z. L. R. 516 2) (1964) N. Z. L. R. 1063 3) (1961) 3 Al]. 
E. R. 58 
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examined she was severely questioned on both these topics and it was 
further suggested that she had on occasions received money from the 
police in consideration of information received. Both these allega- 
tions she denied. The judgement of the Court was delivered by North 
P., who after reviewing the facts as above said1: "There can, we 
think, be no doubt that, even under the English section, the course 
taken by the defence rendered the evidence of previous convictions 
legally admissible. But even so, it has been pointed out in the 
English cases with increasing firmness that the matter is still one 
for the discretion of the trial Judge, who before giving leave should 
consider most anxiously 'whether although legally admissible, it was 
desirable, having regard to the paramount consideration of having a 
fair trial, that it should be admittedi2: This for the reason that it 
has been found, as a result of long experience, that the admission of 
evidence of previous convictions is always highly prejudicial and 
often enough 'absolutely fatali3. In New Zealand, while the whole 
matter is one of discretion, the limits prescribed by the English Act 
will generally be observed in the exercise of discretion. "4 
Professor Lanham has argued that where the defence necessarily 
involves an attack on the character of a prosecution witness, such an 
attack or imputation will not deprive the defendant of his shield in 
New Zealand5. That would be a rule, not the statement of a 
discretionery power, and the argument of course involves denying the 
authority of Selvey V. Director of Public Prosecutions6 in New 
1) (1964) N. Z. L. R. 1063 at 1064 2) Rv Flynn (1961) 3 A11 E. R. 
58,62,63; 3) See Channell J. in Rv Preston (1909) I K. B. 568 at 
575 4) Rv MacLeod (1964) N. Z. L. R. 545 5 oss-examination under 
S, 5(2)(dT of the Evidence Act 1908 - Imputation and Necessity" - 
(1972) 5 N. Z. U. L. R. 21 at p. 34 6) (1970) A. C. 304 
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Zealand. In R v. Macleod, the Court of Appeal seemed to have ap- 
proved the statement of principle submitted by Professor Lanham 
above. For the present purposes the significance of this is that the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal appears to have rejected any proposition, 
that an allegation that one of the prosecution witnesses was the true 
author of the crime is an imputation within the meaning of the sta- 
tute. One can then accordingly submit that the Court of Appeal as 
far back as Macleod recognised the principle that, where it is neces- 
sary for the defendant to attack the character of a prosecution 
S 
witness, he is not to be regarded as making an imputation within the 
terms of the statute. But it is submitted also that the Court of 
Appeal is tending to emphasise the discretion conferred by proviso 
(d) of Section 5 (2), and to downplay the proposition in R v. Clark 
1 
that the English limits will "in general be observed". Thus in R v. 
Manihera2, one Sim helped the police to set up a trap for Manihera. 
He was cross-examined as to whether he took drugs himself or went to 
drug parties. He denied it. The trial judge granted leave to the 
Crown to cross-examine the accused on his 21 convictions for disho- 
nesty because of the imputations against Sim. The Court of Appeal 
held that leave should not have been given. The accused was entitled 
to test the. validity of Sim's assertion of public-spirted co-opera- 
tion, and it could not be said that there was a "deliberate serious 
attack" on Sim's character. Yet upon those facts arising in England 
there is no doubt that they would be imputations in terms of Selvey's 
1) (1953)-N. Z. L. R. ý823 -2) N. Z. C. A., unreported, 20--August-1975 
- 985 - 
case. The New Zealand Court of Appeal moved directly to the exercise 
of discretion. 
An important distinction was made in R V. Fox1. When it is sought 
to cross-examine an accused as to credit, the courts should in 
general follow the principles laid down in the English decisions. 
But when the evidence is relevant to some matter in issue in the 
trial, the English practice will not furnish a bar to such questions. 
In such a case the court in exercising its discretion considers only 
whether it is fair in the circumstances of the particular trial that 
the questions should be asked. In that case, the appellant was 
accused of breaking and entering the Bank of New South Wales at 
Auckland and gave evidence in his own defence. The prosecution was 
granted leave by the Judge to ask the appellant questions concerning 
another burglay of another Bank of Masterton and whether he had not 
proposed to Ha crown witness that H should be a party to the Master- 
ton burglary, and further whether they had not actually committed 
such burglary together and had pleaded guilty thereto and been convi- 
cted. H had testified to a conversation between himself and the 
appellant in which the latter had described in detail the method he 
had used to break into the Bank of Auckland. These details harmo- 
nised with the police evidence. H had been prepared to say, had he 
been asked that the reason why the appellant had described such 
method was to convince H that the plan to break into Bank at Master- 
ton was feasible. As H had been returned to Wellington, by agreement 
part of H's deposition containing the latter fact was read. The 
1) (1973) N. Z. L. R. 458 
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appellant denied the testimony of H concerning the conversation and 
also the part of H's deposition which was read, but admitted that 
they had pleaded guilty and been convicted of the Masterton burglary. 
The Court held that in cases in which leave is sought to cross- 
examine an accused as to credit, the court in exercising the discre- 
tion conferred by Section 5 (2) (d) of the Evidence Act, 1908, will 
in general (but not necessarily in every case) follow the principles 
laid down in the English decisions. Turner J., observed as follows1: 
"In New Zealand, the earlier decisions of this Court to which we have 
referred did not go so far as to enjoin upon New Zealand Judges that 
they must be regulated by every nuance of the English Act and every 
subtlety as to its interpretation which may follow from decisions of 
English Courts. The New Zealand decisions do no more than enjoin 
upon trial judges a general compliance with the limits on cross- 
examination laid down in the English statute. They all expressly 
recognised the fact that there may be cases in which leave may be 
granted in New Zealand, when in England it would not be granted, 
remembering that here the statute does not in terms (as in England) 
positively forbid the cross-examination, but invests the Judge with a 
discretion, which as far as the words of the statute go is an untram- 
melled discretion. The New Zealand decisions do not purport comple- 
tely to shut the door on the exercise of this discretion, and to 
restrict it in all cases of literal compliance with the provisions of 
the English statute as interpreted in English Courts. The discretion 
1) (1973) 1 N. Z. R. R. 458 at 468 
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is still there. Of course, in the ordinary run of cases, in which no 
more is sought than to cross-examine an accused as to credit, and 
thus to damage his credibility, the principles which have been laid 
down in successive English decisions will, in general (though we must 
be careful still to say, not necessarily in every case) be faithfully 
applied. " 
It was further held in the same case -RV. Fox1 - that when the 
evidence sought to be adduced in cross-examination of the accused is 
evidence relevant to some matter in issue in the trial, then the 
English practice will not furnish a bar to such questions. In such a 
case, the Court in exercising its discretion considers only whether 
it is fair in the circumstances of the particular trial that the 
question should be asked. Turner J., explained as follows2: "At the 
end of the discussion of the discretion given by Section 5 (2) we are 
brought back to the point-at which that discussion began - the para- 
mount importance of relevance as a test of admissibility. While in 
England it has been necessary, on a technical construction of the 
English statute, to hold that relevant evidence is excluded by the 
provisions of English section, if the evidence is sought to be ad- 
duced by the cross-examination of the accused on one of the topics 
specified in the statute, we are mot in New Zealand constrained by 
wordss of exclusion in the statute. In this country the Judges are 
given a discretion, and we are prepared to hold that when the eviden- 
ce sought to be adduced in cross-examination of the accused is evide- 
nce relevant to some matter in issue in the trial then the English 
1) (1973) 1 N. Z. L. R. 458 2) Ibid at 469 
practice will not furnish a bar to such questions. In such a case 
the trial judge, in exercising his discretion, considers only whether 
it is fair in the circumstances of the trial that the question should 
be asked. In the trial which forms the subject of this appeal, 
Speight J., considered this; he exercised his discretion in favour of 
the Crown. In doing so we think that he did no more than follow a 
practice which has generally been adopted by trial Judges in New 
Zealand in the past; this practice now receives the formal approba- 
tion of this court. " The appeal was dismissed. 
A difficulty arises from the terminology of Section 5 (2) (d). It` 
speaks of cross-examination relating to "any previous conviction of 
the accused, or to his credit ." What about previous charges, and 
bad but not criminal conduct? On the face of it these are not 
affected, and cross-examination of an accused along . those lines would 
seem to be covered by the common law. But it may be that the courts 
will not adopt such a strict construction, and that they will regard 
Section 5 (2) (d) as conferring a discretion to allow or disallow 
cross-examination about previous charges and previous bad conduct1. 
Certainly, the justification for giving the court a discretion in' 
this area applies to the different forms of cross-examination which 
may prove fatal to the accused. 
One important question that is pertinent to be asked is that what 
can one regard is the relation between the two discretions exercisab- 
le by the judge? There is the discretion, conferred by proviso (d), 
1) Cf dicta of-Turner J in Rv Fox (1973) 1 N. Z. L. R. 458,467 
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as it has been judicially interpreted to allow further cross-examina- 
tion which would not be allowed in England under Section 1 (f) ; and 
there is the overriding discretion to disallow evidence which, though 
technically admissible, has a prejudicial effect out of all propor- 
tion to its probative value. It is not to be thought that in a 
practical world the courts will carefully discriminate between the 
two discretions, but their co-existence does not make it any easier 
to state the law. It is, however, clear that, once a foundation has 
been laid on the facts, consideration should then be given to the 
question whether or not to give leave to cross-examine the accused as 
to previous convictions, having regard to the prejudice involved: it 
is improper to give leave, simply because imputations have been made, ' 
without regard to that question. North P., in R v. Fisherl said ... 
"the case for the appellant in substance was this: That the reasons 
given by the learned trial Judge 'showed that he did not really bring 
his mind to bear on the different considerations which required to 
be considered in determining whether leave-should be given. We think 
that counsel is right when he said there are passages in the written 
reasons given by the Judge which give support for this contention, 
for, having reviewed the nature of the cross-examination, he said: 
'In these circumstances, in my view, the nature and conduct of defen- 
ce is such as to involve imputations on the character of Stevens, a 
witness for the prosecution, -and if the defence is conducted in such 
a way then it is proper that cross-examination of the accused as to 
previous convictions should be allowed'. That is not the correct 
1) Rv Fisher (1964) N. Z. L. R. 1063,1064-5 
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approach. The true view is that a foundation having been laid on the 
facts, it was proper that consideration should-then be given to the 
question whether or not to give leave to cross-examine the accused as 
to previous convictions having regard to the prejudice involved. " 
. 
(10). THE POSITION IN NEW SOUTH WALES 
It is clear from the provisions of the Crimes and Other Acts 
(Amendment) Act 1974 that New South Wales has adopted a legislation 
designed to give effect to the general policy of the UK legislation 
of 1898, but in rather different terms as it is more detailed. 
The new Section of the Crimes Act 1900 provides as follows: Section 
413 A (1) "Subject to. this section and section 413B where in any 
proceedings an accused person gives evidence he shall not in cross- 
examination be asked, and if asked shall not be required to answer, 
any question tending to reveal to the Court or jury - (a) the fact 
that he has committed, or has been charged with or convicted or 
acquitted of, any offence other than the offence charged; or 
(b) the fact that he is generally or in a particular respect a person 
of bad disposition or reputation. 
(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply to a question tending to reveal 
to the Court or jury any fact such as is mentioned in subsection (1) 
(a) or (b) if evidence of that fact is admissible for the purpose of 
proving the commission by the accused of the offence charged. 
(3)*Where, in any proceedings in which two or more persons are join- 
tly charged, any of the accused persons gives evidence, subsection 
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(1) shall not in this case apply to any question tending to reveal to 
the Court or jury a fact about him such as is mentioned in subsec- 
tion (1) (a) or (b) if evidence of that fact is admissible for the 
purpose of showing any other of the accused to be not guilty of the 
offence with which that other is charged. 
(4) Subsection (1) shall not apply if - (a) the accused person has 
personally or by his counsel asked any witness for the prosecution or 
for a person jointly charged with him any question concerning the 
witness's conduct on any occasion (other than his conduct in the 
activities or circumstances giving rise to the charge or his conduct 
during the trial or in the activities, circumstances or proceedings 
giving rise to the trial) or as to whether the witness had committed, 
or has been charged with or convicted or acquitted of, any offence; 
and (b) the Court is of the opinion that the main purpose of that 
question was to raise an issue as to the witness's credibility, 
but the Court shall not permit a question falling within subsection 
(1) to be put to an accused person by virtue of this subsection 
unless it is of the opinion that the question is relevant to his 
credibility as a witness and that in the interests of justice and in 
the circumstances of the case it is proper to permit the question to 
be put. 
(5) subsection (1) shall not apply where the accused person has given 
evidence against any person jointly charged with him in the same 
proceedings. " 
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Section 413 B (1) "In any proceedings an accused person may - 
(a) personally or by his counsel ask questions of any witness with a 
view to establishing directly or by his implication that the accused 
is generally or in a particular respect a person of good disposition 
or reputation; ý--ý. 
(b) himself give evidence tending to establish directly or by 
implication that the accused is generally or in a particular respect 
such a person; or 
(c) call a witness to give any such evidence, 
but where any of these things has been done, the prosecution may 
call, and any person jointly charged with the accused person may 
call, or himself give, evidence to establish that the accused person 
is a person of bad disposition or reputation, and the prosecution or 
any person so charged may in cross-examining any witness (including, 
*where he gives evidence, the accused person) ask him questions with a 
view to establish that fact. 
(2) Where by virtue of this section a party is entitled - 
(a) to call evidence to establish that the accused person is a person 
of bad disposition or reputation, that party may call evidence of his 
previous convictions, if any, whether or not the party calls any 
other evidence for that purpose; or 
(b) in cross-examining the accused to ask him questions with a view 
to establishing that he is such a person Section 413A (1) shall not 
apply in relation to his cross-examination by that party. " 
it is fair to view the above provisions as a mordern attempt to 
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resolve the problems discussed under the 1898 Criminal Evidence Act. 
one of the things of interest is that the prosecution may attack the 
character of the accused by leave where the accused challenges the 
character of a prosecution witness or a witness for a co-accused, and 
as of right where the accused puts his own character in issue and 
when the accused gives evidence against a co-accused. It is clear by 
the provision of Section 413A (4) that the legislature intends that 
an accused shall not be put at a disadvantage if as part of the 
defence it is necessary to make allegations against a prosecution 
witness. It is of interest that the accused does not lose the prote- 
ction of Section 413 A (1) where the imputations on prosecution 
witnesses are made otherwise than in cross-examination, as for exam- 
ple in his evidence or his unsworn statement. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Thayer, in "A Preliminary Treatise On The Common Law"', stated that 
the law of evidence was "ripe for the hand of the jurist ... for a 
treatment which, beginning with a full historical examination of the 
subject and continuing with a criticism of the cases, shall end with 
a restatement of the existing law and the suggestion for the course 
of its future development. " 
Having fulfilled the initial stages of this statement one can now 
make a brief statement of the existing law and attempt to make some 
suggestions for the course of its future development, such as are 
based upon reason and solid principle. 
The approach taken as indicated in the earlier discussion to the 
admissibility of similar fact evidence has been to focus upon the 
interaction of the two factors of the probative value and risk of 
prejudice. It is maintained that any satisfactory account of the law 
relating to the admissibility of similar fact evidence must treat the 
issues of probative value and risk of prejudice as the key issues in 
comparison with which other factors are to be regarded as largely 
incidental. The aim of the discussion of similar facts evidence has 
been to provide such an account. A set of headings has been uti- 
lised, not as a key to admissibility, but merely to conveniently 
group together types of case in which the probative value of similar 
fact evidence is often sufficient to justify admissibilty. It is a 
1) Boston, 1898; Reprint: 1969 
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mistake to think that any set of categories or distinctions can give 
a clear indication of when similar fact evidence will be admissible. 
It may be readily conceded that neither probative value nor risk of 
prejudice can be measured with any degree of exactitude. The poten- 
tial for the prejudice possessed by an item of evidence is often 
largley a matter of guess work. The probative value of an item of 
evidence is often equally difficult to estimate, and is dependent 
upon a large number of variables. In the present context the key 
variables are the nature of the similar fact evidence itself, the 
issues in contest in the case, and the other evidence presented in 
the case. In many of the cases which have been considered, a slight 
variation in the facts would have led to a different result. 
The Common laws concern with and difficulty in resolving the prob- 
lem of the admissibility of evidence of misconduct on other occa- 
sions, otherwise refered to as similar facts evidence, comes as 
something of a surprise to the layman. However, to a legal mind, it 
is to the credit of the common law that it established, not without 
difficulty and inconsistency, a fundamental principle that an accused 
is to be tried not for what he is but for what he has done, and 
subsequently, not merely for what he has done but only for what he 
has done in a particular mental state. Evidence of other misconduct 
may be very helpful - or as the lawyer may say, highly relevant in 
determining either of these two issues, but evidence of other miscon- 
duct may also be prejudicial. The greatest feature of the common law 
criminal system is that it is not only concerned with reaching the 
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right result but is equally concerned with reaching the right result 
by the right process. Not, of course, that we have always succeeded 
or are always succeeding, but we try. 
There are two important things that must be made clear; in the 
first place, similar fact evidence is always circumstantial in na- 
ture. Even if believed, it does not neceessarily rationally lead to 
the conclusion that the accused is guilty - he may have changed his 
ways, he may be the victim of an unfortunate chain of events, he may 
have been "set-up" by the police, by the victim, by a third party - 
precisly because he is known to have acted similarly on other occa- 
sions. It casts a heavy tactical onus of disproof on to the accused 
in the minds of the jury, however well it is instructed. Any eviden- 
ce, the probative value of which lies circumstantially via the route 
of character or disposition, maybe just enough to resolve any reaso- 
nable doubt that the trier of facts may have. Thus similar fact 
evidence must always be supplementary; it can never, in'itself 
be the 
entire case for the prosecution. 
In the second place, even if the accused'is the right person and 
did commit the offence, he is still entitled to the right of requi- 
ring the prosecution to prove his guilt, that is, to prove all 
the requisite elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. If 
that right is to be preserved, we cannot accept short cuts in the 
process by facilitating the finding of guilt simply because the 
accused is a bad person who ought to be found guilty of something. 
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It is clear that when evidence of misconduct on other occasions 
should or should not be admitted depends so much on variables it is 
the trial judge who must make the decision in each case. No one can 
set out the rules in strait-jacket form because there are none. But 
an understanding of the difficulties and the applicable principle 
will greatly facilitate his task. The trial judge must be neither 
too quick to grasp at the matters of minimal relevance nor too defen- 
sive about a jury's perceived chain of reasoning. Many of the cases 
- in fact, - most of the cases - are, it will be perceived, decisions 
of appellate tribunals. An appellate tribunal must be neither too 
quick to substitute its own view of the relevance of similar facts 
evidence in the context of all the evidence for that of the trial 
judge, nor too quick to assume that a properly instructed jury would 
not treat similar facts evidence with the careful scrutiny it must 
receive. 
As a result, merely citing a precedent that evidence of a particu- 
lar act or fact was held admissible to prove identity, or intent, or 
to rebut a particular. defence, etc., is meaningless. It must be 
known why the evidence was admitted. The temptation to admit similar 
fact evidence which seems to fall so neatly into one of the pigeon- 
hole categories established by judicial precedent can lead to the 
admission of prejudicial similar fact evidence which is not relevant. 
True probative value is often lost-sight-of. 
It is important to note that when a case states that the evidence 
under consideration is admissible to prove intent, identity, or is 
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admissible to rebut a defence of accident, innocent association, 
etc., " or that the evidence admissible (or inadmissible) 
notwithstanding a denial of the act, the force of that ratio or dicta 
can only have strength with respect to the facts and circumstances of 
that case. One should not blindly apply precedent. One should not 
take a dictum and apply it directly to the case under consideration 
without taking into account the facts of the other case, the manner 
in which the sufficiency of the logical probative relationship was 
derived from those facts and circumstances, and the issues therein 
raised. The logical inferences and their probative strength must be 
determined anew in each case. To show excessive respect, as Cowen 
and Carter1 pointed out to the "judicial pronouncements, turn out of 
their context and elevated to the dignity and authority of dogma is 
dangerous". One need merely recall the development of the unwarran- 
ted extensions of Thompson V. R2, or the development of the cat- 
chword, "innocent association" from R V. Sims3. We seem to have 
become obsessed with precedent. 
However, since probativeness and admissibilty can change with the 
slightest movement of the kaleidoscope of facts, the value of prece- 
dent in this area of the law, other than stating basic principles 
(which in many instances it has failed to do), can only serve an 
exemplary function - an example of logical inferences and assumptions 
drawn and made by other courts, which in the present case is to be 
utilised as a comparison, as an aid to unveil the reasoning process, 
1) Essays On The Law of Evidence (Oxford, 1955) p. 156 
2) (1918) A. C. 221 (H. L. ) 3) (1946) K. B. 531 (C. C. A. ) 
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so that, possibly, on the facts of present case, a similar reasoning 
process can be applied to prove or refute, the existence of the fact 
or proposition at issue. Precedent should not be used blindly in 
lieu of the reasoning process. As Heydon' pointed out: "Reported 
similar fact cases of which there are vast numbers are notorious for 
disputes and doubts about rules of law, though most of them are 
probably rightly decided. Opinions differ as to which are rightly 
decided largely because the question is one of relevance and there- 
fore of degree. Not too much weight should be placed on seemingly 
identical prior authorities; like modern negligence cases, these are 
decisions of fact dressed up as decisions of law. They have very 
little binding effect on latter courts. Dicta or even decisions in 
one case may be inapplicable to later cases because they are based on 
unexplained assumptions about which issues are relevant and how 
striking similarities are. " 
In an observation by Stow, he. said 
2: "Rules which are devised with 
the idea of relieving people of the trouble of thinking geherally end 
by becoming a troublesome fetter on the reason. " Precedents, when 
treated in a manner analogous to "rules" lead to the same result. 
And as Thayer pointed out, while the law of evidence may, at times, 
be full of good sense, it is a good sense "... that occasionally 
nods, that submits too often to a mistaken application of its 
precedents, that is often short-sighted and ill-instructed, and that 
needs to be taken in hand by the jurist, and illuminated, simplified, 
and invigorated by a reference to general principles. 3 
1) Cases and Materials On Evidence (London) (1973) at p. 262 
2) "Evidence of Similar Facts" (1922) 38 L. Q. R. 63 at 73 3) Thayer, 
A Preliminary Treatise at p. 509 
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Adherence to general principles of reasoning in every case would 
relieve this area of the law of much of its difficulties. Not only 
should the reasoning process be capable of expression in a prior 
case, but the reasoning process and the generalisations and 
assumptions upon which it relies, should be capable of expression in 
" any case at bar. In fact, one Americain writer - Lacy - has 
suggested that the prosecution should be required to work out the 
chain of reasoning leading from the proferred evidence to the issue 
sought to be proved. 
' By that means, the relevancy and sufficiency 
of the evidence will be exposed, rather than evidence being admitted 
perhaps because of some vague notion that it has some value to the 
case. In fact, in some American jurisdictions, 
2 the court has ruled 
that the state is required to give notice of any similar fact 
evidence which it intends to use and the issues to which it is 
thought probative; that "prerequisite to the admissibility of the 
evidence is a showing by the state that the evidence of other crimes 
is not merely repetitive and cumulative, is not a subterfuge for 
depicting the defendant's bad character or his propensity for bad 
behaviour, and that it serves the actual purpose for which it is 
offered. "3 
This latter requirement would force the court to examine the 
relevancy and sufficiency of the evidence, especially with respect to 
the issues sought to be proved or refuted, and would also force the 
court to take into account the negative concept of "need". Precise 
1) "Admissibility of Evidence of Crimes Not Charged In The Indict- 
ment" (1952) Ore. L. R. 267 at 285-6 2) See "Case Comments" (1974) 
2 Fla. S. U. L. R. 202 at 204; Jones, "Other Crimes Evidence in Louisiana" 
(1973) 33 La L. R. 614 at 625; State v Prieur, 277 so. 2d. 126 (La. 1973); 
State v Pilllstrem 149, N. W. 2d 281 (Minn 1967) 3) State v Prieur 
Ibid; "Case Comments", Ibid. 
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predictability cannot, of course, be expected in an area in which 
basic policy considerations compete. It is submitted that similar 
fact evidence is such an area, and that it is a mistake to attempt to 
solve the question of admissibility by reliance upon any simple 
verbal formula or set of distinctions. 
Since the basic thrust of this conclusion is that the question of 
admissibility of misconduct on previous occasions should be focused 
upon the interaction of the two factors of probative value and risk 
of prejudice - and not whether a specific defence has arisen, nor 
whether certain issues or catch-words will automatically allow the 
prosecution to adduce similar fact evidence in chief, nor whether 
the reasoning process takes a particular form of legal reasoning, I 
would strongly recommend an abolition of the categorisation approach 
altogether. We have all after all witnessed the problems created by 
the categorisation approach. It has led to undue adherence to prece- 
dents and to reasons for admissibility which have often been based on 
faulty reasoning. Absolute "rules" have been developed leading to 
hair-splitting distinctions among the various cases and obfuscation 
of the true principle involved. Unfortunately, the circumstances 
which safeguard the accused's right became ossified into rigid and 
close rules. Thus the categorisation approach has limited the scope 
of the study of similar facts evidence and in some ways actually 
complicated it. The question then is, of what effect will its aboli- 
tion be to the central issues of probative value and the risk of 
prejudice. Apart from eliminating those problems enumerated above, 
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which had accompanied categorisation, one other thing is certain, and 
that is that each case can now be considered on its facts and merits, 
rather than by mere "pigeon-holing", which sometimes results in 
irrelevant, evidence being admitted and in some other cases results in 
some relevant though greatly prejudicial evidence being admitted. 
Categorisation places emphasis on precedent which the judges are 
compelled'to follow, and so its abolition will obviate the problems 
that go with precedent which have already been discussed. Thus if 
the recommendation for the abolition is adopted, counsel-and the 
judges would be able to apply themselves strictly to the cases before 
them rather than pre-occupy themselves with enforcing precedent 
through cataloguing of the cases under the separate, headings. The 
consideration for the Court should be whether at any given point in a 
trial a specific issue has substantially appeared so that it can 
safely be said that such is a real issue in the. trial, and further of 
whether at the same given point in time, the proferred evidence is 
sufficiently probative to affect the apparent probabilities of the 
existence of that issue. It is basically a two-step process. As a 
result of the course that the proceedings may take, an issue may 
substantially appear at a given point in time, whether, in the case 
for the prosecution or in the case for the defence, or it may be an 
issue from the outset of the trial, yet, at that point in time, the 
similar fact evidence may not have sufficient logical probativeness 
to that issue. In result, admissibility is denied. -However as the 
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trial progresses, and other evidence is adduced, there may come a 
point in time where, in the contest of the evidence as it then 
stands, the similar fact evidence has attained the requisite degree 
of relevancy to be admissible. Thus, the question of admissibility 
must always be considered in the context of the circumstances and 
peculiarities of a particular case being considered. "The same 
similar fact evidence may be admissible in one context and inadmissi- 
ble in another; the slightest movement of the kaleidoscope of facts 
creates a new pattern which must be examined afresh. "1 
The principles of admission are basically those of relevancy theory 
and counterbalancing prejudice. Relevancy, though simple, can be 
difficult to apply if not understood. One writer claims that 
relevancy, "... is a concept that is difficult to define in a really 
helpful way. Relevance is easier to recognise than it is to 
describe. It is reminiscent of U. S. Supreme Court Justice Potter 
Stewart's remark about obscenity: 'I cannot define it but I know it 
when I see it'; 
2 
It is my view that if the categorisation approach was abolished, 
the study of similar fact evidence would be less complicated, easier 
to fathom the rationales behind the decisions and of course more 
interesting. The admissibility of similar fact evidence would be 
more realistic and less parochial and rigid, as emphasis would shift 
to the correct quarters; what is needed is a clear recognition of the 
competing policies, coupled with a willingness to attempt the diffi- 
cult task of evaluating the probative value and the potential for 
1) Hoffmann, "Similar Facts After Boardman" (1975) 91 L. Q. R. 293 at 
294 2) Waltz, Criminal Evidence (Chicago, 1975) p. 49 
prejudice possessed-by the evidence. And it is also hoped that one 
could avoid excessive rigidity, of the kind illustrated by a typical 
decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts1, where it was held 
that; "If the testimony tended to show nothing more than an act of 
improper familiarity and not a substantive act of adultery on that 
occasion, such evidence would be admissible (to prove the concurrent 
adulterous disposition of the defendant and the particepes crimi- 
nis): It is difficult to find any logic in accepting evidence of a 
mere previous "act of improper familiarity" and rejecting similar 
fact evidence of "a substantive act of adultery" as being the "stron- 
g(est) evidence" of an adulterous disposition. The question of 
admitting similar facts evidence is after all practical rather than 
academic. 
Though the fires of controversy on similar facts evidence seem to 
have engendered more heat than light, one aspect has surprisingly and 
regrettably been neglected, and that is the scientific approach. 
McCormick is one of the few writers to note that "the policy basis 
of the ... rule ... is so doubtful that the courts may profitably 
be 
alert to the future developments. of these scientific studies, in 
appraising the desirability of maintaining the legal barriers. "2 He 
mentions a pioneer article by James and Dickinson 
1 
showing that "a 
limited group of persons have a special predisposition for accidents. 
They are 'accident prone'. " Quite surprising is their finding that 
as to road traffic accidents, "with the exception of vision ..: most 
1) Commonwealth v Thrasher 11 Mass. 450,452 (1858) 2) McCormick, 
Evidence, at p. 326 3) "Accident Proneness and Accident Law" (1950) 
Harv. L. R. 769 
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of the studies show little correlation between physical characteris- 
tics and accident rate. " Besides phycho-motor characteristics, age 
and experience, the personality traits of the driver were found to be 
of major importance. 1 In another article by marsh, entitled "What 
kind of Driver Are You? "2, it is noted that the chances of a driver's 
overcoming a potential accident "depends upon the class to which that 
driver belongs .. much more than upon his quickness ... (I)t is 
possible to classify every driver according to his skill, ignoring 
his sex, age and experience. Most important, a driver who belongs to 
one group will probably stay in it for the rest of his life. " An 
American scientist is cited as saying that "in spite of all efforts, 
a bad driver cannot turn into a good one .... We have conducted re- 
examinations of volunteers after an interval of two years, and found 
that their driving ability had hardly changed. " Another writer 
mentions that "recent medical research has shown that ; accident 
proneness' may be an innate characteristic of some individuals and a 
personal phenomenon independent of any question of responsibility, 
conscious action or blame-worthiness. "3 Dealing with the "evidentia- 
ry aspects" of their study, - James and Dickinson call for a reconside- 
ration of the rule excluding evidence of similar facts since recent 
studies afford a scientific basis for proper evidence of accident 
proneness to be admitted to show carelessness4. Nevertheless, regar- 
ding the uncertainty of the provisional researches in this area, the 
writers do not seem to suggest the total abandonment of the rule. As 
McCormick5 pointed out, proof should be by "results of specific tests 
1) "Accident Proneness and Accident Law" (1950) 63 Harv. L. R. 769 at 
772-775. The same relates to Intellegence. Cf U. S. Bureau of Public 
Roads, Highway Accidents, (1938) 2) Yedioth Aharonot, December 11, 
1970 at p. 8 of the Weekly Magazine. 3) Bristol, "Medical Aspects of 
Accident Control" (1936) 107 A. M. A. J. 653,654 4) James and Dickinson 
see Infra at 793 5) McCormick, Evidence, p. 32 
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of the individual in question ... if introduced through the testimony 
of a qualified expert, " including according to James and Dickinson 
i, 
"an expert opinion whether the individual was accident prone ... 
based on, or contributed by, a clinical interview and observation or 
a past accident record. " 
Of even greater significance are sex cases in which evidence of 
similar acts is admitted to prove performance of the act; its 
culpable character and identity of the agent. Here the evidence is 
admitted "as showing a disposition to commit the act charged. 
" 
If 
the relevant cases are read critically, many of them will be seen to 
fit into the established classes of admissibility. But the courts 
have even gone far beyond those classes , although pretending 
that 
the case falls within the exceptions of system, scheme or design 
? 
The Supreme Court of Arizona was pushed to the wall by dissenting 
judges who frankly admitted: "(T)he courts appear to be more liberal 
in admitting, as proof of guilt, evidence of similar sex offences 
than one who is charged with non-sex offences"I As pointed out in an 
earlier discussion in this thesis and in several other works5 this 
liberalism is probably attributable to the assumption that sex 
offenders have a high disposition towards recidivism. It must also 
be taken as the basis for the increasing statutory interference in 
the area of "sexual psychopathy"ý. Serious doubts have been raised' 
and many consider it wrong to regard sexual offenders as a special 
group and would split it into several types: specific perversions, 
1) (1950) 63 Harv. L. R. at 793 2) Bracey v U. S. 142 F. 2d 85,88 
(D. C. Cr. 1944) 3) Cf Comm. v Kline, 361 P. 434,65A 2d, 348 (1949); 
See generally-Comment. (1949) 23 Temp. L. Q. 133 4) State v Finley, 85 
Ariz. 327,334,338 P. 2d. 790,795 (1959) 5) See Note (1951)39 Cal. L. R. 
584; Trautman, "Logical or Legal Relevancy -A Conflict In Theory" (1952) 5 Vand. L. R. 385 at 400-1 6) See Annots. 24 A. L. R. 2d. 350; 
25 A. L. R. 2d. 354 (1952); K Bowman, "Review of Sex Legislation and 
the Control of Sex Offenders in the U. S. ofA. " (1953) 4 Int. Rev. 
of Crim. Policy 7) See P. Tappon, "Some Myths About the Sex Offender" 
(195$) 22 Fed. Prob; See also J. Gregg "Other Acts of Sexual Mis- behaviour and Perversion as Evidence in Prosecutions for Sexual Offenders" (1965/6) 6 Ariz. L. R. 212,231 
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such as exhibitionism, may be habitual and highly repetitive while 
others, such as rape are not. 
l 
The conclusion to be drawn from the study of "accident prone" 
persons and "sex offenders" is disappointing. The former have not 
yet been adequately investigated, and although for the latter the 
data are quite abundant 
2 the courts seem to ignore them. This 
attitude may be due to condemnation of immorality and the desire to 
combat its recurrence, rather than to objective conclusions. Moreo- 
ver, the judges argue that the scientific studies were not made in 
relation to adjudication and most of them ignore considerations which 
are material for a judge. Mutual distrust between members of the 
' 
legal profession and behavioural scientists is well known 
ý- however 
it is clear that in consequence much valuable material is wasted, 
while lawyers flounder in their own controversies over the Rule and 
its Exceptions. 
Having seen the position of the "sexual offenders", another type of 
evidence for consideration is "(e)vidence of sexual conduct offered 
as the basis of expert psychological or psychiatric opinion that the 
complainant fantasized or invented the act or acts charged. "4 It is 
interesting to note that Wigmore5 suggested that in all rape cases 
psychiatric testimony relating to the state of mind of the victim 
should be admitted: "No judge should never let a sex offence charge 
go to the jury unless the female complainant's social history and 
mental make-up have been examined and testified to by a qualified 
physician. "7 
1) See F. Leppman, "Essential Differences Between Sex Offenders" (1941) 
32 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 366 2) See a Bibliographical list Gebhard, 
Gagnon, Pomeroy & Christenson - The Indiana University Institute of 
Sex Research, "Sex Offenders" (1965) 877-82 -3) See generally, G. 
Dession, "7sychiatty and The Conditioning of Criminal Justice" (1937- 
38) 47 Yale L. J. 319 4) Berger "Man's Trial3Woman's Tribulation: 
Rape Cases In the Courtroom" (1977) 77 Columbia L. R. l. at p. 38 5) 
. 924 at 737 7) Wigmore on Evidence, § 924a at 737 
However problems of expert testimony in the court-room have been 
recognised as a general matter by Wigmore. 
I And Jerome Hall in 
"General Principles of Criminal Law"2, when alluding to the 
appearance of the psychiatrist in the court-room made the comment: 
we are plunged into the extremely complicated task of trying to 
establish the conditions of intelligible inter-communication among 
lawyers and psychiatrists ... " 
There can be little doubt that, in many respects, the Criminal Law 
and psychiatric theory are at odds. At a fundamental level, a 
divergence exists regarding the process of volition itself. A 
significant comment may be found in the judgement of Jackson J., of 
the Kansas Supreme Court in the case of State v. Andrews 
3, 
where it 
was stated that, "... it may be noted that Freudian psychiatrists 
tend to discount the existence of the capacity in the individual to 
exercise his free will. Perhaps it should be noted that there are 
other schools of psychiatry beside the Freudian. It is not for the 
lawyer to decide between these schools. We can only wish all of 
these learned men success in their quest for knowledge in a new 
field. But, the law has always insisted upon an exercise of will". 
This dichotomy has manifested itself in the fact that the law, in 
devising criteria for criminal responsibility, omits psychological 
and sociological considerations which are regarded by medical experts 
as basic to any appreciation of human conduct. The most obvious 
example, of course, being so-called McNaughten Rules which have, 
1) See generally Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 2, "Testimonial Qualifica- 
tions" Chap. XXIII at Pp. 633 et seq. 2) (1960) at P. 452 3) (1960) 
357 P. 2d. 739 at 747; see also e. g. Dusky v U. S. (1961) 295 F. 2d. 
743; and Kwosek v State (1960) 100 N. W. 2d. 399 4) Rv McNaughten 
(1843) 100 CI and F. 200. Cf Scotland - H. M. Advocate v Kidd (1960) 
J. C. 61,70-71. 
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although formulated in 1843, remained the basic statement of the law 
of insanity in England to the present time. Even in jurisdictions 
where the matter is contained in a statute, the position is no more 
realistic 
1 
Psychiatrists as experts cause not the least of these problem S2. 
One of the most problematic areas is that of terminology: what do 
psychiatric terms, which are used with little consistency by those in 
the profession, and with little agreement on their part3 in labelling 
individuals actually mean? Would this approach serve further to 
confuse the jury rather than enlighten them? 
Another problem which arises is that psychiatric evidence differs 
from other expert evidence, even other medical evidence, in its 
methodology. As Diamond and Louisell point out4, the psychological 
sciences differ from most other scientific areas in that their 
subject matter is not visible. "The Investigator must therefore 
rely", they comment, "upon inferences made from derivatives: speech, 
non-verbal communication, actions, behaviour. " Thus, the 
psychological sciences cannot truly be described as exact sciences, 
particularly as the scope of psychological experiment is necessarily 
limited. Therefore, since lawyers like to think of their own 
discipline as precise and logical, a further conflict immediately 
arises exacerbated, Glueck suggest?, by events in the past which 
caused the psychiatrist to be regarded as a practitioner in, " ... 
such supposedly devious acts as hypnotism and animal magnetism; and 
it is nourished by the indubitable fact that mental medicine still 
1) See e. g., the Canadian Criminal Code S. 16; the Tasmanian Criminal 
Code, S. 16; the Queensland Criminal Code'S. 27 and the New Zealand 
Crimes Act (1961) S. 23 2) See eg., J. Hall-General Principles of 
Criminal Law (1960) at P. 452 3) See eg. Copeland, Cooper "Differences 
in Usage of Diagnostic Labels Amongst Psychiatrists in the British Isles" 
(1971) 118 Brit. Jrn. Psychiat. 556 4) "The Psychiatrist as Expert 
Witness: Some Ruminations and Speculations" (1965) 63 Mich. L. R. 1335 at 
p. 1340 5) Law and Psychiatry (1962) at p. 34 
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has a long way to go in discovering the causes and cures of many 
psychic illnesses. " Indeed, it has been cogently argued by Diamond 
himself an eminent psychiatrist, that psychiatry, both as a body of 
scientific knowledge and as a profession, has failed to fulfil the 
needs of the law. Psychiatry has failed, says Diamond, particularly 
in the areas of diagnosis and treatment: effective diagnosis, for 
example, of schizophrenia is impossible because it-is not certain 
whether the condition known as schizophrenia is a disease, a variety 
of diseases or not a disease at all. "There is as yet" he goes on 
to say, 
2 "no thoroughly reliable treatment method which can be ap- 
plied to the mentally ill offender and which can ensure both his 
rehabilitation and the safety of society. " An even more extreme 
position has been taken up by the iconoclastic psychiatrist Szasz, 
whose central thesis is that most mental illness cannot correctly be 
described as disease in the true medical sense, but rather as malada- 
ption which frequently reflects deficiences in moral responsibility 
or character. Therefore, Szasz argues, 
3 
psychiatry is totally irre- 
levant to questions of law and that, hence, psychiatrists should 
withdraw completly from the administration of the criminal law, which 
should abandon any recognition of mental disorder as being relevant 
to the determination of responsibility or sentencing. Similarly, 
other psychiatrists like Schemideberg, have themselves sometimes 
declared, in writing of their own value in courtrooms, that too much 
significance is given to their pronouncements4. And certainly where 
1) "From Durham to Brawner, A futile Journey" ('1973) Washington Univ. 
L. a. P. 109 2) "From Durham to Brawner, A futile Journey" (1973) 
Washington Univ. L. R. at p. 117 3) Law, Liberty and Psychiatry (1963) 
at P. 216.4) Schmideberg "When the Psychiatric Diagnostic Interview 
Is A Farce" (1973) 17 Int. Jrn. Offender Therapy and Comp. Criminal. 
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female psyche is being testified to, it can be contended that the 
trials of court and psychiatrist are increased: thus Sigmund Freud, 
who would be regarded by many as the leader and pioneer in the 
psycho-analytical field, acknowledge his lack of expertise in this 
area. Freud 
1 
said: "If you want'to know more about feminity, enquire 
from your own experience of life, or turn to the poets, or wait until 
science can give you deeper and more coherent information. " 
At this juncture I would like to refer to the important issue of 
the psychiatric evidence of character of witnesses. As seen in the 
previous discussion of the issue, psychiatric evidence of character 
presents a number of interesting and fairly difficult questions. 
However, it is clear that such evidence is usually admissible to show 
that a witness suffers from some mental or physical condition which 
affects the reliability of his evidence 
2 
The pertinent question here and- now is that, in view of the 
considerations already enumerated, does it then, mean that 
psychiatric evidence ought not to be utilised by the courts? The 
first point to be made is that, whatever the true deficiencies of the 
psychological sciences, it has become common-place today that the 
processes of the law and legal reasoning are by no means as 
dispassionate, objective and precise as was once supposed. As Frank 
has described it in a well-known passage, "First, the trial Judge in 
a non-jury or the jury in a jury trial must learn about the facts 
from the witnesses; and witnesses, being humanly fallible, frequently 
make mistakes in observation of what they saw and heard, or in their 
1) Femininity (1932) at P. 22 2) See Toohey v Metro olitian Police 
Commissioner (1965) 49 Cr. App. R. 148; Rv Lupien (1970) 9 D. L. R. 3d)1 
See also Walker and Walker - Law of Evidence in Scotland- §350 
3) Law and the Modern Mind (English Ed. 1949) at P. X; for a Commentary 
see Roebuck "Modern Society and Primitive Law" (1970) 3 U. Tas. L. R. 
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re-collections of what they observed, or in their courtroom reports 
, of those recollections. Second, the trial Judges or Jurors, also 
human, may have prejudices - often unconscious, unknown even to them 
selves - for or against some of the witnesses, or the parties to the 
suit, or the lawyers. " Perhaps, therefore, criticisms of the, psycho- 
logical sciences coming from the often isolated lawyer are not worth 
a great deal. And I would like to recall again here the opinion of 
Wigmorel, an acclaimed and accomplished legal scholar, who suggested 
that in all rape cases psychiatric testimony relating to the state 
of mind of the victim should be admitted. 
It is thought that the alleged lack of exactitude characteristic of 
the behavioural sciences can easily be over-emphasised. Diamond and 
Louisell contend2, correctly in my view, that the value of psyc- 
hiatric evidence cannot be determined by the exactness or infallibi- 
lity of the evidence given, but rather by the probability that what 
the psychiatrist has to say, " .... offers more 
information and 
better comprehension of the human behaviour which the law wishes to 
understand. " 
Finally, I would recommend that the question of the admissibility 
of, and weight to be given to, psychiatric evidence must be 
determined on a broad basis, including matters relating to the nature 
of the criminal trial itself. As Silverman has rightly pointed out 3' 
we should cease to think of the criminal trial as. some kind of 
sporting event and rather as a method of determining truth. To that 
1) Evidence, (3rd ed. ) §924a at 737 2)_ "The Psychiatrist as 
Expert Witness: Some Rumination and Speculations" (1965) 63 Mich. 
L. R. 1335 at 1342; 3) "Psychiatric Evidence In Criminal Law (1971-2) 
14 Crim. L. Q. 145 at'170 
end, psychiatric evidence must be admitted where matters which are 
its province are in issue. Further, in order to assist the court in 
assessing the weight to be given to it, it is desirable that all the 
information gathered by the expert witness should be placed at the 
disposal of the court. In the words of Diamond and Louiselll: "(I)n 
all instances the psychiatric expert (should) be allowed to relate to 
the court exactly how he reached his opinion and what were sources of 
his information. He should be required to describe in fairly precise 
terms his own process of revealing his source material: what 
information did he accept, and what did he reject; what sources did 
he place great weight upon, and what sources did he minimise; and why 
did he evaluate the clinical material in these ways". It is 
essential if such chaotic and unjust situations that sometimes occur 
are to be avoided, that a coherent, scientifically based policy be 
devised regarding psychiatric evidence, for the simple reason as 
Father Philip Berrigan has said, 
2 
that, " .... so long as it 
sacrifices justice, law will never be an instrument of order. " There 
can be no doubt that order is a commodity which has been sadly 
lacking to date. 
In view of'the considerations, I am of the opinion that it would be 
desirable to promote comprehensive psychological research on the 
correlation between character, trait, habit, custom, and similar 
facts. This should lead. to safe conclusions as to the probability of 
committing an additional similar act. I would suggest that research 
groups be set up in the main areas of human activity, every group 
1) See Infra, (1965) 63 Mich. L. R. at 1354 2) Prison Journals 
of a Priest Revolutionary (1971) at P. 115 
being headed by a jurist and composed of behavioural and social 
scientists (Sociologists, psychologists, psychic-trists, 
statisticians, etc), and of representatives of scientific disciplines 
and professions related to the area under research. The groups would 
submit their reports with their recommendations, to an organisation 
for the law reform, which would also comprise scientists. 
Similar fact evidence has never before in the United Kingdom been 
generally governed by statute, and it is in this light that it will 
be interesting to consider here the recommended statutory formulation 
by the Criminal Law Revision Committee) as embodied in Clause 3 of 
the draft Bill annexed to its Eleventh Report. These provisions 
purport to state the existing Common Law, subject to an important 
modification in sub-clause 3(4), and subject to the Committee's hope2 
that the statutory formulation of the existing rules will be less 
strictly construed in favour of the accused. 
Clause 3 (1) states: "Subject to the provisions of this section, in 
any (criminal) proceedings evidence of other conduct of the accused 
shall not be admissible for the purpose of proving the commission by 
him of the offence charged by reason only that the conduct in ques- 
tion tends to show in him a disposition to commit the kind of offence 
with which he is charged or a general disposition to commit crimes. " 
In this section "other conduct of the accused" means conduct of the 
accused other than the conduct in respect of which he is charged. It 
should be noted that evidence of conduct showing only a general 
1) See 11th Report, Paras. 70-101, of Thomson Cozmittee Report - 
Chap 54 2) Para 100 
disposition to crime is wholly inadmissible since it is excluded by 
sub-clause 3 (1) and as we shall see, is not made admissible by 
either sub-clause 3 (2) or sub-clause 3 (4). 
Clause 3(2) states: "In any (criminal) proceedings evidence of 
other conduct of the accused tending to show him in a disposition to 
commit the kind of offence with which he is charged shall be 
admissible for the said purpose if the disposition which that conduct 
tends to show is, in the circumstances of the case, of particular 
relevance to a matter in issue in the proceedings, as in appropriate 
circumstances would be, for example - (a) a disposition to commit 
that kind of offence in a particular manner or according to a parti- 
cular mode of operation resembling the manner or mode of operation 
alleged as regards the offence charged; or (b) a disposition to 
commit that kind of offence in respect of the person in respect of 
whom he is alleged to have committed the offence charged; or (c) a 
disposition to commit that kind of, offence (even though not falling 
within paragraph (a) or (b) above) which tends to confirm the correc- 
tness of an identification of the accused by a witness for the prose- 
cution. " 
It is worthwhile to refer to a pertinent American provision as 
provided by Rule 404 (b) of the American Federal Rules with a view to 
contrasting the provisions. Rule 404 (b) reads as follows: "Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such 
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as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. " 
It is the view of Crossl "that the subclauses of the draft Bill set 
out above are to be preferred firstly because s. 404(b) makes no 
allowance for cases, such as Rv Straffen2 in which evidence of other 
crimes is admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that he acted in conformity therewith; secondly, because the use 
of the ambiguous word 'identity' in the enumeration of the other 
purpose for which character evidence is admissible is tantamount, at 
any rate where the evidence of the actus reus is cicumstantial as it 
was in Straffen's case, to saying that 'evidence of character may be 
admissible when it goes to show that the accused was guilty of the 
crime charged. '" 
As evident from the provisions above, the examples of circumstances 
rendering the evidence of particular relevance in sub-clause 3(2) are 
those where it shows a disposition to commit the offence in a parti- 
cular way, or against a particular person, or where it tends to 
confirm identification. C. F Tapper3 observes that it is perhaps upon 
the first of these that the Committee hopes that a less strict inter- 
pretation will be-placed, and he says that a clue to its attitude may 
be gathered from the committee's discussion of the case of Rv 
Morris4, where it accepts a description of the circumstances of two 
attempted abductions as "strikingly similar" - (infact the Court of 
Appeal said that there was a "startling resemblance") although in 
1) Cross On Evidence, 5th ed. at p. 401 2) (1952) 2 Q. B. 911; 
(1952) 2 All E. R. 657 3) "Criminal Law Revision Committee 11th 
Report", 36 M. L. R. 56 at 58 4) (1964) 54 Cr. App. R. 69 
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one a girl peacefully accepted an invitation from the driver of a car 
to show him the way, whereas in the other an attempt was made to drag 
another girl into a different car after she had been lured to it by 
an offer to show some fireworks. As Tapper rightly criticise], this 
seems questionable, and as he pointed out, it should not be over- 
looked that similarity of technique is not in itself sufficent to 
show a disposition in the accused to commit the offence in that way, 
unless the respect in which similarity is shown is itself unusual. It 
would clearly be insufficient in order to show a disposition to rob 
banks, that bank notes were taken on each occasion. Similarly it 
seems hardly enough in Rv Morris2 that attempts were made on both 
occasions to get girls into a car. 
However, Tapper3 did make some fairly controversial criticisms of 
clause 3(2). For example he complained that the wording of clause 
3(2)(b) does not cater for Rv Ball4, because it speaks of a 
"disposition to commit the kind of offence in respect of the person 
in respect of whom he is alleged to have committed the offence 
charged", and the other conduct proved against the Balls was 
intercourse at a time when incest was not an offence. To that 
criticism Cross retorted-. 5 "I would have thought that the ... 
complaint is answered by the fact that a disposition to have legally 
innocent intercourse becomes a disposition to commit an offence when 
that intercourse is prohibited, even though the prohibition might 
reduce the probability of action in accordance with the disposition. " 
Another criticism by Tapper6 is that clause 3 (2) (c) is explicitly 
1) See Infra 2) (1969) 54 Cr. App. R. 69 3) 36 M. L. R. pp 58-59 
4) (1911) A. C. 47 5)"Clause 3 of the Draft Criminal Evidence Bill, Research and Codification" (1973) Crim. L. R. 400 at 405 6) 36 M. L. R. 
58-59 
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limited to cases where the disposition "tends to confirm the 
correctness of an identification of the accused by a witness for the 
prosecution", and according to him, this is a most important 
qualification of the provision. Tapper argues that "(i)t would thus 
not apparently apply where the accused was identified by a child too 
young to give evidence for the prosecution, or by a witness who 
subsequently disappears or refuses to give evidence, or by a victim 
who dies after making the identification but before the trial". He 
goes on to say that: "It might be argued that the sub-clause is 
exemplary only, and that as the Committee itself recognises the 
undesirability of attempting to compile a fixed list', these cases 
could be catered for by analogy. The difficulty with this approach 
is that it ascribes no significance at all to the -(words 'by witness 
for the prosecution') - which become otiose. " And in answer to this 
complaint Cross says 
2 
"that clause 3 (2)'(c) was drafted with'Thom- 
pson vR in mind. The identification in that case was by a witness 
for the prosecution and, owing to the appointment Thompson was al- 
leged to have made with the boys, his homosexual disposition was in 
the circumstances of the case, of particular relevance to a matter in 
. 
issue in the proceedings'. " 
"It is submitted that these words answer the suggestion of Lord 
Salmon that clause 3(2) is a 'considerable expansion of the law' . 
He had in mind the case of a burglar who regularly gained access to 
houses by forcing downstairs windows. The burglar would have shown a 
1) Paras 82,101 2) (1973) Crim. L. R. at p. 405 3) (1918) A. C. 221 
4) 388 H. L. Deb. Col. 1609; See also Lord Morris at Col. 1632 
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disposition to commit the kind. of offence in a particular manner 
within clause 3 (2) (a), but the circumstances of the case would have 
to be most peculiar for this to be of particular relevance. " 
We can now look at clause 3 (3) which reads as follows: "Where in 
any (criminal) proceedings evidence of any other conduct of the 
accused is admissible by virtue of subsection (2) above for the 
purpose of proving the commission by him of the offence charged, and 
the accused has in respect of that other conduct been convicted of an 
offence by or before any court in the United Kingdom or by a court= 
martial there or elsewhere, then, if evidence tending to establish 
the conduct in question is given by virtue of that sub-section, 
evidence that he has been so convicted in respect of it shall be 
admissible for that purpose in addition to the evidence given by 
virtue of that sub-section. " 
It is thought that', as there are very few reported cases in which 
similar fact evidence has been received where the accused had already 
been convicted of the offence proved by that evidence, this provision 
is of no great practical importance. 
'Clause 3 (4) deals with the situation where the conduct is 
admitted; the proposals here are said to be "highly -contraversial". 
It reads as follows: "In any (criminal) proceedings where the conduct 
in respect of which the accused is charged is admitted in the course 
of those proceedings by or on behalf of the accused, evidence of 
other conduct of the accused tending to show in him a disposition to 
commit the kind of offence with which he is charged shall be 
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admissible for any of the following purposes namely - (a) to 
establish the existence in the accused of any state of mind 
(including recklessness) proof of which lies on the prosecution; or 
(b) to prove that the conduct in respect of which the accused is 
charged was not accidental or involuntary; or 
(c) to prove that there was no lawful justification or excuse for the 
conduct in respect of which the accused is charged, 
notwithstanding that the other conduct is relevant for that purpose 
by reason only that it tends to show in the accused a disposition to 
commit the kind of offence with whom he is charged: 
provided that no evidence shall be admissible by virtue of this 
subsection for the purpose of proving negligence on the part of the 
accused. " 
The innovation of clause 3 (4) is that if the accused admits the 
conduct with which he is charged, then evidence tending to show 
disposition alone is admissible for the listed purposes even in the 
absence if any special circumstances making it of particular 
relevance. Here the three listed purposes are not exemplary but 
definitive, though it is recognised) that there may be some internal 
overlapping. 
As Professor Rupert Cross pointed out, 2 "the basis of the reception 
of evidence of disposition is that there comes a time when, assuming 
that the evidence is true, the hypothesis of the accused's innocence 
of the offence charged places a very great strain on the credulity of 
1) At p. 215 in the Commentary on Clause 3 2) (1973) Crim. L. R. 
at p. 401 _ 
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the tribunal of fact. That tribunal may of course not be satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt of the truth of the evidence of disposition, 
or of the other evidence in the case connecting the accused with the 
offence charged or it may simply be prepared to be credulous. In any 
of these events the accused must be acquitted, but it would be unreal 
not to allow the prosecution to adduce the evidence of disposition. 
The principle of law is that the strain on credulity must be very 
considerable before the evidence of disposition becomes admissible. 
In general, the disposition proved by the other conduct must be a 
dispostion to act in a highly specific way resembling that in which 
the offence charged is alleged to have been committed in every signi- 
ficant respect, and even the most wholehearted admirer of the status 
quo might be disposed to question the good sense of some of the 
decisions". It is thought that the principle underlying clause 3 (4) 
is that the- point at which credulity is strained to such an extent as 
to render it unreal to reject the evidence of disposition is reached 
sooner when the conduct alleged to constitute the crime charged is 
admitted by the accused than when it is denied'. Without doubt, it 
would be too risky to rely on the arguement "he is the kind of man 
who would do that kind of thing" to establish such conduct; but no 
greater risk than that attendant upon the reception of evidence of 
his past beliefs and earlier declarations of intention as evidence of 
the accused's state of mind at the time of the alleged offence is 
involved in the acceptance of the argument from disposition when the 
intention of the accused, or the existence of a lawful excuse, is all 
1) Ibid 
that is in issue. 
There is liable to be a greater strain on credulity where the actus 
reus is admitted than where this is not the case. For example, if on 
the facts such as those of R V. Fisherl, the making of the false 
pretences charged is denied, it may well be right to insist on a very 
high degree of relevance and hence of similarity in the case of the 
other false pretences, but, where the false pretences are admitted, 
it does seem rather absurd to exclude other dissimilar fasle preten- 
ces on the issue of intent to defraud. A further appreciation of 
this point can be seen from the following illustration2. For exam- 
ple, A swears that he saw B furtively approach a car standing outside 
a house, take a handbag from the car and a latchkey from the bag, and 
then open the door of the house with the key. B is charged with 
burglary and his defence is mistaken identification. The hypothesis 
of B's innocence would place some strain on the credulity of the 
tribunal of fact if it were told that B had been guilty of breaking 
into shops and offices by climbing through the windows with intent to 
steal, but the risk of its jumping to the conclusion that B was the 
man observed by A because he is the kind of man who-would commit 
burglary is thought to be too great to render his previous conduct 
admissible. However, assuming that B admits that he was the man 
observed by A, but contends that he entered the house while having a 
black-out, or in order to "have a bit of kip in the warmth"; it would 
be unreal to exclude the evidence of the other break-ins because the 
1) (1910) 1 K. B. 149 2) (1973) Crim. L. R. P. 402 
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strain on the credulity of the tribunal of fact caused by the hypot- 
hesis of B's innocence would be so much greater. A shopbreaker who 
enters other people's houses as a trespasser without dishonest intent 
must be a very rare bird, more than the shopbreaker who is mistakenly 
identified as a burglar entering a house with intent to steal. In 
the opinion of Cross, from the theoretical point of view there is 
much to be said for the proposals of clause 3 (4). He remarked that: 
"In spite of the undoubted theoretical merits of these recommenda- 
tions, it must be admitted that they bear a somewhat academic appea- 
rance, that the admission of the accused's previous convictions is 
probably repulsive to English public opinion, that it might not 
always be easy to ascertain in practice when the actus reus was 
admitted, and the question of what constitutes the same kind of 
offence as the offence charged could give rise to difficulty. "1 
There are some other meaningful criticisms of clause 3 (4) that is 
worth considering. According to Tapper2, this formulation should 
prevent abuse by reference to an alleged confession which is denied 
at the trial. And he thinks that an immediate and obvious reac- 
tion to this provision is that in future the accussed with a record 
will be well advised to admit nothing. He goes on to-point out that 
"(t)he Committee anticipates this objection, but it is rejected by 
the majority because it is of the opinion that where the accused's 
real defence is that the conduct took place but was innocent, he will 
not, for tactical reasons, be in a position to deny the conduct. 
3 In 
other words, it is not plausible to argue, 'I didn't do it at all; 
1) Cross On Evidence, 5th Ed. at P. 403 2) 36 M. L. R. at P. 
60 
3) Para. 94 - 
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but if I did it, I did it with an innocent intent, or by accident, or 
because I was entitled to do it'. " It is argued that though this may 
be true it is not decisive. And to buttress that stand the following 
argument is put forwards: "In the first place, it assumes that the 
accused with a record will run his real defence, at least in the 
alternative. This might be thought to be supported by McCabe's 
finding that 63 per cent of defendants do not deny their involvement 
in the incident in respect of which they are charged. 
2 
But those 
findings relate to cases decided under the present rules. It is 
instructive to compare them with the American findings that indepen- 
dent eyewitness- evidence was adduced by the prosecution in only 25 
per cent of their cases3. This suggests that it might well be 
possible for many more accused persons to deny their involvement if 
it became advantageous for them to do so. A second objection to 
this provision is that it is completely inconsistent with the Commit- 
tee's reason for abandoning the current rule relating to the conse- 
quences of making imputation upon the prosecution witnesses in cross- 
examination, where the imputations is a necessary part of the 
defence, namely-4: 'It is wrong that the admissibilty of evidence, in 
so important a matter as this, should depend on the tactics of the 
defence. The legal advisers of the accused are in the invidious 
situation of having to choose between leaving the jury or magis- 
trates' court in ignorance of the facts behind the evidence given by 
prosecution witnesses (facts that may greatly impair that evidence) 
1) 36 M. L. R. at P. 61 2) McCabe and Purves, "The Jury at Work", 
Oxford University Penal Research Unit Occasional Paper NQ4 (1972), 
P. 4, Table 5 3) Kalven and Zeisel, "The American Jury" (1966), P. 131 
Table 31 4) Para 123 (V) 
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and allowing the prosecution to introduce prejudicial evidence of the 
accused's convictions. Whether the accused is convicted or not may 
depend on the way in which this choice is made, but it is not one 
that legal advisers should be called on to make. A rule that 
operates in this way turns the Criminal trial into a kind of game. "' 
C. F. Tapper argues further that the situation that Clause 3 (4) 
creates, makes the accused with a long and prejudicial record, even 
of dissimilar offences, who happens to be innocent, to be faced with 
a choice between running his real defence of innocent involvement in 
the hope that the jury will not be influenced against him on account 
of his record and fabricating a false defence denying involvement in 
order to avoid any possible prejudice on account of the revelation of 
his record. "If it is wrong to confront the accused with this dilem- 
ma in relation to his tactics in cross-examination, it is hard to 
understand why it is right in relation to his choice of defence. "' 
Another criticism is that clause 3 (4) is unsatisfactory in form; it 
requires "the conduct in respect of which the accused is charged" to 
be admitted. It is thought that this may prove a difficult phrase 
to construe. "Both in the body of the Report2 and in the notes3 it 
is equated with an admission of the actus reus. This is very surpri- 
sing, since a defence that an act was accidental or involuntary, or 
that it was done with at least some lawful justifications or excuses, 
is generally regarded as a denial of an actus reus4. It is vital to 
grasp just what it is that the accused must admit before his. record 
can be used against him. Despite the reference to actus reus by way 
1) 36 M. L. R. at P. 61 2) Paras. 92,94 and 95 3) At P. 215 in the 
Commentary on Clause 3 4) See Williams, Criminal Laws The General 
Part (1961) pp. 12 and 20 
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of- explanation it seems that 'conduct' does not necessarily include 
any mental element since accident and voluntariness figure among the 
purposes which may be proved by evidence of the accused's record. It 
may be noted, however, that in many cases where the defence is that 
the act was involuntary, 1 the accused will not be in a position to 
admit the conduct-since his claim is that he did not know what he was 
doing. To cater for such cases it would be necessary to bring the 
provision into operation not only when the conduct was admitted, but 
also when it was not denied. " 
Whatever the merits or demerits of the criticisms against the 
formulation of claue 3 (4) it seems clear that it is unlikely that 
the suggested changes it hopes to make to the law will prove to be 
acceptable. And it is interesting to note that one of the aims of 
the Committee was to reduce "the gap between the amount of relevant 
evidence which could be given and the amount which is in fact given"; 
but it is thought that the provision of clause 3 (4) not only fails 
to further that aim, but positively detracts from it, and so should 
in principle form *no part of the reformed modern law of evidence. 
Clause 3 (5) provides, for the reception, in a clause 3 (4) case, 
of the conviction of the kind of offence with which the accused is 
charged, whether or not any further evidence of the other conduct is 
given. The pertinent question here is whether the adoption of clause 
3 (5) would appreciably-increase the risk of convicting the innocent. 
And to that question Cross says that2 "(i)t is hard to believe that 
1) e. g. Rv Mortimer (1936) 25 Cr. App. R. 150 2) (1973) Crim. L. R. 
at P. 402 
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the subclause would have the dreaded effect in cases in which further 
evidence of the other conduct is given, just as it is hard to be- 
lieve, that the proof of previous convictions under clause 3 (3) 
would have this effect in cases in which the other conduct is proved 
under clause 3 (2) because it is of particular relevance. " 
Cross then asks about the case in which a bare conviction is proved 
under clause 3 (5). And-in answer to that he draws attention to an 
illustration given by Lord Stow Hilly. "A., who has previous con- 
victions for theft, goes to a football match where he sits beside B 
" who leaves his wallet on the seat. A. takes the wallet up and walks 
away with it intending to hand it into the police station but, before 
he gets that far, he is arrested and charged with theft of the 
wallet. If it-appears at the trial that A handed the wallet over 
without further ado when questioned by the police, and stated that it 
had always been his intention to do so, it is difficult to believe 
that he would not be acquitted, notwithstanding the proof of his 
previous convictions which might in fact arouse the sympathy of the 
jury for a thief turned honest and nonetheless badgered by the 
police. It is of course possible to ring the changes on what might 
occur at the trial; -but A's chances of an acquittal would surely, 
other things being equal, always be as good as, if not better than, 
those of a white man who advances a true plea of self defence to a 
charge of assaulting a coloured man but has shown that he is the kind 
of man who would commit the kind of assault without justification by 
repeated encomia of racist violence. " 
1) 388 H. L. Deb. col. 1662 
- 1028 - 
Cross confesses to "have been indulging in guesswork about the 
reactions of jurors to proof of previous convictions, just as those 
who object to clause 3 (5) on the ground that it would appreciably 
increase the risk of convicting an innocent man are indulging in 
guesswork. "1 
Tapper expressed surprise2 at the fact that the Committee made the 
recommendations embodied in clause 3-without referring to such 
empirial evidence as is available He said: "Had they done so they 
would have found some support for the hypothesis that disclosure of 
the accused's previous record contributes significantly to his chance 
of conviction". And to that criticism Cross asks 
3: "But would they 
have been any wiser with regard to the crucial 'question whether the 
disclosure of the record increases the risk of the conviction of an 
innocent man? " He however acknowleged that it is a sad truth, known 
to everyone, that a person's chance of being reconvicted for an 
offence increases with each conviction of that offence, and the 
natural assumption is that this is because he committed each of the 
offences for which he has been convicted. Cross points out4 that it 
is highly significant that in'the case of one of the studies men- 
tioned by the critics5 there is no indication that the record was 
disclosed to the "jurors" who convicted 81 per cent of the defendants 
in the sample with previous convictions, just as it is most reassu- 
ring to learn from Professor Cornish6 that his "jurors" tended to 
discount the effect of dissimilar convictions and to take account of 
1) (1973) Crim. L. R. 403 2) 36 M. L. R. 56 3) (1973) Crim. L. R. 
403 4) Ibid 5) McCabeand Purves, The Jury at Work 6) Unpublished 
Research 
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a judicial direction to disregard similar convictions. "But what has 
all this to do with the merits of clause 3 (5)? " In the view of 
Cross the truth of the matter is that the critics have completely 
failed to appreciate the enormous difficulties which research into 
the effects of the 
rules 
of evidence must encounter, and then to them 
he recommends the words of Professor Cornish: "Over a matter as 
complex as the functions of juries, it will be long before we can 
base reform upon anything firmer than the impressions of those who 
work in and observe the trial process; and discussions about reform 
cannot be defered indefinitely. "1 
The existing law with regard to character evidence also deserves 
some evaluation with an aim to making suggestions for reforms. 
Occasionally, the character of a person is a material issue in the 
case, an operative fact which dictates the rights and liabilities. 
Examples of such cases when character is a defence or justification, 
an element of the crime charged or cause of action alleged, or in 
which it is relevant to the appropraite punishment or measure of 
damages are: cases involving the lack of fitness or incompetency of 
an employee, actions for defamation in which justification is 
pleaded; cases in which reputation is material with respect to the 
measure of damages. When character is directly relevant to a fact in 
issue and not just circumstantial evidence from which conduct might 
be inferred, or when the substantive law makes character the very 
core of the inquiry, evidence of it must be admitted. It is 
therefore hoped that any proposed legislation would begin. with a 
1) Ibid 
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broad rule of admissibility and liberal stance respecting the manner 
of proof. Furthermore, I would recommend as part of any such broad 
rule that the trial judge should have the power to exercise a 
discretion to exclude in particular case when the probative value of 
the type of evidence sought to be used is outweighed by any of the 
dangers generally anticipated. That is, evidence relevant to the 
character of any person should be excluded, if, in the opinion of the 
judge or other person presiding at the trial or other proceeding its 
probative value is substantially less than the likelihood of: crea- 
ting unfair prejudice to any party in the proceeding, or confusing 
the issue to be decided, or misleading the jury or other person or 
persons whose duty it is to determine the facts; or unduly delaying 
the proceeding. Such judicial discretion should be part of any 
proposed provision with regards to general rules respecting charac- 
ter. It goes without saying however that the dispensation of discre- 
tion has its drawbacks, as it is not subject to review and could 
become an arbitrary thing, but since Judges are generally men of 
trained minds and have in many instance had to exercise their discre- 
tion, I have no doubt that it would pose no difficulty in this case. 
In civil cases, the law at present is that character evidence 
cannot be used as circumstantial evidence in a civil case to prove 
the conduct of the parties. It is evidently agreed that character 
evidence is of such slight probative value that it ought to be 
excluded in civil cases especially when weighed against the 
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possibility of prejudice, consumption of time, distraction from the 
main issue and the hazard of surprise. In those civil cases, 
however, when a party is charged with criminal, immoral or fraudulent 
conduct, for example in actions for assualt or seduction, or in 
actions for intentional conversion or for fraud or deceit, the 
defendant may have his reputation and property at stake as much as in 
a criminal case involving the same matter. The imputations and even 
sanctions may be the same. I would recommend that any future 
legislation should give the trial judge a discretion to admit such 
evidence in civil cases and allow him to balance on the facts of each 
individual case, the probative worth against the dangers enumerated 
above. It is also recommended that such legislation prescribes that 
the same rules with respect to character evidence in criminal cases 
be applicable to civil actions which involve an allegation of moral 
turpitude. 
Another aspect of the character evidence I would like to attend to 
is the controversy over the Common law rule that the prosecution is 
not allowed to open his evidence of the accused's bad character, but 
the accused may adduce evidence of his good character or elicit it in 
cross-examination, and the prosecution may adduce or elicit evidence 
of bad character in rebuttal. It has been suggested that the Common 
law rule should be altered so as to allow the prosecution to open 
with evidence of the accused's bad character, or at least proof of 
his previous convictions, or that the accused's previous convictions 
should be made known to the jury by the Judge. Suggestions of this 
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nature derive much of their force from the commonly held view that 
the modern jury knows that, when an accused does not give evidence of 
good character, he has a bad one, and their speculations may be more 
prejudicial to the accused than knowledge of the truth. There is no 
means of verifying that view however, and one therefore prefers to 
act on the assumption underlying this branch of the law of evidence, 
namely, that, although the accused's bad character is relevant to his 
guilt, its disclosure, when the issue is not raised by the accused, 
would be too prejudicial to an accused with a record. And it should 
be made clear that existing rules forbidding the prosecution to 
adduce evidence of the accused's bad character as part of its 
presentation in chief, are based not on any concern for relevance but 
rather on the fact that the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused 
outweighs the probative value. A trier of fact might convict merely 
because the defendant is seen to be a person capable of committing a 
crime or because he is viewed as a bad man deserving of punishment. 
Also, the trier of fact, having heard evidence of the bad character 
of the accused, might be less critical in assessing the evidence of 
the accused's guilt of the specific offence charged, perhaps feeling 
that the consequences of a mistake would not be too serious. There- 
fore, to ensure a rational decision on the merits of each particular 
case, and to ensure that any person regardless of his past can re- 
ceive a fair hearing, one is bound to signify backing for the conti- 
nuation of the existing rule that forbids character evidence that is 
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tendered solely as circumstantial evidence to prove conduct. 
However, the rationale underlying the rule that forbids the 
prosecution to initiate evidence of the accused's character, that 
such evidence might unfairly prejudice the accused, obviously does 
not apply when the accused himself seeks to introduce evidence of a 
trait of his character that would render it unlikely that he 
committed the crime. Having questioned the probative worth of 
character evidence and the techniques of its proof I am persuaded 
that an accused in a criminal trial, with his liberty at stake, is 
entitled to the special dispensation from the general rule that the 
common law has bestowed. No matter how indefinite character evidence 
may be as a basis for the prediction of conduct, it may, in some 
cases, be enough to raise in the mind of a reasonable person a 
reasonable doubt on accused's guilt. I would however recommend an 
exception, which makes it clear that the accused is not entitled to 
prove his good character at large but may prove only a trait of his 
character which is relevant to the crime charged; the reason for such 
a confinement is to save the court's time and minimise distraction of 
issues. Furthermore it is the reasonable course to take from the 
point of view of probativeness. If the accused leads evidence of a 
trait of his character to prove that he did not commit the crime 
charged, under the existing law the prosecution is entitled to res- 
pond with contrary evidence of the defendant's character. This 
right should be part of any proposed legislation. This will prevent 
1 
the accused from misleading the trier of fact by presenting a mere 
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parade of partisans, or by giving false testimony as to his own good 
character. However I would also recommend here a change to the 
existing law by limiting the prosecution's character evidence to 
evidence of a trait which is relevant to the crime charged, though 
not necessarily the trait with respect to which the defendant has 
chosen to lead character evidence. This recommendation is obviously 
good for the court in terms of expediency. 
Note X in Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence 
l, 
expresses 
doubts about the statement Archbold2, adapted in Rv Redd3, according 
to which the accused's previous convictions may be proved in rebuttal 
of evidence of good character. 
It is my view that previous convictions should be admissible in 
rebuttal; but it is essential to get rid of the effect of the 
decisicn in Rv Winfield4, according to which the accused's character 
is indivisible with the result that a witness called to speak to the 
chastity of someone charged with an indecent assualt upon a woman may" 
be questioned about the accused's previous convictions for larceny. 
In my opinion such a reasoning is contrary to common sense and most 
unfair to the accused. In most cases such evidence lack any proba- 
tive value and worse still it carries with it a high risk of preju- 
dice. 
There is sufficient authority that at common law the defence must 
confine itself to evidence of good character relevant to the offence 
charged. Lord Cockburn C. J. in Rv Rowton5, says that the the 
1) 12th edition 2) 40th ed. Para. 558 3) (1923) I K. B. 104 
4) (1939) 27 Cr. App. R. 139 5) 11 L. T. 745,747 
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prosecution in rebuttal should be similarly confined. He is really 
dealing with the rule that character evidence must be limited to 
general reputation, but the same considerations operate here, in fact 
in Slate v Bloom 
l, 
Warden J., gives the need to limit the prosecution 
to the specific trial as the reason for the rule forbidding the 
defence to go beyond it. It must be remembered though that the 
decision of Rv Winfield is only a dictum, as Winfield's conviction 
was quashed on another ground. The case unfortunately escaped a 
contemporary note in the journals and has passed without comment into 
the textbooks2, except for a recent criticism by Nokes; he observes3: 
"If a man is charged with forgery, cross-exmination as to his convic- 
tions for cruelty can have no purpose, but prejudice". This criti- 
cism, without doubt, goes to the root of the matter; prejudice is 
the ground of exclusion. Old rules for the exclusion of particular 
facts from character evidence rest mainly on absence and confusion of 
issues, but these considerations do not apply in the case of previous 
convictions4. In determining whether a previous conviction relates 
to a relevant trait, the application of the rules should not be too 
finical, and it is thought that some United States authorities err in 
this respect. For instance, in Comm. v Colandro5, on a charge of 
murder, it was remarked that questions about a previous kidnapping 
would have been excluded if objected to, and in People v Haydon6, 
also a case of murder, evidence as to robbery was held to be inadmis- 
7 
sible ". It is submitted that evidence as to these previous crimes 
should have been admissible to rebut the evidence of good character 
1) 68 Ind. 54,57 2) Stone, 58 L. Q. R. at 372, treats it as a case 
under the Act of 1898; also Simon L. C. in (1944) A. C. at p. 329 3) 
Introduction to Evidence at p. 113 4) Wigmore, Evidence, Vol III9 
538, §980 5) (1911) 80 Atl 571,575. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
6) 123 Pac. 1102,1112 - District Court of Appeals, California 
7) 123 Pac. 1102,1112 
that had been offered, as in each case a crime of violence was in 
question. On the other hand, the court should not be too astute to 
admit such evidence. I agree with the submission that a golden mean 
can without difficulty be found if the aim of the court is to exclude 
evidence which is merely prejudicial, and it is submitted that the 
evidence of previous convictions admitted in Rv Winfield was certai- 
nly prejudicial to a fair trial. And it should be pointed out that 
if the above suggestion is to be adöpted in Canada, Section 593 of 
the Canadian Criminal Code, which permits proof of any criminal 
convictions should the defendant adduce evidence of good character, 
would need to be repealed. 
McCormick has said : "One who has read the description of the 
present practice of impeachment and support, will have marvelled at 
the archaic and seemingly arbitrary character of many of the rules. 
He will also have observed with regret the laggard pace of the law in 
taking advantage of the techniques and knowledge which are afforded 
by modern science of psychology in appraising the (problems). Two 
principal retarding influences are apparent, namely an undue distrust 
by the judges of the capacity of jurors, and an over-emphasis upon 
the adversary or contentious aspect of our trial tradition. " 
That statement is probably more true in respect to the character of 
third parties or the victims, than any other part of character 
evidence. 
By the present law, the character of the victim, good or bad, is 
1) McCormick Evidence, §50 
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generally not receivable as circumstantial evidence of the victim's 
conduct on the occasion in question. The only exception exists in 
cases involving sex offences. For example, in a rape case the 
victim's reputation as a prostitute may be received as evidence 
tending to establish that she had consented to the intercourse com- 
plained of and character evidence in rebuttal is similarly admissib- 
le. Indeed, in some cases the woman's reputation, not her consent, 
becomes the central issue. Besides questioning the probative worth 
and the prejudicial effect of such evidence, one is deeply concerned 
with the effects of existing abuses of this type of evidence. Since 
the complainant may suffer unfair embarrasment and great harm, rape 
victims are often reluctant to press charges, and also women of bad 
character are provided with little protection against rape. In cases 
involving sex offences, the accused should not be permitted to adduce 
evidence of bad 
character 
of the victim either in cross-examination 
or in its case in chief. In my view, the present state of the law is 
enormously unfair to the rape victim, and many cases go unreported as 
a result of the intimidating cross-examinations which in many cases 
are found not only lacking in probative worth but are also highly 
prejudicial. 
However, the above-noted concerns are not considered to be as 
overpowering in the trial of other crimes. Evidence of the 
character of the victim should therefore be receivable, when relevant 
to the crime charged or defence raised, even though such character 
was unknown to the accused at the time of the incident. For example, 
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in a prosecution for homicide or assualt, the victim's character with 
respect to violence may be of considerable probative value to show 
that he was the aggressor. Safeguards surrounding the accused's 
decision to lead. this type of evidence should be provided by allowing 
the prosecutor both to rebut the evidence so led and to lead evidence 
exhibiting a relevant trait of the accused's character; the latter 
ability is deemed necessary lest the trier of fact be misled, and 
prejudiced; for example, in determining who was more likely to have 
been the aggressor in an. altercation, the trier of fact should be 
able to take into account character for violence of both the accused 
and the victim - the probative worth of such evidence is undeniable. 
Furthermore I would like to recommend here that the prosecution 
should always be allowed to lead relevant evidence of the victim's 
good character even though the defendant has not directly adduced 
evidence of the victim's bad character. For example, in a case of 
homicide in which the accused alleges self-defence but does not lead 
evidence of the victim's propensity for aggressiveness, the prosecu- 
tion would nevertheless be permitted to lead evidence of the victim's 
character for peaceableness. The danger in this suggestion of course 
resides in possible prejudice to an accused, for the trier of fact 
may be unduly influenced by the attractiveness of the victim and 
decide the case emotionally out of feelings of pity or vengenance. 
It is however, best to leave the decision to exclude this evidence to 
the discretion of the trial judge who would weigh the probative value 
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against the possibility of undue prejudice in the particular case. 
I would now turn my attention to the provisions of the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1898; there have been a lot of diatribes with regard to 
Section 1 (f) of the Act1, and one can confidently say that the 
subsection as construed by the Court is too favourable to the accused 
at some points and too unfavourable to him at other points. Since a 
thorough study of the provisions of Section 1 (f) had already been 
made earlier in the thesis, I intend to consider only those aspects 
of the Act that are due for reform. And it is interesting to note in 
this respect with regard to the cross-examination of the accused 
under the Act, that the Criminal Law Revision Committee has made some 
recommendations which border on a compromise. The relevant 
provisions are set out in clauses 6,7 and 15 of the draft Bill 
annexed to the Eleventh (11th) Report. The word "character" is 
abandoned in favour of "reputation", "disposition" and, where 
appropriate "credibility". 
One general point should be made before referring to the case law 
with which the majority of the recommendations are primarily 
concerned. A provision similar to Section 1 (e) of the Criminal 
Evidence Act of 1898 is recommended by the Criminal Law Revision 
committee when dealing with the privilege against self- 
incrimination; under the recommendation, the accused cannot refuse to 
answer a question or produce a document or thing on the ground that 
to do so would tend to prove him guilty of the offence charged, but 
it proceeded to recommend a provision to which there is no 
1) See 5.159 (d) of the Nigeria Evidence Act; S1(f) of the 1924 
Criminal (Justice) Evidence Act - Ireland3SS. 141(f) and 346 
(f) of 
the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1975 
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counterpart in the of Act 1898. The proposal is that the accused 
cannot refuse to answer a question relevant to an issue on the ground 
that it would criminate him or his spouse as to other offences, 
although he may refuse to answer questions on this ground if they 
only go to his credibility. To take two hypothetical cases on which 
the Committee considers the law to be unclear, A., charged with 
shoplifting, swears-in-chief that he was not in the shop in question 
at the material time; he is asked in cross-examination where he was 
and objects to answering the question because his answer would tend 
to show that he was shoplifting in another shop. B., charged with 
theft, casts imputations on a witness for the prosecution and objects 
to answering a question in cross-examination as to whether he has 
made false tax returns. 
With regard to the first case, it is perhaps arguable that the 
present English law is perfectly clear although' surprisingly enough, 
there seems to be no authority. It could be said that the accused 
can rely on the privilege because there is nothing in the 1898 Act to 
deprive him of it and, if it were the case that, by opting to testi- 
fy, the accused impliedly waives his privilege against self-incrimi- 
nation, proviso (e) to Section 1 would be unnecessary. However, the 
preponderance of American authority appears to support the view that 
there is such an implied waiver, and whether or not it represents the 
present English law, R. 25 (g) of the United States Uniform Rules of 
1953 produces a result similar to that recommended by the Criminal 
1) See 11th Report of the C. L. R. C. §§ 169-72 
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Law Revision Committee: "(a) defendant in a criminal action who 
voluntarily testifies in the action upon the merits before the trier 
of fact does not have the privilege (i. e. the privilege against self 
incrimination) to refuse to disclose any matter relevant to any issue 
in the action ... " 
Similarly, there is no authority with regard to the second 
hypothetical situation. So far as the present law is concerned the 
question would be whether the structure of Section 1 (f) is apt to 
abrogate the privilege against self-incrimination with regard to 
offences other than that charged. As questions tending to show that 
the accused has committed such other offences are permitted, the 
answer given by the present law might be thought to be a clear 
affirmative. But there are those who would approve a change in the 
law on the lines of the above extract from the Uniform Rules of 
America. 
The decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rv Cokarl, shows 
that, when Section 1 (f) (ii) or Section 1 (f) (iii) is inapplicable, 
the accused cannot be asked about a previous charge resulting in an 
acquittal, even though the question is relevant to an issue in the 
case other than the accused's credit as a witness. I think, this is 
too favourable to the accused. In that case, the accused's defence 
at his trial for breaking and entering with intent to steal was that 
he had entered the house in question for the sake of warmth and in 
order to have a sleep. In the course of his cross-examination, he 
denied that he knew it was no offence to enter a house in order to go 
1) (1960) 2 Q. B. 207 
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to sleep, and the trial judge allowed counsel for the prosecution to 
put questions concerning a previous charge of breaking and entering 
which had resulted in an acquittal. It was probable that the accused 
had learned, in connection with that charge that it is not an offence 
to enter a house in order to go to sleep. He was convicted, and his 
conviction was quashed by the Court of Criminal Appeal on the ground 
that the question concerning the previous charge had been wrongly 
admitted. Section 1 (f) (ii) and (iii) did not apply to the case 
because Cokar had neither put his character in issue, nor cast impu- 
tations nor given evidence against a co-accused. 
I would recommend that such a question should be made admissible 
under any new proposal as it is of high probative value. For 
1 
example, if, as in Rv Deighton and Thornton, a man having 
successfully set up a defence of not knowing the difference between 
zircons and diamonds in a previous case, is again indicted for the 
same false pretence, and attempts to set up the same defence, then 
questions about his previous acquittal will be admissible. 
The effect of the speeches of the majority of the House of Lords in 
Jones v D. P. P. 
2, is that, in cases in which S. 1 (f) (ii) and S. 1 
(f) (iii) do not apply, the accused can not be asked questions 
tending to show that he is of bad character, unless the facts which 
those questions tend to reveal have already been disclosed in the 
course of the prosecution's case or the accused's evidence in chief. 
This will lead to results so manifestly absurd that they cannot have 
1) (1964) Crim. L. R. 208 2) (1962) A. C. 635 
been intended by Parliament. For example, an accused who surprised 
the prosecution by alleging for the first time in his evidence that 
he was with his wife on a particular occasion cannot be asked in 
cross-examination whether he was not with his mistress. Similarly, 
an accused who sets up an alibi for Tuesday by producing a passport 
which shows that he was in France from Sunday to Friday cannot be 
asked whether he was in an English prison on Thursday. Without 
question this is too favourable to the accused: and the effects of 
the majority view in Jones's case can be obviated by a provision that 
says that the accused may be cross-examined where such question is 
relevant to an'issue in the case other than the accused general 
credit as a witness. This proposal accords, with the opinion of the 
minority of the House of Lords in Jones, and of the High Court of 
Australia when considering an identical statutory provision in 
Attwood vR. While the opinions to the contrary of the majority of 
the House of Lords in Jones are technically obiter dicta, one feels 
that inferior courts would certainly follow them and that the matter 
must now be dealt with by legislation. 
It does appear that three views may be taken with regard to the 
second part of Section 1 (f) (ii) which deals with imputations on the 
character of the prosecutor or his witnesses. First, it may very 
plausibly be argued that the practical effect of the present law is 
satisfactory. One understands the present law to be that, although 
the earlier authorities are in conflict, the prosecutor is legally 
entitled to cross-examine the accused once there has been an imputa- 
1) (1960) Argus L. R. 321 
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tion, even though that imputation was necessary for the proper deve- 
lopment of such a defence as self-defence. But the Court has a 
discretion to disallow cross-examination under S. 1 (f) (ii) and that 
discretion will invariably be exercised in favour of the accused when 
consent is put forward as an answer to rape, and will usually be 
exercised in favour of the accused when the imputation is a necessary 
part of the defence. I think that the defect of the present law is 
its uncertainty. Counsel for an accused may occasionally be restric- 
ted in the proper development of such defence as provocation by fear 
that his client may be held to have thrown his shield away2. Al- 
though the point is admittedly debatable, it is my opinion that an 
accused with a record may be unduly inhibited in challenging a confe- 
ssion which has been proved against him, or alleging that evidence 
has been planted on him. 
Also it has been suggested that the second part of S. 1 (f) (ii) 
should be repealed altogether. To my mind the drawback of this 
proposal is that it would allow an accused with a bad record too 
great a liberty in attacking the credit of the prosecution witnesses. 
Finally, it may be possible to find a form of words which will only 
render the accused liable to cross-examination where the attack on 
the prosecution witnesses is aimed solely at their credit. If this 
suggestion were adopted, an accused who attacked the prosecution 
witnesses in furtherance of pleas of self-defence or provocation, or 
in the course of challenging confession, would not be liable to 
1) Rv Cook (1959) 2 Q. B. 340; Rv Flynn (1961)'3 All E. R. 58 
2) See Rv Brown (1960) 44 Cr. App. R. 181 and Rv Cunningham (1959) 
1 Q. B. 288 
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cross-examination on his own record. in other words imputations 
necessary for the proper development of the defence could be made 
without running the risk of cross-examination on his past misdeeds. 
I am in favour of such a change in the law and that is the view taken 
by members of the Criminal Law Revision Committee. If the recommen- 
dation were accepted Selvey v D. P. P 
1 
would be overruled, and a 
number of other decisions will suffer the same fate2. It should be 
pointed out that the recommendation by the Criminal Law Revision 
Committee was a majority one for some of its members favoured the 
retention of the existing law, while others favoured a provision more 
adverse to the accused, namely that he should, subject to the discre- 
tion of the judge, be liable to cross-examination to credit like any 
other witness without regard to the nature of his defence, and yet 
other members of the Committee favoured a provision according to 
which the accused should only lose his shield if he sets up his good 
character or gives evidence against the co-accused. As Cross pointed 
out: 
3: "There are precedents for and against every solution of this 
thorny problem which has so far been proposed. The accused is 
treated like an ordinary witness in Canada, where the judge must, if 
he does not exercise his discretion against the cross-examination of 
the accused on his record, instruct the jury not to regard the cross- 
The solution pro- examination as relevant to the accused's guilt 
4 
posed by the majority of the Commitee is that of the American Model 
Code and Uniform Rules, as well as of the Ghana Criminal Procedure 
Code ; while the Isreali Criminal Procedure Law 
6' 
only allows an 
1) (1970) A. C. 304 2) See Rv Hudson (1912) @ K. B. 464; Rv Clark 
(1955) 2 Q. B. 469; Rv Cook (1959) 2 Q. B. 340 3) Evidence, 5th ed at 
p. 438 4) Colpitts vR (1966) 52 DLR (2d) 416 5) Model Code, r. 106 
(3) Uniform Rules, r. 21, and Ghana Criminal Procedure Code, 1960, S. 120 
(5) (c) 6) 5725 of 1965, S. 146 
accused who testifies to be cross-examined about his previous convic- 
tions if he gives or adduce evidence of character. The main argument 
in favour of the present English law is that it prevents an accused 
who testifies, for example, to the effect that he was recovering 
stolen property from the prosecutor and not robbing him, from masque- 
rading as a consistently law abiding citizen when he has a number of 
previous convictions', but it may nevertheless inhibit the develop- 
ment of a genuine defence. " The proposal of the majority of the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee would lessen this danger, but it 
would still make it possible for Crown witnesses with numerous pre- 
vious convictions to go free from cross-examination on the subject 
simply on account of the fact, quite irrelevant to their credibility, 
that the accused also has previous convictions. The Isreali Law thus 
has much to commend it, but it is doubtful whether any change in the 
present. law going further than the proposal of the majority of the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee would be acceptable to the bulk of 
English practitioners. " 
Having completed the discussion of the main contents, I would like 
to discuss some particular issues. 
I shall start by alluding to the question of "Codification". It is 
interesting to note that while the United Kingdom Parliament has been 
instrumental in formulating Evidence Codes for her colonies, she' 
never did have one for the United Kingdom jurisdictions. It is also 
interesting that countries which never had one before have either now 
1) See, for example, Rv Sargvon (1967) 51 Cr. App. R. 394 
got one' or are in the process of getting one2, so it is quite likely 
that there is a strong case for codification afterall. Quite recen- 
tly the view has been expressed by Professor D. M, Walker3, that the 
law of evidence "could, and should be codified, and codified in the 
continental style by the enactment of general principles, not dealt 
with in the usual British way by enactment of enormously detailed and 
verbose provisions. " And earlier in Scotland, when the Draft code 
was proposed, it seemed to the Scottish Law Commission "that for many 
reasons the law of evidence was the branch not only the most easily 
susceptible of codification, but was also that in which a code would 
be of the highest practical value"4. At any rate, the matter is 
outwith the purview of this thesis and as such I wish to express no 
particular opinion, except that this is a matter that deserves some 
thorough consideration. 
The other matter I would like to consider now is one to which I 
made some allusion at the beginning of this thesis, which is with 
regards to the rules of similar facts and character evidence with 
special reference to non-jury trials. 
Nigeria, for example, as earlier pointed out, operates by and large 
on a non-jury trial system. However, as we have seen throughout the 
discussion, the Nigerian law on this subject generally coincides with 
English common law. No serious attempt has been made in the local 
case law to depart from the English rules and reliance on English 
precedents is accepted as a matter of course. It has been argued 
that this automatic absorption of a set of hard and fast technical 
1) See the American Model Code; See also American Federal Rules of 
Evidence 2) See Draft Bill annexed to the Ilth Report - Criminal Law 
Reision Ccm tVtee; 3) "The Work of the Scottish Law Commission, 1972- 
73 (1974) S. L. T. (News) 149 4) Draft Code, Introduction, P. 1 
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rules is regrettable largely because it is arctued, that the rules of 
exclusion is not suited to the Nigerian system and other non-jury 
systems for that matter. The rules close relationship to the jury 
system and the desire to withhold doubtful evidence from the jurors 
do not obtain in Nigeria, where a professional judge alone sits in 
-trial - which is the general practice in all non-jury systems. And 
this is how the situation was described: "(A)fter we have thus 
prepared the judge and trained him, after he has been selected and 
found worthy of his office, we do not trust him, his education, or 
his ability to draw distinctions. Instead we make him close his eyes 
and forbid him to listen lest he see and lest he hear unscreened and 
unreliable evidence and possibly use it as the basis for the 
judgement. It is like having a driver successfully pass all his 
driver's and mechanic's test, but in the end, out of fear of a 
traffic accident, giving him a horse to pull his car and forbidding 
him to use his motor. "' 
The general argument is that the judge is neither inept nor care- 
less to such a degree that he needs protection; and if he is either, 
such a protection will hardly be of any help. 
2 It is further argued 
that in any case , modern mass media will often bring the defendant's 
past to public notice wherever public interest is aroused and 
notwithstanding sub judice restrictions, and the point then is that, 
is it realistic to assume that such information will not reach the 
judge?, and if so, is it any more reliable than evidence introduced 
1) See the introduction to the Isreall Evidence Bill, P. II 
2) See Morgan, Forward to the American Model Code, P. 8 
by a litigant and subject to examination? In fairness it is true to 
say that this factor is of much greater significance in the United 
States, and one may say that it is this perhaps which has influenced 
the liberalisation of the rule in that country, as the media there is 
so influential. 
The other side of the coin may be even more important. A basic 
feature of the jury system is the rule that the judge determines the 
questions of admissibility while the jury makes the findings of fact. 
if therefore it is proper, to prevent any doubtful material reaching 
the triers of facts, at least such contact is prevented by the exclu- 
sionary rule. But in a non-jury system, evidence is proposed to the 
judge himself. If the opponent objects, an incidental issue is 
raised, to decide which the judge may have to examine the evidence, 
and he may reject it, in case it may prejudice him; but it has been 
strongly argued that once the judge has been "contaminated" by the 
improper evidence, it is simply ostrich policy to ignore the harm 
that has already been done, and excluding the evidence altogether 
would prevent its being properly weighted -probative ly. It is worth 
pointing out that even where there is no need to examine the evidence 
itself, or where it is on the face of it admissible and immediately 
rejected, it goes without saying that the very fact of objecting may 
be tactically harmful. It should be realised however, that the main 
risk in admitting similar facts and character evidence is undoubtedly 
the prejudicial impact and this at least is closely connected with 
the jury system. But one must bear in mind that a legal system which 
l) Cf Morgan, Foreward to the Model Code, P. 6 
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allows this kinds of evidence (i. e., similar facts and character 
evidence) is not necessarily primitive and that, afterall, it is done 
in most of the civilized countries. 
1 
A common objection to similar facts and character evidence is that 
the inference therefrom is uncertain, but the same applies to almost 
any evidence, especially circumstantial. Moreover, the objection 
ignores the burden of proof which in civil cases rests on the balance 
of probabilities2 and, in criminal cases, on the mystic formula 
"beyond any reasonable doubt". Nothing less, but also nothing more, 
should, be demanded from, similar facts evidence: is it more 
justifiable to decide a case upon the sole burden of proof -a burden 
which is justified by purely practical reasons, is quite arbitrary 
and can hardly be expected to do justice to the litigants - while 
rejecting evidence of disposition and character, lest that evidence, 
though of undeniable probative merit, cause harm in certain 
situations? 
The objection of possible surprise and unfairness to the litigant, 
compelled to defend his whole past against unexpected attack can be 
met by amending the rules of procedure. The problem is not specific 
to similar facts and character evidence and should find its solution 
in a wider framework Besides , evidence of things that occured in 
the distant past will usually have minor probative value and be 
disregarded on that count. 
Still another objection is that evidence of similar facts may 
1) Stow, "Evidence of Similar Facts" (1922) 38 L. Q. R. 63 2) Cf 
Hart's Sarcastic criticism of the Law of Probability in "From Evidence 
of Proof" (1956) 132-134; L. Tribe "Trial by Mathematics: Precision and 
Ritual in the Legal Process" (1970-71) 84 Harv. L. R. 1329; M Finkel-Stein 
& M. Failrey "The Continuing Debate over Mathematics in the Law of 
Evidence" (1970-71) 84 Harv. L. R. 1810.3) See Illinois Civil Practice 
Act (1933) §43 (4); 
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confuse the issues, complicate the case and unduly delay the 
proceedings. The plain answer is that one who has been present in a 
courtroom will realise that almost any objection to the admission of 
evidence complicates litigation and wastes time, particularly so when 
conflicting authorities are cited (and in Anglo-American practice no 
party will fail to rely on some appropriate authority). 
still no one will deny that the dangers are real; all one is trying 
to do is show that they are not limited to this kind of evidence. 
The best solution, therefore, is not general exclusion, but reliance 
on the judge to reject evidence when the risks involved outweighs its 
probative value. Incidentally, judicial discretion may operate 
either way. It may be used to admit evidence which would otherwise 
be admissible: the fact that a piece of evidence happens to fall 
within or without somewhat arbitrary boundaries of one of the tradi- 
tional exceptions does not conclusively prove or disprove its admis- 
sibility. To sum up, it is thought that the exclusionary rule, 
developed against a different legal background and due in great part 
to the circumstances prevailing elsewhere is unsuitable to the legal 
system of another operating a different system. The absence of jury 
trial it is thought commands that non-jury countries should seek 
their solutions instead of blindly immitating those systems, 
especially where the situations are no more than the result of histo- 
rical accident. And I would like to draw attention to the dictum of 
Jackson J., in Michelson v U. S 
1 
when he said: "We concur in the 
general opinion of courts, textwriters and the profession that much 
1) 335 U. S. 469,69 Supt. Ct. 213 (1948) 
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of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and 
compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset 
by a poorly reasoned counter-priviledge to the other. " 
Having completed the task of the restatement of the existing law 
and made some suggestions towards the reform of some aspects of the 
-law, it is my hope that this thesis has, in Thayer's words, given 
"the Law of evidence a consistency, simplicity, and capacity for 
growth which would make it a far worthier instrument of justice than 
it is. "1 
I would like to end on a philosophical note indicated in a 
periodical far remote from- law and procedure: "Beware of two types of 
persons: of one who says 'The system is old, therefore it is good', 
and of one who says, 'The system is new, therefore it is good. ' A 
system is good only if it solves the problem and promotes the 
subject-matter considered. "2 
1) A Preliminary Treaties On The Common Law at p. 511 
2) (1968) 87 Icarei Yisreal (Isreali Farmers) 
